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PREFACE  
 
This thesis contains references from sources in both English and German. Where 
titles or quotations from German texts are given in English, the translation is my 
own unless otherwise indicated. I have also quoted from existing translations of 
Reinach’s works where it is possible and appropriate to do so. 
 The thesis also contains quotations of passages from the works translated 
in the appendices. These are referenced to the relevant page and paragraph of the 
source text in volume I of Reinach’s Sämtliche Werke (S.W.). These page 
numbers are reproduced in line with the text of the translations in the appendix 
indicated.  
 Some passages quoted from the Sämtliche Werke contain notes inserted 
by the editors. Likewise, some quotations from existing translations contain notes 
inserted by the translator. For clarity, these notes have been left in the original 
square brackets, i.e. [], while my own editorial notes are indicated with braces, 
i.e. {}. Italic text in quotations from appendices (II) and (IV) does not indicate 
emphasis, but instead distinguishes between the transcripts used to reconstruct 
the texts in Sämtliche Werke. The precise meanings of these typefaces and other 
formatting details in the translations can be found in appendix (I). 
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1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Whether there is objective knowledge of values is perhaps the  
most important [question] in the world.1  
 
From the beginning to the end of Adolf Reinach’s philosophical career, the subject of 
ethics was a recurring theme in his thought. Yet, in his lifetime, Reinach never 
published a treatise solely on ethics at all; his published discussions of ethical questions 
all appeared in works primarily relating to the philosophy of law, and his lengthiest 
reflection on ethics formed part of a lecture course that he never prepared for 
publication. This does not mean that Reinach’s writing on ethics was minor or 
unimportant, but, for many years after his death, his works were scattered and 
inaccessible, with some of the most substantial parts surviving only as transcripts 
recorded by Reinach’s students during his lectures. Today, although Reinach’s extant 
comments on ethics exist together in a published form, they are far from the most 
famous part of his body of work and are in fact somewhat overlooked. 
 My thesis is that Reinach made significant contributions in his writings to early 
phenomenological ethics. ‘Early phenomenological ethics’ here refers to a philosophical 
tradition of ethics that prevailed among the realist phenomenologists of the Munich and 
Göttingen circles in the early twentieth century, and one that is still relevant today. In 
the chapters that follow, we will explore the nature of Reinach’s contributions in this 
field. Although Reinach was a pioneer in phenomenological value-theory, a common 
theme in early phenomenological approaches to ethics, his work goes much further, as 
                                               
1 Adolf Reinach, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith (Munich: Philosophia 
Verlag, 1989), vol. 1, p. 505, paragraph 1; translated in Appendix (IV) to this thesis. 
2 
Reinach attempts to address a wide range of problems. In doing so, he identifies three 
separate concepts in ethics: the concept of moral values (sittliche Werte), the concept of 
moral rightness (sittliche Rechtheit) and the concept of goods (Güter). Each of these 
concepts is apportioned its own ethical sphere, and each is capable of accounting for 
questions in ethics that the others cannot. In this way he reconciles non-formal values 
with formal duties, and these in turn with the hierarchical concerns of the good human 
life. He also explores contrasting ethical assessments, the nature of willing and 
motivation, the problem of freedom, and the boundaries between ethics and the 
philosophy of law. We will also show that Reinach’s work had a traceable influence in 
the development of phenomenological ethics by Dietrich von Hildebrand and Edith 
Stein, and that he at least anticipated (if not influenced) some of the ideas put forward 
by the most famous phenomenological ethicist of his lifetime, Max Scheler. 
 Yet, to borrow a distinction used by Reinach, there is a difference between the 
goal of an undertaking, that which one sets out to do, and the purpose for which one 
pursues that goal. While my goal with this thesis is to show Adolf Reinach’s 
contribution to the field of early phenomenological ethics, the purpose of doing so is a 
little broader: to make Reinach’s work on ethics more accessible for future study. It is in 
light of this purpose, as well as in support of our interpretation of the relevant texts, that 
an appendix is included with this thesis containing translations of three pieces of writing 
by Reinach, which —  as we will see in chapter one —  are directly relevant to the 
present investigation. 
 
 
 
 
3 
SECTION ON E  
REINACH’S L IFE  AND LEGACY  
 
 
As far back as our knowledge of his life goes,2 Adolf Reinach was a man of diverse 
interests. The oldest of three siblings,3 he was born in Mainz in 1883, though his name 
is much more closely associated with Munich (where he carried out his undergraduate 
studies) and Göttingen. He belonged to ‘a distinguished Jewish family ranking side by 
side with the patricians of Mainz’;4 his father Wilhelm was a factory owner.5 He first 
came into contact with the world of philosophy through reading the works of Plato at 
grammar school, and developed an immediate attachment to the discipline that was to 
become the focus of his career; but this was no foregone conclusion. In his first year and 
a half at the University of Munich in 1901, ‘he attended courses in a range of subjects, 
including political economy, art history and law’.6 The law, his brother Heinrich’s 
chosen profession, was Reinach’s other great passion, and remained a theme intertwined 
with his philosophy for the rest of his life. He also possessed a strong early interest in 
psychology, which likewise informed his choices of subject matter within philosophy 
and ultimately his move towards phenomenology. 
 Reinach’s philosophical studies began in Munich under Theodor Lipps. He 
joined the Akademische Verein für Psychologie (Academic Society for Psychology), a 
                                               
2 Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, writing in 1987, commented on a general lack of biographical 
work on Reinach: ‘The few existing published biographies of Reinach are, if not unreliable 
(Oesterreicher 1952), then at best very succinct (Avé-Lallemant 1975, 172-74, Crosby 1983, XI-X)’. 
Schuhmann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography’, in Kevin Mulligan, ed., Speech 
Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology (Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1987), p. 1. Schuhmann and Smith later added another introduction to Reinach’s life, in 
German, to the second volume of the S.W. 
3 Reinach’s younger brother Heinrich took up a legal career. He later served as Adolf’s commanding 
officer during the First World War. Their sister, Pauline, entered a Benedictine convent in Belgium in 
1924, wherein she remained until her death in 1977. See, Schuhmann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An 
Intellectual Biography’, p. 2. 
4 John M. Oesterreicher, Walls are Crumbling: Seven Jewish Philosophers Discover Christ (New York: 
Devin-Adair, 1952), p. 101. 
5 Schuhmann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography’, p. 2. 
6 Ibid., p. 3. 
4 
weekly discussion group for Lipps’s students to discuss psychology and philosophy,7 
coming into contact with several other philosophers who would later join the 
phenomenological movement, most notably Johannes Daubert. At this early stage, 
Reinach reached the conclusion that he ‘lack[ed] true sympathy and enthusiasm for the 
subject-matter’ of psychology.8 At this point, it seems that Reinach’s interest in the law 
took precedence over his other pursuits. 
 In 1904, at age 20, Reinach earned his doctorate in philosophy under Lipps.9 By 
the end of that year, he had read Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen twice over. 
Though many found the work difficult to understand, the ideas presented within it 
appear to have struck a chord with Reinach, and the experience convinced him to alter 
his plans for future study.10 The next year, he joined several other Munich philosophers 
in their ‘invasion’ of Göttingen.11 His initial stay was enjoyable but short-lived; though 
he wanted to continue to study under Husserl, with whom he had already founded a 
personal friendship, he felt it necessary to first complete his degree in the law. He 
returned to the University of Munich for two semesters, before moving on to Tübingen 
in the winter of 1906. It was here that he first met Anna Stettenheimer, a physicist from 
Stuttgart studying for her doctorate, who would later become his wife. 
 In 1909, with his legal studies behind him, Reinach completed a philosophical 
work entitled ‘Wesen und Systematik des Urteils’ (‘The Nature and Systematic Theory 
                                               
7 Schuhmann and Smith, Einleitung: Adolf Reinach, S.W., p. 613. 
8 Schuhmann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography’, p. 4. 
9 His doctoral thesis, Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht (On the Concept of Cause in 
the Present Criminal Law), was published posthumously. 
10 Husserl later wrote that ‘Reinach belonged to the very first philosophers who fully understood the 
distinct character of the new phenomenological method’ (Husserl, in ‘Reinach as a Philosophical 
Personality’, ed. by John F. Crosby, Aletheia 3 (1983), p. xi). 
11 Three other students from Munich, including Johannes Daubert, made this move around the same time 
as Reinach; Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Hedwig Conrad-Martius 
followed in later years. (Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical 
Introduction, 3rd edn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 169) 
5 
of Judgement’)12 for a competition in Munich. When the competition was cancelled, 
Reinach began investigating the possibility of submitting it as a habilitation thesis. 
Lipps, however, had become ill and was not able to participate in this process. As a 
result, Reinach returned to Göttingen to attempt habilitation there, submitting ‘Wesen 
und Systematik des Urteils’ as his thesis. His application was accepted and in June of 
that year he completed the additional requirements to be admitted to the position of 
Husserl’s Privatdozent. 
 By 1913, when Edith Stein arrived in Göttingen, Reinach was already well 
established in his new position, being described as ‘Husserl’s right hand’.13 In 1910, 
Max Scheler, who was previously acquainted with Husserl and who believed the two 
shared an ‘intellectual bond’ that was ‘extraordinarily fruitful’,14 began to make 
appearances in Göttingen; ‘he made but little personal contact with Husserl, but all the 
more with his students’.15 He and Reinach, among others, worked side by side at this 
time on Husserl’s Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. 
 In September 1912, Adolf Reinach and Anna Stettenheimer, now a doctor of 
physics, were married. Their life together was, however, to be short. ‘Like almost all 
German intellectuals of the time, Reinach was carried away by the enthusiasm which 
broke out after the declaration of war between Germany and the allied powers’.16 In 
August 1914, mere days after the declaration of war, Reinach volunteered for military 
service and was transferred to France in short order. He was assigned to a reserve 
artillery regiment, in which he served under the immediate command of his younger 
                                               
12 For reasons unknown, plans to publish this work did not go ahead, and it was thought for many years 
to have been lost altogether (Schuhmann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography’, p. 
15). At their time of writing, no surviving copies were known to exist, but a partial text was eventually 
recovered and published in the S.W. 
13 Edith Stein, Life in a Jewish Family, trans. by Josephine Koeppel (Washington DC: ICS Publications, 
1986), p. 247. 
14 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 269. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Schuhmann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography’, p. 29. 
6 
brother Heinrich. He was decorated for his service, receiving the Iron Cross after a 
fierce engagement in 1915. He described the experience of fighting as ‘often terrible’, 
and yet regarded his military service as ‘the proudest time of my life’.17 His experiences 
catalysed the development of his religious views; in 1915, he wrote to Anna and to von 
Hildebrand to tell them about ‘a change to the very roots of [his] being’.18 While at the 
front he wrote his only surviving notes on the philosophy of religion. He also became 
intrigued by the idea of premonitions and the implications that they would hold for 
phenomenology if they could be proven to exist. At the same time, he began to express 
doubts in his correspondence that he would live to see the end of the war.19 
 While Reinach was on leave in 1916, he and Anna were formally baptised into 
the Protestant Church. He returned to the front, and was killed in action on November 
16, 1917, aged 34. He was survived by his wife Anna, his brother Heinrich and his 
sister Pauline.20  
 Although he published very little in his lifetime,21 Reinach’s lasting legacy was 
assured by his role in teaching the students of the Göttingen phenomenological circle. 
Roman Ingarden called him ‘the very heart of our collective efforts, the active spirit 
opening up new aspects and paths of investigation in a creative attitude which never 
rested’.22 Von Hildebrand wrote that ‘from 1910 on, [Reinach] was my only teacher’,23 
praising his influence over and above that of Scheler. In her autobiography, Edith Stein 
recalls, ‘[t]he hours spent in [Reinach’s] beautiful study were the happiest of all my 
time in Göttingen. We [students] were unanimous in the opinion that, when it came to 
                                               
17 Ibid., p. 31. 
18 Oesterreicher, Walls are Crumbling, p. 122. 
19 Schuhmann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography’, p. 30. 
20 Anna Reinach lived on in Germany until 1942, when she was forced to flee the country to avoid being 
arrested by the Nazi regime. She returned to Germany in 1950, where she died in 1953. 
21 A detailed chronology of Reinach’s publications and Nachlass can be found in chapter one. 
22 Ibid., p. 19. 
23 Taken from an introduction written for (but not published in) the compilation of Reinach’s 
Gesammelte Schriften in 1921. Published in ‘Reinach as a Philosophical Personality’, trans. by John F. 
Crosby, Aletheia 3 (1983), p. xx. 
7 
method, we learned more here than anywhere else’.24 Reinach himself found this work 
exhausting, but rewarding.25 In Stein’s words, ‘[a]ll these brilliant achievements were 
the result of unspeakable care and trouble’.26 Spiegelberg concludes that ‘it was 
[Reinach’s] death in action in 1917 rather than Husserl’s going to Freiburg which cut 
short [the promise] of the Göttingen phenomenological circle’.27  
 
SECTION TW O  
ETHICS IN REINACH’S PHILOSOPHY  
 
In chapter one, we will identify the parts of Reinach’s surviving body of works that we 
consider to be dealing with ethics, in order to use them as key primary sources. 
Naturally, this requires us to make a judgement as to what ‘ethics’ means, so that these 
works can be distinguished from the rest of Reinach’s writings. This does not mean that 
Reinach’s works on subjects that we consider not to belong to ethics are irrelevant; they 
provide, rather, important context for our investigation. An understanding of Reinach’s 
phenomenological method, the descriptive investigation of ethics, his theory of 
judgement and the Sachverhalt and his work on social acts are each necessary to 
appreciate Reinach’s work on ethics, but in light of our present focus on ethics we will 
not explore these topics at length. As we review Reinach’s primary works in chapter 
one, we will note key points for later reference in our discussions. 
 Reinach subscribed to a form of early, realist phenomenology inspired (in his 
case) by the philosophies of Theodor Lipps, Johannes Daubert, Alexander Pfänder and 
Edmund Husserl. We will discuss early phenomenology in detail in chapter two, but for 
the purposes of context it is important to note that all of Reinach’s philosophical 
                                               
24 Stein, Life in a Jewish Family, p. 274. 
25 Oesterreicher, Walls are Crumbling, p. 101. 
26 Stein, Life in a Jewish Family, p. 274. 
27 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 192. 
8 
projects, including his ethics, aspire to the description of essences given in experience. 
When Reinach sets out to investigate what he sees as the questions of ethics, he is not 
aiming to produce a concise and self-contained ethical calculus or a set of imperatives; 
his project is to describe the ethical as completely and as faithfully as possible, with 
nothing left out for the sake of neatness.  
 We base our understanding of ethics here broadly on the sense in which Reinach 
also used it, to describe a field within philosophy that is concerned with universal, a 
priori normative questions (‘What ought I to do?’, ‘What ought to be?’), and their 
answers. Even here, though, our language is ambiguous without clarification. The issue 
of translating the original German-language terms of Reinach’s philosophy into English 
only adds to the difficulties we must overcome. 
 Reinach does not draw any kind of clear distinction between the meanings of the 
words ‘ethics’ (Ethik) and ‘morals’ (Sitten), or between ‘ethical’ (ethisch) and ‘moral’ 
(sittlich). He is consistent in referring to the field or exercise of studying ethics and 
morals as ‘ethics,’ and to this field belongs the study of moral values (sittliche Werte). 
Although Reinach also sometimes refers to ethical values (ethische Werte) with 
apparently the exact same meaning as moral values, it would be accurate to express the 
distinction as follows: Reinach is interested in the study of ethics, which is concerned 
with the moral. But what Reinach calls the ‘concept of the moral’,28 moral value, does 
not satisfy all of the questions of ethics. Specifically, it satisfies the question ‘what is 
good?’ but not the question ‘what ought to be?’ This latter question requires a second 
basic concept in ethics, that of moral rightness, to be satisfied. Reinach also refers to a 
third basic concept, that of goods (Güter). We will discuss in detail what these three 
concepts and their respective spheres (Sphären) mean in chapter three; for now it is 
                                               
28 S.W. p. 335, paragraph 3; Appendix (II). 
9 
sufficient to be clear that as far as Reinach is concerned, they are necessary —  and at 
least provisionally sufficient —  to describe the essence of the ethical, the ‘things 
themselves’ of ethics, in the way called for by his phenomenological method. 
 Reinach associates ethics directly with normative statements, with the concept of 
‘ought’ (Sollen). He does not consider psychological egoism and hedonism to be 
compatible with ‘ethics in the customary sense’,29 because those theories consider 
human action to be necessarily governed by selfish or hedonistic desires; they do not 
allow any claims about what ought to be. Ethics, then, is normative by definition. 
 However, concern with the concept of ought is not exclusive to ethics either. 
Legal enactments also take the form ‘ought’ and express norms, prescriptions and 
prohibitions for human action; yet Reinach separates the ethical from the legal as 
distinct areas of investigation.30 Ethics, then, is more specifically concerned with oughts 
that are absolute or universal, deriving from formal moral laws and their relationship to 
non-formal values. Ethical norms are a priori and categorical, while legal norms are a 
posteriori and hypothetical; in other words, ethics is the same for everyone, while each 
positive law is unique and specific to a certain jurisdiction. Finally, the positive law is 
purely formal, while ethics is also concerned with non-formal values that are all that can 
convey the moral good in concrete situations. The positive law recognises goods in the 
sense of Reinach’s third concept of ethics, but without the objectively ranked 
importance that Reinach attributes to them within that ethical sphere. 
 Likewise, Reinach’s work on ethics must be briefly distinguished from his 
theory of the social acts. Although the theory of social acts deals with the concepts of 
promises and obligations, it does so from the point of view of fact, not that of 
normativity. There is certainly a relationship between the essential obligation to fulfil a 
                                               
29 S.W. p. 487, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
30 For example, in ‘Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung’, Reinach considers the 
significance of reflection in ethical and legal contexts under separate headings. 
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promise and the moral obligation to do so, but these obligations are not identical and it 
is crucially important not to conflate them. The social acts as a whole are ‘non-ethical 
categories’,31 and although they have a certain relationship with ethics, they do not 
belong to ethics. We will discuss this relationship further in chapter three. 
 
SECTION THREE  
THE S IGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF ‘C ONTRIBUTION’ 
 
We have emphasised that our goal in this investigation is to identify Reinach’s 
contribution to early phenomenological ethics. In the chapters that follow we will 
discuss what we mean by several of these key terms. Yet the task itself might seem 
strangely specific; why be concerned with Reinach’s ‘contribution’ at all, rather than 
simply with Reinach’s ‘ethics’? 
 The core reason for this is that Reinach did not produce an ethics, not in the 
sense of a complete or systematic theory. It would be misleading to describe what we 
are investigating in those terms. Given Reinach’s body of surviving works, the question 
of what he contributed in the development of a phenomenological ethics is a more 
productive one. But the idea of a contribution also has a particular importance in the 
context of the early phenomenological movement. There was a shared attitude 
characteristic of the Göttingen and Munich phenomenologists towards scholarship and 
the purpose of their work that shifted emphasis away from the achievements of the 
individual. In the words of Herbert Spiegelberg: 
The shortness of his life was not the only reason for the torso of Reinach’s 
philosophy. Like all the other early phenomenologists he firmly believed in 
philosophy as a cooperative scientific enterprise to which each researcher would 
have to contribute patiently and unhurriedly, much in the way as it is the case in 
the sciences. There could be no such thing as a one-man system.32  
                                               
31 Armin Burkhardt, ‘Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in der Rechtsphilosophie 
Adolf Reinachs’, in Mulligan, ed., Speech Act and Sachverhalt, p. 156. 
32 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 192-3. 
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We see this attitude reflected especially in the case of Johannes Daubert, a hugely 
influential figure in the formation of the Munich and Göttingen circles of the 
phenomenologists who yet ‘did not publish a single word during his time with either 
[the Munich or Göttingen] circle,’33 and in the works of Edith Stein, whose work often 
covered gaps in the phenomenological investigations made by her colleagues.34 The 
early phenomenologists were making what they saw as a rigorous, scientific analysis of 
real objects given in phenomena, so the discussions and conclusions of any one member 
of the movement were open to usage —  and correction —  by all others. In such an 
environment, a phenomenologist could focus not on rushing towards the final 
completion of an over-arching theory, but on the careful and complete investigation of 
one problem at a time. 
 This suggests that Reinach’s writings on ethics were not necessarily intended as 
the beginnings of an ethical theory, or even the groundwork or foundation for one. Each 
question Reinach raised and addressed in his works was an addition to the body of 
phenomenological philosophy, a contribution towards the development of a project that 
was bigger than any one thinker. The fact, therefore, that Reinach produced only a 
contribution and not a full ethics is not in any way a mark of failure on his part. 
 
 
                                               
33 Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray, Doorway to the World of Essences: Adolf Reinach (Saarbrücken: Verlag Dr. 
Müller, 2009), pp. 119-120. In a footnote, Jaray gives another explanation for this phenomenon, one 
also applicable to Reinach: 
 ‘The reason Daubert never published a word, why his manuscripts for both Festschrift and Jahrbuch 
were never completed, can be ascertained from letters between Husserl and Daubert. Daubert, like 
Reinach, was a perfectionist where his work was concerned and overly self-critical. Smid calls 
Daubert “phenomenology’s Socrates,” since he stimulated the work of other students, but never 
formulated a corpus of published work himself’. Ibid., p. 120, n. 46. 
34 In editing Husserl’s manuscripts for the second and third volumes of Ideen, Stein saw Husserl 
‘struggle with issues she thought she had resolved, without his being willing to revisit her 
contribution’. Mette Lebech, ‘Why Do We need the Philosophy of Edith Stein?’, in Communio, vol. 
xxxviii, no. 4 (Winter 2011), p. 695. 
12 
SECTION FO U R  
METHODOLOGY  
 
 
The question at hand —  expressed in its simplest form as, ‘What was Adolf Reinach’s 
contribution to early phenomenological ethics?’ —  is not one that can be answered 
simply or briefly. For our conclusions on this question to be comprehensible and 
supportable, we must first consider carefully what the question itself means. We must 
answer the questions that this main question raises in turn: Which of Reinach’s works 
have to do with ethics? What is the context in which we intend to consider his work as a 
contribution? What, in fact, do we mean when we refer to a contribution? These 
questions, in turn, generate questions of their own, and it is around this growing list of 
questions that the course of this investigation can be formed. 
 The answering of these many questions requires a careful reading and 
interpretation of the primary source material that makes up Reinach’s work on ethics. In 
the face of the comparative lack of secondary literature dealing with the present subject, 
the importance of this study of the primary sources is greater still. Detailed 
interpretation of primary texts is also essential to the process of translation, in order to 
faithfully reproduce the sense and meaning of the original German text in English. 
There is, therefore, a reciprocal relationship between the process of translation and the 
process of investigating Reinach’s works on ethics. Critical discussion of Reinach’s 
work in its philosophical context leads to a deeper understanding of his arguments and 
conclusions, which in turn serves the refinement of the translation, allowing the 
translation to support the argument of the thesis. 
 Not every primary source used in this investigation could be translated for this 
purpose, however. First, only those most relevant —  those that deal directly with ethics, 
even if ethics is not the primary subject investigated —  were considered here. Of the 
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texts that met this criterion, one (Reinach’s monograph ‘Die apriorischen Grundlagen 
des bürgerlichen Rechtes’) already exists in an English-language translation, of such 
quality that it would accomplish little to present an alternative translation. This does not 
mean that this source was exempted from the process of interpretation found above; on 
the contrary, comparison of this and other existing translations with the original German 
texts, and the translators’ own notes on terminology and rendering of terms, have all 
been helpful in the interpretation of the other texts and the refinement of their respective 
translations. 
 The process of establishing the context or background for assessing Reinach’s 
contributions to early phenomenological ethics depends upon both textual evidence on 
one hand, and historical and biographical evidence on the other. To draw a connection 
between two texts requires that something of one text be recognisable in the other, but 
as the early phenomenologists were not in the habit of making direct textual references, 
we must often rely on biographical sources and personal correspondence simply to tell 
us which works a particular philosopher had read. Despite their overall lack of 
philosophical content, these sources thus provide important context for our 
investigation. 
 
SECTION F IVE  
STRUCTURE  
 
 
This thesis is presented in four chapters. Together, these chapters lay out the content, 
context, nature and extent of Reinach’s contribution to early phenomenological ethics. 
The chapters are followed by appendices containing translations from Reinach’s work. 
 Chapter one is a review of primary and secondary literature to show where the 
central question of the thesis stands, both in the nature and extent of the relevant 
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primary source material and in the body of existing scholarship. The first section of the 
chapter lays out many of the important sources involved in investigating Reinach’s 
contribution, showing how these particular works fit into the timeline of Reinach’s 
surviving writings. The second and third sections identify secondary sources that are 
important for understanding Reinach’s work and situating it historically, with particular 
attention paid to those that address Reinach’s work on ethics. 
 Chapter two discusses the context of Reinach’s contribution by identifying and 
profiling key figures who influenced the development of Reinach’s ethics, or that of 
early phenomenological ethics generally. This also involves a discussion of where 
‘early phenomenology’ originated and what it is understood to mean. The ideas 
introduced in this chapter are helpful in understanding Reinach’s works on ethics, and 
so have been placed before the discussion of those works. However, the content of this 
chapter is most important for the later assessment of Reinach’s contribution; it serves to 
establish what Reinach was contributing to with his writings. 
 Chapter three presents an in-depth critical discussion of Reinach’s work on 
ethics, showing in detail what is to be found in the primary sources identified in chapter 
one. This chapter lays out the content of Reinach’s contribution to early 
phenomenological ethics, and analyses the positions taken by Reinach in relation to 
ethics. Of particular significance is Reinach’s division of ethics, as noted above, into 
three separate spheres (Sphären),35 correlating to three separate basic concepts in ethics: 
the concept of moral value, the concept of moral rightness, and the concept of goods. 
 Finally, chapter four explores the key issue of contribution by discussing three 
main themes: the originality of Reinach’s work on ethics, the distinctness of his work 
from that of his key contemporaries, and his demonstrable influence on other members 
                                               
35 S.W. p. 492, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
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of the phenomenological movement in their discussions of ethics. This chapter draws on 
the conclusions of all of the previous chapters in order to establish the ways in which 
Reinach’s work on ethics can be considered a contribution, both within its specific 
context and generally. 
 Appendix (I) consists of a preface to the translations in the other appendices, 
including a glossary of key translated terms. The remaining three appendices each 
consist of a translated text by Reinach: ‘Grundbegriffe der Ethik’ (1906) in appendix 
(II), ‘Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung’ (1912/13) in appendix 
(III), and an extract from Reinach’s ‘Einleitung in die Philosophie’ lecture course 
(1913), entitled ‘Grundzüge der Ethik’, in appendix (IV). Each text is presented with the 
original German text and the English translation in parallel columns. 
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CHAPTER I 
PRIMARY SOURCES AND A REVIEW OF  
LITERATURE ON REINACH’S PHILOSOPHY   
 
This chapter discusses the primary and secondary sources for this thesis. It is divided 
into four sections, covering Reinach’s primary works as well as secondary literature on 
his philosophy and other sources relevant to this investigation. 
 The aim of the first section is twofold: (1) to delimit which texts will be 
understood as Reinach’s work on ethics when analysing his contribution to early 
phenomenological ethics; and (2) to situate those texts both historically and 
philosophically within the body of Reinach’s known works. 
 Section two gives more detailed discussion on our four primary sources for 
Reinach’s work on ethics: (1) ‘Grundbegriffe der Ethik’, (2) ‘Die Überlegung: ihre 
ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung’, (3) ‘Grundzüge der Ethik’, and (4) ‘Die 
apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes’. 
 Section three presents some of the sources, in particular biographical works, 
editions and translations of Reinach’s work, used in accessing and translating Reinach’s 
philosophy. 
 The final section of this chapter looks at the present state of the question on 
Reinach’s contribution to early phenomenological ethics, in the form of secondary 
literature. Although our emphasis will thus be on works that discuss Reinach’s 
contribution to ethics, critical studies of Reinach’s work in general are also vital to fully 
understanding Reinach’s philosophy, and will be discussed here as well insofar as they 
are of relevance to our topic. 
 
 
17 
SECTION ON E  
T IMELINE OF REINACH’S KN O W N  WO R K S  
 
Reinach’s surviving body of work was produced between 1904, when he completed his 
doctoral thesis, and 1917, the year of his sudden death in World War I. Four of these 
surviving texts, and at least one that has been lost, deal with the subject of ethics.1 The 
four surviving texts are of most relevance to the present investigation, and will be 
discussed in more detail in the subsequent section, but it is of importance to understand 
first how these writings fit into the context of Reinach’s work as a whole. 
 Reinach published only a few articles in journals during his lifetime. He never 
published a book, and the majority of his published articles are quite short. 
Reconstructions of lectures and papers he delivered make up a sizeable and very 
significant part of his surviving body of work. Though there are a few recurring themes 
in Reinach’s philosophy, his works overall cover a wide range of topics, from the law 
and ethics to logic and numerology. The philosophy of law is the most prominent theme 
among Reinach’s publications, but it does not dominate his body of work. 
 
1.1 .1  1904–1905  
 
Reinach’s earliest surviving publication, completed in 1904 at the University of Munich 
and published in 1905, was his doctoral thesis, Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden 
Strafrecht (On the Concept of Cause in the Present Criminal Law).2 In the thesis, 
Reinach examines the relationship between psychology and criminal law, and the 
presuppositions that the law makes about the psychology of motivation. Written under 
                                               
1  ‘The Probeverlesung [Reinach] delivered during the habilitation process in 1909 was devoted to the 
theme “Probleme und Methoden der Ethik” – the problems and methods of ethics. (Unfortunately, this 
text is no longer extant.)’ James DuBois, ‘Adolf Reinach: Metaethics and the Philosophy of Law’, in 
Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy: A Handbook, ed. by John J. Drummond and 
Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 328. 
2 S.W., pp. 1-43. 
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the supervision of Theodor Lipps, this thesis is not typical of Reinach’s later 
phenomenological work, but his early comments here with regard to the assessment of a 
criminal suspect’s character are of interest for this investigation, as this is a theme that 
would also appear in his subsequent works on ethics. 
 
1 .1 .2   1906–1909  
 
Reinach published nothing between the years 1906 and 1909. He wrote, however, three 
short articles during this period that have survived to the present day. The first of these 
articles, and the first key source for this investigation, is the paper he delivered to the 
Akademischer Verein für Psychologie on July 6, 1906.3 The paper’s original title, if any, 
is not known, and Reinach’s own notes for it have not survived, but two of the society 
members present took extensive notes, from which the paper was reconstructed and 
ultimately published under the title of ‘Die Grundbegriffe der Ethik’ (‘The Basic 
Concepts of Ethics’).4 In the paper, Reinach discusses the question of whether an ethics 
can be based wholly on the concept of moral value, and concludes that it cannot. Ethics 
is broader than questions about value, he argues, just as value theory is broader than 
questions about ethics. It thus follows that ethics cannot be limited to just an ethics of 
values. Because it deals directly with a central issue for phenomenological ethics, this 
text will be considered a key source when investigating Reinach’s contribution to early 
phenomenological ethics, and will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 The next article to survive from this period is ‘Über impersonale Urteile’ 
(‘Concerning Impersonal Judgements’),5 in which Reinach explores the relationship 
                                               
3 ‘The Academic Society for Psychology,’ founded by Theodor Lipps for his students in Munich. 
4 S.W., pp. 335-37. Previously published with some additional background material in Speech Act and 
Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, ed. by Kevin Mulligan 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 275-89.  
5 S.W., pp. 347-50. Never published in Reinach’s lifetime, it appeared in Gesammelte Schriften (1921), 
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between sensory perceptions and the judging or recognising of states of affairs. The 
sensory perception of warmth is related to but distinct from the judgement that an object 
is warm. This distinction between the grasping of objects (sensorily or otherwise) and 
the judging of states of affairs is central to Reinach’s distinction between moral value 
and moral rightness, as we shall see in chapter three. 
 Lastly, in 1909, after the conclusion of his legal studies, Reinach completed 
‘Wesen und Systematik des Urteils’ (‘The Essence and Systematic Theory of 
Judgement’), which he submitted for his successful habilitation in Göttingen. Only a 
small part of the text survives today, and was printed in the Sämtlich Werke. 6  
 
1 .1 .3   1910–1911  
 
The remainder of Reinach’s surviving body of work dates from after his habilitation and 
his acceptance into the position of Privatdozent at Göttingen. His next surviving article 
is an obituary he wrote for Welt und Wissen. Hannoversche Blätter für Kunst, Literatur 
und Leben on the death of the American philosopher William James (1842-1910).7  
 In 1911, Reinach published an article on ‘Die obersten Regeln der 
Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant’ (‘The Supreme Rules of Rational Inference According to 
Kant’)8 in issue 16 of the journal Kant-Studien. This was followed by another article on 
Kant, ‘Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Problems’ (‘Kant’s Interpretation of Hume’s 
                                                                                                                                         
pp. 117-20. 
6 S.W., pp. 339-46.  
7 S.W., pp. 45-50. Reinach and James had never met, and as Smith notes, ‘why the essay on James 
appeared at all and how it should have been commissioned, written and accepted in such a short time 
remains unexplained.’ Barry Smith, Foreword to his translation of the text in Speech Act and 
Sachverhalt, p. 291. Smith suggests that Reinach had likely given lectures on James’s philosophy 
(ibid., n. 1). Certainly the phenomenologists were familiar with pragmatism; Lyotard lists it among the 
philosophical traditions to which phenomenology is opposed. Jean-François Lyotard, Phenomenology, 
trans. by Brian Beakley (Albany: State University of New York Press , 1991), pp. 31-32. 
8 S.W., pp. 51-65. First published in Kant-Studien, 16 (1911), pp. 214-33. The English title is that used 
in the translation by James M. DuBois (see below, n. 107). 
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Problem’).9 The same year, Reinach wrote his ‘first systematic-phenomenological 
essay’,10 entitled ‘Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils’ (‘A Contribution Toward the 
Theory of the Negative Judgement’).11 In this article Reinach further discusses 
judgements and states of affairs, and argues that there are not only acts of positive 
judgement (for example, the affirmation of a statement, or the conviction that a state of 
affairs obtains), but also negative judgements. According to Reinach, the judgement that 
a contingent statement is not true, or that a described state of affairs does not obtain, 
should be recognised as an act of negative judgement in its own right and not simply as 
a refusal to make a positive judgement. 
 Parts of several of Reinach’s lecture courses from this period have also survived. 
Although Reinach’s own notes for these lectures are lost, some of his students —  
notably Margarete Ortmann and Winthrop Bell —  took extensive notes that have 
allowed the content of these lectures to be reconstructed. Reinach’s course on Kant from 
the winter semester of 1910-1911 was transcribed by Ortmann, and later reconstructed 
under the title ‘Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit im Sachverhalt’ (‘Necessity and 
Generality in the State of Affairs’).12 In the surviving text, Reinach discusses the 
difference between necessary and contingent or accidental truth in states of affairs. He 
concludes that the necessity or contingency of a state of affairs is part of the essence of 
that state of affairs, and also disagrees with Kant that being necessary or universal is a 
required characteristic of the a priori. As we will see in chapter two, the understanding 
                                               
9 S.W., pp. 67-93. First published in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosopische Kritik, 141 (1911), 
pp. 176-209. The English title is that used in the translation by J. N. Mohanty (see below, n. 103). 
10 As described by Husserl. See Crosby, ‘Reinach as a Philosophical Personality’, in Aletheia, 3 (1983), 
p. xii. 
11 S.W., pp. 95-140. First published in Alexander Pfänder’s collection Münchener philosophische 
Abhandlungen; Theodor Lipps zu seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet von seinem früheren 
Schülern (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1911), pp. 196-254. The English title is that used in the 
translation by Don Ferrari (see below, n. 104).  
12 S.W., pp. 351-54. 
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of the a priori and Reinach’s support of a non-formal or material a priori is key to 
Reinach’s disagreement with Kant’s philosophy in general. 
 Part of a second course on the freedom of the will and responsibility, which 
Reinach delivered in the summer semester of 1911 and again in the winter semester of 
1911-1912, has survived in notes by both Bell and Ortmann, and was reconstructed with 
the title ‘Nichtsoziale und soziale Akte’ (‘Non-Social and Social Acts’).13 In this early 
discussion of the theory of social acts that Reinach would publish in its more complete 
form in 1913 (see below, section 1.1.4.), he discusses the recurring themes of promising 
and obligation. The brief transcript does not touch on the subject of ethics, and Reinach 
does not distinguish between the different kinds of obligation as seen in Grundlagen; as 
Grundlagen represents the more mature and developed expression of Reinach’s social 
act theory, this early discussion is not of importance for us. A series of lectures from 
Summer 1910 on ‘Platons Philosophie’ (‘Plato’s Philosophy’) also survives in the form 
of notes taken by Alexandre Koyré.14  
 
1 .1 .4   1912–1913  
 
The years 1912 and 1913 mark the period in which Reinach produced the three works 
(two published articles and one lecture course) that form the most important sources of 
this investigation. In 1912 he published the first part of ‘Die Überlegung: ihre ethische 
und rechtliche Bedeutung’ (‘Reflection: Its Ethical and Legal Significance’),15 with the 
second part arriving in 1913. This article was Reinach’s response to a debate in legal 
circles concerning the legal definition of murder, which at the time stated only that a 
                                               
13 S.W., pp. 355-60. 
14 These did not appear in the S.W., but were published later in an Appendix to Josef Seifert, Ritornare a 
Platone: La Fenomenologia Realista come Riforma Critica della Dottrina Platonica delle Idee 
(Milan, 2000), pp. 181-241. 
15 S.W., pp. 279-311. First published in two parts in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische 
Kritik. The first part appeared in vol. 148 (1912), 181-96, and the second in vol. 149 (1913), 30-58. 
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murder was a killing carried out with reflection or premeditation (Überlegung). Reinach 
was of the opinion that the law needed reform, and in the course of arguing the point in 
this article he closely examines the phenomenon of reflection in intellectual, ethical and 
legal contexts, showing the ambiguous and unreliable significance of reflection. The 
middle section of the text also discusses value theory and the ethics of values. Thus, 
though its central question belongs to the philosophy of law rather than to ethics, this 
article will be considered another key source of this investigation, and will be further 
discussed below. 
 In 1913 Reinach published ‘Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen 
Rechtes’ (‘The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law’).16 This article, too, is primarily 
concerned with legal philosophy, as its central questions have to do with the essential 
foundations of positive law. The text, nonetheless, includes numerous references to 
ethics and the relationship between ethics and the law, which are at least of interest from 
the point of view of discussing Reinach’s contributions to meta-ethics, if not also to 
ethics. This article will also be considered a key source for this investigation. As it has 
already been translated into English, and has been commented on more extensively than 
the other key sources of the investigation in secondary literature,17 no translation of this 
article is included in the appendix below. The text will be further discussed below. 
 In 1912 and 1913, Reinach took part in discussions at two colloquia that were 
also attended by Winthrop Bell, whose notes from the proceedings have survived. The 
first transcript appears under the heading ‘Die Vieldeutigkeit des Wesensbegriffs’ (‘The 
Ambiguity of the Concept of Essence’),18 in which Reinach distinguishes between 
‘how’-essences and ‘what’-essences. A ‘what’-essence has a role in determining what a 
                                               
16 S.W., pp. 141-278. Originally published in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische 
Forschung, issue 1 (1913), pp. 685-847. The English title is that used in the translation by John F. 
Crosby (see below, n. 105). 
17  For examples of these discussions in secondary literature, see below, section 1.4.1. 
18 S.W., pp. 361-64. 
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thing is. If one thinks of a brown table, the status of the table as a table is a ‘what’-
characteristic: if it were removed, the table would no longer be a table. Removing the 
brownness of the table, on the other hand, would not change what it is, only ‘how’ it is. 
Brownness is thus only a ‘how’-characteristic (Wiebeschaffenheit) of the brown table, 
but it is part of the ‘what’-essence of different shades of brown themselves. This offers 
an insight into what Reinach means by ‘essence’, and the manner in which essences 
interrelate. The second set of notes is given the title ‘Über Dingfarbe und Dingfärbung’ 
(‘Concerning the Colours and Colouration of Things’),19 and discusses our experiences 
of colours and of how light and colour interact. 
 In the summer semester of 1913, Reinach delivered a lecture course entitled 
‘Einleitung in die Philosophie’ (‘Introduction to Philosophy’). Winthrop Bell and 
Margaret Ortmann attended the course and took extensive notes, from which the lecture 
course was eventually reconstructed.20 The transcribed text of this course is the longest 
single work in the Sämtliche Werke, and is divided into two major sections: (1) ‘Die 
philosophische Problematik: Ausgewählte Hauptprobleme der Philosophie’, and (2) 
‘Hauptfragen der Logik und Ethik’. Of particular importance for us here is the second 
chapter of the second section, and the final part of the lectures that has survived: 
‘Grundzüge der Ethik,’21 Reinach’s longest and most comprehensive discussion of 
ethics known today. Perhaps even more so than the others mentioned here, this is a key 
source for this investigation and will be further discussed below. 
 In the winter semester of 1913-1914, Reinach taught on the subject of 
numerology, and notes taken from these lessons by Winthrop Bell and Edith Stein have 
survived. They have been reconstructed under the title ‘Zum Begriff der Zahl’ (‘Toward 
                                               
19 S.W., pp. 365-68. 
20 S.W., pp. 369-513. 
21 S.W., pp. 485-513. 
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the Concept of Number’).22 Here Reinach discusses how numbers come to be 
understood and whether our knowledge of them depends on experience. This text 
contains references to Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic, as well as to the work of the 
neo-Kantian philosopher Paul Natorp (1854-1924), who was soon to feature again in 
Reinach’s writings.  
 
1 .1 .5   1914–1917  
 
In 1914, Reinach published a quite lengthy and detailed review of Natorp’s Allgemeine 
Psychologie nach kritischer Methode (1912).23 The same year, Reinach was given the 
opportunity to deliver a paper in the University of Marburg, where Natorp taught. In 
this paper, Reinach attempts to make his phenomenological approach and viewpoint 
understandable to his neo-Kantian audience. In doing so, he discusses many themes 
from elsewhere in his philosophy, including experiences, essences, judgements, logic 
and numerology. This is the closest thing to an explanation by Reinach of what he takes 
the method and purpose of phenomenology to be. The paper was later to be published 
under the title ‘Über Phänomenologie’ (‘Concerning Phenomenology’),24 and later still 
as ‘Was ist Phänomenologie?’ (‘What is Phenomenology?’).25  
 Late in 1914, Reinach joined the German army and left to fight in the First 
World War. At the time he was working on an article entitled ‘Über das Wesen der 
Bewegung’ (‘Concerning the Essence of Movement’).26 Reinach did not complete the 
article before he left for the war, but it was edited for publication by Edith Stein and 
appeared posthumously in the first compilation of his works, Gesammelte Schriften. In 
                                               
22 S.W., pp. 515-29. 
23 S.W., pp. 313-31. First published in Göttingischen gelehrten Anzeigen, issue 4 (1914), pp. 193-214. 
24 S.W., pp. 531-50. First published in Gesammelte Schriften, pp. 379-405. The English title is that used 
in the translation by Dallas Willard (see below, n. 99). 
25 Adolf Reinach, ‘Was ist Phänomenologie?’, ed. with a foreword by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (Munich: 
Kösel, 1951). The English title is that used in the translation by Derek Kelly (see below, n. 99).  
26 S.W., pp. 551-88. First published in Gesammelte Schriften, pp. 406-61. 
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this article, Reinach argues that the fact that we can intuitively visualise a phenomenon 
—  such as motion —  gives absolute evidence for its possibility. This reflects Reinach’s 
general position on essences given in experience; seeing one moving object does not 
prove that this particular object exists, but that real movement is possible in principle. 
 During the war, Reinach continued to take notes towards future works. 
Fragments of two texts have survived: ‘Zur Phänomenologie der Ahnungen’ (‘On the 
Phenomenology of Premonitions’),27 and a fragment of a treatise on the philosophy of 
religion.28 These are brief and very much incomplete, providing only a glimpse into 
Reinach’s thought during what were to be his final years. The turn towards the 
philosophy of religion reflects Reinach’s conversion to Christianity, which he 
underwent along with his wife in 1916. 
 
SECTION TW O  
SELECTED SOURCES FOR REINACH’S WO R K  O N  ETHICS  
 
In the course of the above section, we identified four texts for further discussion as 
sources for Reinach’s ethics. In this section we will discuss each of those texts in turn, 
with particular attention to the ethics-related content of each. Of these four texts, one 
(‘Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes’) exists in English translation. 
The remaining three appear in translation in the appendices in the appendix, thus 
making Reinach’s entire body of work on ethics available in an English-language form. 
 
                                               
27 S.W., pp. 589-92. 
28 S.W., pp. 605-11. The English titles are those used in the translation by Lucinda Brettler (see below, n. 
102).   
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1 .2 .1   VO R T R A G  Ü B E R  D I E  GR U N D B E G R I F F E  D E R  E T H I K 29 
 
 
In 1906, Reinach was invited by his close friend Theodor Conrad, then chairman of the 
Akademischer Verein für Psychologie, to give a paper at one of the society’s meetings. 
Reinach at the time was in the midst of his legal studies, but ultimately, on the 6th of 
July, he presented this paper on ‘the basic concepts of ethics’.30 Reinach laid out the 
main point of the paper in a letter to Husserl, (with whom he had at this point already 
formed a personal friendship), to show that in addition to moral values, which are borne 
by objects, there is also a separate concept of moral rightness, which pertains to states of 
affairs (Sachverhalte). Reinach is said to have planned a second lecture to follow from 
this one, but if it ever took place, no copies have survived.31  
 This short article on ethics is one of Reinach’s earliest surviving works, and 
shows the influences of both Theodor Lipps (under whom Reinach had only recently 
completed his doctorate, and whose view on ethical correctness Reinach here criticises) 
and Edmund Husserl (whose Logical Investigations Reinach had read in the previous 
years). Specifically, Reinach seems to be taking the terminology of the state of affairs 
(Sachverhalt) from Husserl here,32 although he also encountered this term in his studies 
of law.33  
 Reinach begins the paper with a discussion of values. ‘Value’ is to be 
understood here not as a matter of subjective preference, but as an objective predicate, a 
                                               
29 The translation of this text can be found in Appendix (II). 
30 Daubert labelled the text as ‘Vortrag von Dr. Reinach über Grundfragen der Ethik’, a title reminiscent 
of Theodor Lipps’ Ethischen Grundfragen. Since the text itself refers to ‘Grundbegriffe’ (basic 
concepts) rather than ‘Grundfragen’ (basic questions), the editors of the S.W. chose the title above, 
taken from Pfänder’s transcript. 
31 Sämtliche Werke, vol. 2., p. 708. 
32 See, for example, Husserl, Logical Investigations, I, §63. 
33 In a letter to Theodor Conrad in October 1906, some months after he delivered this paper, Reinach 
asks Conrad if he is familiar with the role of the Sachverhalt in the German civil code, and offers to 
reproduce the relevant paragraphs for Conrad to look at, as Reinach ‘know[s] them all off by heart.’ 
(Schuhmann and Smith, Reinach: An Intellectual Biography, p. 10.) 
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property of objects (Gegenstände) grasped in experience.34 Reinach describes several 
different kinds of values, including both moral and non-moral values. At this early 
stage, he concludes that only a negative definition of moral values (i.e. what they are 
not) is possible.35 Moral value is value, just as beauty is value, but moral value is not the 
same as beauty. ‘Customarily, morally valuable would be equated with good; 
disvaluable with evil or bad’.36 To say that other values are ‘good’ is to equivocate with 
the morally good.37 As a value, moral value is a predicate of objects, but Reinach does 
not here seek to precisely identify the bearers of moral value.38  
 Reinach then questions whether moral value can be the only basic concept of 
ethics. He argues that it cannot. Ethics goes beyond the confines of the world of values 
to enter the world of being. States of affairs, which are not objects and cannot be the 
bearers of values, can still have ethical significance. Rather than being termed morally 
valuable or morally disvaluable, they can be morally right or morally wrong. This 
concept of moral rightness (sittliche Rechtheit) is entirely distinct from the concept of 
moral value. The being happy of a morally good man is not morally valuable, nor is the 
being happy of a morally evil man morally disvaluable, but they are morally right and 
morally wrong, respectively. 
                                               
34 This is what is indicated by a ‘realist’ theory of values: one that holds that value is a real and inherent 
quality of certain objects independently of any act of valuation. 
35 Reinach never spelled out the precise difference between moral and non-moral value. This may be 
because he saw the difference as simply undefinable; ‘moral value’ is ‘moral goodness in itself’, and 
we know the difference between this and other kinds of goodness only by experiencing it. Much later, 
in his lecture Über Phänomenologie, Reinach speaks critically of ‘hopeless efforts to define 
something by means of that which it is not’, indicating that negative determinations are certainly not 
satisfactory for his phenomenological approach. ‘Concerning Phenomenology’, trans. by Willard; 
S.W. p. 535. 
36 S.W. p. 335, paragraph 2; Appendix (II). The ‘good’ referred to here by Reinach is different from his 
concept of goods, which he introduces in Grundzüge. ‘Good’ (as an adjective) and ‘goodness’ refer to 
the quality of something being good, whereas ‘a good’ (as a noun) refers to a kind of intangle 
possession (such as life or happiness). 
37 This equivocation is what G.E. Moore calls the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, although the mistake is not 
specifically naturalistic; a better description is the ‘definist fallacy’, as suggested by William 
Frankena. See Frankena, ‘The Naturalistic Fallacy’, Mind, Vol. 48, No. 192 (Oct. 1939), 464-477. 
38 The bearer (Träger) of a value is the object (Gegenstand) that bears or possesses that value. When one 
appreciates the wisdom of another human being, that human being is the bearer of the value of 
wisdom. When one sees a beautiful landscape, the landscape is the bearer of the value of beauty. 
Reinach later identified acts, persons and personal qualities as the bearers of moral values. 
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 The term ‘morally right’ would also be used in normal speech to indicate that an 
action was ‘right’, or that a person ‘did the right thing’. Reinach distinguishes this from 
the rightness of a state of affairs, but also shows that it is possible to connect the two. 
An action is right insofar as it aims towards the realisation of a morally right state of 
affairs. ‘Right’ (recht) is also not to be confused with ‘correct’ (richtig) in the sense that 
an act of judgement can be correct. Correctness has to do with what is; rightness has to 
do with what ought to be. 
 Reinach accuses Lipps of conflating moral value with moral rightness. For 
Lipps, an action that arises from a valuable disposition is morally correct (or right).39 
This takes away rightness from states of affairs in themselves; in this sense, a state of 
affairs could only be right because it was brought into being by a right action. In turn, a 
state of affairs will only be right if it is one that a morally perfect person could will to 
be. For Reinach, this relationship requires clarification. The moral value of an act of 
willing40 is dependent on the moral rightness of the state of affairs that is willed. 
 Reinach now expands on the relationship between the valuable and the right. 
Reinach here refers to ‘mediating statements’; earlier he indicated that rightness was a 
kind of ‘in order.’ In other words, there are rules which allow us to determine the 
rightness of a state of affairs.41 Four examples of these statements are: it is right that a 
morally valuable object exists; it is right that a morally disvaluable object does not 
exist; it is wrong that a morally disvaluable object exists; it is wrong that a morally 
valuable object does not exist. Reinach refers to a two-directional relationship here 
where value translates to rightness and vice-versa. 
                                               
39 At several points within Grundbegriffe the word ‘correct’ (richtig) appears where it seems very likely 
that Reinach meant ‘right’ (recht). Since the text has survived only in the form of transcripts, it is 
possible this was due to misunderstanding by the listeners rather than inconsistency in Reinach’s 
usage. These misunderstandings may have been fuelled by the fact that Lipps uses the term ‘morally 
correct’; ‘Das sittlich Richtige’ is the title of the fifth chapter in Die Ethischen Grundfragen. 
40 As opposed to an action; the value of an action is rooted in its essence. 
41 Later in Grundzüge, Reinach designates this as the function of a formal moral law such as Kant’s. 
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 Reinach here makes a distinction between ‘rightness’ and ‘ought-to-be.’ ‘It is 
right that a valuable object exists’ and ‘a valuable object ought to exist’ are equivalent 
statements, but their meaning is not identical. Reinach does not go further into this here, 
and never refers back to the distinction in later works. 
 Reinach concludes the paper with an acknowledgement that he has not fully 
explored this issue yet. The meanings of ‘moral value’ and ‘morally right’ have not 
been satisfactorily explained, nor has the way in which values ‘correspond’ to objects. 
He wishes only to conclude that one cannot ignore the sphere of rightness, or explain it 
away42 in terms of value. The investigation of ethics must take this second sphere into 
account in its own right. 
 
 
1 .2 .2    ‘DI E  ÜB E R L E G U N G :  I H R E  E T H I S C H E  U N D  R E C H T L I C H E  B E D E U T U N G ’43 
 
 
Reinach wrote this article in anticipation of a reform of the criminal law in Germany,44 
in which the legal definition of the distinction between murder and manslaughter was a 
matter of some debate.45 Reinach himself was of the view that the existing definition (in 
which murder was defined as killing carried out ‘with reflection’ (or premeditation) and 
bore a compulsory death sentence, while manslaughter was defined as killing carried 
out ‘without reflection’ and could be punished with a minimum of six months’ 
imprisonment) was inadequate, pointing to both the vague legal definition of what 
‘reflection’ meant and the unreliability of the criterion, even if properly defined.46  
                                               
42 At least in later works (particularly Über Phänomenologie), Reinach regards it as a pervasive and very 
damaging tendency in psychological investigations to ‘interpret away’ (wegdeuten) one phenomenon 
by reducing it to another. At the same time, he warns against the opposite tendency (treating as 
essentially different things that are essentially the same), though he does not give examples of this. 
43 The translation of this text can be found in Appendix (III). 
44 S.W., p. 311, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). 
45 S.W., p. 309, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). ‘Murder’ here is not to be confused with homicide, which 
refers to any killing of one person by another. Both murder and manslaughter are, by definition, unjust 
or criminal homicide. 
46 The law in force in 1912, which dated back to the unification of Germany, was as briefly worded as 
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 To support his argument for legal reform, Reinach engages in an investigation of 
‘reflection’ (Überlegung), which he understands as a process of extended questioning 
undergone when one is uncertain about a question.47 The first section of the article 
investigates both the nature of the experience of reflection in general and intellectual 
reflection (reflection on the being or non-being of a state of affairs being the prime 
example) in particular.  
 Reflection is not an act in Reinach’s technical sense of that word,48 but a 
process, an attitude into which the subject enters. Entering into reflection constitutes a 
break in the normal flow of experiences; more often than not, we judge states of affairs 
or resolve to carry out projects without this kind of extended inner questioning. All 
reflection is based on an inner indecision over a question, the topic or theme of the 
reflection. Reflection properly ends in the taking of a position on that question —  an 
intellectual conviction or a volitional resolve49 —  but it can end in failure in this regard. 
Intellectual reflection can also end in a range of partial fulfilments when the subject is 
not fully convinced of his or her position: one can suspect that something is true without 
                                                                                                                                         
Reinach suggests. In full, it read: ‘Whoever intentionally kills a person, if he carried the killing out 
with reflection, will be punished with death for murder’. Thomas Fuchs (ed.), Strafgesetzbuch für das 
Deutsche Reich vom 15. Mai 1871, Historisch-synoptische Edition (Mannheim, 2010), p. 968. 
47 This is not equivalent to the use of ‘reflection’ (Reflexion) by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. In 
Husserl’s terms, reflection ‘implies that what we reflect upon, the phenomenological experience, is 
rendered objective to us (is inwardly perceived by us), and that the properties to be generalized are 
really given in this objective content’. Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. by J. N. Findlay 
(London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1970). Sixth investigation, §44, p. 783. 
48  For Reinach, ‘an act in the genuine sense’ is ‘an inner activity of the subject’ that is ‘temporally 
punctual’, as opposed to having ‘any temporal duration’. S.W. p. 282, paragraph 3; Appendix (III). 
Not all phenomenologists share this understanding. An act for Husserl, for example, can be ‘a 
psychological process, a mental occurrence, an episode of consciousness, or indeed some ideal part of 
a conscious experience’. Dermot Moran and Joseph Cohen, The Husserl Dictionary (London/New 
York: Continuum Philosophical Dictionaries, 2012), p. 27. 
49 The taking of an intellectual position often (though not always) means an act of judgement. Although 
Reinach does not directly reference his own work, this investigation is therefore linked to his earlier 
work on judgement and states of affairs, most notably in Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils. A 
practical position-taking involves the forming or grasping of a volitional resolve. Reinach had not 
discussed volitional resolves in detail previous to this, but there are references in Husserl’s work to 
‘voluntary decisions’ and ‘voluntary intentions’. Husserl, Logical Investigations, fifth investigation, 
chapter 2, §11, p. 555. 
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a decisive judgement that it is true, or doubt that it is true without a decisive (negative) 
judgement that it is not true, all with varying degrees of certainty. 
 The second section of the article examines reflection’s ethical significance, and 
discusses volitional reflection (reflection on whether to carry out a project, a thought-of 
action). This section, with its extensive comments on moral value and the nature of 
moral decision-making, is naturally the most important for our present investigation. 
Reinach centres his argument on addressing four different assessments that are 
customarily applied to the presence or absence of reflection in the making of a decision, 
that is to say, assessments that, at first glance, appear to contradict one another. A good 
action may be considered less praiseworthy if the agent carried it out without a 
moment’s thought beforehand, but we would also consider it less praiseworthy if the 
agent stood by and reflected for a long time on whether to act. And although we would 
criticise a person for carrying out an important action without reflection, an evil action 
carried out with reflection, or premeditation, is considered much worse than one carried 
out without reflection, as seen with the harsher punishment for premeditated killing. 
 Reinach does not mean to show that these assessments are actually 
contradictory, however. Nor do they indicate that the moral value-character of reflection 
is variable or relative. ‘The ethically reflective human being as such represents an 
ethical value, if a modest one’.50 Rather, Reinach shows that a moral assessment can 
take into account more than just the essential moral value or disvalue of an action. We 
see this in how we assess a mundane, everyday action being performed in a reckless 
manner. ‘If the thought of driving on the open road at extraordinary speed contains in 
and of itself no disvalue, or even a value-importance, it yet possesses, “in view of” or 
                                               
50 S.W. p. 302, paragraph 3; Appendix (III). 
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“in consideration of” the fact that human lives are endangered, a negative value-
character.’51  
 In the same way, the different ways in which reflection affects the moral 
assessment of an action are based not on the action itself, nor on reflection as such, but 
on what the whole decision to act indicates about the character of the agent. There are 
differences in the sensitivity of different persons to values, and in how persons react to 
the feeling of values; and these reflect on the character of the person. Sensitivity to and 
respect for moral value are themselves moral values; the lack of these is morally 
disvaluable.52 Because reflecting on an action can potentially increase one’s awareness 
of the action’s moral value or disvalue (and because reflection itself is morally 
valuable), it is always best to reflect before acting; but a person who needs to reflect for 
a long time before performing a good action shows a low sensitivity for value, as a 
keenly-felt moral value should strongly motivate action. Similarly, a person who 
performs an evil action after reflection shows a lower sensitivity to or respect for value. 
Thus, in both these latter cases, there is some basis for assessing the person’s character 
less favourably. Reinach, nevertheless, stresses that these relations are far from 
necessary; for the purposes of most assessments, reflection ‘possesses a merely 
symbolic character.’53 The presence or absence of reflection in different cases cannot be 
considered a completely reliable method of assessing a person’s character. 
 Building on this conclusion, Reinach turns to examine the significance of 
reflection for the criminal law. Here a third form of reflection comes into focus: 
                                               
51 S.W. p. 293, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). The ‘value-modification’ referred to here by Reinach raises 
difficulties for his ethics that we will discuss in chapter three. 
52 ‘The feeling of an ethical value and the capacity for the feeling of ethical values in general are 
themselves ethical values’. Correspondingly, ‘the incapacity to feel an ethical value is itself an ethical 
disvalue, and equally or even more so, is practical deviation from the feeling of a disvalue’. (S.W. pp. 
300-01; Appendix (III). 
53 S.W. p. 300, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). Reinach adds, ‘There are necessary and universally-existent 
symbolic relationships. Those which we have just discussed certainly do not belong among them.’ 
(Ibid., paragraph 2) 
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practical-intellectual reflection (premeditation on what means to use in achieving an end 
that one has already resolved to bring about). This is a kind of intellectual reflection, but 
concerns a hypothetical course of action rather than a question of fact or being. Reinach 
cites Richard Katzenstein as an example of a jurist who argued that the test to identify 
murder should be premeditation of this kind, not volitional reflection.54 That is, to have 
committed murder, a killer must have considered how to commit the crime, not whether 
to. Katzenstein had argued that ‘the most reproachable criminal’ would never stop to 
reflect volitionally; if only volitional reflection were considered in the definition of 
murder, then the law would show leniency to ‘murdering thugs’ who never stop to 
question whether what they are doing is right.55 Reinach counters that it is no better to 
focus entirely on practical-intellectual reflection. In certain circumstances, an 
opportunistic killer might have no need to reflect on his or her method of killing. 
Reinach gives the example of a man out hunting, who already has a gun in his hand. If 
this man sees another man and decides to shoot him, there is no need for the killer to 
consider his method, since the means to success is already clear.56 It makes no sense for 
the law to be lenient in such a case. So, neither volitional nor practical-intellectual 
reflection is guaranteed to be a factor in the most ruthless of homicides.57  
  Reinach contrasts the ethical significance of reflection with its significance in 
the criminal law. In ethics, he had concluded that reflection can have a symbolic 
significance that is still worth paying attention to, because it indicates a receptivity or 
                                               
54 S.W. p. 309, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). 
55 Ibid. 
56 S.W. pp. 305-06; Appendix (III). 
57 Reinach considers volitional reflection to be the better measure, if either is to be used at all. This it not 
because of the ethical significance of that type of reflection; in fact, the legal assessment here 
‘proceeds in the opposite direction’. It is perfectly adequate for the criminal law if a person refrains 
from breaking the law purely because of the threat of punishment, not because he or she knew that it 
was morally wrong. But because reflecting on an action also brings the possibility of punishment into 
focus, the decision to break the law with reflection symbolises a lack of concern with the authority of 
the law and with being punished, a particularly dangerous disposition from a legal point of view. S.W. 
p. 308, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). 
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unreceptivity to value on the part of the agent. But the criminal law is not at all 
concerned with the moral goodness or badness of the character, with whether or not the 
agent is sensitive to values or respects values. ‘The “antisocial” disposition does not 
coincide with the unethical, not even in the sense that it forms a small section of it.’58 A 
person with a completely immoral character can act fully within the law out of self-
interest, while a person who is scrupulously moral can break the law precisely because 
of his or her moral commitments; the law is only interested in punishing the latter of the 
two. Thus, the law needs its own set of reasons for applying the same assessments about 
reflection as are customary in ethics, and Reinach finds these lacking. A lack of 
reflection might symbolise a state of ‘emotional turmoil’,59 implying diminished 
responsibility, which would support a reduced sentence. Reinach reasons, however, that 
if the agent’s emotional state is what is important, then that is what the law should refer 
to, not reflection. It is possible both to act swiftly and without deliberation while in a 
calm and collected state, and to think over a course of action while consumed with 
emotion. Reinach concludes that to define murder within the law simply as reflected-
upon killing is unsuitable, especially when it leads to such a sharp increase in severity 
of punishment, from imprisonment to death.  
 The discussions of values, value-experiences and moral assessments in 
Überlegung are all of importance to investigating his ethics. In particular, Reinach’s 
contrasting of value against personal interest, under the influence of von Hildebrand, is 
a significant addition to the structure of his ethics. 
 
1 .2 .3   ‘GR U N D Z Ü G E  D E R  E T H I K ’60 
 
 
                                               
58 S.W. p. 308, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). 
59 S.W. p. 311, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). 
60 The translation of this text can be found in Appendix (IV). 
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This set of lectures represents Reinach’s longest single surviving work on ethics; 
however, it was never intended for publication. The text that survives was reconstructed 
by the editors of the Sämtliche Werke from transcripts taken by two of Reinach’s 
students, Winthrop Bell and Margarete Ortmann. 
 Based on a reading of the section headings, ‘Grundzüge der Ethik’61 would 
appear to be a historical lecture course describing different prevailing theories of ethics: 
hedonism and egoism, utilitarianism, and Kantian deontology.62 However, the text itself 
is much more than this. Beginning by laying out a basic structure in the form of three 
spheres, Reinach here lays out the groundwork for his phenomenological theory of 
ethics, and defends it by showing how it can succeed where the prevalent theories of 
ethics fail. 
 In the first section, ‘The Problem of Value’, Reinach revisits his discussion of 
the basic concepts of ethics from Grundbegriffe. To the two concepts he had previously 
discussed, moral values and moral rightness, Reinach here adds a third: the concept of 
goods. Drawn from Reinach’s experience with the law, the sphere of goods refers to 
things that can be possessed, pursued, and taken away from a person, even though they 
are intangible: life, happiness, the right to one’s property. These are all distinct from the 
person himself or herself, and they are not values, although some may be bearers of 
values. Goods and values each form their own respective order of precedence or 
‘hierarchy’, indicating that some of each are more important than others.63 Reinach 
associates each of his three basic concepts of ethics with its own sphere of ethics: the 
                                               
61 ‘Grundzüge’ translates as ‘basic features’, ‘essential features’ or just ‘essentials’. 
62 The modern revival of interest in Aristotelian virtue ethics would not take place until some years later. 
Aristotelian themes in early phenomenological value ethics will be discussed in chapter two. 
63 S.W. p. 485, paragraph 3 and p. 486, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). The word used by Reinach is 
Rangordnung, literally an order of ranks. Although often translated as a ‘hierarchy’, this word is not 
meant in the sense of an order of holiness but simply as an order of precedence: ‘A body of persons or 
things ranked in grades, orders, or classes, one above another’. (‘hierarchy, n.’, OED Online. 
December 2012 (Oxford University Press) <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/86792> [accessed 16 
February 2013]) 
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sphere of moral values, the sphere of moral rightness, and the sphere of goods. In each 
sphere, ‘the problems of ethics [can be] very differently formulated’.64  
 The second section of the lectures discusses hedonistic, eudaimonistic and 
utilitarian theories of ethics. These fall under the heading of ethics of purpose, theories 
which attempt to put forward a single goal or purpose as the correct (or necessary) end 
of human action. It is based on the achievement of this prescribed purpose that all 
actions are to be assessed. According to the theory of psychological egoism, no human 
action is possible other than that which serves the perceived self-interest of the agent. 
Reinach counters that this is not addressing the questions of ethics at all. Even if the 
theory were true, ‘we could still say: all people until now have been egoists, but they 
ought not to be so!’65 Reinach also denies that it is possible to reduce all of willing to 
the pursuit of pleasure. Willing, he argues, involves three components: a motive, a 
purpose, and a source. The purpose is that which the agent plans to bring about, but 
although this can be something that I expect will give me pleasure, the purpose itself is 
often still more than that. The motive is some fact in the past or present that causes me 
to want to achieve the purpose; this cannot simply be pleasure or the desire for pleasure 
either. The source is an emotion that impels me to act; this can be pleasure, but an 
action out of pleasure is not an action for the sake of pleasure. So even if one seeks 
pleasure in one’s actions, the process of actually willing something cannot simply be 
reduced to the seeking of pleasure. 
 In eudaimonistic and utilitarian ethics, which identify pleasure or happiness as 
that which is good and ought to be pursued or maximised, Reinach finds a different set 
of flaws. These ethical theories attempt to explain the three concepts of value, rightness 
and goods in terms of a single good; for example, pleasure. Reinach argues that, first of 
                                               
64 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
65 S.W. p. 487, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). 
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all, pleasure cannot take over the role of moral value; moral value means goodness in 
itself, unaltered by circumstances. For the utilitarians, nothing has value except 
inasmuch as it produces a maximum of possible pleasure and a minimum of pain or 
displeasure. Nor is anything morally right or wrong in and of itself, only in the sense 
that a maximum of pleasure and a minimum of pain are thereby realised. ‘In 
utilitarianism, there would be nothing so wrong that it could not be made right by its 
possible consequences.’66 Reinach acknowledges that pleasure and happiness are goods, 
and that they do have significance in ethics.67 But even if happiness were the highest 
good of all, this would not be enough to base all of ethics on happiness. 
 Reinach now moves on to the third section of the lectures, discussing Kantian 
ethics. Reinach acknowledges that Kant was correct to reject both emotion-based and 
empirical ethics, but he denies that his own theory of values is either of these things. 
Rather, he argues that Kant had an overly limited view of the a priori, which caused 
him to limit his ethics to purely formal laws. Reinach allows that there is a formal 
component to ethics, as embodied in his own concept of moral rightness: for a state of 
affairs to be morally right means that it essentially conforms to a formal moral principle. 
But the non-formal sphere of values is equally important, if not more important, in fact, 
for making concrete decisions in real circumstances, where purely formal rules simply 
do not suffice. 
 To highlight his disagreements with Kant, Reinach ascribes three characteristics 
to Kant’s ethics: (1) voluntarism (in that it concerns itself solely with assessing the will, 
as distinct from the character of the person); (2) formalism (in that it relies on a purely 
formal moral law and assesses all actions based on their compliance with that law); and 
(3) rigorism (in that it demands that actions not only conform with, but arise from 
                                               
66 S.W. p. 494, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
67 S.W. p. 497, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
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respect for the moral law). Reinach is critical of all three of these characteristics. 
Voluntarism, he argues, limits the domain of ethics too much, ‘crippling and 
diminishing’ it.68 A voluntaristic ethics is unable to assess the character of a person, or 
the rightness of a state of affairs. Pure formalism, meanwhile, makes it impossible for 
Kant’s ethics to be directly applied to any real, practical choice. Reinach agrees with 
Kant that there is a role in ethics for a formal moral law, but he argues that it cannot 
take over the role of non-formal ethics as well.69 And finally, Kant’s rigorism leads to a 
condemnation of any action that is carried out from a personal inclination (or merely in 
accord with one’s moral duty) rather than from a sense of duty and regard for moral 
principles. Kant calls for impartial reflection on all actions and a denial of all personal 
preference in one’s decisions. But Reinach contends that inclinations cannot always be 
bad – an inclination towards that which is morally valuable, the good in itself, is 
evidence of a good moral character, not of any kind of flaw.70 On all three of these 
grounds, then, Reinach finds Kant’s ethics flawed. 
 Though the start of a new section is not indicated, the focus of Reinach’s 
discussion now shifts somewhat away from Kant, towards wider questions about 
responsibility and the freedom of the will. Reinach argues that the entire debate of 
determinism and indeterminism —  whether one’s actions are freely chosen or 
determined by causal factors —  is not altogether relevant for ethics; what is of 
importance is that the agent’s actions are his or her own, authored by the individual Ich, 
or ‘I’. There are also cases where a person is forced into action by a phenomenal 
necessitation, that is, something that is experienced as compelling the person to act 
although they are not physically forced into doing so. 
                                               
68 S.W. p. 502, paragraph 5; Appendix (IV). 
69 S.W. p. 503, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
70 S.W. p. 506, paragraph 5; Appendix (IV). 
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 Here, Reinach references an idea originally put forward by Alexander Pfänder: 
the distinction between willing and striving or conation (Streben).71 Strivings are 
impulses that have nothing to do with the will, but can impel us to act; for example, fear 
at a peal of thunder can cause a person to jump. These kinds of actions are no more 
‘determined’ than actions that are rationally willed, but they are ‘unfree’. They do not 
reflect the character of the agent in quite the same way that free actions do. This is 
reflected in the idea that a person’s responsibility for an action can be diminished in 
situations of stress. Given this focus on phenomenal rather than causal freedom, 
Reinach concludes that ‘[the] problem of freedom [is] thus ultimately also [a] problem 
for phenomenology.’72  
 From the very structure of ethics itself, to the nature of moral decision-making 
and motivation, and to the significance of one’s free autonomy in ethics, Grundzüge 
covers a great deal of ground. It is a key part, if not in fact the most important part, of 
Reinach’s extant work on ethics. 
 
1 .2 .4   ‘DI E  A P R I O R I S C H E N  GR U N D L A G E N  D E S  B Ü R G E R L I C H E N  RE C H T E S’ 
 
No work of Reinach’s has received greater scholarly attention than this monograph, his 
longest single publication during his lifetime. Reinach is best known as a jurist and a 
philosopher of law, and Grundlagen was, in Lucinda Brettler’s words, his ‘magnum 
opus’ in that field.73 John F. Crosby has called Grundlagen ‘one of the purest, most 
perfect pieces of phenomenological analysis which has ever been carried out.’74 Though 
the article’s central question belongs to the philosophy of law, it also has a broader 
                                               
71 S.W. pp. 508-09, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
72 S.W. p. 513, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
73 Lucinda Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach: Chapters in the Theory of Knowledge and 
Legal Philosophy (McGill University, 1973), p. ii. 
74 John F. Crosby, ‘Adolf Reinach’s Discovery of the Social Acts’, Aletheia, 3 (1983), 143-194 (p. 144). 
40 
significance. Edith Stein acknowledges the influence of Grundlagen on her 
Untersuchung über den Staat, in which she draws on the significance of Reinach’s a 
priori sphere of law for political philosophy.75 Reinach’s discussion of social acts, the 
distinction between duties and obligations and the very nature of the formal, atemporal 
relations and temporal objects that make up the essential foundations of law stretches 
into other philosophical fields, including (crucially for the present investigation) the 
field of ethics.  
 In the central argument of Grundlagen, Reinach challenges the theory of legal 
positivism, which holds that laws and legal concepts are purely artificial constructs, 
with no reality outside of a positive legal code. Reinach argues that all positive law is 
essentially founded on concepts that have their own validity prior to, and independently 
of, any positing or enactment. These essential foundations do not constitute a ‘natural 
law,’ nor are they to be confused with the formal moral laws of ethics. Above all, there 
is no ideal or perfect legal code that all makers of positive laws should strive to emulate. 
The essential foundations of law are no more than foundations, and cannot dictate a 
complete positive law. 
 Grundlagen is made up of three chapters, each divided into three sections. No 
one of these chapters or sections is devoted to the discussion of ethics. Rather, in 
discussing the law and the essential relations among legal entities, Reinach often 
provides a comparison with ethics. It is primarily the sphere of moral rightness that 
enters into his discussions in this work; value is referenced only occasionally, and even 
in Reinach’s example of why a promise to commit an evil act is not morally binding, the 
word ‘value’ does not appear at all.76  
                                               
75 The influence of Reinach and Grundlagen on Stein’s philosophy will be discussed in chapter four. 
76 For Reinach’s discussion of this example, see ‘The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law’, trans. by 
John F. Crosby, p. 45. 
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 In chapter one, Reinach introduces his theory of social acts. A social act is 
delimited as being an act that is ‘according to its essence in need of being heard 
(vernehmungsbedürftig)’.77 That is, a social act must be addressed to and understood by 
another person in order to be effective. The efficacy of a social act means that there is 
some real consequence of its being carried out; in the case of a promise, the ‘prototype 
and model of a social act’,78 this means the appearance of an obligation on the part of 
the one who makes the promise, and the appearance of a claim on the part of the one to 
whom the promise is made. This kind of obligation does not represent a moral, a legal 
or even a traditional or conventional norm; it does not contain, in itself, any kind of 
‘ought’. It is simply a matter of fact, part of the meaning of the promise. If I make a 
promise, it is presupposed thereby that I inwardly undertake to fulfil my promise, and 
accept the corresponding essential obligation. If I do not really mean to do this, then the 
promise is not really a promise; this is a ‘pseudo-performance (Schein-Vollzug)’79 of the 
act of promising, a lying promise. 
 Reinach describes obligations and claims as ‘temporal objects’ (zeitliche 
Gegenstände), ‘of a special kind of which one has not yet taken notice’.80 They are not, 
in other words, easily classified. Claims and obligations are not physical things, because 
they have no physical form. Even a signed contract is not a physical extension of the 
essential obligation relating to it. But claims and obligations are not ideal objects either, 
because they have a temporal existence; they come into being and cease to be in 
accordance with specific social acts. Nor are they psychic objects, because they 
continue to persist even if nobody is thinking about them, or if the social act that 
brought them about is forgotten by all concerned. James M. DuBois seems to be correct 
                                               
77 Ibid., p. 19. 
78 Armin Burkhardt, ‘Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in der Rechtsphilosophie 
Adolf Reinachs,’ in Speech Act and Sachverhalt, p. 239. 
79 ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, p. 22. 
80 Ibid., p. 9. 
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when he concludes that Reinach here demonstrates ‘a new category of real being which 
is occupied by claims and obligations, those peculiar legal entities which we might call 
“Reinachian objects”’.81  
 In explaining his use of ‘obligation’ here, Reinach distinguishes it from two 
other senses of obligation: legal obligation and moral obligation.82 Certain social acts 
result in a kind of essential obligation, which can imply a legal obligation, or a moral 
obligation, or both; but essential obligation, legal obligation and moral obligation are 
always to be understood as distinct from one another. Again, we turn to the case of 
promising to clarify these distinctions. 
 When I make a promise, then I have an essential obligation to carry it out; the 
social act of promising presupposes my intent to follow through with the promise, and 
the effective performance of the promise means that I accept this obligation. Since I live 
in a society of laws, it may also be that making a promise places me under a legal 
obligation to carry it out. This depends on the precise positive law to which I am 
answerable. A positive law is imaginable which would consider every promise binding, 
as is one that would consider no promise binding (though whether either of these legal 
codes could function in practice is another matter). In practice, most positive legal codes 
will strike a middle ground; for example, by prescribing an official procedure for 
                                               
81 DuBois, Judgment and Sachverhalt, p. 143. It is also possible to imagine that claims and obligations 
specifically could be understood as states of affairs (‘the being obligated of person A to perform a 
certain action for person B’). There are two problems with this interpretation. First, technically 
speaking, Reinach uses the word object (Gegenstand) to describe what a claim or obligation is. For 
Reinach, Gegenstand and Sachverhalt seem to be mutually exclusive categories (for discussion of this 
distinction in Reinach’s philosophy, see chapter three, section 3.2.3). Second, claims and obligations 
are not the only kinds of legal entities referred to by Reinach. Another is the legal enactment, which is 
not so easily expressed as a relation between persons. The only object to which a legal enactment 
relates is the state that enacted it, and the state itself may well be classified as a legal entity. A legal 
enactment also has as its content something that ought to be, albeit conditionally, whereas a state of 
affairs represents what is. These difficulties are sufficient to support the interpretation of legal entities 
as temporal objects of a distinctive and possibly unique kind, just as Reinach describes them. 
82 The language used here is somewhat more ambiguous than Reinach’s own. Reinach terms both the a 
priori essential obligation and the legal obligation as Verbindlichkeiten, while the moral kind of 
obligation is represented by Verpflichtung. Both translate into English as ‘obligation’, with 
Verpflichtung also suggesting ‘duty’. As duty (Pflicht) has another meaning in Grundlagen, I have 
diverged from Crosby’s chosen translation by translating ‘Verpflichtung’ with ‘moral obligation’. 
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making a legally binding promise, and by positing that a promise to break the law is null 
and void. But even if the positive law strikes down a promise as illegal and releases the 
promisor from his or her obligation, the essential obligation to fulfil the promise 
remains unchanged, as the positive law cannot change the essential meaning of what it 
is to promise. 
 Separate from both the legal and essential obligation to fulfil a promise is the 
moral obligation to do so. This is in accordance with a general, formal moral law; one 
ought to keep one’s promises. Like the essential obligation, the moral obligation does 
not depend on any positive law and cannot be ended by any third party. Nor is it 
dependent on the content of the promise. This leads to a situation that at first seems very 
strange: the general moral obligation to carry out a promise applies even if the content 
of the promise is immoral. This is because the principle that one ought to keep one’s 
promises is formal and universal; ‘the immorality of the content is irrelevant’.83 But 
Reinach is quick to clarify: 
Of course it is not irrelevant in every respect – we just mean that it is here of the 
greatest importance to keep distinct the various levels [of obligation]. If the 
content of the obligation is not morally right, then the duty not to realize it, is 
grounded in this wrongness – and not in the obligation as such.84  
 
From this we see that one moral obligation can carry more weight than another; for 
example, the moral obligation not to commit murder outweighs the moral obligation to 
fulfil every promise. The balance of moral obligations gives rise to one’s moral duty 
(Pflicht), that which one has the highest moral obligation to do —  that which, 
ultimately, one ought to do. Reinach’s approach here appears to be intended to avoid 
any kind of relativism, whether legal or moral; the lesser obligations do not lose any of 
                                               
83 ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, p. 45. 
84 Ibid. There is another important case to consider here, that where a change of circumstances alters the 
moral responsibility of a promisor to fulfil his or her promise. As we will see below, Reinach has been 
criticised by Armin Burkhardt regarding situations of this kind. We will discuss Burkhardt’s criticism 
in chapter three, section 3.2.2.5. 
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their own significance, but are merely outweighed by greater obligations. Although 
Reinach does not discuss this balance in terms of moral values, we might infer that the 
greater obligation is identified by the higher moral value of its content. It is therefore 
possible that Reinach is here dancing around the issue of a principle of utility without 
wanting to admit to one; i.e., that the highest obligation is distinguished by the fact that 
it realises a maximum of moral value and a minimum of moral disvalue when compared 
with all other possible courses of action. 
 The latter two chapters of Grundlagen introduce less material of importance to 
Reinach’s work on ethics, but some points are worth noting. In examining the nature of 
legal enactments, Reinach discusses the workings of normative statements about what 
ought to be. It is only meaningful to say ‘this ought to be’ about something that could 
either be or not be. To say ‘two times two ought to equal five’ is clearly nonsense, 
because two times two can never equal five. But ‘two times two ought to equal four’ is 
just as meaningless, because two times two can never fail to equal four.85 Statements 
about ‘ought’, then, and by extension all moral rightness and wrongness, have to do 
with possibilities, not impossibilities or necessities. This will be important to note as we 
critique Reinach’s theory of the personal character in chapter three. 
 Reinach also gives some intimations as to the nature of the formal moral law 
here, as he contrasts the moral law with positive legal codes. The act of positing or 
enacting is a social act, in which a person —  vested with the necessary authority 
through other, prior social acts —  declares that a set of other persons ought or ought not 
to act in a certain way. Thus, anyone from the head of a household to a feudal monarch 
to the legislative body of a democratic state can posit that ‘no person ought to steal’, and 
have this enactment be effective among those who answer to the relevant authority. In 
                                               
85 See ‘Apriori Foundations’, p. 104. 
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the efficacy of an act of enacting, an entity comes into being in the form of a legal 
principle, or simply an ‘ought’ (Sollen). The formal moral law is made up of oughts in 
the same way as a positive law is. The difference is in their source and their 
applicability. While positive laws must be posited or enacted, the formal moral law is 
‘independent of positing acts of any kind’, and while a positive law is ‘valid only for the 
persons for whom the enacting act is efficacious’, the formal moral law ‘is valid under 
all circumstances’.86  
 Taken together with his discussion of moral rightness and the formal moral law 
in Grundzüge, Reinach’s comments on ethics in Grundlagen provide a valuable insight 
into the structure of his ethics. Most of all, Reinach’s comments in Grundlagen provide 
our only clear picture of how Reinach understands the concepts of obligation and duty, 
and how he relates them to action. We will refer back to Grundlagen particularly for 
insight into Reinach’s theory of moral rightness and its role in his ethics. 
 
SECTION THREE  
EDITIONS , B IOGRAPHICAL SOURCES AND TRANSLATIONS  
 
This section of the chapter looks at several important sources for the present 
investigation that do not fit into the categories of primary or secondary literature. The 
first subsection deals with compiled editions of Reinach’s work, of which two exist. 
These compilations are indispensable in gaining access to Reinach’s philosophy, as 
most of his publications otherwise only appeared in journals; without these 
compilations, Reinach’s Nachlass would be confined to manuscript notes in the 
Bavarian State Library.87 However, even these compilations exist in only a few libraries 
                                               
86 ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, p. 109. 
87 Reinach’s archival material is stored at the Bavarian State Library (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek) in 
Munich under the sigil ANA 379. The content of this archive is documented in Eberhard Avé-
Lallement, Die Nachlässe der Münchener Phänomenologen in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek 
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worldwide. The second subsection discusses biographical works, which are helpful in 
placing Reinach’s works in their proper context. The third subsection deals with the 
existing English-language translations of Reinach’s works, which are valuable as 
introductions to those works and in maintaining translation conventions with regard to 
Reinach’s terminology. 
 
1 .3 .1  C O M P I L E D  E D I T I O N S  O F  RE I N A C H ’S  W O R K  
 
Reinach’s various published writings (see above) were re-issued in a collected edition, 
entitled Gesammelte Schriften, in 1921,88 along with some previously unpublished 
material. Following the discovery of new unpublished material, an updated critical 
edition was later published in 1989 under the title Sämtliche Werke.89  
 Both of these compilations represent more than just collections of Reinach’s 
publications. They also include parts of Reinach’s Nachlass, based on manuscripts and 
notes that were never published in Reinach’s lifetime, painstakingly reconstructed by 
the editors of the compilations (Edith Stein in the case of Gesammelte Schriften, Karl 
Schuhmann and Barry Smith in the case of Sämtliche Werke). Sämtliche Werke also 
contains detailed information on the history, sources and composition of each of 
Reinach’s works. 
 In the interests of consistency, this thesis will use the Sämtliche Werke as its 
chief source and reference for Reinach’s primary works, on the basis of it being the 
more complete collection of Reinach’s works. There are variations between the two 
                                                                                                                                         
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975), pp. 171-80. 
88 Gesammelte Schriften (Halle: Niemeyer, 1921). The compilation was edited by Reinach’s former 
students, primarily by Edith Stein, with an introduction written by Hedwig Conrad-Martius. 
89 Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe in 2 Bänden, edited by Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith 
(Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1989). The introduction was written by  Eberhard Avé-Lallement. 
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volumes’ presentations of Reinach’s Nachlass. Where such variations appear in the 
primary source texts referenced, they will be noted accordingly. 
 
1 .3 .2  B I O G R A P H I C A L  SO U R C E S  
 
There is currently no entirely comprehensive biography of Reinach. He was the subject 
of a chapter in John Oesterreicher’s biographical compilation, Walls are Crumbling: 
Seven Jewish Philosophers Discover Christ.90 A section in Herbert Spiegelberg’s The 
Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (the first edition of which was 
published in 1960) was given over to Reinach’s life and work. Very brief biographical 
sketches of Reinach also appear in Eberhard Avé-Lallement’s catalogue of the legacies 
of the Munich phenomenologists in the Bavarian State Library,91 and in the foreword to 
John F. Crosby’s translation of Die Apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen 
Rechtes.92 In the same journal issue, Crosby also included a collection of translated 
remarks on Reinach from his contemporaries, including Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, 
Dietrich von Hildebrand and Hedwig Conrad-Martius.93  
 In 1987, Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith (who were then in the process of 
editing the 1989 Sämtliche Werke) published a short but detailed intellectual biography 
of Reinach.94 In doing so they commented that all previous biographies had been either 
‘very succinct’95 or (in Oesterreicher’s case) ‘unreliable.’96 Their own biography gives a 
detailed account of Reinach’s academic career; detail on his personal life is relatively 
                                               
90 Oesterreicher, Walls are Crumbling: Seven Jewish Philosophers Discover Christ (New York: Devin-
Adair, 1952), pp. 87-118. 
91 Avé-Lallement, Die Nachlässe der Münchener Phänomenologen in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitx, 1975), pp. 172-74. 
92 John F. Crosby, ‘A Brief Biography of Reinach,’ in Aletheia 3 (1983), pp. ix-x. 
93 ‘Reinach as a Philosophical Personality,’ in Aletheia 3 (1983), xi-xxxi. 
94 Schuhmann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography,’ in Speech Act and Sachverhalt, 
ed. by Kevin Mulligan, pp. 3-27. 
95 Ibid., p. 3. 
96 Ibid. 
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light. In 1993, Schuhmann also wrote a chapter discussing the personal and 
philosophical relationship between Reinach and Edith Stein, granting an insight into 
Reinach’s role as a teacher in Göttingen.97  
 
1 .3 .3  E N G L I S H -L A N G U A G E  T R A N S L AT I O N S 98 
 
The first English-language translations of Reinach’s work were two separate 
translations of Reinach’s lecture ‘Über Phänomenologie,’99 based on the republication 
of that lecture (under the title ‘Was ist Phänomenologie?’) in 1951.100 This is the only 
one of Reinach’s works for which two different English translations currently exist.101 
Lucinda Brettler’s thesis The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach: Chapters in the Theory 
of Knowledge and Legal Philosophy contained translations of the two fragments (see 
Primary Sources 1914-17, above) from Reinach’s final years.102 Reinach’s article 
‘Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Problems’ was translated in 1976 by J. N. 
Mohanty.103 ‘Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils’ was translated in 1981 by Don 
                                               
97 Karl Schuhmann, ‘Edith Stein und Adolf Reinach,’ in Studien zur Philosophie von Edith Stein, ed. by 
Reto Luzius Fetz (Freiburg: Alber, 1993), pp. 53-88. 
98 The translations listed here are valuable resources for the English language reading of Reinach’s work. 
At the same time, they do not and cannot serve as authoritative sources for this investigation. 
99 What is Phenomenology?, trans. by Derek Kelly, in The Philosophical Forum, vol. 1, no. 2 (1968), 
234-256; and Concerning Phenomenology, trans. by Dallas Willard, in The Personalist, vol. 50, no. 2 
(1969), 194-221. 
100 Willard’s translation was revised in light of the publication of the Sämtliche Werke, and was re-issued 
online at <http://www.dwillard.org/articles/artview.asp?artID=21>. 
101 Lucinda Brettler reviewed these translations comparatively in her thesis The Phenomenology of Adolf 
Reinach. Brettler accuses Kelly of ‘complete alteration of the meaning of the text at point after point’ 
and ‘total misreading of the German text,’ and concludes that this translation ‘should not have been 
published.’ By contrast, ‘the translation entitled “Concerning Phenomenology”, by Dallas Willard, is 
quite good in all respects.’ Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, pp. 240-41. Follwing 
Brettler’s judgement of these serious flaws in Kelly’s translation, as well as the fact that Willard’s 
translation has been updated since Brettler’s time of writing on the basis of newly-emerged works 
from Reinach’s Nachlass, this investigation will consider Willard’s translation to be the more useful 
reference of the two (though as previously noted, the German original shall be considered the 
definitive version throughout). 
102 ‘On the Phenomenology of Premonitions’ and ‘Fragment of a Treatise on the Philosophy of Religion,’ 
trans. by Lucinda Brettler, in Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, pp. 242-44 and 248-49 
respectively. 
103 ‘Kant’s Interpretation of Hume’s Problem,’ trans. by Mohanty, in Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 
7 (1976), 161-88. 
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Ferrari.104 ‘Die Apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes’ was translated in 
1983 by John F. Crosby, together with a brief biographical sketch, detailed annotations 
and extended critical commentary.105 In 1987, Barry Smith published a translation of 
Reinach’s obituary work, ‘William James und der Pragmatismus’.106 In 1993, James 
DuBois published a translation of ‘Die obersten Regeln der Vernunftschlüsse bei 
Kant’.107  
 
SECTION FO U R  
SECONDARY L ITERATURE 
 
This part of the chapter will discuss secondary material written about Reinach and his 
work, with particular attention to literature that deals specifically with Reinach’s work 
on ethics. The discussion will be divided into two sections. The first section covers 
critical studies of Reinach’s philosophy that do not deal directly with his ethics. The 
second section discusses in detail the few existing works that deal specifically with 
Reinach’s ethics. 
 
1 .4 .1  C R I T I C A L  ST U D I E S  
 
Friedrich Bassenge was one of the first philosophers to critically examine Reinach’s 
work, in the first section of his 1930 dissertation Das Versprechen. Bassenge examines 
Reinach’s work on the act of promising in the first part of the dissertation, ‘the 
phenomenology of promising.’ While Bassenge begins by expressing agreement with 
                                               
104 ‘A contribution toward the theory of the negative judgement’, trans. by Don Ferrari, Aletheia 2 (1981), 
15-64. 
105 ‘The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law’, trans. by Crosby, in Aletheia 3 (1983), 1-142. The 
additional historical and critical material is listed in the appropriate sections elsewhere in this chapter. 
106 ‘William James and Pragmatism,’ trans. by Barry Smith, in Speech Act and Sachverhalt, ed. by Kevin 
Mulligan, pp. 291-98. 
107 ‘The Supreme Rules of Rational Inference According to Kant,’ trans. by James M. DuBois, in Aletheia 
6 (1994), 81-97. 
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Reinach that a promise is not just a statement of intent,108 he argues that Reinach does 
not actually provide a definition of what the promise is.109 Bassenge’s conclusion is that 
the essence of the social act of promising is the making of an assurance 
(Vertrauenserregung) to another person.110  
 In 1973, Lucinda Brettler became one of the pioneers in the English-language 
study of Reinach with her thesis, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach: Chapters in the 
Theory of Knowledge and Legal Philosophy, the stated purpose of which was to analyse 
and evaluate Reinach’s philosophy as a whole.111 The thesis, which Barry Smith has 
called ‘an extremely useful synoptic treatment,’112 covers a wide range of themes in 
Reinach’s philosophy, including his work on judgements and states of affairs, 
philosophy of law, and ethics. Brettler’s comments on Reinach’s ethics will be 
discussed separately below. 
 Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist 
Phenomenology, a collection of studies of Reinach’s philosophy in English and German 
edited by Kevin Mulligan, was published in 1987, shortly before the publication of the 
Sämtliche Werke. The chapters of this book cover a wide range of subjects within 
Reinach’s philosophy, of which a few are particularly relevant to this investigation. The 
first four chapters all deal with Reinach’s theory of social acts, particularly the key 
theme of promising, which relates (if indirectly) with Reinach’s discussions of moral 
                                               
108 ‘Promising is an entirely unique social act. I consider this position of Rainach’s [sic] to be 
unassailable. It cannot be doubted that the mere announcement of an intent on one hand, and a 
promise on another, are two different things.’ Bassenge, Das Versprechen. Ein Beitrag zur Philosophie 
des Sittlichkeit und des Rechts (Leipzip, 1930), p. 9. 
109 Ibid., p. 10. ‘What description does Reinach offer to replace the foregoing [the statement of intent]? It 
seems to me one must answer: none.’ Bassenge seems to have overlooked a crucial aspect of 
Reinach’s descriptive phenomenology, namely that one cannot do justice to an essence by defining it 
in terms of other essences. 
110 Ibid., p. 14. ‘To promise an action to someone means to deliberately bring him or her to the point of 
trusting (vertrauen) in that action.’ 
111 ‘The thesis expounds, analyzes, and evaluates Adolf Reinach’s philosophical work and his role in the 
development of early phenomenology. Reinach’s ontological and epistemological assumptions are 
clarified through an analysis of his theories of states of affairs, intentionality and judgments.’ Brettler, 
The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, abstract. 
112 Smith, Adolf Reinach: An Annotated Bibliography, p. 306. 
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obligation and duty. The chapters by Wolfgang Künne and Barry Smith both deal with 
of states of affairs, a key part of Reinach’s phenomenology with a bearing on his theory 
of moral rightness. Most importantly for this investigation, Armin Burkhardt’s chapter, 
‘Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in der Rechtsphilosophie Adolf 
Reinachs’,113 focuses on the discussions of ethics presented in Grundlagen; as such, this 
chapter will be given further discussion below. The book also includes some valuable 
additional material including an intellectual biography of Reinach114 and a translation of 
Reinach’s obituary of William James,115 as well as an extensive bibliography.  
 In 1992, Wojchiech Zelaniec published an article entitled ‘Fathers, Kings and 
Promises: Husserl and Reinach on the a priori.’116 The central theme of the paper is an 
apparent disagreement between Husserl and Reinach on the definition of the synthetic a 
priori, but the discussion also has significant implications for both philosophers’ 
writings on social experience. Ultimately however, in relation to both Husserl’s and 
Reinach’s positions, it is ‘inconclusive.’117  
 James M. DuBois delivered a paper on Reinach’s phenomenological realism and 
theory of the a priori, with specific reference to his work on the ontology of numbers, at 
the 15th annual Wittgenstein symposium in 1993.118 Subsequently, he included an 
introduction to Reinach’s ‘The Supreme Rules of Rational Inference According to Kant’ 
with his translation of that text in 1994.119 His book Judgment and Sachverhalt: An 
Introduction to Adolf Reinach’s Phenomenological Realism deals with a variety of 
themes in Reinach’s philosophy, including some that are generally overlooked such as 
                                               
113 Speech Act and Sachverhalt, pp. 155-74. 
114 By Barry Smith and Karl Schuhmann; see under Biographical Works, above. 
115 Translated by Barry Smith; see under English-Language Translations, above. 
116 In Husserl Studies, 9 (1992), pp. 142-77. 
117 Ibid., p. 171. 
118 James M. DuBois, The Ontology of Number: Adolf Reinach’s Phenomenological Realism, in 
Philosophy of Mathematics: Proceedings of the 15th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Vienna: 
Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1993), pp. 351-60. 
119 James M. DuBois, ‘An Introduction to Adolf Reinach’s “The Supreme Rules of Rational Inference 
According to Kant”’, Aletheia, 6 (1994), pp. 70-80. 
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numerology. In this book, DuBois proposed the term ‘Reinachian object’ to refer to 
those objects, neither physical nor truly ideal, that are pointed to in Grundlagen in the 
form of claims, obligations, laws and more.120  
 Even in the light of all of these publications, when Kimberly Jaray completed 
her doctoral thesis Adolf Reinach’s Contribution to the Early Phenomenological 
Movement in 2007, she asserted that the attention given to Reinach’s philosophy to date 
had been inadequate, and that aspects of it had been misinterpreted. In the thesis, she 
accuses ‘more than one recent commentator’ of misrepresenting Reinach’s philosophy 
as Platonistic,121 a view that she also attacks in a more recent article.122 Jaray published 
this thesis in book form in 2009, under the title Doorway to the World of Essences: 
Adolf Reinach.123 Jaray also discusses Reinach’s theory of states of affairs in Reinach 
and Bolzano: Towards a Theory of Pure Logic.124 Here, she compares Reinach’s 
phenomenology, and that of the early Husserl, with the thought of the Austrian school 
to which Bernard Bolzano belonged. 
 In addition to these general examinations of Reinach’s philosophy, there have 
been articles more focused on specific areas of Reinach’s philosophy. In 1983, 
alongside the first English-language translation of Reinach’s ‘Apriori Foundations of 
the Civil Law,’ John F. Crosby explored the significance of Reinach’s positing of a 
theory of social acts years before speech act theory in its present form was founded.125 
                                               
120 James M. DuBois, Judgement and Sachverhalt: An Introduction to Adolf Reinach’s Phenomenological 
Realism (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 141-43. 
121 Kimberly Jaray, Adolf Reinach’s Contribution to the Early Phenomenological Movement, (doctoral 
thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 2007), p. 138. 
122 Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray, Adolf Reinach is Not a Platonist, in Symposium: Canadian Journal of 
Continental Philosophy 13.1 (April 2009), pp. 100-12. 
123 Kimberly Jaray, Doorway to The World of Essences: Adolf Reinach (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. 
Müller, 2009). 
124 Kimberly Jaray, Reinach and Bolzano: Towards a Theory of Pure Logic, in Symposium: Canadian 
Journal of Continental Philosophy 10.2 (October 2006), pp. 473-91. 
125 Aletheia, 3 (1983), 143-94. 
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In 1997, Nebojsa Kujundzic published an article entitled ‘Reinach, Material Necessity 
and Free Variation,’126 dealing with the finer points of Reinach’s theory of essences. 
 Reinach’s philosophy has seen some comparison with the work of other thinkers 
of his time. In 1997, Lars Lundsten completed his doctoral thesis in which he discusses 
Reinach’s theory of social acts alongside J. L. Austin’s work on speech acts.127 Beate 
Beckmann examined themes relating to the philosophy of religion in Reinach’s work 
alongside that of Edith Stein in 2003.128 Alessandro Salice’s thesis Urteile und 
Sachverhalte, published in 2009, compares Reinach’s theory of judgement with that of 
the Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong, a former student of Brentano.129  
 
1 .4 .2  W O R K S  DE A L I N G  W I T H  R E I N A C H ’S  E T H I C S 130 
 
Most of the attention in the above secondary works, including Jaray’s, is given to 
Reinach’s realism, his work on judgements and states of affairs, or his philosophy of 
law and particularly his theory of the social acts. Whether these subjects have been 
covered satisfactorily is beyond the scope of this research. What is significant for this 
investigation is what the secondary literature has had to say about Reinach’s ethics. 
 It is not entirely surprising that little attention has historically been given to 
Reinach’s work on ethics. Only two of the four articles identified above as key primary 
sources were published in Reinach’s lifetime; the other two existed only as handwritten 
                                               
126 Dialogue, 36 (1997), 721-39. 
127 Lundsten, Communication as Experience: A Reinachian Enquiry (dissertation, University of Helsinki, 
1997). 
128 Beckmann, Phänomenologie des religiösen Erlebnisses: religionsphilosophische Überlegungen im 
Anschluss an Adolf Reinach und Edith Stein (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003). 
129 Salice, Urteile und Sachverhalte. Ein Vergleich zwischen Alexius Meinong und Adolf Reinach 
(Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2009). 
130 Reinach’s works on ethics are also referenced by Kevin Mulligan in his article ‘On Being Struck by 
Value’ (2008) <http://www.unige.ch/lettres/philo/enseignants/km/doc/ValueStruck.pdf> [accessed 
10/05/2012]. However, for the most part Mulligan simply uses Reinach as an example of a value-
realist alongside Scheler and von Hildebrand, and does not discuss the specific details of Reinach’s 
ethics. 
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transcripts until 1989. Nevertheless, studies were made of the work on ethics found in 
Grundlagen and Die Überlegung during this time.  
 
1.4 .2 .1  T H E  P H E N O M E N O L O G Y  O F  A D O L F  R E I N A C H  
 
Lucinda Brettler discusses Reinach’s ethics in two sections of her thesis, both times in 
conjunction with discussions of his legal philosophy. This level of attention seems quite 
appropriate in context, as the scope of the thesis does not allow for detailed discussion 
of every aspect of Reinach’s philosophy. Further, at the time when Brettler wrote her 
thesis, many of Reinach’s writings had yet to be rediscovered and were believed lost,131 
and she did not have access to all of Reinach’s writings on ethics. Her main listed 
sources on this subject are Die Überlegung and a partial version of Grundzüge der Ethik 
from Margarete Ortmann’s shorter transcript. 
 Brettler summarises Reinach’s main arguments and conclusions in Die 
Überlegung on the significance of reflection and its role in ethics and the law. She 
concludes that Reinach is correct in pointing out the ambiguity of the significance of 
reflection, but takes issue with Reinach’s view that a person’s character can be judged 
positively or negatively based on their ability to feel value. She suggests that there are 
‘quagmires into which use of the criterion of “ability to feel value” may lead legal 
philosophy,’132 such as imposing a death penalty for repeat offenders as ‘defective 
social material,’ or subjecting prisoners to ‘psychological torture’ in the pursuit of some 
form of rehabilitation. In relation to Reinach’s theory of moral value, Brettler suggests 
‘we may infer that Reinach would have agreed that nothing more can be demanded of a 
                                               
131 Brettler describes Reinach’s Nachlass as consisting of ‘only notes and short essays from the World 
War 1 period.’ (Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. vi) For more on how Reinach’s 
other unpublished writings were recovered, see Avé-Lallement’s preface to the S.W., pp. XI – XIII. 
132 Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 138 
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person than that they use whatever degree of ability to feel value that they have,’133 but 
adds that ‘this is not clear.’134 This is a significant charge against Reinach’s value-
ethics; Die Überlegung places great emphasis on precisely this kind of assessment of an 
agent’s character, and the role of persons as the bearers of moral values is also 
referenced elsewhere in his work. We will examine Brettler’s criticism more closely in 
chapter three. 
 Regarding Reinach’s first two spheres of ethics, those of moral value and moral 
rightness, Brettler states that Reinach’s concept of morally right states of affairs would 
require ‘a more thorough theoretical development [… ] to be made useful’.135 She does 
not qualify her position on this point to any great degree. In chapter three we will 
discuss just how important Reinach’s theory of moral rightness is to his work on ethics, 
and in chapter four we will assess it as a contribution to early phenomenological ethics.  
 
1.4 .2 .2  ‘V E R P F L I C H T U N G  U N D  V E R B I N D L I C H K E I T.  E T H I S C H E  A S P E K T E  I N  D E R  
   R E C H T S P H I L O S O P H I E  A D O L F  R E I N A C H S’136 
 
 
Like Brettler’s thesis, Armin Burkhardt’s chapter in Speech Act and Sachverhalt is 
limited to drawing upon sections on ethics in Reinach’s works on the philosophy of law 
and the transcripts of Grundbegriffe. Nevertheless, it quite accurately covers the key 
ethical themes within ‘Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law.’ First, Burkhardt explores 
Reinach’s theory of social acts and shows how Reinach forms a non-ethical, or amoral, 
theory of claims and obligations. For Reinach a promise creates a claim and an 
obligation because it is part of the meaning of a promise that it does so, not because it is 
morally good to fulfil promises (although the latter is still true). 
                                               
133 Ibid. Brettler’s emphasis. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., p. 207. 
136 In Speech Act and Sachverhalt, ed. by Mulligan, pp. 155-74. 
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 As the title of the chapter implies, Burkhardt discusses the difference between 
moral obligations (Verpflichtungen) and legal obligations (Verbindlichkeiten), and 
shows how moral obligations relate to Reinach’s sphere of moral rightness as laid out in 
Grundbegriffe der Ethik. He also highlights the difference between the moral and ‘a 
priori-legal’ spheres, using Reinach’s own example of promising to carry out an evil 
action. Next, Burkhardt discusses the distinction between the a priori sphere of law and 
the positive law. He shows how the positive law includes ought-statements, or simply 
oughts, and how these legal oughts differ from moral oughts. A positive legal ought 
states what a person ought or ought not to do if they are answerable to that positive law, 
but it can make no claim on people who are outside the appropriate jurisdiction. A 
moral ought states what a person ought to do regardless of time or place. 
 Burkhardt concludes with some critical remarks on the ethical aspects of 
Reinach’s legal philosophy. He argues that Reinach goes too far in stating that a 
promise and the moral obligation to carry it out continue to apply until the promise is 
fulfilled, no matter the circumstances or how they change – a promise to pay a friend a 
visit, or go for a stroll with him, must be qualitatively different from promises involving 
matters of life and death. He praises Reinach for identifying the social act of promising 
precisely with the expression of the promise, but argues that Reinach’s understanding of 
social acts as a priori is problematic; ‘“a priori” [here] can always only mean: a priori 
under the presupposition of the existence of human beings’.137 Burkhardt’s comments 
and criticisms are quite relevant to our discussion of Reinach’s sphere of moral 
rightness and we will return to them in more detail in chapter three. 
 
 
                                               
137 Burkhardt, ‘Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit’, in Speech Act and Sachverhalt, p. 173. 
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1.4 .2 .3  ‘A D O L F  R E I N A C H :  M E T A E T H I C S  A N D  T H E  P H I L O S O P H Y  O F  L A W ’138 
 
James Dubois’ chapter on Reinach in Phenomenological Approaches to Moral 
Philosophy139 is one of the most comprehensive discussions of Reinach’s ethics, taking 
into account the full extent of Reinach’s work as published in the Sämtliche Werke. 
However, it does not give as much attention to Reinach’s unpublished works dedicated 
to ethics, as to his published works which discuss ethics in a secondary capacity. 
 DuBois begins the chapter with a brief sketch of Reinach’s life and work, and a 
short introduction to his realist phenomenology, before starting discussion of his ethics. 
He very briefly examines the posthumous works, Die Grundbegriffe der Ethik and 
Grundzüge der Ethik, discussing Reinach’s distinction between value and rightness and 
his criticisms of Kant in Grundzüge. DuBois argues that Reinach’s concept of moral 
rightness is incomplete, and does not constitute an ‘actual contribution to practical 
philosophy’.140 We will discuss the importance of Reinach’s concept of rightness to 
establishing a role for duty in ethics in chapter three. DuBois also finds that Reinach’s 
‘foundational convictions regarding the possibility of a “material ethic of value” wholly 
overlapped with Scheler’s.’141 However, Reinach’s belief in the need for a formal 
sphere within ethics, distinct from the non-formal or material sphere of values, is one of 
the key disagreements between Reinach and Scheler that we will discuss in chapter four. 
 DuBois next moves on to discuss Reinach’s value theory as it appears in Die 
Überlegung, which he classifies as a contribution to ‘moral psychology.’ He follows 
Reinach’s examination of the symbolic relationship between reflection and value, and 
                                               
138 In Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy, ed. by Drummond and Embree, pp. 327-346. 
139 This book deserves particular mention here for its value as a starting point in any investigation of 
phenomenological ethics. While the remit of each chapter is only to provide an introduction to one 
particular thinker, the book’s scope is comprehensive, covering the history of phenomenological ethics 
from the earliest stages to the turn of the millennium. 
140 DuBois, ‘Adolf Reinach: Metaethics and the Philosophy of Law’, p. 332. 
141 Ibid. Scheler’s ethics will be discussed in chapter two, and will be compared with Reinach’s in chapter 
four. 
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finds the most interesting point from a philosophical point of view to be that the worst 
possible criminal —  the one who lacks even enough moral sensitivity to pause for 
reflection —  might be spared punishment on precisely that basis.142 DuBois then 
discusses elements relating to ethics in Reinach’s legal philosophy, examining 
Reinach’s social act theory and his work on the nature of enactments and ought-
statements. 
 DuBois concludes that ‘Reinach’s contributions to ethics per se are rather 
meager,’143 but that his work on meta-ethical questions and the philosophy of law is 
significant. He critiques Reinach’s theory of the a priori sphere or foundation of law, 
first by arguing that Reinach goes too far in his ‘amoral approach to legal 
institutions.’144 ‘If the essence of ownership is necessary, unchanging, and highly 
intelligible,’ DuBois argues, ‘then we should be able to consider this essence and then 
answer very basic questions about the origination of the relationship of owning.’145 But 
it is nearly impossible to resolve questions of original ownership without having 
recourse to moral considerations of rightness and justice, which Reinach separates from 
these legal concerns. Further, Reinach’s concept of essential property rights makes no 
exception for cases where property ought not to be recognised. Finally, DuBois 
questions whether Reinach’s a priori sphere of law is in fact as self-evident as Reinach 
claims. 
 DuBois’ study provides an insightful examination of the meta-ethical 
implications of Reinach’s philosophy of law, and some discussion of his value theory. 
However, Dubois’ account here skips over some of Reinach’s most distinctive 
contributions to ethics proper, and overstates somewhat the similarity between 
                                               
142 DuBois, ‘Adolf Reinach: Metaethics and the Philosophy of Law’, pp. 336-37. 
143 Ibid., p. 340. 
144 Ibid., p. 341. 
145 Ibid., p. 342. 
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Reinach’s ethics and Scheler’s. We will address these points in more detail in chapter 
four. 
 
SECTION F IVE  
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this chapter we have explored and discussed the primary sources that this 
investigation has to draw upon, and the secondary literature surrounding our central 
question. We have seen the chronology and, briefly, the content of Reinach’s body of 
surviving work, identified the works that are of particular importance for this 
investigation, and seen how these works fit into the wider context of Reinach’s writings. 
We have noted that most of the attention given to Reinach’s philosophy in secondary 
literature focuses on his legal philosophy, his theory of social acts, and his work on 
judgements and states of affairs. All of these are very important parts of Reinach’s 
philosophy, and represent significant contributions on his part to the early 
phenomenological movement. In later chapters we will see how these distinct 
components of Reinach’s philosophy relate to his work on ethics. 
 With regard to Reinach’s ethics, we have also seen some of the key questions 
and criticisms that have been raised by previous commentators on the subject. Some of 
these criticisms will prove to be entirely valid; others, however, can only be properly 
addressed when we discuss Reinach’s ethics in detail in chapters three and four. 
 Before proceeding to do so, however, we must consider the context in which 
Reinach’s work on ethics is to be interpreted and assessed as a contribution. To do so, 
we must discuss the other philosophers who influenced the development of Reinach’s 
ethics and that of early phenomenological ethics generally. This discussion will, 
therefore, be the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND TO REINACH’S ETHICS 
 
Reinach’s work on ethics can be properly located as a contribution to early 
phenomenology. This requires that we understand what we mean by ‘phenomenology’ 
and ‘early phenomenological ethics’. Yet Reinach’s work on ethics is both broader than 
the phenomenological school of philosophy, regardless of how one characterises that 
school. Reinach’s work shows influences as far back as Plato and including —  on 
various subjects —  Hume,1 Kant2 and Nietzsche.3 Thus the discussion in this chapter 
cannot be restricted by the characterisation of phenomenology; rather, Reinach’s 
contribution to early phenomenological ethics must be understood in relation to this 
broader philosophical background to his thought. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a background and a context in which to 
understand Reinach’s contribution to early phenomenological ethics. It is divided into 
three main sections. The first section addresses the question of what ‘early 
phenomenology’ means. It is partly on the basis of the characterisation presented here 
that the second and third sections are divided. The second section will discuss 
philosophical influences on the development of Reinach’s ethics, and of early 
phenomenological ethics more generally, that pre-date phenomenology as characterised 
here. The third section will begin by discussing what ‘early phenomenological ethics’ 
means, before profiling those early phenomenologists whose work influenced Reinach’s 
ethics. 
                                               
1  Most notably in his 1911 article ‘Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Problems’ (see Chapter 1). 
2 As seen in Chapter 1, many of Reinach’s surviving works deal with Kant; no other philosopher’s 
name appears more frequently in Reinach’s writings. Several notable examples date from 1911 alone, 
including the aforementioned ‘Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Problems’, ‘Die obersten Regeln der 
Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant’ and the lecture course published as ‘Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit im 
Sachverhalt’. A large section of Grundzüge (beginning on S.W. p. 497; Appendix (IV)) is given over 
to Reinach’s critique of Kantian ethics, which we will discuss below. 
3 See S.W. pp. 490-91, 511, 512; Appendix (IV). 
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 Each of the chosen philosophers will be profiled below on an individual basis, 
examining their work on ethics (if any) and the nature of their contact with or influence 
on Reinach. This is done for two reasons: for the purposes of comparison, when 
showing where Reinach seems to have received ideas from other philosophers, and for 
the purposes of contrast, where Reinach’s ideas appear to be unique or original. It is 
beyond the remit of this chapter (and of this thesis as a whole) to provide an 
independent treatment and critical discussion of the philosophies of any of these 
thinkers, rather their ideas are selected and presented here to serve as necessary 
background or for comparative purposes to Reinach’s philosophy.  
 
SECTION ON E  
W HAT IS ‘EA R LY PHENOMENOLOGY’? 
 
There have been many attempts to define the term ‘phenomenology’, from the simple 
and concise to the lengthy, complex and qualified. Examining the word itself, Dermot 
Moran points out that ‘phenomenology means literally the science of phenomena, the 
science which studies appearances, and specifically the structure of appearing’.4 In 
more detailed terms, he states elsewhere that ‘phenomenology is best understood as a 
radical, anti-traditional style of philosophising, which emphasises the attempt to get to 
the truth of matters, to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as whatever appears 
in the manner in which it appears’.5 Robert Sokolowski calls it ‘the science that studies 
truth [… ] the art and science of evidencing evidence’.6 Jean-François Lyotard finds it 
useful to define phenomenology in terms of what it opposes as much as by what it is: ‘it 
                                               
4 Dermot Moran, ‘Introduction’, The Phenomenology Reader, ed. by Dermot Moran and Timothy 
Mooney (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 4. 
5 Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 4. 
6 Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 185. 
Earlier in the same work he writes, ‘Phenomenology is reason’s self-discovery in the presence of 
intelligible objects’. (Ibid., p. 4) 
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is against psychologism, against pragmatism, against an entire period of occidental 
thought [… ]. It began, and remained, a meditation on knowledge, and its famous 
“putting in parentheses” consists above all in dismissing a culture and a history, in 
tracing all knowledge back to a radical non-knowledge’.7 Herbert Spiegelberg spends 
the final chapter of his history of The Phenomenological Movement discussing the 
‘essentials of the method’8 in an attempt to fully describe what phenomenology is, in 
retrospect of the history of phenomenological thought as discussed in the rest of the 
book.9 However, he cautions about the difficulties of defining phenomenology, as ‘the 
underlying assumption of a unified philosophy subscribed to by all so-called 
phenomenologists is an illusion’.10 There are, in fact, several senses of 
‘phenomenology’, of which ‘early phenomenology’ (which is what concerns us here) 
denotes only a part.11 
 Yet no question can be answered without an understanding of its key terms. 
Recognising there are several kinds of phenomenology (e.g, descriptive-psychological 
phenomenology, existential phenomenology, hermeneutic phenomenology, pure 
transcendental-idealist phenomenology, dialogical phenomenology) does not change the 
                                               
7 Lyotard, Phenomenology, trans. by Brian Beakley, pp. 31-32. 
8 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 677-717. 
9 In brief, Spiegelberg offers two criteria to delimit the phenomenological movement for the purposes of 
his book: 
 ‘(1) Explicit or implicit adoption by the would-be phenomenologist of [… ] two methods: 
 (a) Direct intuition (in a sense still to be clarified) as the source and final test of all knowledge, 
to be formulated as faithfully as possible in verbal descriptions; 
 (b) insight into essential structures as a genuine possibility and a need of philosophical 
knowledge. 
 (2) Conscious adherence, however qualified, to the movement as such in full awareness of these 
methodological principles. Short of such an expression, a thinker may well be thought of as “really” 
belonging to the movement, but it would be unfair to read him into it as an actual member’. (Ibid., pp. 
5-6) 
10 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. xxvii. 
11  Since several versions of ‘phenomenology’ were developed in the first half of the twentieth century, 
and some of those versions directly opposed Husserl’s idea of phenomenology, it is not that surprising 
that the question ‘what is phenomenology?’ was still being raised some fifty years after Husserl had 
launched his idea of phenomenology with his Logical Investigations in 1900–01. Cf., Pierre 
Thévenaz, ‘Qu’est-ce que la phénoménologie?’, Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, 1952, 9–30; in 
Pierre  Thévenaz, What is Phenomenology? and Other Essays, trans. by James M. Edie (London: 
Quadrange, 1962). 
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fact that we must know what we mean when we refer to ‘early phenomenology’. Even if 
we cannot hope to provide a definition that is either concise or precise, a discussion and 
a characterisation of what is meant by ‘early phenomenology’ are necessary before we 
go any further.  
 
2 .1 .1  OR I G I N S  O F  E ARLY PH E N O M E N O L O G Y  
 
Interpreted broadly as a way of doing philosophy, phenomenology does not have a 
defined starting point. ‘Phenomenology has been practiced in various guises for 
centuries’,12 and Socrates13 and Aristotle14 have been cited as examples of philosophers 
employing a phenomenological approach long before it was given that name. In order to 
understand what phenomenology is, we must narrow our focus somewhat to concentrate 
on those philosophers who attached the word ‘phenomenology’ to this way of doing 
philosophy. 
 It seems appropriate to begin looking for an understanding of what 
phenomenology is with the man often regarded as the founder of the phenomenological 
movement.15 Certainly, the role of Edmund Husserl in the development of 
phenomenology cannot be overlooked, and many of the early phenomenologists 
                                               
12 Smith, David Woodruff, ‘Phenomenology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 
Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta 
 <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/phenomenology/> [accessed 31 October 2012]. 
13 ‘Socrates has often been called —  by Michael Landmann, for instance — a proto-phenomenologist, 
precisely because he spends so much time on unravelling the contradictions and misconceptions 
which frequently result from not returning to the proper understanding of what things themselves are’. 
Josef Seifert, Back to Things Themselves: A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism 
(Boston: Routledge and K. Paul, 1987), p. 14. 
14 John J. Drummond refers to Aristotle as ‘the first phenomenologist of moral experience’. J. J. 
Drummond, ‘Aristotelianism and Phenomenology’, in Phenomenological Approaches to Moral 
Philosophy, ed. by Drummond and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 
15. 
15 Even this designation is disputed. Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, for example, ‘have no hesitation 
in calling [Johannes Daubert] —  and not Husserl —  the true architect of the phenomenological 
movement’. Schuhmann and Smith, ‘Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I’, in Review of 
Metaphysics 39 (1985), p. 763. We must also take into account the involvement of Franz Brentano, 
who, as we shall see, had a key influence on the development of Husserl’s phenomenology. 
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considered themselves, at least at first, to be following Husserl. The extent to which this 
was actually true is a subject of great controversy.16 However, it is useful to set out with 
an understanding of what phenomenology originally meant to Husserl. 
Phenomenology as initially understood by Edmund Husserl in the First Edition 
of the Logical Investigations meant descriptive psychology, and had its origins in 
the project of Brentano. From Brentano, Husserl took over the conviction that 
philosophy is a rigorous science, as well as the view that philosophy consists in 
description and not causal explanation.17  
 
Although Brentano inspired Husserl’s identification of philosophy as a rigorous science, 
it is important to note that ‘from the very start the conception of scientific method had a 
rather different ring for Husserl than for Brentano’.18 Whereas Brentano had in mind 
‘the inductive natural sciences’,19 Husserl, a mathematician by training, considered the 
natural sciences ‘philosophically naive’.20 As time passed, Husserl’s concern with 
achieving a sufficient level of rigour would be part of what motivated him to further 
develop his understanding of phenomenology, towards his transcendental idealism.  
 Husserl’s transcendental turn ‘was alleged to be a repudiation of the earlier 
realism’21 of his thought. There is much dispute over how this change in Husserl’s 
viewpoint should be understood,22 but nevertheless, realism was very important to 
Husserl’s students: 
                                               
16 Husserl’s students from his time in Freiburg, for example, ‘adhered precisely to the late Husserl and 
reproached the earlier students for not having understood the real intention of the master’.  Theodore 
de Boer, ‘The Meaning of Husserl’s Idealism in the Light of his Development’, trans. by H. Pietersma, 
Analecta Husserliana, 2 (1972), p. 322. 
17 Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 7. 
18 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 72. 
19 Ibid. This, however, is true only of Brentano’s understanding of ‘genetic psychology’, the natural 
scientific component of empirical psychology. For ‘descriptive psychology’, Brentano proposed a 
method that, as Moran notes, is not causal, but involves a direct (non-hypothetical), intuitive (non-
theoretical) a priori examination of ‘pure’ psychical-phenomena. See, Franz Brentano, Descriptive 
Psychology, trans. and ed. by Benito Müller (London: Routledge, 1995), p.8. Where Husserl differs 
from Brentano, methodologically, is that Husserl advances a descriptive-eidetic method for Brentano’s 
new science of descriptive psychology. See, Spiegelberg and de Boer. 
20 David Bell, Husserl (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 158. 
21 De Boer, ‘The Meaning of Husserl’s Idealism’, p. 322. 
22 De Boer, for example, takes the view that while Husserl was at one time a realist, ‘the realism of the 
Logical Investigations is a presupposition which must be surrendered if the theme of intentionality is 
to be fully carried through’. Ibid., p. 327. 
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This [realist] conception of the nature and goal of phenomenology allowed 
Reinach and other phenomenologists a manner in which to analyze experience 
with its essential connections without either falling prey to psychologism or 
resorting to Platonism: phenomenology for them was truly a realist alternative.23  
 
Husserl’s perceived departure from this early conception of phenomenology did not 
mean that phenomenology of that kind ceased to exist. Many who belonged to the 
Göttingen and Munich circles of phenomenologists —  in large part having been 
influenced by Husserl’s work as well as by the teaching of Theodor Lipps24 —  stood by 
an early, realist phenomenology and rejected Husserl’s new transcendental approach. 
Reinach, for instance, ‘remained a realist untouched by any transcendentalising 
tendency’.25 The kind of phenomenology to which these philosophers held can be 
identified as ‘early phenomenology’,26 ‘classic phenomenology’,27 realist 
phenomenology or Munich and Göttingen phenomenology.  
 Since his work is the focus of our investigation, let us now turn to Reinach 
himself. Described by Hedwig Conrad-Martius as ‘the phenomenologist par 
excellence’,28 Reinach was a vital influence on the development of the Göttingen 
phenomenological circle.29 Here, though, our expectation of finding a simple definition 
is at its lowest yet. Reinach does not deal in concise definitions; a definition alone, he 
contends, ‘cannot bring the fact itself (der Sache selbst) a hair closer to us’.30 But this 
very opposition to simple definitions tells us something about phenomenology for 
Reinach: phenomenology is concerned with seeing (erschauen) and making evident 
                                               
23 Jaray, ‘Reinach and Bolzano’, p. 473. Thévenaz calls this a ‘realism of ideal essences’, ‘Qu’est ce que 
la phénoménologie?’, p. 13, p. 21. 
24 On Lipps’ relationship to the phenomenological movement, see his profile below, section 2.2.4.1. 
25 Salice, Urteile und Sachverhalte, p. 20. 
26 The term used by the North American Society for Early Phenomenology (NASEP). 
27 Peter H. Spader, Scheler’s Ethical Personalism: Its Logic, Development and Promise (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2002), p. 9. 
28 John F. Crosby, ‘Adolf Reinach’s Discovery of the Social Acts’, p. 143. 
29 Even Husserl is said to have credited Reinach with helping him to understand his own work. ‘“It was 
really Reinach who introduced me to my Logical Investigations, and in an excellent way”, Husserl 
once said lightly and yet in earnest’. Oesterreicher, Walls are Crumbling, p. 100. 
30 Reinach, ‘Concerning Phenomenology’, trans. by Willard; S.W. p. 532. We would generally translate 
‘der Sache selbst’ as ‘the thing itself’; what is meant is the essence that one is aiming to describe. 
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essences given in experience that cannot be simply defined. Reinach’s opposition to 
simple definitions is not a sign of defeatism, but merely the beginning of a more 
conscientious approach to problems. Thus, in his Marburg lecture Über 
Phänomenologie, Reinach states his intention as follows: 
I have not set myself the task of telling you what Phenomenology is. Rather, I 
would like to try to think with you in the phenomenological manner. To talk 
about phenomenology is the most useless thing in the world so long as that is 
lacking which alone can give any talk concrete fullness and intuitiveness: the 
phenomenological way of seeing and the phenomenological attitude. For the 
essential point is this, that phenomenology is not a matter of a system of 
philosophical propositions and truths —  a system of propositions in which all 
who call themselves ‘Phenomenologists’ must believe, and which I could here 
prove to you —  but rather it is a method of philosophizing which is required by 
the problems of philosophy.31  
 
Reinach here indicates that phenomenology is not a set of philosophical answers, but a 
way of approaching philosophical questions enabling ‘concrete fullness and 
intuitiveness’ in talking about such problems. Thus phenomenology, for Reinach, is a 
means to achieve philosophical knowledge, not an end to be pursued in itself. Reinach 
places descriptive psychology among the sciences, while clearly distinguishing it, as 
Brentano initially did in his lectures on Descriptive Psychology at Vienna University 
(1887–1891), from ‘genetic psychology’, which is ‘a science of empirical laws’.32  
 Like Husserl before him, Reinach indicates phenomenology to be concerned 
specifically with eidetic knowledge, knowledge about the essential characters and 
characteristics, or simply the essences of things. This is far from a simple task; far, 
indeed, from a matter of simply providing definitions. ‘If we wish to mark out the class 
of judgments which are propositions (Urteilssätze), for example, as the class which 
consists of all of those propositions that are either true or false, then the essence of the 
proposition and of the judgmental proposition —  that which it is, its “whatness” (Was) 
                                               
31 Ibid.; S.W. p. 531. Reinach’s emphasis. 
32 Ibid.; S.W. p. 533. 
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—  has come no closer to us thereby’.33 There is a significant distance between simply 
intending or grasping something on the one hand, and understanding its essence on the 
other; this distance is by no means an easy one to overcome. Rather than even try, 
sciences whose task it is to directly intuit essences ‘have avoided that task up to now’.34 
Phenomenology as a method aims to succeed where other sciences have so far failed; it 
seeks to intuit ‘apriori knowledge’,35 in the form of essences, despite the difficulties that 
are known to accompany such a task.  
 As previously noted, one of the characteristics of early phenomenology —  
Reinach’s phenomenology included —  is a commitment to realism. Lucinda Brettler 
indicates that this position needs to be clarified: ‘Reinach was a realist. This 
characterisation alone, however, is also misleading’.36 As a phenomenologist, Reinach 
is concerned with what is given in experience. There is no presupposition that any 
specific perception proves that something real is being seen. But specific experiences 
can still be analysed, and insights drawn from them. ‘The fact that we can intuitively 
visualise motion’, for example, ‘gives us absolute evidence of its existential 
possibility’.37 This does not mean that Reinach denies any significance to the ideal. ‘For 
Reinach objectivity [… ] includes both ideal and real existents. By attributing to both 
kinds of existents a status independent of consciousness, Reinach avoids idealism and 
scepticism’.38  
 So far, then, phenomenology appears to us as a philosophical method or 
approach, intended to be rigorous and in some sense scientific, based on a faithful 
description of appearances, in the manner in which they appear, that aims at intuitive 
                                               
33 Ibid.; S.W. p. 532. 
34 Ibid.; S.W. p. 533. 
35 ‘Concerning Phenomenology’, trans. by Willard, passim. 
36 Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach: Chapters in the Theory of Knowledge and Legal 
Philosophy (doctoral thesis; McGill University, 1973), p. 76. 
37 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
38 Ibid., p. 78. Hence, Reinach subscribes to a ‘realism of ideal essences’ as referred to above, n. 23. 
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insight into essential, a priori truth about real and ideal things in themselves.39 
However, not all of these characteristics are universal to all understandings of 
phenomenology. Husserl’s departure from his realist roots, above all, would change 
everything for his early realist philosophers. 
 
2 .1 .2  HU S S E R L’S  T R A N S C E N D E N T A L  T U R N  A N D  L AT E R  PH E N O M E N O L O G Y  
 
Between the publication of his Logical Investigations (1900–1901) and that of his Ideas 
I (1913), Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology was perceived to undergo radical 
changes. The nature of and reasons for these changes are, to say the least, controversial. 
There is not even universal agreement on whether Husserl’s actual project changed at 
all, although there was certainly a process of development in his phenomenological 
method. It is clear, nonetheless, that during this time Husserl came to be divided from 
some —  indeed most, if not all —  of his early students and colleagues over the question 
of what ‘phenomenology’ meant.40 No precise dates can be placed on the change within 
Husserl’s thought, but ‘in 1907 [Husserl] delivered a series of five lectures which, for 
                                               
39 See, Husserl, Ideas I, §66 Faithful Expressions of Clear Data. Unambiguous Terms, and §75 
Phenomenology as a Descriptive Eidetic Doctrine of  Pure Mental Processes. 
40 Of the controversies dividing the early and later phenomenologists, one in particular is worth noting 
here. ‘In retrospect Husserl made Reinach responsible for a kind of Platonism among 
phenomenologists which had distorted the picture of true phenomenology’. Spiegelberg, p. 192. This 
allegation of Platonism against Reinach is a contentious issue in itself. Certainly, Reinach’s initial 
interest in philosophy was inspired by Plato, but it is not accurate to describe his phenomenology as 
outright Platonistic. Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray identifies three charges in particular that have been used 
to suggest that Reinach’s theory of states of affairs is Platonistic. The first, that Reinach believes in 
states of affairs subsisting ‘independent of any judgment or cognition on our part’, is true; in other 
words, Reinach believes that there are such things as true facts. The second point is that Reinachian 
states of affairs ‘constitute a special “realm”’ (a word with ‘blatant Platonistic connotations’) separate 
from the world of objects. This is simply not borne out in Reinach’s use of language; ‘Reinach never 
uses the word “realm” (Gebiet) when describing states of affairs’, and there is no indication that states 
of affairs exist in a world separate from the world of objects, although states of affairs are not objects 
themselves. The third allegation is ‘that states of affairs have an eternal or immutable existence in 
contrast to temporal objects’. This is not accurate either, since for Reinach the existence of an object is 
a state of affairs. If objects are temporal, it is not possible that states of affairs are atemporal. See, 
Baltzer-Jaray, Doorway to the World of Essences, pp. 91-101. 
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the first time, made public the fact that his philosophy had taken a “transcendental turn” 
away from naturalism’.41  
 Husserl’s transcendental turn was only the beginning of a major shift in 
phenomenological thought; or, perhaps better said, it was just one step in his 
development of phenomenology, a process that was already underway and one that 
would continue. Later philosophers who took their cues —  at least to some extent —  
from Husserlian phenomenology would diverge still more radically from the method as 
understood by the Göttingen and Munich phenomenologists. Although Martin 
Heidegger is one of the most prominent names to be associated with phenomenology, 
the meaning that he gave to phenomenology was simply not recognisable as such to 
Husserl’s earlier (or later) students.42 The informal and comparatively short-lived 
Bergzabern circle of phenomenologists gathered largely in opposition to these 
transformations in phenomenological thought, rallying around Reinach’s writings as 
representing, in their minds, the original and true meaning of phenomenology.43 Edith 
Stein, who went on to become a member of the Bergzabern circle after leaving her 
position as Husserl’s assistant, described Husserl’s transcendental approach ‘as a return 
to Kantianism, as an abandonment of that very move towards the object in which one 
saw Husserl’s greatest merit, and of that ontology that signifies the discovery of the 
                                               
41 Bell, Husserl, p. 153.  Husserl himself dates his conversion to transcendental phenomenology around 
this time (1907–1908), after he undertook in his seminars an eidetic comparative analysis of the mode 
of ‘being as thing’ (Sein als Ding) given to outer perception and the mode of ‘being as (conscious) 
experience’ (Sein als Erlebnis) given to inner perception. See, de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s 
Thought, pp. 322-23. 
42 Shortly after Reinach’s death in 1917, Husserl gave Heidegger access to some of Reinach’s material 
(prepared by Edith Stein, Husserl’s assistant at that time) in June 1918. See, Theodore Kisiel, The 
Genesis of Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 75. The 
nature and extent of influence of Reinach on Heidegger's thinking, however, is outside the scope and 
parameters of our study. 
43 On this stage in the history of realist phenomenology, see Joachim Feldes, ‘A Yet Hidden Story —  
Edith Stein and the Bergzabern Circle’ in Intersubjectivity, Humanity, Being. Edith Stein’s 
Phenomenology and Christian Philosophy, ed. by Haydn Gurmin and Mette Lebech (Traugot-Bautz, 
libri nigri, forthcoming). 
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essential structure of the objective world’.44 As far as Husserl was concerned, however, 
his transcendental turn was precisely what was needed to truly follow through his 
phenomenological project, a goal that could not be achieved until he had refuted the 
natural attitude. 
 The precise differences between the early and later approaches to 
phenomenology are a matter of considerable debate. Josef Seifert, for example, asserts 
that throughout his phenomenological project, Husserl remains concerned with ‘getting 
at the essences of things. First, eidetic analysis of essences, then genetic 
phenomenology uncovering the constitution and origin of essences, is his goal’.45 While 
Husserl does indeed continue to discuss essences in Ideas I and beyond, the degree to 
which eidetic analysis is an important or interesting component of transcendental 
phenomenology has been disputed by some commentators. David Michael Levin argues 
that ‘the kind of evidence Husserl ascribes to essences (or to their correlative eidetic 
insights) is not demonstrably possible’,46 and that ‘the Wesensschau, in sum, tends to 
ensnare us in the labyrinths of a mischievous visualism’.47 Dan Zahavi, on the other 
hand, questions even the significance of essences as a concern for Husserl, pointing out 
that ‘this interest in essential structures is so widespread and common in the history of 
philosophy that it is nonsensical to take it as a defining feature of phenomenology’.48 
Certainly, essence has not always been the focus for those investigating Husserl’s 
phenomenology, as Jan Patocka commented:  
                                               
44 Edith Stein, ‘Über die weltanschauliche Bedeutung der Phänomenologie’ (1932) in Welt und Person. 
Beitrag zum christlichen Wahrheitsstreben (Louvain/Freiburg: Nauwelaarts, Herder, 1962), p. 11. 
45 Seifert, Back to Things Themselves, p. 140. 
46 David Michael Levin, ‘Husserlian Essences Reconsidered’, in David Carr and Edward S. Casey, eds., 
Explorations in Phenomenology: Papers of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 171. 
47 Ibid., p. 173. 
48 Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 37. There are, however, 
different meanings to the concept of ‘essence’ in the history of thought, but a phenomenology that did 
not focus on ‘essential structures’ of our experience would be, nonetheless, nonsense for Husserl (as 
he eventually thought of Heidegger’s (controversial) development of his own idea of 
‘phenomenology’). 
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For many years analysts and commentators on Husserlian thought concentrated 
on the transcendental basis of knowledge and on the constitution of being (l’être) 
in transcendental consciousness. During the existential vogue, one rapidly 
passed over the doctrine, expressed in the Logical Investigations and developed 
systematically in the first chapter of Ideas, in the Formal and Transcendental 
Logic and in the Experience and Judgement, of an eidetic intuition as a major 
process yielding general theses which are independent of empiricism.49  
 
 The full range of controversies and interpretations that exist in relation to 
Husserl’s transcendental turn is beyond the scope of our present investigation. Most of 
the approaches we have not covered derive to at least some extent from the work of 
Husserl or that of Heidegger, but each also has its own unique characteristics.50 For our 
current purposes it is sufficient to clearly distinguish between early phenomenology 
(which is what we aim to characterise) and other forms of phenomenology. Whether one 
approach or another is ‘right’ does not have a bearing on the central question of this 
thesis. What we can conclude, nonetheless, is that Reinach subscribes to some version 
of realism in relation to the existence of essences or essential features of our experiences 
which he wishes to examine in his work in philosophy and phenomenology.  
 
2 .1 .3  C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S  O F  E ARLY PH E N O M E N O L O G Y  
 
From the above, we have enough information to lay out a characterisation of early 
phenomenology. This still does not mean that every early phenomenologist understood 
the method or its goals in exactly the same way. However, there is enough common 
ground for us to propose the following set of characteristics: 
                                               
49 Jan Patocka, ‘The Husserlian Doctrine of Eidetic Intuition and Its Recent Critics’, trans. by F. Elliston 
and P. McCormick, in Elliston and McCormick, eds., Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 150. 
50 Heidegger’s interpretation of phenomenology is sufficiently different from Husserl’s, and sufficiently 
influential, ‘that Husserl could not be regarded today, either philosophically or historically, as the only 
founder of twentieth-century phenomenology’. Cyril McDonnell, ‘Brentano’s Revaluation of the 
Scholastic Concept of Intentionality into a Root-Concept of Descriptive Psychology’, Yearbook of the 
Irish Philosophical Society (2006), 124–171, (p. 171). 
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1. Identification with a version of phenomenology as a philosophical approach.51  
2. Description of phenomena, rather than explanation, as the goal of philosophy. 
3. Intuition based on experience as a means to philosophical insight. 
4. The distinction of a real world, external to the experiencing subject, from the 
subject’s experiences as such. 
5. Concern with accessing a priori eidetic knowledge about the ‘things 
themselves’. 
While there is much more to phenomenology than this, for the purposes of our 
investigation, this set of characteristics is sufficient to delineate a field of ‘early 
phenomenology’ within which Reinach’s work on ethics can be understood as a 
contribution. 
 
SECTION TW O  
EA R LY INFLUENCES  
 
The period of early phenomenology to which Reinach belongs, in both a historical and a 
philosophical sense, pre-dates the modern revival of virtue ethics, such as, exemplified, 
for instance, by Elizabeth Anscombe’s essay Modern Moral Philosophy.52 There is, 
nevertheless, a strong case for regarding Aristotle as part of the background to early 
phenomenology, and thus to the associated approaches to ethics.  
 
 
                                               
51 We do not mean here that the characterisation of early phenomenology is recursive or redundant (that 
‘phenomenology’ should be part of the definition of phenomenology). Rather, for the purposes of our 
characterisation, it will be required that the early phenomenologist use that term to describe his or her 
own way of doing philosophy. 
52 First published in Philosophy 33 (1958), pp. 1-19. 
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2.2 .1 .1  A R I S T O T E L I A N I S M  A N D  P H E N O M E N O L O G Y  
 
Brentano was well versed in Aristotle’s philosophy, and wrote several books (including 
his first two published works) on Aristotle.53 With regard to philosophical method, John 
J. Drummond has gone so far as to give the title of ‘the first phenomenologist of moral 
experience’ to Aristotle.54 Likewise, John F. Crosby has likened Scheler’s and von 
Hildebrand’s value-theories in particular to virtue ethics.55 Scheler, however, would not 
have agreed with this likening of his ethics with Aristotle’s, as he considered 
Aristotelian ethics to be an ethics of goods and purposes, and so, fundamentally 
incompatible with a non-formal ethics of values.56 Certainly, there are points of 
distinction between value ethics and virtue ethics, which we will discuss below as we 
examine the relationship between the two approaches. 
 
 
 
                                               
53 Brentano’s first book was Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1862) and his second, his 1866 habilitation thesis was on Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, 
insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poietikos (Mainz, 1867). Brentano turns away from this approach 
to psychology in his next published work in 1874, his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt 
(Leipzig, 1874), wherein he now maintains that the science of psychology is founded in the ‘inner 
perception of our own psychical phenomena’, rather than as the science of the soul of living beings 
(animals, plants, human beings). Cf., Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Book I 
Psychology As A Science, Chapter 2 ‘Psychological Method with Special Reference to its Experiential 
Basis’ (§ 2 ‘Über die Methode der Psychologie, insbesondere die Erfahrung, welche für sie die 
Grundlage bildet’), trans. by Antos. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995), pp. 40–44. Brentano, therefore, switches to and 
subscribes to a Cartesian-Lockean-Humean view of psychology in his idea of a new descriptive 
psychology, a position that Husserl also later advanced in his work in phenomenology. 
54 John J. Drummond, ‘Aristotelianism and Phenomenology’, in Phenomenological Approaches to 
Moral Philosophy, ed. by Drummond and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2002), p. 15. 
55 John F. Crosby, ‘Dietrich von Hildebrand: Master of Phenomenological Value-Ethics’, in 
Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy, p. 494. 
56 ‘Aristotle’s ethics is in essence an ethics of “goods” and “objective purposes,” one that I reject [… ] It 
is only after the collapse of ethics of goods and purposes, with their self-reliant “absolute” world of 
goods, that “non-formal value-ethics” could come into being’. (Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal 
Ethics of Values, trans. by Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1973), 5th ed., p. xxviii) ‘Goods’ for Scheler are the objects that bear values; unlike values 
themselves, goods come into being, cease to be and change in value, and are thus not a suitable basis 
for ethics in the way that values, with their unchanging hierarchy, are. See below, section 2.3.4.4. 
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2.2 .1 .2  A R I S T O T E L I A N  E T H I C S  
 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is divided into ten books;57 the topic of books two to 
four is ‘virtue or excellence of character’.58 Aristotle takes on board the shared idea in 
Greek philosophy that the highest good is happiness,59 and identifies the happy life, the 
life lived well, with the virtuous life, that is, one guided by virtue or excellence.60 
‘Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are 
adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit’.61 Habit (ethos, to 
which Aristotle traces the very origin of the word ethike,62 ethics) has a very important 
role here; developing a virtuous character through habit and training is the first step 
towards becoming a good person and living a good, happy life. As examples of virtues 
identified by Aristotle, Crisp lists ‘courage, temperance, generosity, magnificence, 
greatness of soul, even temper, friendliness, truthfulness, wit, justice and friendship’.63  
 Aristotle indicates that virtue represents moderation between extremes. ‘Excess 
and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue’.64 Perfection in virtue 
means striking a precise balance. Perfect generosity, for example, would mean giving 
exactly the right amount to the right people, no more and no less. This is part of the 
reason why experience and habituation are so important in learning to be virtuous; only 
through experience can one really learn to strike the right balance between excess and 
                                               
57 Of these ten books, ‘three – books v–vii – are shared with the Eudemian Ethics, and usually thought to 
belong to that earlier work’. (Roger Crisp, introduction to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. vii) 
58 Christopher Charles Whiston Taylor, introduction to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Cary, NC: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. xi. 
59 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. by W. D. Ross, in Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. by Mark Warnock 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1973) I 1095a16-20. ‘Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the 
general run of men and people of superior refinement say that [the highest of all goods] is happiness, 
and identify living well and doing well with being happy’. 
60 Ibid., I 1098a 17-19. ‘Human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if 
there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete’. 
61 Ibid., II 1103a 23-25. 
62 Ibid., II 1103a 17-18. 
63 Roger Crisp, introduction to Nicomachean Ethics (1961), p. xviii 
64 Nichomachean Ethics, trans. by Ross, II 1106b 32-33. 
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deficit. To properly recognise virtues and virtuous action calls for phronesis, practical 
wisdom or simply prudence. As it is possible to recognise greater practical wisdom and 
virtue in others than one possesses personally, certain individuals come to be recognised 
by others as possessing wisdom in matters of good, and ‘it is to [these] that one will 
entrust such matters’.65 A person of recognised practical wisdom is referred to as a 
phronimos.  
 Since ‘there is a necessary connection between thinking something and doing 
it’,66 possession of practical wisdom and thus knowledge of what is good will naturally 
lead to good action. ‘Practical wisdom issues commands, since its aim is what ought to 
be done or not to be done’.67 However, Aristotle indicates that this is not a matter of 
total necessity; a person can believe one thing to be best, and yet do something else. 
Aristotle discusses behaviour of this kind under the term akrasia (‘incontinence’).68  
 In discussing the relationship between Aristotelian ethics and modern virtue 
ethics, C. C. W. Taylor puts forward four aspects that are ‘central to the theory [of 
virtue ethics] and broadly Aristotelian in inspiration’. These are ‘(i) the primacy of 
character’, whereby ethical evaluations focus on the character of the agent more than on 
his or her actions; ‘(ii) the primacy of habituation’, whereby the development of the 
character through some kind of habituation is emphasised; ‘(iii) the centrality of moral 
sensibility [or] practical intelligence’, whereby an important role is given to some sense, 
faculty or other property of the human being that allows him or her to intuitively 
recognise the good; and ‘(iv) the centrality of well-being’, whereby the theory 
emphasises the importance of happiness or flourishing through the life well-lived.69  
                                               
65 Ibid., VI 1141a 26-27. 
66 Ackrill, Aristotle’s Ethics, p. 31. 
67 Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Ross, VI 1143a 8-10. 
68 Ackrill, Aristotle’s Ethics, p. 31. 
69 Taylor, introduction to the Nichomachean Ethics, pp. xvi-xvii. 
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 We see aspects (i) and (iii) as particularly prominent in phenomenological value 
theory. The person or personal character is an important bearer of values for Reinach 
and for Scheler,70 and most phenomenological value theorists hold that the feeling of 
values involves a ‘receptivity to value’,71 ‘emotional intelligence’,72 or other intuitive 
sense of what is valuable. In Reinach’s view, sensitivity or receptivity to moral value is, 
in itself, a moral value. Aspect (ii) is at least hinted at by Reinach,73 but generally 
speaking is not prominently featured in value ethics. Aspect (iv) is suggested by 
Reinach’s discussion of the sphere of goods (see chapter three), and is also explored by 
Stein when she discusses the role of values in the development or growth of 
communities and individuals (see chapter four). 
 There is much clearer evidence of an Aristotelian influence in the early 
development of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s ethics. In his 1922 work Sittlichkeit und 
ethische Werterkenntnis,74 von Hildebrand uses the term ‘virtue’ (Tugend) alongside the 
more usual ‘value’, and the very first page contains a citation from the Nicomachean 
Ethics.75 Direct evidence of this influence is not so visible in von Hildebrand’s later, 
major work, Christian Ethics. 
 
                                               
70 In particular, Scheler identifies the ‘moral tenor’ or ‘disposition’ (Gesinnung) of the person as a bearer 
of values. ‘Without a good moral tenor there is no good deed’. (Scheler, Formalism, p. 114) 
71 S.W. p. 307, paragraph 3; Appendix (III). 
72 Mette Lebech, ‘Stein’s Phenomenological Value Theory’, in Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical 
Society (2010), p. 146. 
73 In Grundzüge, Reinach refers to an ‘objective attitude’ of concern with values which a person can be 
led into, for example, through the appreciation of art. S.W. p. 491, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
Reinach’s exact meaning is not entirely clear, but it seems that it is at least somewhat possible to 
habituate oneself in the objective attitude. We will discuss this issue further in chapter three, section 
3.2.1.6. 
74 Written on the occasion of Husserl’s birthday and published in volume 5 of the Jahrbuch, pp. 463-
602. 
75 The reference is to book VI, chapter 13, 1144b 25-30, where Aristotle discusses why virtue is distinct 
from mere accordance with right reason. 
77 
2.2 .1 .3  A R I S T O T L E  A N D  R E I N A C H  
 
Despite the similarities noted above, it is quite difficult to establish a direct influence of 
Aristotle’s ethics on Reinach’s. Reinach does not refer back to Aristotle in his ethics the 
way he does to most of the other philosophers discussed in this chapter. Reinach does 
discuss the ‘pious dream [of the] ancient Greeks’76 that happiness and goodness are 
necessarily linked, a theme present in Aristotle’s ethics, but even here Reinach does not 
refer to Aristotle by name. Reinach does briefly reference Aristotle’s philosophy in 
some of his works (for example, in ‘The Supreme Rules of Rational Inference 
According to Kant’77), but we do not have the same historical evidence for Reinach 
taking an interest in Aristotle as we do for his interest in Plato. 
 Reinach’s value ethics resembles an ethics of virtues in the same way that 
Scheler’s or von Hildebrand’s does. Most of all in his investigation of the ethical 
significance of reflection in Die Überlegung, Reinach emphasises the assessment of the 
person (more precisely, the personal structure) as a bearer of values. He does not refer 
to these values of the personal character by the word ‘virtue’ (Tugend), but the role 
moral values play in his ethics —  in that values of the personal character are evidenced 
in one’s actions, and in that those values will lead a person to prefer actions that are 
valuable —  resembles that of virtues in Aristotelian ethics. Receptivity or sensitivity to 
value, and love or respect of value, are both moral values of the personal character and 
are reflected in the I’s reaching of resolutions to act.78 However, there are noteworthy 
differences here as well. Aristotle considers practical wisdom to be an intellectual 
virtue, rather than a moral virtue or virtue of character,79 whereas Reinach is clear that 
                                               
76 S.W. p. 496, paragraph 5; Appendix (IV). 
77 See ‘The Supreme Rules of Rational Inference According to Kant’, trans. by James M. DuBois, p. 96; 
S.W. p. 65. 
78 See S.W. p. 299, paragraph 2, and p. 301, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
79 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II 1103a 6-8. As translated by Ross: ‘We say that some of the virtues 
are intellectual and others moral, philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being 
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receptivity to value is itself a moral value. Reinach also does not distinguish between 
moral value of the kind borne by persons and that borne by actions, describing actions 
as inherently possessing certain characters of moral value.80  
 As we discuss Reinach’s ethics in the next chapter, these themes will be 
highlighted further. We must accept the caveat, however, that there is no definitive 
evidence of how extensively Reinach read Aristotle himself. An unknown amount of 
Aristotelian influence on Reinach may instead have come to him second-hand through 
other philosophers, and we cannot tell whether or not Reinach was fully aware of its 
origin. 
 
2 .2 .2  K A N T I A N  PH I L O S O P H Y  
 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is, without doubt, one of the most important figures in the 
history of philosophy, especially in a German context. His moral philosophy, laid out 
across three books, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785), Critique of 
Practical Reason (1788), and Metaphysics of Morals (1797), is just part of his wide-
ranging body of philosophical work. By the time of the early phenomenologists, neo-
Kantianism was a dominant school of philosophical thought in Germany. For better or 
for worse, Kant was an inescapable part of the philosophical environment in which 
phenomenology arose, and it is not surprising that —  as we will see below —  Kant is 
the single philosopher most often discussed in Reinach’s extant writings. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
intellectual, liberality and temperance moral’. Roger Crisp instead translates the latter kind of virtues 
as ‘virtues of character’. 
80 ‘Value- and disvalue-character pertain to the project by virtue of its composition’. S.W. p. 292, 
paragraph 1; Appendix (III). 
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2.2 .2 .1  K A N T I A N  P H I L O S O P H Y  A N D  P H E N O M E N O L O G Y  
 
Naturally, Kant never commented on phenomenology; he died fifty-five years before 
Husserl was born. The phenomenologists, on the other hand, had plentiful opportunity 
and cause to comment on Kant’s philosophy, and the early phenomenologists in 
particular found much to agree and disagree with in his work. 
 Kant’s philosophy is associated with —  indeed, ‘inseparable from’81 —  a form 
of ‘transcendental idealism’ to which the early, realist phenomenologists were opposed. 
The ideal, for Kant, means that which is dependent on, or internal to the mind; broadly, 
all that is subjective. The real, by contrast, is all that is external to the mind or 
independent from it. In the empirical sphere, the ‘real’ refers to the ‘objective aspects of 
human experience’;82 in other words, the objects that we see, hear and touch. Kant does 
not want to deny that these objects exist in the empirical sphere. But it is the 
transcendental sphere, the necessary conditions that make experience (including 
sensible experience) possible, not the empirical one that is of central importance for 
philosophical reflection. At the transcendental level, the ideal (that which belongs to and 
is interior to the mind) ‘is used to characterise the universal, necessary, and, therefore, a 
priori conditions of human knowledge’.83 Space and time belong to the transcendentally 
ideal because without them, experience would not be possible; they are a priori 
necessities for our experience of the world. Space and time are not objects of 
experience, therefore, because they are conditions of experience. They are mental forms 
of intuition. On the other hand, within the transcendental sphere, the real is a much 
more limited category. If our knowledge of something real depends in any way upon 
experience, then we know it only empirically as real, not transcendentally. On the 
                                               
81 Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (Yale University 
Press, 1983), p. 3. 
82 Ibid., p. 7. 
83 Ibid., p. 7. 
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transcendental level, reality (still indicating independence of or externality to the mind) 
‘means independence of sensibility and its conditions. A transcendentally real object is 
thus, by definition, a nonsensible object or noumenon’.84 Again, Kant does not mean to 
specifically deny that there is anything transcendentally real; he simply considers this 
‘thing in itself’ to be beyond the reach of philosophical reason, it cannot be known. Thus 
Kant’s notion of ‘the thing in-self’ denotes, essentially, a limit concept of our 
knowledge. For Kant, that which we can really know, a priori, is tightly restricted.85  
 Kant’s limitation of the a priori was opposed by the early, realist 
phenomenologists of Munich and Göttingen. What they understood by the slogan ‘back 
to the things themselves’ was a return to these noúmena that Kant considered to be 
beyond philosophical knowledge. As Josef Seifert puts it: 
Phenomenological realism [… ] holds that ‘things in themselves’ are truly what 
Kant calls them: noúmena, that is, knowable and intelligible objects of human 
knowledge, instead of unknowable X’s as Kant believed them to be (thereby 
belying the very meaning of the term ‘noúmenon’ which means ‘the intelligible’, 
that which is understandable or understood).86  
 
Yet it is not so clear that Husserl’s own phenomenological project was ever 
incompatible with neo-Kantianism, and transcendental idealism would ultimately be a 
hallmark of Husserl’s phenomenology as it matured. The extent to which Husserl’s 
transcendental turn was inspired by Kant is unknown, but Husserl did show a ‘sudden 
and intense interest in Kantian thought’ prior to that turn.87 Edith Stein, for one, saw 
Husserl’s adoption of a transcendental idealist position as ‘a return to Kantianism’.88  
                                               
84 Ibid., p. 7. 
85 ‘It has been customary to say, even of much knowledge that is derived from empirical sources, that we 
have it or are capable of having it a priori, meaning that we do not derive it immediately from 
experience, but from a universal rule —  a rule which is itself, however, borrowed from experience. 
Thus we would say of a man who undermined the foundations of his house, that he might have known 
a priori that it would fall, that he need not have waited for the experience of its actual falling. But still 
he could not know this completely a priori. For first he had to learn through experience that bodies are 
heavy, and therefore fall when their supports are withdrawn’. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by 
Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 43. 
86 Seifert, Back to Things in Themselves, p. 2. 
87 Bell, Husserl, p. 153.  Nowhere, however, is Husserl closer, philosophically speaking, to Kant than at 
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 Whatever their disagreements, not all phenomenologists were entirely 
dismissive of Kant or his philosophy. Scheler in particular had a great deal of respect 
for Kant, as we shall see in our profile on Scheler, below. Reinach described Kant’s 
insights into ethics as a ‘deep enrichment of the world of human thought, however one 
might assess it’.89 However much their opinions on Kant and Kantianism differed, it is 
no accident that every phenomenologist had such an opinion; Kant had a very important 
presence in the philosophical environment in which phenomenology developed. 
 
2.2 .2 .2  K A N T ’S  E T H I C S  
 
Despite the ‘deep rift’90 that separates it from the realist phenomenological approaches 
to ethics which chiefly concern us here, Kant’s ethics had a demonstrable influence on 
the development of Reinach’s philosophy. Thus, it is appropriate —  especially given 
some of our later comments in discussing Scheler —  to discuss Kantian ethical theory. 
Many phenomenologists reacted against Kant and were critical of his philosophy in 
general, and this is no less true when it comes to his ethics, as we shall see below and in 
subsequent sections. 
 Kantian ethics centres on the concept of duty. According to Kant, there is a pure, 
formal, a priori moral law; it is the duty of all rational beings to act in accordance with 
this law, but more than that, to be moral, one must act out of a sense of this duty. Thus, 
Kantian ethics exclusively assesses the will, based not only on whether it obeys the law, 
                                                                                                                                         
the time of his writing of the Logical Investigations, for, in that work Husserl subscribes to the dual 
experiences of a valid normative logical consciousness as such as well as the experiences of natural-
factual consciousness as such, though the latter is not a concern in his eidetic descriptions of valid 
logical experiences. He, nevertheless, subscribes to Kant’s two domain theory of consciousness, 
normative and factual consciousness, characteristic of human beings. 
88 Stein, ‘Über die weltanschauliche Bedeutung der Phänomenologie’, p. 11. Husserl, however, never 
began his philosophizing outside of Kant’s perspective. See, previous note. 
89 S.W. p. 500, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
90 Steven Galt Crowell, ‘Kantianism and Phenomenology’, in Phenomenological Approaches to Moral 
Philosophy, p. 48. 
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but also the reasons why it does so. ‘Action from “good will”, according to Kant, is 
always good and can never be bad, and is therefore “good without qualification” or 
“unreservedly good”.’91 Thus, 
An action does not derive its moral value from the results it succeeds in bringing 
about, but from ‘the maxim’, as Kant calls it, that is, from the type of willed 
action intended by the agent. Kant therefore believes that morally good actions 
[… ] are actions carried out ‘from duty’. Such actions, he says, have an inner 
worth.92  
 
The moral law ‘is a supreme principle of morality which informs all the particular moral 
rules but does not itself refer to any specific types of action’.93 According to Kant, these 
specific types of actions (such as theft and murder) are based on empirical concepts that 
have no place in the a priori moral law. Kant provides three formulations of this moral 
law, not separate laws, but different ways of understanding the same central law: 
1. ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law’;94 
2. ‘So act that you treat humanity in your own person and in the person of 
everyone else always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means’;95 
and 
3. ‘So act as if [you] were through [your] maxim always a legislating member in 
the universal Kingdom of Ends’.96  
These three formulations are as close as Kant comes to presenting the categorical 
imperative in a concrete form. Specific actions, specific goods of any kind, do not play a 
                                               
91 H.B. Acton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 12. Kant explains the sense in 
which the good will is good without qualification as follows: ‘A good will is not good because of what 
it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its 
volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all 
that could merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the 
sum of all inclinations’. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 8. 
92 Acton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, p. 12. 
93 Ibid., p. 20. 
94 Ibid., p. 21. 
95 Ibid., p. 35. 
96 Ibid. 
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role here, except inasmuch as they can be determined by the categorical imperative. 
Thus conformity with and respect for the categorical imperative as a formal principle is 
the duty of the will. ‘Respect’ (Achtung) or ‘reverence’ has a particular significance 
here, ‘quite different from the feeling someone has when he contemplates an individual 
who is beautiful, clever, powerful or successful. He can admire such people, but 
admiration is not “awareness of a rule that abolishes my self-love” as reverence for the 
moral law does’.97  
 That beauty and intelligence would generally be considered values (but not 
moral values) in phenomenological value-theory helps to highlight how Kantian ethics 
and realist value-ethics are radically opposed to one another. In Kant’s view, the kind of 
appreciation that comes from what a phenomenologist would call experiences of value-
feeling is simply of a lesser order than appreciation of the pure goodness of the moral 
law. His arguments did not go unanswered. Many phenomenologists of ethics directly 
addressed their disagreements with Kant in their writings. We will see some of 
Reinach’s criticisms of Kant below; criticisms by other phenomenologists discussed 
here will be covered in their respective sections. 
 
2.2 .2 .3  K A N T  A N D  R E I N A C H  
 
In his surviving philosophical writings, Reinach engaged directly with Kant more than 
with any other past philosopher. In general, Reinach is highly critical of Kant’s 
philosophy, but not dismissive of his insights. What he chiefly takes issue with is Kant’s 
position on the a priori. He accepts that empirical data is, by definition, not a priori 
knowledge, but contends that ‘[Kant] had confused “non-formal” with “empirical” [and] 
“a priori” with “formal.” [… ] The placement of empirical and formal as opposites, 
                                               
97 Ibid., p. 14. 
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however, is not justified’.98 This contention is central to Reinach’s entire commitment 
to eidetic analysis: 
(T)he restrictiveness with which Kant conceived of the apriori could not but 
become disastrous for subsequent philosophy. In truth, the realm of the apriori is 
incalculably large. Whatever objects we know, they all have their “what,” their 
“essence”; and of all essences there hold essence-laws {Wesensgesetze}.99  
 
On this basis, Reinach (like Scheler100) argues for the possibility of a non-formal a 
priori foundation for ethics, in that although we grasp values in experience, the values 
themselves have a priori status and cannot be dismissed as empirical data. Thus, even 
though it is true that the bearers of value in the world constantly change, and we only 
know which objects bear value as we experience that value, our a priori knowledge of 
the world of values is a sound basis for ethics. The focus for Reinach and his fellow 
phenomenologists of values is not, therefore, on individual experiences of value, but on 
the essence of the valuable and of our experiences of it. 
 In the next chapter, we will discuss the formal moral law that is part of 
Reinach’s own ethics. For now we will only note that for all the ways he criticises Kant, 
Reinach never casts doubt on the idea that the moral oughts and imperatives of this law 
can be known the same way Kant’s categorical imperative is to be known: through 
reason. This is ultimately an area of ambiguity in Reinach’s ethics, as he never explains 
how the formal moral law is to become known. If the formal moral law is recognised by 
acts of cognition of the same kind in which values are grasped, then Reinach is close to 
positing value-sensitivity as a general practical wisdom or phronesis. However, it is also 
possible that Reinach saw the moral law as something deducible by reason, requiring no 
special sensitivity or receptivity; a position closer to Kant’s. Reinach’s claim that at 
                                               
98 Ibid. 
99 ‘Concerning Phenomenology’, trans. by Willard; S.W. p. 546. 
100 ‘Contrary to Kant, we recognise an emotive apriorism as a definite necessity, and we demand a new 
division of the false unity of apriorism and rationalism that hitherto has existed’. Scheler, Formalism, 
p. 65. 
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least some of the principles of the formal moral law are ‘self-evident’101 lends weight to 
the latter interpretation over the former. 
 
2 .2 .3  F R A N Z  BR E N T A N O  
 
If Edmund Husserl was the father of phenomenology, then Franz Brentano (1838-1917) 
might be called its grandfather; however, he ‘stayed demonstratively aloof’ from the 
phenomenological movement.102 Brentano lectured at the University of Vienna between 
the years 1874 and 1895, where his students included Husserl (1884–1886) and later 
Sigmund Freud. Husserl later wrote that when it came to choosing ‘between staying in 
mathematics and devoting my life to philosophy, Brentano’s lectures [on descriptive 
psychology] were the deciding factor’.103  
 Brentano practised philosophy in a place and time dominated overwhelmingly 
by neo-Kantianism, which he viewed as a stifling dogma and the final, catastrophic 
phase in a historical cycle within philosophy. This cycle had begun with Plato and the 
golden age of thought that his work inspired; from there, it followed a steady decline to 
the time of Kant himself, and the neo-Kantian school represented its lowest point.104 
Ultimately, however, with his insistence on a descriptive a priori method of enquiry in 
philosophy (descriptive psychology), ‘Brentano became part of a back-to-Kant 
                                               
101 S.W. p. 503, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). 
102 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 20. 
103 Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, trans. by Linda L. McAllister and Margarte Schättle, in 
The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by McAllister (London: Duckworth, 1976) , p. 47. 
104 Brentano’s historical cycle had four phases. It began with a period of ‘ascending development’ 
characterised by a ‘lively and pure theoretical interest’ and a ‘method that is essentially appropriate to 
nature.’ This led into a decline as pragmatic motives began to dilute the purity of the investigative 
endeavour, followed by a ‘time of predominating scepticism’ which paralysed philosophy altogether, 
before finally, in a backlash against scepticism, and ‘with pathologically intensified enthusiasm, 
people start once more to form philosophical dogmas.’ (Mezei and Smith, The Four Phases of 
Philosophy, pp. 85-86) Brentano considered neo-Kantianism to exemplify this disastrous final phase. 
(Ibid., p. 99) 
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movement —  despite his critique of Kant’s idealism, with which the decay of modern 
philosophy begins’.105  
 
2.2 .3 .1  B R E N T A N O  A N D  P H E N O M E N O L O G Y  
 
Brentano’s lectures on descriptive psychology, delivered in Vienna between 1887 and 
1891, had an important role in inspiring Husserl’s phenomenology.106 Brentano’s 
rediscovery and development of the Scholastic theory of intentionality was a vital 
inspiration to Husserl.107 But as we saw in section one of this chapter, there was more to 
Brentano’s influence than this. Brentano’s method of descriptive psychology inspired 
the phenomenological method of describing things themselves as they are given in 
experience. Brentano also inspired Husserl’s aspirations toward establishing philosophy 
as a rigorous science, his opposition to logical psychologism, and in many aspects of his 
descriptive-psychological approach generally. More than this, Brentano ‘gave [Husserl] 
the problems with which he was to concern himself throughout his entire career and 
which drove him to ever more radical solutions’.108  
 The fact that Brentano never identified himself with the phenomenological 
movement does not mean that his philosophical position was all that far apart from 
Husserl’s at certain times. Brentano (like Karl Stumpf, a pupil of Brentano from his 
earlier Würburg period and another important influence on Husserl) ‘could hardly have 
                                               
105 Theodore de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, trans. by Theodore Plantinga (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 107. 
106 Husserl did not personally attend Brentano’s lectures on descriptive psychology, as he had left Vienna 
before Brentano first delivered them, but instead read a transcript of the lectures after the fact. (See 
McDonnell,  ‘Brentano and Intentionality’, p. 125) 
107 ‘Throughout his career in philosophy, Husserl reiterated the point that he began his philosophical path 
of thinking in phenomenology and phenomenological research in the aftermath of Brentano’s re-
introduction of the Scholastic concept of intentionality, and his transformation of it into a root-concept 
of descriptive psychology’. McDonnell, ‘Brentano and Intentionality’, pp. 124-25. 
108 De Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, p. xx. 
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been expected to join a movement started by one of their students’.109 This point is all 
the more significant in Brentano’s case, as Stumpf and Husserl each independently state 
in reminiscences of Brentano that, though he was ‘against the development of a 
school’,110 he was prone to be quite critical of his own students if their philosophical 
development seemed to diverge significantly from his own.111 For his own part, 
Husserl’s ‘sustained critique of Brentano’,112 in particular his allegations of logical 
psychologism in spite of Brentano’s vocal rejection of that position, inevitably 
contributed to whatever ill-feeling existed between Brentano and Husserl.  
 The greatest philosophical difference between Brentano and the early 
phenomenologists lies in Brentano’s rejection of eidetic analysis, for, ‘according to 
Brentano [… ] there are no essences’.113 There is also an important difference in the 
degree to which Brentano was committed to a phenomenology-like method. In his 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), Brentano’s descriptive psychology 
‘had only a subordinate function: it served as a preliminary for genetic psychology’.114 
                                               
109 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 6. 
110 Carl Stumpf, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, trans. by Linda L. McAllister and Margarte 
Schättle, in The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by McAllister (London: Duckworth, 1976), p. 44. 
111 Stumpf writes: ‘If he encountered basic intuitions in his students’ publications which were 
considerably different from his own, and which were not thoroughly justified and defended on the 
spot, he was inclined to consider them at first as unmotivated, arbitrary statements, even though they 
may have been subject to several years’ thorough study [… ] Occasional ill-feelings were unavoidable 
in the face of this, just as has happened between other teachers and students’. Ibid. Husserl 
corroborates this: ‘I knew how much it agitated [Brentano] when people went their own way, even if 
they used his ideas as a starting point. He could often be unjust in such situations; this is what 
happened to me, and it was painful’.  Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, p. 53. 
112 Dermot Moran, ‘Husserl’s Critique of Brentano in the Logical Investigations,’ Manuscrito, vol. xxiii, 
no. 2 (2000), p. 166. 
113 Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology’, in The Philosophy of Brentano, p. 98. 
Cf. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, ‘Appendix (1911), Supplementary Remarks, 
IX ‘On Genuine and Fictitious Objects’, pp. 291–301. Brentano believed that universal a priori 
judgements, e.g. Colour implies extension, could be re-interpreted, without loss of meanings, as 
negative existential judgments: ‘there are no coloured things that are not extended’. Thus he can retain 
his Aristotelian presupposition that only individual things exist at the basis of perception for a priori 
judgements, and see Husserl’s assertion of the existence of ‘general objects’ or  ‘essences’, such as 
‘colour in general’, as platonic fictive entities. Husserl’s point that something general is also posited in 
such judgements, and that the judgements is about ‘colour’ itself, as a general object, and not a 
judgement that can be reduced to empirical judgments about existing coloured things (that, in 
principle, are open to correction). 
114 Theodorus de Boer, ‘The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano: Its Two Functions and Their 
Significance for Phenomenology’, trans. by Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schättle, in The 
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Genetic or explanatory psychology ‘had to take place according to the method of the 
natural sciences’;115 no descriptive method could be substituted for that. However, his 
view and function of descriptive psychology changed over time; ‘by 1889 [descriptive 
psychology] had acquired an autonomous position which is connected with its new 
function: establishing the foundations for the normative sciences’.116 Ethics, logic and 
aesthetics are included among these, as Brentano considered all three to be normative 
disciplines concerned with the correctness of judgment that could be defended (and 
could only be defended) through a priori judgements, not empirical matters of fact. An 
immoral practice (for example, that of slavery in Europe during the colonial era) cannot 
be defended by a matter of fact (in this case, the role played by slaves in developing and 
supporting many colonial economies). 
 
2.2 .3 .2  B R E N T A N O ’S  E T H I C S  
 
Today, Brentano is known ‘above all [as] Husserl’s teacher’ and as a far-reaching 
influence on the development of phenomenology.117 This was not always where his 
fame lay, however, for, ‘Brentano’s reputation in Austria in the first decades of [the 
twentieth] century, outside the narrow circle of philosophers and theoretical 
psychologists, was principally as an ethicist’.118 Brentano had in fact been a Catholic 
priest for some years (between 1864 and 1873), but experienced difficulties over his 
religious vocation in the 1870s, particulary over the doctrine of Papal infallibility. He 
ultimately resigned from the priesthood prior to taking up his post at the University of 
                                                                                                                                         
Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by Linda L. McAlister (London: Duckworth, 1976), p. 101. 
115 Ibid., p. 102. 
116 Ibid., p. 106. 
117 Balasz M. Mezei and Barry Smith, The Four Phases of Philosophy (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 
1998), p. 1. 
118 Barry Smith, ‘Kafka and Brentano: A Study in Descriptive Psychology’, in Structure and Gestalt: 
Philosophy and Literature in Austria-Hungary and her Successor States, ed. by Barry Smith 
(Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1981), p. 129. 
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Vienna in 1874. Perhaps not coincidentally, Brentano’s work on ethics from after this 
period lacks the religious elements to be found in the work of Scheler and von 
Hildebrand. 
 Brentano first identifies the task of ethics with a descriptive method in his 1889 
lecture ‘Vom Ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis’,119 in which he attempts to establish a 
basic theory of ethics, making the ethical relatable to pure experience. In this work, 
Brentano forms a direct association between the goodness of a thing or action and the 
experience of love. ‘His main proposition is that what we know, when we know that a 
thing is good in itself, is that the feeling of love towards that thing (or pleasure in that 
thing) is “right” (richtig). Similarly, that a thing is bad, is merely another way of saying 
that hatred of that thing would be “right”’.120 However, Brentano ‘denied that 
phenomena of love and hate alone could provide a criterion of ethical correctness’.121 
Something was needed that was given with absolute evidence; such absolutely evident 
givenness equates to objectivity, or as near to it as matters for the purposes of 
descriptive psychology.122  
 Further developing this line of thought in Descriptive Psychology, Brentano 
examines acts of judgement and of emotion side by side. Both acts of judgement and of 
emotion are divided into being either positive or negative. A positive act of judgement 
affirms something; a positive act of emotion represents a positive or favourable attitude 
(a ‘pro-attitude’, such as love).123 A negative act of judgement denies something; a 
negative act of emotion rejects, hates or vilifies. But distinct from the positivity or 
negativity of an act of judgement is its correctness, for, a judgement can be correct or 
                                               
119 Translated by R. M. Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schneewind as The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right 
and Wrong (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1969). 
120 G. E. Moore, review of The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, in International Journal of 
Ethics, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Oct 1903), p. 115. 
121 Mezei and Smith, Kafka and Brentano, p. 130. 
122 Ibid., p. 131. 
123 Wilhelm Baumgartner, ‘Franz Brentano: The Foundation of Value Theory and Ethics’, in 
Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy, p. 132. 
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incorrect, depending on whether it corresponds with evidence. So too, Brentano 
concludes, with emotions, that it is one thing to love an intentional (intended) object of 
that act of love, but ‘love is correctly characterized if we notice that this intention itself 
is worthy of love (and an incorrect love lacks these characteristics)’.124 So there are 
correct and incorrect emotional reactions, just as there are correct and incorrect 
judgements. 
 From here, Brentano puts forward a set of principles on which a morally correct 
course of action can be chosen. The principle of summation of good indicates that some 
goods and evils are greater and lesser than others, and that a greater, more certain or 
longer-lasting good is to be preferred over a lesser, less certain or shorter-lasting one 
(and conversely, a lesser, less certain or shorter-lasting evil is to be preferred over a 
greater, more certain or longer-lasting one).125 The principle of bonum progressionis 
states an order of preference for pleasure and displeasure in the good and bad; it is better 
to take pleasure in the good than to take pleasure in the bad, and better to take 
displeasure in the bad than displeasure in the good; but it is also better to take pleasure 
in the good than displeasure in the bad. 
 This system of theoretical preferences forms the basis for a practical ethics of 
choices and preference. The correct moral choice consists in choosing the most 
preferable action that is possible. Both of these criteria are important because the choice 
must be made on the basis of preference for the good it represents, yet it must also 
                                               
124 Ibid. 
125 As fully expanded by Baumgartner: ‘that a sum of goods is to be preferred to a partial good, and 
conversely, that a partial bad is to be preferred to a sum of bads; the good that lasts longer than a good 
that is otherwise the same is to be preferred; the summation of mental states is to be preferred to a 
single one; some good known to be real is to be preferred to a probable or presumed one; and the more 
probable good is to be preferred to a good that is otherwise the same, but less probable’. Ibid., pp. 
133-34. 
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involve a resolution to carry out an action one can indeed perform. Concisely, 
Brentano’s imperative is to ‘choose the best that is obtainable’.126  
 More broadly, Brentano’s conception of the moral life involves maximising 
one’s usefulness to as many others as possible. The reminiscence of this ‘usefulness’ to 
a principle of utility is not accidental; in The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, 
Brentano states: 
We have established a supreme moral precept [… ] that can be regarded neither 
as altruistic nor as egoistic, neither as hedonistic nor as ascetic. If anyone wants 
to call it a utilitarian principle, he is free to do so. To make oneself as useful as 
possible to as many beings as possible is to strive for the best end attainable.127  
 
However, utility here does not mean maximising pleasure or happiness as such. Only 
appropriate pleasure, pleasure as a correct emotional reaction, has ethical importance for 
Brentano. 
 Even though Brentano does not refer to values in his ethics, his development of 
the concept of correct and incorrect emotional acts, and in particular the linking of this 
correctness to experiential evidence, are clearly reminiscent of a realist theory of values. 
In particular, the idea that certain objects of experience are correctly loved aligns with 
later phenomenological views on the feeling of value in relation to objects that bear it. 
More broadly, realist value theory owes a great deal to Brentano’s theory of 
intentionality, as Reinach himself acknowledged.128  
 
                                               
126 Ibid., p. 135. Behind this is Brentano’s ‘realistic’ view that one cannot have a moral duty to bring 
about something that is unobtainable or that cannot be done. 
127 Brentano, The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, trans. by Elizabeth H. Schneewind (London: 
Routledge and K. Paul, 1973), p. 204. 
128 S.W. p. 504, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
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2.2 .3 .3  B R E N T A N O  A N D  R E I N A C H  
 
Reinach met Brentano in person at least once, during a visit to Florence with Dietrich 
von Hildebrand in 1911.129 Reinach references Brentano’s philosophy in Grundzüge,130 
though without naming any particular works as sources, providing documentary 
evidence that he was familiar with Brentano’s philosophy. That he would have been is 
almost inevitable; at the very least, he would have encountered Brentano’s ideas 
through their influence on Husserl, and thus on the development of phenomenology as a 
whole. Thus, whether directly or indirectly, Reinach’s value-theory —  specifically, his 
position that we attain knowledge about good and evil through intentional experiences 
of objective reality which he published in his On the Origin of our Knowledge of Right 
and Wrong in 1889 —  owes a debt to Brentano’s ethics. 
 
2 .2 .4  T H E O D O R  L I P P S  
 
Theodor Lipps (1851-1914) was a highly influential philosopher and psychologist. 
Teaching philosophy at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, he was the 
founder of the Akademische Verein für Psychologie (Academic Society for 
Psychology), to which Reinach and the other Munich phenomenologists initially 
belonged. However, Lipps is best remembered today as a psychologist, principally for 
his pioneering work on sympathy and the subconscious.131 Like Brentano, Lipps also 
taught Sigmund Freud. Unlike Brentano, Lipps was one of the most prominent early 
supporters of the theory of the unconscious mind, which Brentano rejected.132  
                                               
129 Alice von Hildebrand, The Soul of a Lion: Dietrich von Hildebrand: A Biography (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2000), p. 112. 
130 See S.W. p. 503, paragraph 3, and 504, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
131 For a concise account of Lipps’ work from the perspective of psychology, see Montag, Gallinat and 
Heinz, ‘Theodor Lipps and the Concept of Empathy: 1851-1914’, in The American Journal of 
Psychiatry, vol. 165, no. 10 (October 2008). 
132 Brentano follows Locke’s view that whatever is in consciousness must be conscious. Thus he sets 
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2.2 .4 .1  L I P P S  A N D  P H E N O M E N O L O G Y  
 
Lipps did not identify with phenomenology as such, but his later philosophy was 
somewhat influenced by Husserl’s. He developed a ‘psychological technique for 
painstaking yet flexible descriptions of subjective phenomena’ that had a lasting 
influence on the Munich phenomenologists.133 Lipps was criticised by Husserl in the 
Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations for his psychologism.134 Lipps did not react 
negatively to this criticism, however; on the contrary, after the Logical Investigations 
was published he ‘began to send students to Husserl’.135 Lipps also pioneered the 
important notion of das Ich, the I, ‘conscious life prior to numerical differentiation into 
individuals pursuing individual conscious lives’.136  
 Lipps’s students included Pfänder, Daubert, Reinach, Theodor Conrad and 
Moritz Geiger, who took part in the Munich invasion of Göttingen, and who joined the 
phenomenological movement already equipped with Lipps’s descriptive technique. 
While the Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists, his own students included, rejected 
Lipps’ psychologistic views, his influence on them endured.  
 
2.2 .4 .2  L I P P S’S  E T H I C S  
 
Lipps’s main work on ethics is a collection of lectures published together in 1899 as Die 
Ethischen Grundfragen: Zehn Vorträge. Each deals with a different topic within ethics: 
egoism and altruism, motivation, eudaimonism and utilitarianism, autonomy and 
                                                                                                                                         
aside the ‘hypothesis’ of the unconscious in any treatment of consciousness as such in the elaboration 
of his idea of descriptive psychology in his 1874 study of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. 
133 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 197. 
134 Dermot Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology (Cambridge Malden: MA Polity Press, 
2005), p. 23. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Marianne Sawicki, Body, Text and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the 
Phenomenology of Edith Stein (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 12. 
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heteronomy, duty and inclination, moral norms, purposes, social organisms, the freedom 
of the will, and responsibility and punishment. As he covers each of these topics in 
existing ethical or legal theory, Lipps builds up his own theories on ethics and on 
correct motivation.  
 Lipps refers to values (Werte) in his ethics, but here, ‘value’ does not connote an 
objective hierarchy of good and bad. For Lipps, a human being’s value-judgements are 
not graspings of outward reality, but are inner responses shaped by prevalent morality 
and tradition.137 Thus, each individual human being has his or her own perspective 
when it comes to values. In a certain sense, Lipps’s value theory is psychological rather 
than realist, as it focuses on values as inner responses of the individual subject rather 
than as objectively given phenomena. 
 Lipps’s ethics, like Kant’s, is voluntaristic; that is, it is primarily concerned with 
the assessment of the will, and not of actions, persons or personal qualities as such. 
Unlike Kant, however, Lipps does not call for the will to act out of duty to universal 
laws. Rather, Lipps’s chief concern is a kind of authenticity: all willing ought to be 
motivated by acknowledgement of one’s own striving or conation (Streben), distinct 
from either egoism or altruism.138 This, therefore, stresses being motivated by the 
feeling of one’s own value (Eigenwertgefühl). 
 Lipps’s term for this particular motivational attitude is ‘self-respect’ 
(Selbstachtung).139 This attitude means that one must not only begin by respecting 
oneself, but also act in such a way so as not to lose that self-respect.140 In this attitude it 
                                               
137 ‘Morals, traditions, ethical judgements and prejudices prevalent in my environment [… ] can all 
determine me in my ethical valuations’. Theodor Lipps, Die Ethischen Grundfragen, p. 22. 
138 Lipps spends much of the erster Vortrag carefully describing egoism and altruism, attempting to give 
them firm definitions that comply with customary usage. Egoism is motivated entirely by good or 
pleasure for oneself, altruism by good for others. Lipps argues that any further extension of these 
terms that might cause them to overlap with his basic motive of ethics would be artificial and contrary 
to their use in everyday language. 
139 Lipps, Die Ethischen Grundfragen, p. 29. 
140 Ibid., p. 30. 
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is still possible to seek out goals that seem egoistic. But whereas the egoist cares only 
about goods and pleasures for himself or herself, regardless of where they come from, 
the self-respecting individual is not satisfied to receive these things through the efforts 
of others or by accident, without working for them. To receive goods and pleasures that 
one has not earned does not bring to the subject ‘the delightful sense of power 
(Kraftbewußtsein), the entirely unique, liberating and extending feeling of can-do, the 
energy or strength of my will’.141 Happiness, then, stems not from succeeding in 
realising the goals of actions, but from the actions themselves inasmuch as they are 
expressions of one’s own will. 
 There is such thing as a valuing of objects for Lipps, as seen when one takes 
enjoyment in seeing something appealing. The enjoyment in these cases ‘relates not to 
the object, but to my [inner] activity, or to me’.142 The fact that an object has the 
potential to inspire such a response, however, is a function of that object. ‘The objective 
value of a thing is its possibility —  which resides entirely in the thing —  for 
engendering a feeling of value’.143 Thus, the object does not truly have value in itself, 
but the qualities of that object that inspire a value response in a person are inherent in 
the object. 
 For Lipps, the basic motive of self-respect is always good in itself. Evil arises 
from failure to properly respect one’s own strivings and values, and to seek this feeling 
of satisfaction in the execution of one’s own will. Virtue is something defined by what 
one is or does, and not by what one is not or by what one does not do. ‘Virtue is 
competence, inner life-power [… ]. The criminal can be more virtuous than dozens of 
“virtuous” human beings […  who] do no evil, harm nobody, and through their actions 
                                               
141 Ibid., my emphasis. 
142 Ibid., p. 35. 
143 Ibid., p. 123. 
96 
do not disturb the peace of individuals or the community’.144 As a general moral 
principle, Lipps proposes: ‘At all times, conduct yourself inwardly in such a way that in 
respect of your inward behaviour you can always remain true to yourself’.145 This is far 
from being a simple doctrine of selfishness or self-interest because certain ethical norms 
are supported by the need to be true to oneself. For example, to lie to another person or 
to act otherwise in a deceitful or treacherous manner means to misrepresent oneself and 
contradict one’s own true values. 
 For Lipps, the identification of the positive with goodness is universal. ‘Evil is, 
in itself, a negative. It is the non-being of the good. Everything positive is good’.146 
Something is always to be preferred over nothing, which Lipps gives as a reason why 
the death penalty is morally unjustified: ‘even the worst human being is still morally 
more than the nothing with which the death penalty would replace him or her’.147  
 
2.2 .4 .3  L I P P S  A N D  R E I N A C H  
 
Despite not being identified as a phenomenologist himself, Lipps had a very significant 
influence on the Göttingen (and, of course, especially the Munich) phenomenologists. It 
was his students who made up the Munich ‘invasion’ of Göttingen in 1905, and several, 
including Reinach, would go on to become established members of the Göttingen circle. 
Despite having turned away from Lipps, Reinach and the other Munich 
phenomenologists had their understanding of phenomenology somewhat influenced by 
Lipps’s thought.148  
                                               
144 Ibid., p. 133. 
145 Ibid., p. 134. 
146 Ibid., p. 301. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Reinach and Lipps also seem to have remained on good terms despite Reinach’s turn away from 
Lipps. Reinach’s first application for habilitation was in Munich under Lipps; only when this failed to 
take place did he begin his successful application in Göttingen. 
97 
 Reinach’s careful distinguishing of the moral attitude from both egoism and 
altruism closely resembles Lipps’ discussion in the erster Vortrag. However, Reinach 
criticises Lipps for his voluntaristic ethics, just as he does Kant, considering it an 
unjustified reduction in the scope of ethics. Reinach also criticises Lipps for his 
identification of all positive motivation with goodness, and evil with a lack or absence. 
Reinach argues that a sadistically cruel human being takes active pleasure in the 
suffering of others, which by Lipps’ account would make him morally better than 
another person who simply lacks sympathy (Mitgefühl) for the suffering of others.149 
Interestingly, the influence of Lipps on Reinach is also visible in a stylistic sense. The 
structure of the early sections of Reinach’s Grundzüge resembles that of Lipps’ 
Ethischen Grundfragen and Reinach even uses some of the same hypothetical scenarios 
as Lipps to highlight his points.  
 
SECTION THREE  
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT 
 
Earlier in this chapter, we discussed the meaning of phenomenology and what 
distinguishes ‘early phenomenology’ from later approaches. The division between early 
and later phenomenological ethics can be made along similar lines. Early 
phenomenological ethics was characterised by its realist view of the experience of 
values. As a term, value (Wert) ‘invaded philosophical discussions at the turn of the 19th 
and 20th centuries’,150 and was reasonably well-established by the time of the 
phenomenologists. As we saw in the previous section, value has a role in Lipps’s ethics. 
What distinguishes Lipps’ value theory from that of the early phenomenologists is the 
                                               
149 See S.W. p. 503, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
150 Jürgen Gebhardt, ‘Die Werte; Zum Ursprung eines Schlüsselbegriffs der politisch-sozialen Sprache 
der Gegenwart in der deutschen Philosophie des späten 19. Jahrhunderts’, in Anados: Festschrift für 
Helmut Kuhn, ed. by Rupert Hofmann, Jörg Jantzen and Henning Ottmann (Weinheim: VCH, Acta 
Humaniora, 1989), p. 35 (quoting Helmut Kuhn). 
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realism of the latter with regard to values and their hierarchy. For Lipps, there are no 
universally correct value responses, only responses that are correct for the individual 
person. In realist phenomenological value theory, there is some kind of objective 
hierarchy of values, although the details of this vary among phenomenologists. 
 
2 .3 .1  E ARLY PH E N O M E N O L O G I C A L  E T H I C S  
 
Broadly speaking, realist phenomenological approaches to value-theory share two key 
views: firstly, that value is something that is discovered in the subject’s experiences, 
and has some level of objective reality before, during and after the experiencing of it; 
secondly, that values are experienced in an act entirely separate from the perceiving of 
the object that bears the value. This experiencing of value is described as a grasping 
(erfassen) or perception (wahrnehmen), and often as a kind of feeling (fühlen), all 
indicating that something outside the subject, but also distinct from the intended object, 
is grasped. The feeling of a value is often considered distinct from a feeling in the sense 
of an emotional state, such as pleasure.151 Reinach, for example, indicates that emotions 
lack the character of a grasping of something outside the subject, but may be a reaction 
to such a grasping, including the grasping of a value.152  
 Husserl moved away somewhat from this value realism as part of his general 
move toward transcendental idealism, but he did not by any means abandon value 
theory completely; he simply ‘reject[ed] the kind of realism in which values are directly 
                                               
151 However, ‘according to many philosophies and psychologies of the emotions appraisals, evaluations, 
assessments, valuing and impressions of value and importance are essential to our emotional lives. 
And according to many philosophies value is to be understood in terms of emotions’. Thus it is 
‘surprising’, as Kevin Mulligan remarks, that the philosophies of value and of emotion pay so little 
direct attention to one another. Kevin Mulligan, ‘Emotions and Values’, in Oxford Companion to the 
Philosophy of Emotions, ed. by P. Goldie (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 475. 
152 S.W. p. 493, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). Even the latter situation of emotions being inspired by 
values is not reliable as ‘all kinds of different emotions can build themselves on [the] feeling of value. 
[Even] opposite emotions can arise from the same value (viewing the work of one’s enemy!)’. 
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given independently of the objects that instantiate them’.153 Even beyond this, however, 
there were already some notable differences in how the early phenomenologists 
understood values and their role in ethics. For this reason a single discussion of the role 
of values in phenomenological ethics is not sufficient here; for those phenomenologists 
profiled below who developed a theory of values, the details of his or her value theory 
will be explored. In particular, not all of the early phenomenologists of ethics agreed on 
how values and value experience translate into knowledge of good and evil, or 
otherwise form the basis for an ethics. 
 
2 .3 .2  T H E  M U N I C H  C I R C L E  
 
During and after his time as a student in Munich, Reinach had close contact with the 
philosophers who made up the Akademische Verein für Psychologie and later the 
Munich circle of phenomenologists. As their influence was significant in the early 
development of Reinach’s phenomenology (and some of their work is relevant in the 
discussion of themes that touch on Reinach’s ethics, particularly when it comes to the 
will and motivation), some discussion of them is appropriate here. It was Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations that inspired Reinach’s move away from his Lippsian roots and 
towards Husserl’s phenomenology, but it was the members of the Munich circle who 
introduced Reinach to the Logical Investigations in the first place, and even before that 
to some phenomenological themes in their own work. Two leading members of the 
Verein, Johannes Daubert and Alexander Pfänder, were particularly influential on 
Reinach’s development during this time.154  
 
                                               
153 John J. Drummond, introduction to Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy, p. 9. 
154 Pfänder and Daubert were also responsible for transcribing and preserving Reinach’s earliest extant 
work on ethics, later published as Grundbegriffe der Ethik. 
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2.3 .2 .1  J O H A N N E S  D A U B E R T  
 
Daubert (1877-1947) was one of Reinach’s fellow students in Munich, and the one who 
drew Reinach’s attention to the Logical Investigations; he and Reinach went on to 
introduce Husserl’s work to others.155 Daubert was one of the leading lights of the 
Munich circle as a whole, and his pioneering work would influence the direction that 
Reinach took with his phenomenology. 
It was [… ] Johannes Daubert who was intellectually the most important figure 
among the Munich phenomenologists, and it was Daubert who was to be of most 
significance for Reinach’s later philosophical development. Already in this 
period Daubert was working on just those topics —  positive and negative 
judgements, impersonalia, dispositions, Sachverhalt and Gegenstand —  which 
were later to play a central role in Reinach’s work.156  
 
 Daubert’s importance to the early phenomenological movement is largely 
obscured by the fact that he ‘never published a line’.157 His only surviving work was in 
the form of manuscripts, released only after his death and written in his personal 
shorthand. As is so often the case in the tight-knit relationships of the early 
phenomenologists, Daubert’s philosophical influence on his fellows is very difficult to 
trace, but his significance cannot afford to be overlooked. Along with Pfänder, he 
‘primarily led’ the Akademische Verein für Psychologie.158  
 Daubert’s doctoral dissertation dealt with ‘existential judgments’ and states of 
affairs, establishing the tone of his work before he encountered Husserl’s 
phenomenology; its content ‘renders Daubert’s immediate interest in the Logical 
Investigations less than two years later completely understandable’.159 Daubert shared 
                                               
155 Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 2. 
156 Schuhmann and Smith, ‘Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography’, p. 4. 
157 Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, ‘Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I’, in Review of Metaphysics 
39 (1985), p. 763. The authors nonetheless ‘have no hesitation in calling him —  and not Husserl —  the 
true architect of the phenomenological movement’. 
158 Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 1. 
159 Baltzer-Jaray, Doorway to the World of Essences, p. 119. 
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the classic view of phenomenology as the eidetic description of phenomena as they are 
experienced. He also shared the realist standpoint of the other early phenomenologists. 
Daubert’s objective inclinations are evident when he describes the object as the 
‘a priori bearer or substrate of determinations.’ [… ] ‘The unity and essence of 
an object are independent of consciousness. The unity of object indicates an 
object in “absolute signification”.’160  
 
Although we cannot show any direct influence from Daubert on Reinach’s ethics, 
Daubert’s work on states of affairs and judgements helped to form Reinach’s 
understanding of those topics, which in turn informed his work on ethics; Reinach’s 
identification of moral rightness as a predicate of states of affairs was his first 
contribution to ethics. Daubert’s philosophy forms an important part of Reinach’s 
philosophical background without having a direct bearing on our assessment of 
Reinach’s contribution to early phenomenological ethics. 
 
2.3 .2 .2  A L E X A N D E R  P F Ä N D E R  
 
Pfänder (1870-1941) was a founding figure in the Munich circle of phenomenologists, 
and although he and Husserl had little direct contact, Husserl regarded Pfänder as ‘the 
“most solid” thinker of the Munich group’.161 Nevertheless, ‘Pfänder, along with the 
other members of the Munich group, stood fundamentally in the realist tradition and 
tried to utilize the phenomenological approach for buttressing the realistic position’.162 
As with Daubert, Pfänder was an influence on Reinach before the latter ever 
encountered Husserl’s philosophy; and, as with Daubert, this influence is made difficult 
to trace by the close-knit nature of the Verein. However, there are some clearly 
                                               
160 Ibid., p. 122. 
161 Herbert Spiegelberg, foreword to Alexander Pfänder, Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation, 
trans. by Spiegelberg (Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. xix. 
162 Ibid. 
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identifiable areas where Pfänder’s work on willing and motivation influenced 
Reinach’s. 
 Pfänder developed the distinction between acts of willing and striving, which 
Reinach, among others, adopted. Strivings are impulses or inclinations that accost the I 
and can lead it into action without an act of willing. Strivings are positive or negative in 
nature (towards or against something), but they are not the same as value-experiences; 
they originate from the I. If a sudden noise causes me to jump, I am the source of that 
action, but I do not will it. Equally, an action can be willed without any striving towards 
it being experienced, as when a decision is made purely on the basis of calm reflection. 
Reinach also makes use of Pfänder’s term project (Projekt) for describing ‘the proposed 
behaviour of the self’ that forms part of the act of willing,163 and his identification of a 
motivational impulse as a ‘demand’ (Forderung).164 Reinach refers to these ideas in his 
works on ethics, and they form part of how he proposes to assess decisions from an 
ethical standpoint. 
 
2 .3 .3  E D M U N D  HU S S E R L  
 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) has a strong claim to be considered the founder of the 
phenomenological movement. He was ‘the master’ to the Göttingen students. Although 
a student of Brentano, Husserl ‘distanced himself step by step’ from the Brentano 
school of Austrian philosophy, ‘not only in the details, but ultimately in his entire 
attitude’.165 The impact of the publication of his Logical Investigations at the dawn of 
the twentieth century is well testified to in the history of early phenomenology (see 
section one, above); for Husserl himself, it saw him move from his position as 
                                               
163 Pfänder, Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation, p. 22. 
164 Ibid., p. 28. 
165 Salice, Urteile und Sachverhalte, pp. 17-18. 
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Privatdozent at Martin Luther University in Halle to a professorship in Göttingen. 
Originally a mathematician who also studied astronomy and psychology, Husserl 
‘always remained something of a natural scientist even when he turned to 
philosophy’.166  
 
 2.3 .3 .1  H U S S E R L’S  E T H I C S  
 
Husserl is not well known for his work on ethics; he published nothing on the subject 
during his lifetime. He did, however, give several lecture courses on ethics at different 
times, and while it is not clear whether Reinach attended these specific lectures (the 
earliest took place in 1902, before Husserl and Reinach first met), it is highly likely that 
Husserl’s ideas on ethics would have become known to Reinach during their years in 
Göttingen. Some manuscript notes from these lectures have survived amongst Husserl’s 
considerable Nachlass.167  
 In the Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl makes a brief discussion of the 
phenomena of ‘values’ and ‘disvalues’, linking those terms with the phenomenological 
experiences of intentional preference.168 He only began to build on this concept in his 
subsequent lectures in Göttingen. Here, Husserl discusses the divide between ethics 
based on feelings (for example, that of Francis Hutcheson) and ethics based on reason 
(for example, that of Immanuel Kant). Husserl does not fully agree with either of these 
                                               
166 R. Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 212. Thus 
Husserl never rejected the method of the natural sciences, in the way that Dilthey did, but he did reject 
the ability of natural science to explain human consciousness and the very existence of the world that 
they assumed to simply there, present (vorhanden), whether attention is directed towards it, or not, as 
fostered by the thesis of the natural attitude. 
167 See Husserl, Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre, ed. by Ullrich Melle (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1988). This volume covers three major groupings of lectures (one set from 
1908/9, one from 1911 and one from 1914) as well as some more fragmentary material. 
168 Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. by J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1970), 
Prolegomena, chapter 2, §14, p. 84. ‘Each normative proposition presupposes a certain sort of 
valuation or approval through which the concept of a “good” or “bad” (a value or disvalue) arises in 
connection with a certain class of objects: in conformity with this, objects divide into good and bad 
ones’. 
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traditions. ‘He sides with rationalist ethics in denouncing the subjectivism and 
relativism of the ethics of feeling, but he agrees with the ethics of feeling that axiology 
and ethics are ultimately grounded in acts of feeling and willing’.169  
 Husserl instead argues that rationality, objectivity and truth can also pertain to 
emotional and volitional acts, acts of feeling and of willing. Thus, there must also be an 
analogue in the world of emotional reactions to the formal laws of reason that obtain in 
the intellectual sphere. The search for a suitable analogue of this kind ‘dominates 
Husserl’s early ethics’.170 He did not, however, develop a practical theory of ethics at 
this time, or later.171 Values in a broadly realist sense continue to have an important role 
in ethics for Husserl during this time; in a 1914 lecture, he argues for the ‘strict and 
actual objectivity of the validity of the axiological sphere’,172 adding, ‘The being taken 
of something as a value [für-Wert-gehalten-Werden] persuades us of the objective being 
of a value: the being, objective in the narrow sense, of a positive or negative value, or 
the objective non-being of a value’.173  
 In the post-war years, Husserl’s approach to ethics shifted somewhat. He came 
to emphasise the importance of the phenomenon of love in ethics over any kind of 
formal or categorical moral law, and social or community ethics over the ethics of 
individuals. Husserl now distinguishes objective values, which are the more classical 
phenomenological values, part of the content grasped or received in intentional 
experience, from values of love, which are not originally instantiated in an object, but 
are given to it by the subject’s act of love. ‘This love is something active’, and ‘involves 
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an element of choice’.174 It is the latter values, the values of love, that take absolute 
precedence for Husserl, completely displacing the objective values. Values of love do 
not naturally form a hierarchy. ‘There is no rational preference of one value for the 
other; there is only the tragic sacrifice of one absolute value for another equally absolute 
value’.175  
 This approach does not, of course, make it easy to establish what an individual 
ought to do in a specific situation. In fact ‘Husserl acknowledged the irrationality of the 
absolute ought if it is looked at in isolation. The absolute ought of the individual person 
has its rational meaning only in a theological context’.176 Ethics as such for Husserl is 
now concerned primarily with communities, to determine which forms of community 
are preferable over others.177 The reference to theology is also significant, however. 
Faith in God gives new meaning to the notion of an absolute ought for the individual 
and allows reason and love to be balanced. In Melle’s words, ‘Only through faith in 
God can we overcome any apparent contradiction between the rule of reason and the 
rule of love’.178  
 
2.3 .3 .2  H U S S E R L  A N D  R E I N A C H  
 
Husserl and Reinach met during Reinach’s first visit to Göttingen in 1905, and by the 
following year, they were corresponding by letter. Husserl’s Logical Investigations —  
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parts of which Reinach had read twice before their first meeting179 —  had a huge impact 
on Reinach and inspired his move towards phenomenology. Husserl later credited 
Reinach with being one of ‘the very first philosophers who fully understood the distinct 
character of the new phenomenological method and who was able to see its 
philosophical significance’,180 and with assisting his own understanding of the Logical 
Investigations.181 Philosophically, however, Reinach and Husserl would soon begin to 
grow apart. By the time Reinach completed his habilitation in Göttingen, Husserl had 
already delivered the lectures that made clear the transcendental turn in his thought.182  
 Although Reinach had already been introduced to the terminology of values by 
Lipps, the use of ‘value’ in Reinach’s writings on ethics denotes a real quality that is 
more likely to have been inspired by Husserl’s influence. However, as early as 1906, 
Reinach was already making his own contributions to a phenomenological theory of 
ethics. The bulk of Husserl’s distinctive work on ethics, as outlined above, dates from 
the post-war years, too late to have influenced Reinach’s work. Husserl does not seem 
to have adopted any of Reinach’s original ideas in these later works, either. Husserl’s 
move away from value-realism and towards his emphasis on love put ever greater 
distance between his ethics and Reinach’s; even though values remained important for 
Husserl, his understanding of the term ended up being quite different from Reinach’s. 
 
2 .3 .4  M A X  S C H E L E R  
 
Max Scheler (1874-1928) is one of the first names many would associate with the field 
of early phenomenological ethics. Though he earned his doctorate in the strongly neo-
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Kantian environment of the University of Jena and was an admirer of Kant’s work, his 
rise to prominence came after he embraced a realist phenomenology that both reflected 
and would come to influence the Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists. Scheler was 
not, however, a follower of Husserl; ‘a close look at [Formalism and The Nature of 
Sympathy] reveals that Max Scheler’s concept of the function, purpose and significance 
of phenomenology [… ] is at bottom different from Husserl’s’.183 This gap would only 
grow wider as Husserl began his move toward transcendental phenomenology, while 
Scheler persisted with his realist approach.184  
 Scheler’s academic career was badly affected by his turbulent personal life. Two 
public scandals saw him lose first his position at Jena, then at Munich, after which he 
spent time in Göttingen as a private scholar unattached to the university. At this time, 
Scheler ‘made but little professional contact with Husserl, but all the more with 
[Husserl’s] students’,185 many of whom attended Scheler’s private lectures.186 During 
the war, Scheler’s public reputation was restored somewhat by his political writings, 
and in 1919 he was able to secure a teaching position at the University of Cologne. In 
1928 he was also offered a position at Frankfurt University, but he died on the eve of 
taking it up. 
                                               
183 Manfred S. Frings, foreword to Max Scheler (1974-1928) Centennial Essays, ed. by Frings (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. vii. 
184 Around 1913, Scheler wrote an essay (which was not published in his lifetime) on ‘Phenomenology 
and the Theory of Cognition’. Scheler identifies phenomenology as an ‘attitude’ and a ‘procedure of 
seeing’ that makes possible insight into a realm of facts that are otherwise hidden. See, Scheler, trans. 
by Spader, in Scheler’s Ethical Personalism, pp. 52-53. The language here is similar to that used by 
Reinach in his 1914 lecture ‘Über Phänomenologie’. Scheler calls phenomenology a kind of 
empiricism, but identifies the key distinction in that the sense empiricist seeks to fulfil an explanatory 
role instead of simply describing what is given. By means of his phenomenological attitude, Scheler 
believes it is possible to have ‘immediate intuition of the essences of non-formal (material) values’. 
Spader, Scheler’s Ethical Personalism, p. 78. 
185 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 269. 
186 This included Edith Stein, who recorded her impressions of Scheler from these meetings in her 
autobiography. See, Stein, Life in a Jewish Family, pp. 258-60. Stein notes that ‘the young 
phenomenologists were greatly influenced by Scheler; some, like Hildebrand and Clemens, depended 
more on him than on Husserl’. (p. 258) 
108 
 Scheler was one of the most influential figures of the early phenomenological 
movement. ‘Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gabriel Marcel, Martin Buber, 
Nicolai Hartmann, Roman Ingarden, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Alfred Schutz, Karol 
Wojtyla, and many other philosophers of international reputation have acknowledged 
their debt to him’.187 In later years during his lifetime, Scheler’s influence on ethics was 
somewhat overshadowed and diminished by Heidegger’s ‘repudiation of all 
philosophies of value’.188 However, Heidegger was not dismissive of Scheler and his 
thought. ‘By the many testimonies of his contemporaries throughout Europe (such as 
[Nicolai] Berdyaev, [Martin] Heidegger, [José] Ortega y Gasset), [Scheler was] often 
referred to as the most brilliant mind of his time’.189  
 
2.3 .4 .1  S C H E L E R ’S  E T H I C S :  C H R I S T I A N  V A L U E S  A N D  E T H I C A L  P E R S O N A L I S M  
 
By contrast with Husserl, ethics was one of the main preoccupations of Scheler’s 
philosophy. Though Scheler’s relationship with his Christian faith and the Catholic 
Church was as volatile as the rest of his personal life, one of his first works on ethics 
(written in 1912) was a defence of Christian values against an attack by Nietzsche,190 
and Christian themes are prevalent in his philosophy as a whole. 
 Scheler’s major work on ethics, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale 
Wertethik,191 is, in large part, given over to disputing Kant’s rejection of non-formal 
ethics, and it has been suggested that Scheler’s ethics as a whole is best understood in 
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the context of this conflict with Kant’s ethics.192 Scheler was an admirer of Kant, and 
‘was most appreciative of what Kant had accomplished in showing the inadequacy of all 
prior attempts at non-formal ethics’.193 Scheler also rejected all post-Kantian approaches 
to non-formal ethics, which he felt ‘provide only the background against which the 
greatness, strength and terseness of Kant’s work stands out all the more’.194 However, 
Scheler also believed that a non-formal ethics was still possible and that Kant’s formal 
ethical approach was ‘blind’.195 Scheler’s goal was to provide the foundation for a new, 
non-formal Christian ethics.  
 
2.3 .4 .2  S C H E L E R  A N D  R E S S E N T I M E N T  
 
In his 1912 article on Ressentiment, Scheler responds to an accusation made by 
Nietzsche that all ethics arise from the effects of ressentiment, the denial of true values 
by those who lack value themselves.196 Nietzsche had argued that Christian values were 
the product of a ‘slave morality’; unlike a noble morality that affirms and celebrates the 
self, this slave morality simply reacts with hostility against everything outside the self. 
Inoffensiveness, cowardice and powerlessness are made from weaknesses into virtues as 
an act of revenge by those who themselves are weak, while true strengths and virtues 
are devalued and regarded negatively. 
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 Scheler agrees with Nietzsche that ressentiment played a role in some sets of 
values, especially the bourgeois values he believed to have taken over from Christian 
values long before his time, but he holds up Christian values as being specifically free 
of such a basis. According to Scheler, what Nietzsche misunderstood in Christian values 
is the ‘reversal in the movement of love’ to be found there.197 In classical thought, love 
was understood as a striving or aspiration from the lesser to the greater; Christian love, 
though, is embodied in ‘that the nobler stoops to the vulgar, the healthy to the sick, the 
rich to the poor, the handsome to the ugly, the good and saintly to the bad and common, 
the Messiah to the sinners and publicans’.198 In this self-renunciation, the lowering of 
oneself in service to others, the Christian does not lose his or her own nobility, but 
instead moves closer to God. This, then, is no result of ressentiment or of a refusal to 
better oneself, but an attempt precisely to better oneself through these humbling actions. 
 ‘Modern humanitarian love’ —  in which Scheler includes Bentham’s 
utilitarianism —  is a different case. It is not an affirmation of any positive value, but a 
protest ‘against ruling minorities that are known to be in the possession of positive 
values’.199 This is indeed a result of ressentiment and is the kind of corrupt ethics that 
Scheler, in his revival of Christian values, seeks to overturn. 
 
2.3 .4 .3  T H E  A X I O M S  O F  S C H E L E R ’S  E T H I C S  
 
Early in Formalism, Scheler identifies three sets of axioms that he believes all non-
formal ethics of values, his own included, must presuppose. The first set in particular is 
worth reproducing here for later comparison: 
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I. 
a. The existence of a positive value is itself a positive value. 
b. The non-existence of a positive value is itself a negative value. 
c. The existence of a negative value is itself a negative value. 
a. The non-existence of a negative value is itself a positive value. 
II. 
a. Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a positive value in 
the sphere of willing. 
b. Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a negative value in 
the sphere of willing. 
c. Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a higher (or the 
highest) value in the sphere of willing. 
d. Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a lower (or the 
lowest) value in the sphere of willing. 
III. The criterion ‘good’ (‘evil’) in this sphere consists of the agreement 
(disagreement) of a value intended in the realization with the value of 
preference, or in its disagreement (agreement) with the value placed after.200  
 
2.3 .4 .4  S C H E L E R ’S  V A L U E  T H E O R Y  
 
Key to Scheler’s disagreement with Kant is his stance on values and their objectivity. 
Kant had argued that goods —  what Scheler would call the bearers of values —  are not 
fixed or eternal; those things that are goods change as they themselves are created, 
altered, and destroyed. A material ethics of goods, then, would have no fixed, objective 
basis. Scheler responds that although the bearers of values change, the values 
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themselves ‘do not change with changing objects [… ]. The value of friendship remains 
a value, no matter if my friend turns out to be a rascal’.201 Thus, although an ethics of 
goods is not viable, an ethics of values is. Scheler also rejects Kant’s view that goodness 
is bound up with the good will and action from duty. One’s sense of duty, he suggests, 
can just as well be seen as a ‘coercive inclination’ as it can as evidence of a good moral 
character.202  
 For Scheler, value has a broad meaning, encompassing both that which is 
preferable for the individual person and that which is good in itself. There are four main 
types of values, which ultimately form a hierarchy.203 From lowest to highest, the order 
runs: sensory values (from the agreeable to the disagreeable); vital values (from the 
noble to the vulgar); spiritual (geistig) or cultural204 values (from the beautiful to the 
ugly, and from the right to the wrong); and religious values (from the holy to the 
unholy).205 The moral values of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ belong to their own category, and are 
not originally borne by anyone or anything other than God. Values of all kinds are 
experienced in ‘cognitive (or intentional)’ acts of feeling (or ‘affective perception’).206  
 Where his axioms refer to the ‘existence’ of values, Scheler means the 
instantiation of a value in an object that bears it. ‘Like colors, [values] actually exist 
only when realised in actually existing “bearers”’.207 An object that is a bearer of value 
is designated as a ‘good’. In experience, though, ‘a value precedes its object; it is the 
first “messenger” of its particular nature’.208 In other words, we grasp the value and its 
object separately, and we often grasp the value first, so we may feel that a thing is 
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beautiful or ugly without at first knowing why. Not all objects can be bearers of all 
values. The moral values, good and evil, ‘are values of the person’.209 Moral value can 
also be borne by virtues and vices (as distinct from the persons who possess those 
virtues and vices; and by acts and actions (or deeds).210  
 As with most early phenomenological value-theorists, Scheler’s theory includes 
an objective value hierarchy, and so, refers to ‘an original table of values which is a 
priori yet nonetheless non-formal’.211 A recurring problem for realist theories of value-
experience is that they consider values to be objective, and usually to form a fixed 
hierarchy, yet it is clear that not everyone has the same experiences of values or their 
ordering. How can we account for ‘blindness’ to value, or worse, for persons who seem 
to experience values in a different hierarchy from that of others? 
 Scheler’s answer to this is to relate value-feeling with acts of love and hate. This 
is not directly related to the idea of correct and incorrect experiences of love, as in 
Brentano’s theory; rather, it has to do with how these acts of love and hate affect our act 
of value-feeling. When we experience values, we recognise their relation to other values 
of which we are aware, but not their absolute position in the hierarchy. This is why 
Scheler states that the moral good attaches to realising the highest value ‘with respect to 
the measure of cognition of that being which realizes it’.212 Acts of love are what allow 
us to more broadly experience the world of values and better recognise the highest 
values. ‘Love opens us to more and more of the hierarchy of values and allows us to 
become more and more fulfilled as persons’.213  
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 Acts of hate have the converse effect. ‘When we hate, what we can feel of the 
“objective” hierarchy of values is diminished’.214 Even in this situation, Scheler does 
not feel that we become fully detached from real values. ‘Hate [… ] is by no means an 
utter repudiation of the whole realm of values generally; it involves, rather, a positive 
preoccupation with lower possibilities of value’.215 Our awareness of values can in fact 
also become distorted, so that we do not recognise the correct hierarchy even among the 
values we do experience. This, however, is the effect of ressentiment, not of hate.216  
 
2.3 .4 .5  S C H E L E R ’S  T H E O R Y  O F  T H E  P E R S O N  
 
Scheler designates his ethics as an ‘ethical personalism’, emphasising the role of the 
person within it. His definition of a ‘person’, however, is unique among the early 
phenomenologists. For Scheler a ‘person’ is a unity of experiences; not the experiences 
themselves, but also not anything that can exist separately from those experiences. As 
Spader puts it, ‘(I)n Scheler’s view, the person is not something separate from the acts 
—  the person is in the acts’.217 Scheler emphasises that the person, for him, is not an 
object, and nor are its acts, even though both persons and acts are the bearers of values, 
and the person is in turn the bearer of valuable or disvaluable virtues or vices. We do 
not grasp the values and disvalues of a person or act through the intentional grasping of 
the person as such, but that person’s actions carry —  in addition to their own value-
character —  ‘a symbolic value for the moral tenor’, or disposition (Gesinnung), of the 
person.218  
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 A key element of Scheler’s ethics is his concept of role models (Vorbilder), 
model persons who can inspire others to be good. A person who finds himself or herself 
unable to choose the correct course of action can take guidance from the example of a 
saint or other model person. Scheler saw this theory of model persons as an essential 
part of his ethics, but he never developed it completely.219  
 
2.3 .4 .6  S C H E L E R  O N  G O O D  A N D  E V I L  
 
Although actions can be bearers of moral values, and good and evil are identified as 
values, Scheler’s criterion of good or evil in human action is actually the realisation of 
non-moral values. In a slightly different phrasing of what he would include among his 
axioms, Scheler writes: ‘The value “good” —  in an absolute sense —  is the value that 
appears, by way of essential necessity, on the act of realizing the value which (with 
respect to the measure of cognition of that being which realizes it) is the highest’.220 In 
other words, moral goodness means acting in a way that is consistent with the correct 
hierarchy of values. ‘“Good” in itself never consists in a conceptually definable 
property of man’.221  
 As noted above, Scheler indicates that an action or deed carries both a symbolic 
value, in that it reflects the character of the subject, and its own inherent value. Thus, he 
makes a distinction between wanting or even choosing to carry out a valuable action, 
and actually carrying out that action. For Scheler, a person who is disabled and unable 
to act on his or her value-feelings will always have a lower moral standing than a person 
who is both willing and able to act. 
The paralysed person is, of course, not at all subject to moral reproach. But 
neither is he subject to any part of the moral praise that belongs to the rescuer. 
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Any opinion that would refute the above view and regard the moral tenor as the 
only bearer of moral value must be reduced to the ressentiment of ‘disabled’ 
people.222  
 
The only exception that might apply is if the disabled person tries, despite his or 
disability, to act, even if he or she is prevented from succeeding by the resistance caused 
by the disability. This is because the value associated with the rescuer’s action is not 
contingent on success, but is borne by the attempt, even if it fails.223  
 
2.3 .4 .7  R E L I G I O N  A N D  S C H E L E R ’S  E T H I C S  
 
As Francis Dunlop notes, ‘There is a surprising amount of talk about God, as summum 
bonum and supreme “person”, in Formalism. Both Scheler’s ethics and his idea of the 
person seem to require the existence of an absolute being’.224 Towards the end of 
Formalism, Scheler acknowledges this, concluding that ‘the natural continuation of our 
investigations requires a theory of God and also an investigation into the types of acts in 
which the essence of God comes to the fore (theory of religion)’.225 Scheler had 
introduced Formalism only as a foundation for an ethics,226 a project he felt it was 
impossible to complete without further establishing work. 
 Scheler revised Ressentiment in 1915 and Formalism in 1916, but he made no 
further attempt to build on the foundation that Formalism was intended to provide for 
his ethical personalism. His writings during the war were more political in character; 
later, he wrote on the philosophy of religion. Scheler’s relationship with the Catholic 
church also became less stable during this time, and shortly before his death the focus of 
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his religious philosophy took a sharp turn away from theism, in favour of a form of 
pantheism which surprised many of his contemporaries. According to Spader, ‘(C)ritics 
were not only surprised by the change; all too many of them abandoned any attempt to 
understand the change as rooted in philosophical difficulties, opting instead to see it as 
reflective of personal instability’.227  
 Scheler had acknowledged the need for a theory of religion in Formalism to 
complete his ethics, and Spader argues that it was difficulties in creating a theory of 
religion that would fit this task that inspired Scheler’s radical shift (his position on 
pantheism apparently reversing completely, from rejection to acceptance, in less than 
two years).228 However, Scheler died before he could put his new theory of religion to 
use in further developing his ethics. 
 
2.3 .4 .8  S C H E L E R  A N D  R E I N A C H  
 
Scheler at one time held a post at Reinach’s alma mater, the University of Munich, and 
later held lectures privately at Göttingen during Reinach’s time there. It is not clear 
quite how much contact the two had personally, but Reinach does cite some of Scheler’s 
work, providing evidence of his familiarity with it.229 Reinach’s first surviving work on 
ethics and moral values, Grundbegriffe, dates from 1906, the year before Scheler took 
up his position in Munich. After spending time in Tübingen and Göttingen, Reinach 
finally came into ‘close contact’230 with Scheler in 1908, when Reinach temporarily 
returned to Munich before beginning the habilitation process in Göttingen. The two 
would meet again in Göttingen after Scheler’s move there in 1910. Reinach and Scheler 
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(among others) collaborated in the publication of Husserl’s Jahrbuch, the inaugural 
issue of which featured Reinach’s monograph Grundlagen and the first part of Scheler’s 
Formalism, as well as the first book of Husserl’s Ideas. 
 The greatest of difficulties accompanies any attempt to trace Scheler’s influence 
on Reinach, or indeed Reinach’s influence on Scheler. The two demonstrate very 
similar understandings of values and of the nature of value-experience; they share the 
view that values are real, form an objective order of precedence, and are grasped in a 
unique kind of intentional cognitive act. Where they differ, in their respective value 
theories, is chiefly on the role of values in ethics; as early as his 1906 paper 
Grundbegriffe, Reinach considered values alone to be insufficient for founding an 
ethics. The significance of this disagreement will be highlighted as we discuss 
Reinach’s value theory in chapter three. In general, given their limited early contact 
with one another, mere similarities between Reinach’s and Scheler’s ethics do not 
conclusively prove the influence of either on the other. We will discuss the relationship 
between Reinach’s and Scheler’s ethics in greater detail in chapter four. 
 
2 .3 .5  D I E T R I C H  V O N  H I L D E B R A N D  
 
Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977) has received many accolades for his work on 
ethics, including that of ‘master of phenomenological value-ethics’.231 As a fellow 
student of Reinach’s at Munich, he took part in the 1905 invasion of Göttingen, and 
though he was never a full-time student at Göttingen, he later wrote that ‘from 1910 on, 
[Reinach] was my only teacher’.232 Reinach and von Hildebrand shared a personal 
friendship, and the religious conversion of von Hildebrand and his first wife had a role 
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in inspiring the Reinachs themselves to convert. Likewise, von Hildebrand was also a 
close friend of Scheler’s for many years, and his philosophical development was 
influenced by Scheler. 
 However, von Hildebrand would truly make his name not for his 
phenomenology, but for his contributions to Christian ethics. After his conversion from 
Protestantism to Catholicism in 1914, Christianity and Christian values became central 
to his philosophy, while Scheler’s break with the church became a source of friction 
between the two. In the inter-war years von Hildebrand also became known as an 
outspoken opponent of Nazism, and was ultimately forced to flee Germany when Hitler 
came to power; he was tried and sentenced to death in his absence. He lived the rest of 
his life in New York, where he taught at the Jesuit-run Fordham University until 1960. 
 
2.3 .5 .1  V O N  H I L D E B R A N D ’S  E T H I C S  
 
Dietrich von Hildebrand’s first published work was his Die Idee der sittlichen 
Handlung,233 an expanded form of his doctoral thesis, which he had completed in 1913. 
His aim in this work was to dispute Kantian voluntarism —  the view that only the will 
can, without reduction or limitation, be designated as morally good —  with a general 
account of moral values and their bearers. Value —  encompassing here ‘the beauty of a 
picture or the goodness of a human being’234 —  is described by von Hildebrand as ‘a 
qualitative something attached to the object, and which I can come to know in a 
particular way to be a quality of the object’.235 He identifies actions236 and persons237 as 
the bearers of states of affairs, but he also discusses values in relation to states of 
                                               
233 Originally published in Husserl’s Jahrbuch, vol. 3 (1916), pp. 126-251. Republished in Die Idee der 
sittlichen Handlung; Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1969), with commentary by Karla Mertens. 
234 Von Hildebrand, Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung; Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis, p. 76. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid., p. 2. 
237 Ibid., p. 3. 
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affairs.238 He argues that a fact, such as the non-existence of a good, can ‘stand as an 
evil before us’,239 but notes that ‘we do better to say that the existing state of affairs is 
valuable, rather than that it is the bearer of a value’.240 In general, von Hildebrand’s 
value-ethics at this point in his development had a great deal in common with both 
Reinach’s and Scheler’s. 
 Von Hildebrand’s ethics underwent a marked development over the years that 
followed, catalysed by his religious conversion in 1916. His 1922 Sittlichkeit und 
ethische Werterkenntnis shows signs of Aristotelian influence, adding the term ‘virtue’ 
(Tugend) to his lexicon. It was in 1952, roughly in the middle of his philosophical 
career, that von Hildebrand published Christian Ethics (later republished simply as 
Ethics), which is considered his major work in moral philosophy,241 indeed his 
‘magisterial work’.242 His ethics here remains focused on the basic concept of value, 
but, further developing the distinction between ‘value’ and ‘personal interest’ that had 
influenced Reinach, von Hildebrand here places values in the wider category of 
‘importance’. 
 Importance is that which has the power to motivate us, to attract or repulse us. It 
is meant quite generally, but not everything is of possible importance in this sense. The 
significance of this concept and the degree to which it is intuitive is quite elegantly 
shown by von Hildebrand: 
Were we to ask a despairing man the reason for his sorrow, and were he to 
answer, ‘Because two and two are four,’ or, ‘Because the sum of the angles in a 
triangle is equal to two right angles,’ we would obviously reject these facts as 
explanations for his sorrow. We would suppose either that he is putting us off 
                                               
238 Ibid., pp. 69-74. Von Hildebrand’s attribution of value to certain states of affairs is a key point of 
difference from Reinach, who argues that ‘only objects can be morally valuable, never states of 
affairs’. S.W. p. 336, paragraph 2; Appendix (II). We will discuss this disagreement further in chapter 
four. 
239 Von Hildebrand, Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung; Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis,, p. 69. 
240 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
241 Crosby, ‘Dietrich von Hildebrand’, in Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy, p. 477. 
242 Karla Mertens, commentary to von Hildebrand, Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung; Sittlichkeit und 
ethische Werterkenntnis, p. 269. 
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for some reason, in refusing to tell us the true object of his sorrow, or else that 
he superstitiously connects these facts with some evil.243  
 
Importance is ‘this property of a being which enables it to motivate our will or to 
engender an affective response in us’.244 There is both positive importance (the ‘good’, 
bonum, in the broadest sense) and negative importance (the ‘bad’, malum, again in an 
entirely general sense), and the two are distinct opposites; negative importance is not 
just a lack or absence of positive importance, but is something that is in itself bad. 
 Von Hildebrand identifies three key subcategories of importance: ‘The merely 
subjectively satisfying, the objective good for the person, and the value’.245 Thus, he 
distinguishes the motivating importance behind simple self-indulgence, rational self-
interest, and moral action, respectively. The merely subjectively satisfying and the 
objectively good for me are always relative, dependent on personal circumstances. What 
sets values apart from the first two categories of importance is that they are not good 
‘for me’ or for anyone in particular, but good in themselves; they are good 
‘independently of any motivation’.246 Thus, value is exclusively a category of things 
that are important as such. Something that is valuable may also be subjectively 
satisfying (as when a painting is pleasant to look at, or a person is ‘a pleasure to be 
around’), but they are never merely subjectively satisfying; they can be appreciated on a 
higher level than their pleasantness. 
 Von Hildebrand identifies three bearers of moral values and disvalues: actions, 
inner responses and fundamental attitudes. The latter are the most important of the 
three, and can be directly identified with virtues and vices. Thus, the character of the 
human person is a primary focus of moral assessment. Crosby concludes that in light of 
                                               
243 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Ethics, p. 23. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid., p. 80. 
246 Ibid., p. 43. Von Hildebrand criticises Scheler for failing to make this distinction between value and 
everything that is not good in itself. 
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von Hildebrand’s ethics, ‘we do not have to wait until the end of the 20th century in 
order to find virtue ethics after Kant’.247 Persons also have an intrinsic ontological value 
as embodiments of the imago dei; life, dignity and other intangible properties of the 
person also bear an inalienable ontological value as such.248 It is the ‘basic human 
vocation’249 to possess a morally valuable character, but not every value can be 
possessed by every person, as some are subject to a mutual ‘polarity’. Some of these 
polarities are hostile (as good and evil are), but others are complementary (in the way 
that male and female are).250 For example, von Hildebrand suggests, ‘One and the same 
person cannot at once be endowed with an overwhelmingly powerful vitality and with 
an ethereal delicacy’.251  
 Von Hildebrand’s understanding of moral values is closely bound up with his 
Christian philosophy. Good itself is identical with God, who embodies absolute 
ontological perfection. Those who lack moral value can attain it through Christian faith, 
and nobody can be perfectly moral without ‘being transformed into Christ’.252 
Interestingly, von Hildebrand holds that he does not consider God’s reality to be a 
postulate that must be believed to support his ethical theory, ‘as Kant did’.253 Rather, 
‘morally relevant values are an objective hint at God’s existence’.254 ‘For our 
knowledge of moral values, of the moral obligation, of the natural moral law’, he 
continues, ‘the knowledge of God is not required. But objectively these data presuppose 
God’.255   
 
                                               
247 John F. Crosby, ‘Dietrich von Hildebrand’, p. 494. 
248 Ibid., p. 135. 
249 Ibid., p. 173. 
250 Ibid., p. 143. 
251 Ibid., p. 141. 
252 Ibid., p. 178. 
253 Ibid., p. 456. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid., p. 457. 
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2.3 .5 .2  V O N  H I L D E B R A N D  A N D  R E I N A C H  
 
Much as Reinach had been in his early life, Dietrich von Hildebrand was inspired by 
Plato’s dialogues to take up philosophy, and just as Reinach had, he went on to study 
philosophy at the University of Munich, beginning in 1906. Here, in 1907, he and 
Reinach met for the first time.256 It was also during this time in Munich that von 
Hildebrand first met Max Scheler, who had secured a teaching position there. In 1909, 
inspired by Husserl’s Logical Investigations, von Hildebrand transferred to Göttingen 
for the summer semester, and returned again in 1910. During that year he attended 
Reinach’s lectures along with Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden and Hedwig Conrad-
Martius. Although he then left to carry out his doctoral research in Vienna (his thesis, 
on The Nature of Moral Action, marked his first step toward the serious development of 
his ethics) he acknowledged both Scheler and Reinach as ongoing influences on his 
work. 
 The fact that Reinach was von Hildebrand’s teacher in Göttingen does not mean 
that von Hildebrand did not also influence Reinach. In Die Überlegung, Reinach credits 
his use of the distinction between value and personal interest to von Hildebrand’s then 
unfinished doctoral thesis.257 The details of Reinach’s influence on von Hildebrand are 
much more difficult to tease out. Only by first examining the differences between 
Reinach’s and Scheler’s ethics can we attempt to identify their differing influences on 
von Hildebrand’s. We will return to this subject in chapter four. 
 
                                               
256 Reinach had by then completed his doctorate in philosophy and was completing his studies in the law. 
He left Munich to continue these studies in Tübingen later that same year. 
257 S.W. p. 298; Appendix (III), n. 21*. 
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SECTION FOU R  
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this chapter we have examined the background to Reinach’s ethics and the context in 
which his ethics will be considered as a contribution. None of the profiles in this chapter 
are to be understood as exhaustive or comprehensive critical discussions of the 
respective philosophers or schools. It is sufficient to have a basis for understanding how 
Reinach’s work on ethics fits into his historical and philosophical environment. With 
this done, we are in a better position to discuss Reinach’s ethics, which will be the 
subject of the next chapter. 
 Phenomenological ethics was quite a diverse field even in its early stages. The 
extent to which the pioneers of this field shared basic terminology somewhat obscures 
the extent to which they disagreed on the meanings of those terms, on methodology, and 
on the practice of ethics. Similarly, the close personal associations between many of the 
early phenomenologists, and the scarcity of direct textual references in their respective 
works, makes it difficult to establish with certainty who influenced whom and at what 
times. The profiles above will serve to provide a basis for comparison as we discuss 
Reinach’s ethics, in view of which the originality of his work can be considered. It 
remains clear that there are distinct similarities between Reinach’s approach to ethics 
and those of his contemporaries; this is particularly true in the case of Scheler, whose 
ethics will be directly compared with Reinach’s in chapter four. 
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CHAPTER III 
REINACH’S ETHICS —  CRITICAL DISCUSSION 
 
The four extant works by Reinach that deal with ethics —  one paper, one transcript 
from a lecture course, and two separately published articles —  do not form a cohesive, 
linear exposition of Reinach’s views on ethics, nor were they originally meant to. Two 
were never intended for publication at all and each of the other two has, as its central 
topic, a question of legal philosophy, rather than one of ethics. We cannot, therefore, 
simply follow the order in which Reinach himself presented his ideas and expect that 
the result will be a clear account of a theory of ethics. Rather, we must take elements 
from all of these four works together in order to construct a complete picture of the 
phenomenological ethics contained in them. 
 Reinach shares much of his value theory with the other early phenomenologists 
of values, and values have a key role in his ethics, but his work on ethics is not 
exclusively concerned with values, nor does he propose a theory of ethics that is non-
formal in its entirety.1 Reinach regards moral values as only one of three basic concepts 
with which ethics is concerned, and in terms of which questions relevant to ethics can 
be asked. The significance of these three concepts and their differing roles in ethics will 
form a major subject of discussion in this chapter.  
 Reinach’s reasoning for distinguishing these concepts is rooted in his 
phenomenological viewpoint.2 One of Reinach’s chief concerns in his philosophy is to 
provide descriptive accounts of essences, as accurately as possible. Every experience 
and every object of experience has an essence which is uniquely and irreducibly its 
                                               
1  ‘Non-formal’ here translates the German ‘material’, as it appears in the title of Scheler’s Der 
Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. This translation is used because the more literal 
English translation, ‘material’, is not obviously opposite to ‘formal’, which this usage is intended to 
be. 
2 We will more closely examine the characterisation of Reinach’s ethics as phenomenological in chapter 
four. 
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own. It is not possible from Reinach’s perspective to attempt to ‘build up’ an essence 
out of preconceived ideas. That which is truly essential to each experience can be found 
only through the phenomenological study of that experience. Nor is it sufficient to 
attempt to explain or categorise one essence as another essence, to say that ‘X is a kind 
of Y’.3 The reduction of one act to another act (categorising the social act of forgiving 
as an act of judgement, for example) does not do justice to either act. Each essence must 
be approached on its own, studied in itself, and allowed to stand independently. The 
study of essences, not the study of facts, is the concern of Reinach’s phenomenology.4  
 Accordingly, Reinach’s ambition in approaching ethics is to explore the whole 
realm of ethical experience, to account for at least the possibility of every question and 
every aspect of the ethical, leaving nothing out. He opposes attempts by other ethicists 
to limit the domain of ethics —  the voluntarism of Kant and Lipps, limiting the good to 
the will alone; the consequentialism of the utilitarians, limiting the good to the 
outcomes of actions. For Reinach, such limitations represent ‘an enormous reduction of 
the province of ethics’.5 A complete account of ethics must have no such artificial 
limitations, allowing for the ethical significance of persons, of actions, of states of 
affairs (as motives and as consequences), of the intangible products of actions, of 
decision-making (not just acts of will in themselves, but the entire process of 
motivation, decision-making and resolving). For this ambitious task, Reinach finds the 
basic concept of moral value to be necessary, but also insufficient.6 Two further basic 
                                               
3 ‘[Phenomenology] has nothing to do with explanation of existences and the reduction of them to other 
existences. When it forgets that, there arise those reduction attempts which are in truth an 
impoverishment and falsification of consciousness’. Reinach, ‘Concerning Phenomenology’, trans. by 
Willard; S.W. p. 534. 
4 ‘It is precisely with facts that descriptive psychology has nothing to do {… } It intends to bring to 
ultimate, intuitive givenness the “whatness” [Was] of the Experience, from which, in itself, we are so 
remote. It intends to determine this “whatness” as it is in itself; and to distinguish and mark it off from 
other “whatnesses”’. Ibid., pp. 534-535. 
5 S.W. p. 500, paragraph 5; Appendix (IV). 
6 ‘Can all statements of ethics be put in the form: “this is morally valuable”? No. There is an array of 
questions that are designated as moral questions, {but} that would not be determined by that. Ethics 
127 
concepts, namely, the concept of moral rightness and the concept of goods, are also 
necessary to fully account for all questions that belong to ethics, making a total of three 
concepts. 
 The first section of this chapter discusses the meaning of ‘ethics’ (Ethik) as 
Reinach understands it and the basic structure of his ethical theory. Section two 
explores the three concepts of ethics proposed by Reinach and the ‘spheres of ethics’ 
that relate to these, examining in turn the significance of each and its unique role in 
ethics. Section three looks at Reinach’s work on motivation and willing, the process of 
moral decision-making, and autonomy, all of which are important in the ethical 
assessment of persons and their actions. The final section critically analyses Reinach’s 
work on ethics as a whole, based on the understanding of it established in the preceding 
sections. 
 
SECTION ON E  
THE FOUNDATIONS OF REINACH’S ETHICS  
 
Although Reinach never published a work fully dedicated to ethics, it would be 
incorrect to assume that he did not regard ethics as a significant area of interest within 
philosophy. Of Reinach’s full body of surviving work, discussions of ethics make up 
only a small part, and a significant portion of those discussions takes place within works 
on the philosophy of law. However, these latter comments are by no means cursory or 
mere distractions from the main subject of the articles. A full third of the text of Die 
Überlegung discusses ethics, equal in length to the section discussing legal philosophy 
and indeed overlapping into that section. A much smaller proportion of Grundlagen 
touches on ethical themes, but Reinach’s comments there still go beyond what is 
                                                                                                                                         
does not only have to do with the question of what is morally valuable’. S.W. p. 335, paragraph 3; 
Appendix (II). 
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necessary to clarify the difference between his positions on ethics and the law. 
Grundzüge der Ethik, the section of Reinach’s 1913 lecture course that deals with 
ethics, represents only one part of that lecture course, but is still of quite substantial 
length. Reinach chose to dedicate both his 1906 paper to the Akademische Verein für 
Psychologie (Die Grundbegriffe der Ethik) and his 1909 Probeverlesung during the 
habilitation process at Göttingen (which has not survived) to the discussion of ethics. 
We may recall that in Grundzüge, Reinach suggests that the question of whether there is 
such thing as objective knowledge or recognition of values is ‘perhaps the most 
important question in the world’.7  
 
3 .1 .1 T H E  M E A N I N G  O F  E T H I C S  
 
Reinach does not provide a concise definition of ‘ethics’ (Ethik) in his work, nor does 
he explicitly distinguish the meanings of the words ‘ethical’ (ethisch) and ‘moral’ 
(sittlich). By his usage, ‘ethics’ refers to a field or area of study, to which the ‘concept 
of the moral’ belongs.8 As much as anything else, Reinach defines ethics by what it is 
not; he begins by contrasting an ethical viewpoint with a psychological one.9 The point 
of view of ethics is different from, and indeed incompatible with, ‘the descriptive 
relationships of acts’ as investigated in empirical psychology.10 For the purposes of a 
descriptive-psychological investigation, it is correct to view the experiences of loving 
and hating as similar, since both represent an attitude or disposition towards something; 
loving and forgiving are unalike, since forgiving is an act, and loving is not. From an 
                                               
7 S.W., p. 505, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
8 S.W. p. 335, paragraph 3; Appendix (II). 
9 The use of ‘psychology’ and ‘psychologism’ as terms by the phenomenologists is always an area of 
ambiguity; de Boer identifies six different senses in which ‘psychologism’ can be used (De Boer, The 
Development of Husserl’s Thought, pp. 116-17). Of these six, what Reinach is here referring to is 
closest to de Boer’s fourth sense: ‘when genetic psychology is regarded as the fundamental discipline 
and basis for the normative sciences’ (Ibid., p. 116). 
10 S.W. p. 485, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
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ethicist’s perspective, though, these groupings do not make sense. Ethically speaking, 
loving something and hating it are opposites; loving and forgiving are ‘very closely 
related’.11 Similarly, whereas psychology is concerned only with how things are, ethics 
seeks to answer questions of ought (sollen): What ought I to do? What way ought things 
to be? What kind of person ought I to become? Reinach points to theories about how 
persons are or about how they must act, such as psychological egoism, as precisely 
missing the point of ethics. Even if it were true that all persons act in an egoistic 
manner, ‘we could still say: all people until now have been egoists, but they ought not 
to be so!’12 For Reinach, a theory of ethics needs to account for our knowledge of the 
ethical (of the kinds of persons we ought to strive to become; of the actions we ought to 
perform; of the way things ought to be), and for our autonomous motivation in living 
according to these moral concepts.  
 Reinach’s thesis is that there are a priori moral truths, truths about what ought to 
be that are objective, knowable and capable of being realised. These a priori truths 
encompass both the formal a priori of Kant’s ethics, and a non-formal a priori as also 
advocated by Scheler. That is to say, there is a formal moral law, but there are also 
immediate and intentional experiences of real ethical phenomena, and these are 
interconnected and interrelated within and between three separate spheres or domains of 
ethics. 
 In Reinach’s own view, the philosophy of positive or state law is distinct from 
ethics. In Überlegung, for example, Reinach dedicates different sections of the treatise 
to the ethical significance and the legal significance of reflection or premeditation, 
                                               
11 Ibid. 
12 S.W., p. 487, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). 
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while in Grundlagen, he distinguishes not only between ethical and legal obligations, 
but also a third category, which we have called ‘essential’ obligations.13  
 
3 .1 .2 T H E  OB J E C T I V E  AT T I T U D E  
 
Since Reinach’s ethics is meant to be founded in a priori, objective truths, the first thing 
called for by his theory is an attitude that reflects this. In his discussions of egoism and 
altruism in Grundzüge, Reinach characterises egoism as an attitude that ignores all 
objective concerns, and instead assigns everything an importance relative to the 
individual I of the egoistic human being. In this case, that which is good for me is 
preferred, and that which is bad for me is avoided, regardless of whether it is good or 
bad in itself.14 On the other hand, altruism —  understood as egoism’s opposite —  is an 
attitude in which the good for others is preferred, likewise ignoring essential value or 
disvalue. Thus, regardless of whether altruism is morally preferable to egoism, neither 
of these is an objective attitude. Neither is concerned with what is good in itself. For the 
egoist, that which is objectively bad can still be preferred if it is good for me. For the 
altruist, that which is objectively good can fail to be preferred if it is not good for 
others. These attitudes both fail to recognise moral truth.15  
                                               
13 Despite his work both on ethics and on the philosophy of law, there is a significant gap in Reinach’s 
philosophy when it comes to exploring the relationship between positive law and a priori right. As 
Seifert comments, ‘Reinach’s reflections on the general relationship between apriori and positive law 
represent not only the most underdeveloped part of Reinach’s work but [… ] many statements of 
Reinach on this extremely important issue deviate from what the careful reader of the preceding 
masterful chapters is led to expect’. Thus, we are left to question whether Reinach’s comments on this 
subject ‘are sufficient or even correct’. Seifert, ‘Is Reinach’s “apriorische Rechtslehre” More 
Important for Positive Law than Reinach Himself Thinks?’, p. 200. We will discuss this issue in more 
detail in chapter four, section 4.2.7. 
14 Reinach sees the egoistic attitude as the origin of the phenomenon of ressentiment. Ressentiment is 
viewed here not as the incorrect ranking of values due to a distorted perspective, but as a ‘dislocation 
of the I’ that outright ignores values in themselves. S.W. p. 490-91; Appendix (IV). 
15 This section of the text closely resembles the erster Vortrag of Lipps’ Die Ethischen Grundfragen. 
Lipps carefully distinguishes the egoistic and altruistic attitudes (which he defines slightly differently 
from Reinach) from the attitude of self-respect which is the foundation of morally good action for 
him. The key difference is that for Lipps, no objective moral truths exist outside the subject. 
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 Reinach calls instead for an objective attitude,16 one that is concerned at all 
times and in all circumstances with the objective, absolute, a priori truths of ethics. 
Reinach aims to investigate the nature of these truths, how they become known, and 
how they can be acted upon. Ultimately, Reinach has no intention of providing his 
reader with a list of good actions, or any concrete rules to follow in any specific 
situations. To discuss specific experiences of value would run counter to his 
phenomenological method. It is not the specifics, the facts of ethical truth that he wishes 
to investigate, but their possibility, the essence of the experiences in which they are 
given. Reinach can say ‘murder is morally evil’ for the sake of an argument or an 
example, because murder, by definition, is understood to mean an unjust killing, but it is 
up to the individual in a real situation to feel the moral disvalue of the murder and 
refrain from it on that basis. Were Reinach to attempt to provide even general rules for 
action, the non-formal aspirations of his ethics would be undermined. The non-formal 
aspect of Reinach’s ethics requires that individual persons feel and respond to values in 
concrete situations, rather than follow general imperatives. Acting morally, in other 
words, is more than following a moral rule, it is acting out of conviction that one is 
following a moral principle. 
 
3 .1 .3 OB J E C T  A N D  OB J E C T I V I T Y  
 
Throughout this chapter we refer to the status of objects regarded as the bearers of 
values, and the objectivity of values (and of formal moral principles, among other 
things), all of which are the concerns of the objective attitude as discussed above. It is 
of importance that we clarify the meanings of these terms here, as it is not always 
                                               
16 Translating ‘sachliche Einstellung’ and ‘sachliches Gerichtetsein’ (S.W. p. 490, paragraph 3; 
Appendix (IV)), or ‘objektive Einstellung’ (S.W. p. 491, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV)). This refers to 
being concerned with and directed by objective facts rather than by relative or subjective concerns. 
See the following section for discussion clarifying the senses of ‘objective’ and ‘object’ in this chapter. 
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possible to translate into English the precise words used in the original German text. In 
brief, ‘object’ here translates ‘Gegenstand’17 and sometimes ‘Objekt’18 while 
‘objectivity’ most often translates ‘Sachlichkeit’19 and ‘Objektivität’,20 but also 
‘Gegenständlichkeit’.21  
 Object (generally speaking, Gegenstand) here refers to an object of 
intentionality, the referent of an experience; the intended object of the experience. This 
is not synonymous with ‘object’, in normal English usage, in the sense of a tangible 
thing (‘Ding’). An action or an experience itself, for instance, can be an object of 
experience, as can a trait of character, possibly even a person as a whole; thus, not all 
objects that are given to our experiences (for reflection) are physical things or things 
grasped perceptually. All of these are capable of existing or not existing. Their 
possibility of existence is primarily what distinguishes them from a different kind of 
entity with an important role in Reinach’s phenomenology: the state of affairs 
(Sachverhalt). States of affairs do not exist, but rather subsist, or obtain. They are the 
‘essential connections’ between things and properties.22 We do not perceive or grasp 
states of affairs; rather, we judge them to be or not to be. When I see a blue car, the car 
and the state of affairs the being–blue of the car (the fact that it is blue) are to be 
distinguished from one another. I grasp the car through an act of perception 
(Wahrnehmung) and in doing so find evidence to judge that the car is blue. There are 
important differences, therefore, between this act of judging and an intentional act of 
perceiving. If someone tells me that a car I have never seen before is blue, I can judge 
the car to be blue without seeing it. I have not grasped the car itself in any act. Equally, I 
                                               
17 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). 
18 S.W. p. 489, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
19 S.W. p. 491, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
20 S.W. p. 504, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
21 S.W. p. 485, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
22 Baltzer-Jaray, Doorway to the World of Essences, p. 69. 
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may see a car through a tinted pane of glass, and though I see it as blue, I suspect the 
blueness to be an illusion; I can then judge that the car is not in fact blue, or withhold 
judgement until I have better evidence on which to judge.  
 In Grundbegriffe, Reinach states that ‘object and state of affairs are different’,23 
and he reaffirms this in Grundzüge, when he states that ‘persons, characteristics and 
suchlike are morally valuable: not states of affairs, but objects’.24 The latter 
statement indicates that ‘object’ and ‘state of affairs’ are not only distinct terms, but are 
also, in fact, mutually exclusive of one another.25  
 To establish that states of affairs are not objects, in the sense that Reinach 
generally uses for ‘object’, requires some further clarification. The broadest sense in 
which Reinach, like Husserl, uses the word Gegenstand is by placing it in direct 
opposition to content (Inhalt). ‘Thus if “content” is said to be all that belongs to the “I” 
as a function, state-of-being, act, or subjective experience (i.e., all that can be executed 
by and in the “I”), then “object” can be said simply to be all that is foreign to the “I”, 
transcendent to the consciousness’.26 In other words, ‘object’ in this particular sense 
indicates all that is objective. In this regard, what is given to perceptual consciousness 
as an object must be sharply distinguished from what exists in consciousness, the 
experiencing or living through (Erleben) of the experience.27 In this sense a state of 
                                               
23 S.W. p. 336, paragraph 2; Appendix (II). 
24 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). My emphasis. 
25 It appears from this that states of affairs are never the intentional objects of experiences. Even 
in acts of judgement, the object and its properties are what is actually intended and judged —  
the car is judged to be blue, and blueness is judged to be a property of the car. However, the 
state of affairs ‘the being–blue of the car’ is an ‘entity’ of a certain kind, and obtains or 
subsists independently of whether anyone is conscious of it. 
26 Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 98. 
27 The object-content distinction was developed by Alexius Meinong, a student of Brentano. As 
Passmore recounts, ‘Meinong came to distinguish sharply between content and object with the help of 
the Polish philosopher, [Kazimierz] Twardowski, who in his Towards a Theory of the Content and 
Object of Presentations (1894) had distinguished three distinct elements in a “psychical phenomenon” 
—  the mental act, its content, and its object. The effect of identifying content and object, Meinong 
considers, is to make it appear that what is before the mind (the object) is somehow a part (the 
content) of the apprehension of it’. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1978), pp. 180-81. That Brentano had failed to distinguish between object and content in this 
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affairs, being effectively a true fact, is an ‘object’, or perhaps better put, an objectivity. 
The sense in which states of affairs are not objects is precisely in that they do not exist 
as any identifiable transcendent object given to perceptual awareness or in any such 
manner.28  
 Values too, then, are objects of a kind: they exist in some sense and are intended 
in acts of value-feeling. States of affairs are no such objects, and the ‘rightness’ of a 
state of affairs is not an object either; rightness is the quality of conformance with a 
formal moral law, with what ought to be. ‘“It is right” [is] like “it is in order”’.29 
Whether, however, a state of affairs really is or obtains is objective (sachlich), as is the 
rightness, wrongness or moral indifference of that state of affairs. What is important for 
us to emphasise is that the objective attitude (objektive Einstellung) is not concerned 
only with objects (Gegenstände), but with all that is objective and this includes states of 
affairs. 
 These are the senses in which we will use the terms ‘object’ and ‘objective’ in 
this chapter and beyond. While the meaning of ‘object’ is largely technical, it is of the 
highest importance for Reinach that his ethics is concerned with truths that are objective 
in this precise sense.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
way was one of Husserl’s main criticisms of Brentano’s descriptive-psychological view that what is 
given to consciousness must be in consciousness. Here Reinach follows Husserl in distinguishing the 
objectifying function of perception, the transcendent object of perception, from sensation. Whether 
this transcendent object of perception is identifiable as a ‘real object’ having extra-mental existence in 
any realist sense, of course, is not part of the phenomenological description of the transcendent object 
given to perceptual awareness. Thus Husserl can abstract from questions pertaining to the real 
existence of the intended object qua intended object in his descriptions of that object in his Logical 
Investigations, without losing any descriptive content of that object. 
28 Another way to look at this is to say that while only a finite number of objects might exist in the 
world, states of affairs are not limited in the same way. Any postulated connection between any 
objects and any properties is a viable and potentially true state of affairs. Thus Reinach’s theory 
requires, as DuBois puts it, the acceptance of ‘not simply “arbitrarily many”, but of infinitely many 
positive and negative states of affairs which obtain, as well as infinitely many contradictorily opposed 
states of affairs which do not obtain’. DuBois, Judgment and Sachverhalt, p. 27. 
29 S.W. p. 336, paragraph 2; Appendix (II). 
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SECTION TW O  
THE THREE SPHERES OF ETHICS  
 
As we saw in chapter two, moral values are a recurring theme in early 
phenomenological ethics, and they have a central role in Reinach’s theory as well. In 
Reinach’s terms, ‘morally good’ and ‘morally valuable’ have the same meaning; moral 
value equals moral goodness. In Grundbegriffe, he refers to the concept of moral value 
as, more succinctly, ‘the concept of the moral’.30 In the same article, however, he argues 
that ethics is about more than moral values, and that the concept of moral value alone is 
not sufficient to be able to understand and answer all questions of ethics. Not everything 
in our experience is or could be seen as the bearer of a moral value-character —  states 
of affairs, for example, cannot bear value or disvalue at all,31 and yet there are 
meaningful ethical questions that can be asked about them. 
 If I wish to say it is a good thing to help the poor, I can do so in terms of value; 
value attaches to the action of helping the poor and to the generosity of character that 
motivates that action. But if I wish to say it is bad or wrong that the poor are suffering 
in the first place, then the situation becomes more difficult. If states of affairs cannot be 
bearers of values, I cannot describe the state of affairs ‘that the poor suffer’ as 
disvaluable. The best I can do is to say it is disvaluable to ignore suffering, or to 
promote it. Yet we have a sense that the state of affairs should not be, the poor ought 
not to be suffering, and we want to be able to express this. If we cannot do so in terms 
of value, then value is an insufficient concept to address all ethical questions. 
 For Reinach, this problem shows the necessity of recognising a second basic 
concept in ethics, which can be referred to in answering questions about whether states 
of affairs ought to be. Ultimately, he establishes a total of three such basic concepts: the 
                                               
30 S.W., p. 335, paragraph 3; Appendix (II). 
31 ‘Only objects can be morally valuable, never states of affairs’. S.W. p. 336, paragraph 2; Appendix 
(II). 
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concept of moral values (sittliche Werte), the concept of moral rightness (sittliche 
Rechtheit), and the concept of goods (Güter).32  
 These three concepts all form part of an interconnected system of ethics, but 
they are not directly interchangeable with one another. ‘Valuable’ and ‘right’ do not 
mean the same thing and cannot be equated with or reduced to one another. To 
emphasise the distinctness of these concepts, Reinach describes each of these concepts 
as belonging to a different ‘sphere’ or domain of ethics: the sphere of values, the sphere 
of rightness and the sphere of goods, respectively.33 The three spheres together make up 
the world of ethics, each playing a role in how we experience and understand the 
ethical, and allowing us to ask and answer ethically-relevant questions that the other 
spheres cannot account for alone.  
 We will discuss each of these three spheres in turn and show why it is necessary 
for Reinach to include them —  and to distinguish them —  in his ethics. The diagram on 
the following page briefly shows how the realm of ethics is divided up into the three 
spheres.  
                                               
32 It is worth noting that Reinach’s understanding of ‘goods’ is entirely different from Scheler’s usage of 
the term as ‘things of value [Wertdinge]’ (Formalism, p. 9).  
33 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
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Ethics 
 
Sphere of Values  Sphere of Rightness  Sphere of Goods 
     
Pertains to objects. 
Moral value specifically 
is borne by persons, 
personal qualities and 
actions. 
 Pertains to states of 
affairs. 
 Pertains to tangible and 
intangible possessions or 
properties. 
     
An object is morally 
valuable (that is, morally 
good) in that it bears a 
moral value, and does 
not bear moral disvalue. 
 A state of affairs is 
morally right in that it 
essentially conforms 
with a formal moral 
law. 
 A good is not a value, or 
necessarily valuable, but 
the formal moral law may 
dictate that its existence or 
non-existence is right or 
wrong. 
     
Positive moral value is 
moral goodness. That 
action or characteristic 
which is morally 
valuable is morally good 
in its essence. 
 A morally right state 
of affairs ought to be. 
The existence of a 
morally valuable 
object (including an 
action) is morally 
right. 
 Goods form an order of 
precedence, but the 
creation of goods is not a 
moral goal of action in 
itself. 
     
The action of murder, the 
person of a murderer and 
the insensitivity to value 
that makes it possible to 
murder are all morally 
disvaluable. 
 The fact that a good 
person is happy is not 
morally valuable, but 
is morally right. 
 Happiness is not a moral 
value, but it is morally 
right that the morally good 
human being is also happy. 
     
Values are experienced 
(grasped) in intentional 
acts of value-feeling. 
 Rightness is deduced 
from formal moral 
principles. 
 Some goods (such as 
pleasure) are experienced, 
but they are not ‘felt’ in the 
way that values are. 
Happiness is an example of 
a good that is not an 
emotion in the sense that 
pleasure is, as it may exist 
without being experienced 
or recognised. 
     
      
 
Fig. 1: The Three Spheres of Ethics 
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Based on this overview, we see that each sphere accounts for a different set of questions 
in ethical discussion. The concept of moral values allows us to discuss and assess the 
moral status of actions, persons and the qualities of the characters of persons. The 
concept of moral rightness allows us to discuss and assess the moral status of being, of 
facts or states of affairs that obtain in the world. The concept of goods allow us to 
discuss tangible and intangible possessions and properties that can be morally deserved 
or undeserved, without necessarily being morally valuable or disvaluable in themselves. 
It is this diversity that creates the primary need for the three spheres and for keeping 
them separate from one another; values, rightness and goods cannot be equated, cannot 
account for one another in a satisfactory way, and above all should not be confused with 
one another. 
 
3 .2 .1 T H E  SP H E R E  O F  VA L U E S : M O R A L I T Y  I N  C H A R A C T E R  A N D  A C T I O N  
 
As seen in chapter two, a theory of values is a common component in early approaches 
to phenomenological ethics. Reinach’s ethics is no exception. He shares the 
understanding of value as something real or objective, instantiated in objects and 
experienced intentionally through a unique act of grasping of feeling, to be seen in other 
early phenomenological theories of ethics, and particularly exemplified in Scheler’s. 
While the characteristics that set Reinach’s core value-theory apart from those of his 
contemporaries are few and subtle, his understanding of the role of values in ethics, and 
the implications of that understanding for his wider ethical theory, are, nonetheless, 
quite unique. We will begin discussing Reinach’s theory of value from its first 
principles. 
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3.2 .1 .1  T H E  M E A N I N G  O F  V A L U E  
 
In Reinach’s terms, a value (or disvalue) is an inwardly grasped characteristic of an 
intended object (Gegenstand) that causes it, in itself, to be attractive (or repulsive) to the 
subject. Any definition beyond this is extremely difficult; Reinach does not even 
attempt to simply define what a value is. His aim is to describe values, and the manner 
in which they are experienced, in their respective essences. Value or disvalue is always 
experienced in relation to a grasped object, its bearer (Träger). The value itself is also 
the object of a separate act of grasping.34 Values, however, form an order of precedence 
(Rangordnung) or of hierarchy distinguishing the higher from the lower, or greater and 
lesser values, a distinction broadly of better, equal and worse. This order of precedence 
does not depend on the real existence of any values to remain constant, suggesting that 
each value has a separate, possibly ideal existence as well. ‘It makes no difference at all 
whether there is anything in the world to which moral value belongs’;35 moral value 
remains morally valuable even if it is not realised in any object.36  
 Anything that represents goodness, excellence or preferability in itself in an 
object that bears it is a value. Moral goodness, as we will discuss below, is just one of 
these; beauty and wisdom are other examples given.37 That which is good only in a 
qualified sense —  good for me, or good for a specific purpose —  is not a value or a 
valuable object.38 Reinach is also at pains to point out that ‘goodness’ in the various 
                                               
34 S.W. p. 295, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). ‘Even the one least versed in the phenomenological analysis 
must recognise that he grasps the activity of a subject in a very different way to how he grasps the 
value or disvalue of said activity; that the latter case is a matter of grasping by feeling’. 
35 S.W. p. 335, paragraph 2; Appendix (II). 
36 Here we see a key difference between the values of objects as interpreted by Reinach and by Lipps. 
For Lipps, an object has value inasmuch as it has the possibility of engendering a value response in a 
person. For Reinach, value is a real and a priori quality of objects that is independent not only of any 
human experience, but also of its instantiation in the world. ‘The value of {… } money declines if 
its being put to use [becomes] impossible; [on the other hand], the value of goodness never 
declines’. S.W. p. 493, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
37 S.W. p. 485, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
38 This can be compared to the distinction between a hypothetical and a categorical imperative in 
Kantian ethics: that which I ought to do to achieve a specific purpose or at a specific place and time, 
140 
senses used here must not be confused with moral goodness. We describe a beautiful 
painting as a good painting, or advice that evinces wisdom as good advice, ‘but these 
are just equivocations with moral good or bad’.39 Moral value is not otherwise defined; 
it is moral goodness, in and of itself. 
 The opposite of a value —  a quality that represents badness or inferiority in 
itself —  is termed a disvalue (Unwert). Reinach generally refers to disvalue as a lower 
value or a lack of value, not as an outright negative or opposite to value. ‘[The] essence 
of the Devil’, he comments in Grundzüge, ‘[consists precisely] in that he hates the good, 
and does not love it’.40 The greatest evil, then, is purely negative, concerned with 
diminishing or destroying value, not with creating anything that is opposite to value. 
Lack of sensitivity to value and lack of love for value are both moral disvalues of the 
personal character. No reference is ever made in Reinach’s writings to a love of 
disvalue or the disvaluable.  
 
3.2 .1 .2  T H E  E X P E R I E N C I N G  O F  VA L U E S  
 
A value is grasped in an intentional act: a unique cognitive act of feeling (fühlen). This 
feeling is not to be confused with the ‘feeling’ or emotion (Gefühl) of love or hate that 
may be associated with feeling a value or disvalue. As noted previously, the grasping of 
a value through feeling is an act in Reinach’s phenomenological sense —  a single, 
temporally punctual experience —  and is an intentional experience of an object. An 
emotion, on the other hand, is a state with a temporal duration, and is executed entirely 
within the subject; it is not an experience of anything in an intentional sense. An 
emotion can arise in response to the feeling of a value or disvalue; ‘it may be, for 
                                                                                                                                         
as against that which I ought to do absolutely and regardless of circumstances. 
39 S.W. p. 335, paragraph 2; Appendix (II). 
40 S.W. p. 506, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
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example, that joy relates to the value of a thing’,41 while grasping a disvalue might 
evoke disgust. However, these relationships are not by any means necessary, and the act 
of feeling the value is always distinct from any emotional reaction. ‘All kinds of 
different emotions can build themselves on [the] feeling of value.’42 A person may feel 
a value yet not experience any emotional state corresponding to that feeling, or even 
have a negative emotional reaction to a positive value. DuBois is correct when he 
suggests that the ‘feeling’ by means of which we experience value should ‘be accepted 
as a technical term: rather than thinking of a perception charged with affectivity, one 
should simply accept that this is the word used to denote the way that the person 
apprehends values’.43  
 Though values exist independently of when and by whom they are experienced, 
not every person is equally sensitive or receptive to value. ‘The feeling of an ethical 
value and the capacity for the feeling of ethical values in general are themselves ethical 
values. Their value increases with the growing fineness of the feeling’.44 
Correspondingly, a lack of sensitivity to moral value is less valuable. Love or regard for 
value is likewise valuable in itself. Thus, ‘a person’s character or the essence of their 
personality is documented in their ability to feel value and in the feeling-states grounded 
in this value feeling’.45  
 
3.2 .1 .3  VA L U E  A N D  D E M A N D  
 
Just as the feeling of a value is distinct from the emotional (gefühlsmäßig) reaction one 
has to that value, both of these in turn are distinct from the fact that values are, by 
                                               
41 S.W. p. 295, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
42 S.W. p. 493, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
43 DuBois, ‘Adolf Reinach: Metaethics and the Philosophy of Law’, p. 334. 
44 S.W. p. 300, paragraph 3; Appendix (III). 
45 Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 137. 
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definition, capable of motivating us.46 It is part of the meaning of a ‘value’ that we are 
attracted to it, and motivated to pursue it; it is part of the meaning of a ‘disvalue’ that 
we are repulsed by it, and motivated to deny it. The feeling or grasping of a value is 
classified as a motivational or emotive (emotional) experience. But what is the extent of 
this? Is it possible, for example, to feel a value but to deny its motivational influence? 
 Here Reinach considers the Platonic idea that it is impossible to know the good, 
and yet do otherwise. This, he concludes, is somewhat true, if one correctly interprets 
what it means to ‘know’. It is possible to ‘know’ what is good and still choose evil, but 
in this case, ‘knowing’ what is good indicates only a cold, incomplete knowledge that a 
value exists. The full experiencing of a value includes the experiencing of its emotive 
power; the more strongly one feels the value, the more one is motivated by it. At the 
ideal, perhaps impossible extreme, one experiences the value truly and completely, and 
in this case it may well be impossible to deny its motivational power. Reinach thus 
gives a qualified agreement to the Platonic principle: if one knows what is good in this 
true and complete sense of knowledge, it may be impossible to refuse it. 
 The motivational power of a felt value or disvalue is accompanied by the 
experience of a ‘demand’ (Forderung) to realise that value or as a ‘prohibition’ (Verbot) 
against realising that disvalue.47 In both cases the intensity of the experience correlates 
with the intensity of the feeling of value or disvalue. It is always, it seems, possible to 
defy a demand or prohibition and act against it, to be disobedient, but to do so, one must 
                                               
46 ‘There are things without rational motivatedness ([for example, an] experience that [gives] sensory 
pleasure from the good taste of a meal). There, value has no place’. S.W. p. 504, paragraph 2; 
Appendix (IV). 
47 Demands and prohibitions are experienced in acts of ‘Vernehmen’, literally ‘hearing’, although this 
does not suggest that the demand is really heard as a sound is. See S.W. p. 291, paragraph 3; Appendix 
(III). Reinach also uses vernehmen in Grundlagen to describe the way in which we ‘hear’ the social 
acts of others. John F. Crosby comments, ‘We use the term “hear” in a broad sense which enables us 
to speak of the commanded person hearing the command even when his ears are in no way involved, 
as when he apprehends the command by reading something. [… ] neither German nor English has any 
natural and unambiguous word for expressing the highly meaningful concept of a receptive act which 
refers to an act of another person addressed to the subject’. Crosby, ‘Apriori Foundations’, p. 49. 
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overcome this influence. When a person engages in volitional reflection, bewildered 
over whether or not to carry out a project, what that person seeks, through reflection, is 
a demand to carry out the project or a prohibition against doing so.48  
 
3.2 .1 .4  M O R A L  V A L U E S  A N D  T H E I R  B E A R E R S  
 
The ‘world of values’ has an extremely complex and nuanced structure.49 Values have a 
system of relation to one another that is more complex than ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ values. 
Reinach also divides values based on modality, height and magnitude,50 though he 
never fully explains the meanings of these terms. Among the many distinctions that 
exist is the differentiation between moral values and non-moral values. Beauty, utility, 
pleasantness and wisdom are all indicated to be values at different points within 
Reinach’s work. All of these are ‘good’, but goodness in this sense is not to be confused 
with moral goodness; likewise, these values are not moral values. Moral value is that 
which is morally good in itself, sui generis, and we know it only by experiencing it.  
 Though the full nature of the order of precedence of values is not made clear, 
some values are certainly greater, more preferable, than others. This is experienced 
simply as a more intense feeling of the value, a stronger feeling of preference; we do not 
see the precise relation between the two values, but rather feel a greater motivation to 
pursue one than the other. The motivation manifests in the ‘demand’ or ‘prohibition’ 
mentioned above, which is ‘heard’ by the person in an act separate from the grasping of 
the value. 
                                               
48 ‘In the practical questioning stance, we are opened to the demands that we hope to sense on the basis 
of the diverse reflective activity regarding the project. The sensing of the demands {in volitional 
reflection} stands in analogy with the insight into the being of the state of affairs {in intellectual 
reflection}’. S.W. p. 294, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
49 S.W., p. 486, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
50 S.W., p. 485, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
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 Values are not experienced independently in the world, but are always 
associated with bearers —  things that we grasp in acts of perception, and in connection 
with which we feel the value.51 Different kinds of values are borne by different things; a 
landscape can be the bearer of the value of beauty, but not of the value of wisdom. As 
the bearers of moral values specifically, Reinach identifies four categories of things: 
persons, personal qualities, acts and actions. Certain actions bear values by their 
essence; thus ‘value- and disvalue-character pertain to [a] project by virtue of its 
composition’.52  
 
3.2 .1 .5  T H E  R O L E  O F  V A L U E S  I N  E T H I C S  
 
As actions are the bearers of moral value-characters, values are key to how morally 
good actions can be chosen: we can feel the moral value of a thought-of action53 and 
immediately know that it would be morally good to carry it out, or feel its moral 
disvalue and immediately know that to carry it out would be evil. But the role of values 
in Reinach’s ethics goes beyond this preferring of actions. Indeed, as we shall soon see, 
Reinach indicates that the values of actions are of secondary importance to the values of 
persons. 
 In Kantian ethics, moral goodness belongs to the will, in its freedom to act out of 
respect for practical reason. The willing of an action is good if that action is in 
accordance with the formal moral law, the categorical imperative, and if the action is 
willed out of respect for that law. It is thus self-imposed. In utilitarian ethics, moral 
goodness belongs to the purpose or end of an action, or to its consequences. An action 
                                               
51 Reinach does not state that values can never exist independently of bearers, but the values that he 
discusses (such as wisdom, beauty, receptivity to value and moral goodness) are qualities rather than 
things. It is hard to imagine beauty existing without being a quality of an object, and hard to say how 
we would recognise disembodied beauty of this kind. 
52 S.W. p. 292, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). 
53 Or, to be more accurate to Reinach’s terminology, a project. The project considered is not the same as 
the action performed. See below, section 3.3.2. 
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that has as its purpose the promotion of pleasure or happiness, over the alternative that 
promotes pain and displeasure, is good. It is impossible to be a good person in either 
Kantian or utilitarian ethics except in the sense of being a person who wills or performs 
good actions. The sole criterion of goodness in each of these theories is something that 
cannot be possessed by persons, at least not directly; it is something that lies by 
definition outside them. For Kant, human beings have moral dignity and are to be 
appreciated and respected as the members of the ‘universal kingdom of ends’. Goodness 
of character, however, is not assessed in terms of personal qualities, but only in terms of 
the will.54  
 Reinach agrees that ‘there is in fact a formal ethics’,55 and that happiness is a 
good. Yet he disagrees with Kant that an action is morally good only if it is chosen out 
of respect for the formal moral law. On the contrary, for a person to be motivated by a 
rational sense of duty rather than a personal preference for the morally valuable 
suggests, in Reinach’s estimation, that that person lacks a proper appreciation of 
genuinely good; that he or she lacks, in fact, a sensitivity to moral value and respect for 
moral value. Reinach also disagrees that ethics can have its basis in the ends of actions, 
or in their possible or actual consequences. Every action has an essence, and rooted in 
that essence is a definite value-character. Some actions are morally valuable in 
themselves, others are morally disvaluable, and this essential or inherent value does not 
change under any circumstances.56 However, when it comes to what is morally good, 
Reinach’s emphasis is not really on the goodness or the willing of specific actions at all. 
Instead, Reinach’s position is closer to an agent-based theory of ethics, such as 
Aristotle’s. 
                                               
54 More specifically, Kant holds that only the will can be good unreservedly and without qualification. 
55 S.W. p. 503, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). 
56 Reinach, however, suggests that it is possible for a project’s value-character to be modified in view of 
its circumstances or consequences. See below, section 3.3.3. 
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 In Aristotelian ethics, actions themselves are not the primary focus in moral 
assessment; the emphasis, rather, is on the character of the agent. A person who 
possesses and recognises the correct virtues and acts consistently with those virtues is a 
good person; that a good person performs good actions follows naturally. Reinach’s 
position is similar, but not identical to this. For Reinach, actions do have their own, 
essential moral value-characters, and a person who scrupulously performs the most 
morally valuable actions at all times realises a maximum of moral value or goodness. 
This, nevertheless, is not the requirement to be a good person. A person who always 
performs morally valuable actions is still not morally perfect if he or she does not 
possess a certain sensitivity to value and a respect for moral value. This sensitivity and 
this respect are, themselves, moral values of the personal character.57 No number of 
good actions, then, can make a person ‘good’ except perhaps by habituation and the 
development of values in that person’s character.58 Reinach paraphrases Martin Luther 
with the statement: ‘[The] person must [already] be good, before [the] good action’.59  
 In summary, then, moral values account for perhaps the most fundamental 
questions in Reinach’s ethics: those of how persons ought to be and of what kinds of 
actions persons ought to perform. Any question of whether an action ought to be carried 
out, or not, is, first of all, a question of whether that action is morally valuable in itself, 
morally disvaluable in itself, or neither. No other factors (and other factors do apply to a 
moral decision, as we will see in later sections) can make the action of murder morally 
                                               
57 Reinach contrasts this ethical point of view with that of the criminal law. The law distinguishes only 
between (legal) guilt and innocence, between those who break the law and those who do not. Whether 
a person refrains from breaking the law out of respect for the law and a sense of civic duty, or out of 
fear of the punishment he or she would receive, makes no difference from a legal perspective; the 
person is correctly safe from reproach or punishment in all these cases. Morally speaking, however, a 
person who refrains from an evil action only out of fear of punishment has a lower moral standing 
than one who refrains because he or she finds the evil action repugnant. See S.W. p. 308, paragraph 1; 
Appendix (III). 
58 Reinach does not make it entirely clear how moral development of this kind takes place. See below, 
section 3.2.1.6. 
59 S.W., p. 501, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). The reference appears to be to Luther’s article Von der 
Freiheit eines Christenmenschen (1520). 
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good, because murder is morally disvaluable in itself;60 and above all other concerns, 
every person is called on to be good, not only in his or her actions, but as a person. 
 Having seen what role values are to play in Reinach’s ethics, however, we must 
also be aware of the limits of that role, of what values cannot do. Values cannot help us 
to resolve questions about morality in being, about the ethical status of facts, or of 
anything else that is not properly designated as a bearer of values. Nor can the concept 
of value help us to understand how that which is not a value, or morally valuable, can 
yet be correctly deserved in a moral sense. Only a method of preferring actions and of 
assessing persons is provided in this sphere, which is not enough to satisfy the questions 
of ethics. The concept of moral value alone does not allow us to say what a person’s 
moral duty is;61 it offers only a means of preferring one action over another that does 
not necessarily get to the heart of what one absolutely ought to do. The sphere of values 
is only the first of three, which each have their role to play. 
 
3.2 .1 .6  C R I T I Q U E  
 
In The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, Brettler criticises Reinach for his argument 
that the ability to feel value is necessary to act morally. ‘We may infer that Reinach 
would have agreed that nothing more can be demanded of a person than that they use 
whatever degree of ability to feel value that they have’, she writes, but ‘this is not 
clear’.62 At face value, it seems unfair that a person should be required to do more than 
his or her best, more than is in his or her power, to act in a morally good manner. 
 In fact, it seems clear that Reinach does indeed suggest that more can be asked 
of a person than this. A person who lacks sensitivity to value is not only likely to do 
                                               
60 Reinach never gives a definition of murder that he himself is happy with. However, it is reasonable to 
suggest that murder —  as opposed to the more general term of homicide —  is by its nature morally 
bad. All murder is homicide, but not all homicide is necessarily murder. 
61 Moral duty instead hinges upon the sphere of moral rightness, which we will discuss in section 3.2.2. 
62 Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 138. 
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things that are morally bad, but is also a morally bad person in himself or herself. As we 
have noted, Reinach’s emphasis when it comes to the role of values in ethics is on the 
assessment of the personal character. A person who fails to recognise values correctly 
faces reproach for that failure only indirectly; what is fundamental is that the failure 
indicates a flaw in the person’s character, a way in which that person ought to be better. 
This, as we will see below,63 is the reason why an evil action performed after a pause 
for reflection is judged more harshly than one hastily performed: ‘the incapacity to feel 
an ethical value is itself an ethical disvalue’.64 As long as it is possible for a person to 
improve himself or herself, to increase the moral values of his or her personal character 
and correspondingly decrease the disvalues, then Reinach is not making an unfair 
demand of the person with low value-sensitivity; he is simply making a demand more in 
line with an Aristotelian understanding of ethics. It is not that a person ought to act in 
the best way that he or she can act, but that that person should be the best person that he 
or she can be and can become. 
 So, while in fact Brettler’s concern here is warranted, it does not create an 
immediate problem for Reinach’s ethics as presented. This clarification, nonetheless, 
does point us to a deeper problem with Reinach’s ethics of personal values: that of 
personal moral development. 
Reinach makes it clear that not all persons have the same level of sensitivity to 
value: there are ‘different talents among human beings in the grasping of these 
distinctions of value’.65 Moreover, ‘the feeling of an ethical value and the capacity for 
the feeling of ethical values in general are themselves ethical values. Their value 
increases with the growing fineness of the feeling’.66 What Reinach does not make clear 
                                               
63 See section 3.3.6. 
64 S.W. p. 301, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
65 S.W. p. 485, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
66 S.W. p. 300, paragraph 3; Appendix (III). 
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is what, if anything, determines an individual person’s ‘fineness of feeling’ or 
sensitivity to value, or how that sensitivity can change. In other words, if a person 
possesses a low sensitivity to value and is to that extent a morally bad person, it is not at 
all clear how that person can increase his or her fineness of feeling or sensitivity and 
improve morally. Nor does Reinach explain how any other value of the personal 
character, moral or otherwise, can be obtained, or how a disvalue of the personal 
character can be removed. 
 This is not just a question of the apparent fairness or justness of the situation. 
Reinach insightfully shows us that ‘ought’ applies only to contingent states, to that 
which can be one way or another.67 ‘Ought’ necessarily implies ‘can’. He also indicates 
that the existence of a value is morally right and that that which is morally right ought to 
be. If a person’s low value-sensitivity, however, is in some way determined and fixed, 
and unable to be changed, if that person cannot ever possess a higher sensitivity to 
value, then that person’s being unreceptive to value is not contingent, and is thus not 
wrong. It is not meaningful to say ‘he ought to be more sensitive to value’ if that is 
impossible. Likewise, it is not clear whether ‘cases of actual inability to feel value’68 are 
possible for Reinach, and if so, how they should be assessed. A person completely 
unable to feel value is completely unable to do good for good reasons (to be ‘good 
before the good action’). Thus we cannot say that he or she ought to do good for good 
reasons; it is not only unlikely in this case, but impossible. 
 Reinach provides only a partial solution to this problem. He makes reference to 
a ‘“redemption” of the I through art or suchlike, [generally through] anything that would 
lead it on to the objective attitude’.69 Creating or viewing art is presented here as a 
means to refine one’s appreciation of it. This suggests that paying close attention to 
                                               
67 ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, pp. 108-9. 
68  Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 137, n. 1. 
69 S.W. p. 491, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
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values in general can lead a person to the correct attitude for recognising moral values. 
Nevertheless, Reinach does not explicitly clarify whether this means that the person’s 
sensitivity to value can increase in this way, or not. If so, then there is a role in a 
Reinachian ethics for moral habituation, as there is in Aristotelian ethics; habitually 
doing good will promote those values of the personal character that are necessary to be 
a good person. Since Reinach does not make this clear, it is impossible to be certain 
how he would resolve these difficulties. 
 Within the first of his three spheres of ethics, Reinach answers perhaps the most 
immediate questions of ethics: How do I know what kinds of actions I ought to 
perform? How do I know what kind of person I ought to be? Once a person has entered 
into the objective attitude and has begun to appreciate the good in itself, the answer 
comes naturally; one’s own feelings of value are the basis on which to prefer one thing 
over another, and feelings of moral value are the basis to prefer actions or traits of 
character. But Reinach still has a long way to go to chart out the entire realm of ethics, 
as not every question in ethics can be answered in terms of value. We will discuss the 
significance of Reinach’s unique contributions to the field of value-ethics in the next 
chapter.  
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3 .2 .2 T H E  SP H E R E  O F  R I G H T N E S S : M O R A L I T Y  I N  T H E  W O R L D  O F  B E I N G  A N D  T H E  
F O R M A L  M O R A L  L AW  
 
 
The state of affairs (Sachverhalt)70 has an important role in Reinach’s phenomenology. 
Expressed formally, a state of affairs takes the form ‘the being A of B’ (a–Sein des Bs), 
where A is a state or characteristic and B is an object. If I say ‘the sky is blue’, I express 
the state of affairs ‘the being blue of the sky’ as an assertion.71 Another person to whom 
I express this statement can then understand the meant state of affairs, and take an 
intellectual position toward it. This intellectual position can be belief that the state of 
affairs indeed obtains (agreement that the sky is blue), but equally it can be disbelief of 
the state of affairs, doubt, suspicion, or indifference. One’s taking of a position may or 
may not be aided by visual evidence (looking out the window to confirm that the sky is 
blue) or reflection (trying to recall whether the sky was blue when last seen).  
 As taking a position of belief involves judging that the statement is true, that the 
meant state of affairs obtains, it is also referred to simply as an act of judgement 
(Urteil); taking a position of disbelief is an act of negative judgement, while other 
positions (doubt, suspicion and indifference) represent an incomplete judgement or a 
failure to judge. All of these judgements are about whether the state of affairs is, 
subsists or obtains; whether the statement ‘the sky is blue’ is true. States of affairs never 
exist; they are not objects. The existence of an object is itself a state of affairs; the being 
of a state of affairs is not itself a state of affairs. 
 As states of affairs are not objects, do not exist as such, and are never 
intentionally grasped (but deduced and judged to be), they cannot be the bearers of 
value. ‘So in ethics’, Reinach concludes, ‘one cannot get by with just the concept of the 
                                               
70 In common usage, a Sachverhalt is simply a fact, or ‘the facts of the matter’. Here it is used as a 
technical term. 
71 Although we often assert states of affairs in this way, a state of affairs is not the same thing as an 
assertion, as DuBois makes clear: ‘The question, is the chair wet?, and the assertion, the chair is wet, 
refer to the same state of affairs, but it is only in the latter case that the state of affairs is posited or 
asserted’. DuBois, Judgment and Sachverhalt, p. 9. 
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morally valuable’.72 The inability of the concept of moral value to satisfy questions 
about the moral status of states of affairs, of facts, necessitates Reinach’s second basic 
concept of ethics, the concept of moral rightness. A state of affairs cannot be ‘valuable’ 
or ‘disvaluable’, but it can be ‘morally right’ or ‘morally wrong’.73 The concept of 
rightness allows us to ascribe a moral character to a state of affairs, to ask and answer 
morally relevant questions about facts of being. 
 An obvious question is, why do we need a separate concept to ask and answer 
questions of this kind? Why can we not simply describe ‘moral rightness’ as a kind of 
value, and states of affairs as bearers of that kind of value? The answer is that to do so is 
not consistent with what a value is or with how it is experienced. When a person sees a 
beautiful landscape, he or she is immediately struck by it; we can call a vista of this 
kind ‘stunning’ or ‘arresting’ for exactly this reason, as it overtakes the viewer and 
almost forces him or her to look closely at it. Long before every detail has been taken 
in, before we necessarily know exactly what we are seeing, this feeling has already 
taken hold. On meeting another person, we can be immediately attracted to or repelled 
by that person before we can really say what it is about that person that so impresses or 
disgusts us. It is difficult to avoid feeling a value, to keep from being overtaken by it. 
 A state of affairs is never experienced in the way that we grasp an object. 
Learning of a state of affairs —  hearing the news of some terribly unjust event —  can 
provoke an emotional reaction, but this is always a reaction; value-feeling is an 
intentional act of grasping, not a reaction. A state of affairs is never grasped; rather, one 
judges that it obtains or does not obtain on the basis of evidence. A single point of 
information, a single fact, can change whether I believe in a state of affairs, or not. One 
                                               
72 S.W. p. 336, paragraph 4; Appendix (II). 
73 Right (recht) is to be distinguished from correct (richtig). In ordinary usage one might refer to a 
judgement about a state of affairs as being right, but what is meant here is that the judgement is 
correct, that it reflects reality. Rightness in the sense used here is specifically a quality of states of 
affairs, not of judgements about them. 
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can refuse to believe in a state of affairs, explicitly or implicitly, regardless of the 
evidence for its being; we never have this chance when it comes to values. I grasp, or 
perceive, an object, and before I can judge whether or not it really exists (a state of 
affairs), I also grasp its value.  
 
3.2 .2 .1  T H E  M E A N I N G  O F  M O R A L R I G H T N E S S  A N D  T H E  F O R M A L  M O R A L  L A W  
 
It is important to note that although a state of affairs can be morally right, ‘the being 
morally right of a state of affairs’ is not a valid state of affairs. States of affairs are facts 
about objects, not about other states of affairs. Rightness is a property of a state of 
affairs: a state of affairs can be morally right, morally wrong, or neither. To say that a 
state of affairs is morally right is equivalent to saying that, morally speaking, it ought to 
be or obtain; ‘if certain further conditions are fulfilled, I ought to do {or realise} it’.74 
Ethically speaking, the being of a morally right state of affairs is better than its non-
being, and the non-being of a morally wrong state of affairs is better than its being —  
not in the sense that it is more valuable, or that it is a good, but directly in that it ought 
to be. None of this is applicable to non-moral states of affairs, e.g., ‘orange lies between 
yellow and red’, or ‘it is raining’. 
 ‘Ought’ is an important concept in Reinach’s philosophy of ethics and of law. 
Any legal enactment contains either an is-statement or an ought-statement. An example 
of the former is a legal definition, such as that of the age of majority, when a person is 
no longer by the law as a minor. Such statements are true for the purposes of that legal 
code. Legal ought-statements, on the other hand, state that a specific action is required, 
permitted or prohibited of some or all persons. To put it another way, they state that 
certain things ought to be done, or ought not to be done, or ought not not-to-be done. 
                                               
74 ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, p. 105. 
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Such a law might be worded as an is-statement (‘all citizens at the age of eighteen shall 
serve one year of military service’), but this is really an ought-statement, an imperative, 
not an is-statement. It is possible that a citizen will break the law and avoid military 
service. Ought-statements that are part of a positive legal code are ‘valid for a certain 
group of persons’,75 namely those who live subject to that lawmaker’s authority, during 
a finite period of time after the law is brought into force and before it is repealed. 
 However, it is also possible to conceive of ought-statements that are not bound 
to any specific place or time and that possess universal applicability. These are the 
expressions of a formal moral law (Sittengesetz). The formal moral law represents that 
which is morally right, that which ought to be, in an absolute and universal sense.76 The 
moral rightness, wrongness or indifference of a state of affairs is determined by whether 
that state of affairs essentially conforms with a formal moral law. Reinach presents four 
key examples of principles of the formal moral law: (i) It is right that any morally 
valuable object exists; (ii) It is right that any morally disvaluable object does not exist; 
(iii) It is wrong that any morally disvaluable object exists; (iv) It is wrong that any 
morally valuable object does not exist.77 These principles link the spheres of values and 
rightness. A valuable object is never ‘right’, but its existence is right. A state of affairs 
is never ‘valuable’, but its rightness may depend on a value being realised in it. 
 In customary usage, we might also refer to an action as being morally right. 
Reinach attaches two specific meanings to this expression at different points. An action 
cannot be morally right in itself, as that is a property of states of affairs, but an action 
can have as its goal or purpose the realisation of a state of affairs that is morally right. In 
                                               
75 ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, p. 109. 
76 S.W. p. 502, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). ‘Moral rightness is an attribute of essence: that which 
is right, is right as such, on the basis of its essence; circumstances make no difference [there]. 
What is right can [thus] be expressed as conformance to a general law’. 
77 S.W., p. 337, paragraph 2; Appendix (II). We will discuss the distinction between these statements and 
the equivalent axioms put forward by Scheler in chapter four, section 4.2.3. 
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this case, the action can be called morally right by association, but it is not in and of 
itself; ‘it is right insofar as that which is wanted is right, but not in itself. [So] the 
willing inherits from that which is willed’.78 Later, however, in Grundlagen, Reinach 
points to an alternative meaning. Actions can be the bearers of values, and, to the extent 
that actions can be said to exist,79 the existence of an action is a state of affairs. 
Accordingly, that existence can be morally right or morally wrong if the action itself is 
the bearer of a moral value-character. Thus, as Burkhardt puts it, the spheres of value 
and rightness ‘are embedded in one another: the morally valuable object is a component 
of a state of affairs, while the right state of affairs is the goal, result or content of an act, 
which itself —  in Reinach’s sense —  is an object’.80  
 Only a contingent state of affairs, one that can either be or not be, can be morally 
right or wrong. This is because an ought-statement is only meaningful if it refers to a 
contingent truth. It is meaningless to say ‘two plus two ought to equal five’ because two 
plus two can never equal five. However, it is equally meaningless to say ‘two plus two 
ought to equal four’ because two plus two can never fail to equal four. So the statement 
‘only good persons ought to be happy’ (‘it is right that only good persons are happy’) is 
directly incompatible with the ‘pious dream of the ancient Greeks’81 that good persons 
are necessarily happy or that happiness is only possible for those who are good.  
 Because moral rightness is linked to compliance with a formal moral law —  
whether the state of affairs in question ought to be —  it lacks the ‘extensive nuancing’ 
of the sphere of values.82 Values are ranked in relation to one another and vary in 
numerous ways, as discussed above. Moral rightness lacks this diversity. A state of 
                                               
78 S.W., p. 336, paragraph 3; Appendix (II). 
79 ‘Every moral obligation {… } presupposes that the existence of a person’s action, which forms the 
content of his duty, is either morally right or right in virtue of the rightness of other related states of 
affairs’. Reinach, ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, pp. 13-14. 
80 Burkhardt, ‘Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit’, p. 161. 
81 S.W. p. 496, paragraph 5; Appendix (IV). 
82 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
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affairs that essentially complies with a formal moral law is right, and ought to be; a state 
of affairs that essentially violates a formal moral law is wrong, and ought not to be. All 
other states of affairs are neither morally right, nor morally wrong; from a moral 
standpoint they are neutral or indifferent. If two states of affairs are morally right, 
neither can be more or less right than the other, and thus there is no system of 
preferences within the sphere of rightness aside from the preferability of rightness over 
non-rightness or wrongness. To achieve any kind of ordered ranking of states of affairs 
in their rightness requires us to refer back to the sphere of values, and to the moral value 
that is realised in each state of affairs. 
 
3.2 .2 .2  T H E  R O L E  O F  T H E  S P H E R E  O F  R I G H T N E S S  I N  E T H I C S  
 
We have established what the Reinachian distinction between values and rightness is 
and what it amounts to, but the need for that distinction, for these two separate concepts 
in ethics, must be examined. ‘Valuable’ means ‘good’ and ‘morally valuable’ means 
‘morally good’, so we already have a basis for discussion of moral goodness and evil. 
Under what circumstances would we need to talk about rightness or wrongness, where 
value and disvalue would not suffice? 
 To return to an example we mentioned previously, let us imagine that two men 
are convicted of the same crime in the same penal system, and sent to prison for the 
same term. One of these men is guilty of the crime he committed; the other is innocent. 
We want to be able to say, at least, that the fact that the guilty man is imprisoned is 
preferable to the fact that the innocent man is imprisoned.83 Yet we cannot say ‘it is 
                                               
83 Reinach refers to the punishment of the guilty as intrinsically, morally right on more than one 
occasion. However, he is not able to show precisely why it is morally right to punish the guilty (as 
opposed to being justified under positive law or even a priori right relations). We will see below 
(section 3.3.2.4) why Reinach’s position here is so problematic. Where we refer to this formal moral 
principle in this chapter, it functions only as an example that has a direct basis in Reinach’s writings. 
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morally valuable that the guilty man is imprisoned’, or ‘it is morally disvaluable that the 
innocent man is imprisoned’.84 Every value needs a bearer, and in this case there is 
nothing to bear the moral value or moral disvalue, unless we designate states of affairs 
as the bearers of values. Reinach rejects this as a possibility. As we saw in our previous 
discussion of the technical sense of ‘object’, states of affairs do not exist, but obtain, 
and are not grasped in intentional acts of perception. ‘The sky is blue’ is a state of 
affairs, but I can only judge it to either obtain or not obtain based on available evidence 
and on my other beliefs. If that state of affairs does indeed obtain, then my judgement is 
correct, but I still have not grasped the state of affairs in a perceptual act. Only the 
object (the sky) exists and can be grasped intentionally. If on viewing the blue sky I 
grasp an aesthetic value in relation to it (that is to say, if I find it to have beauty), then 
that value is borne by the sky, not by the fact that it is blue or even by its characteristic 
of blueness. Likewise, generosity is a value of the personal character, and is borne by 
the generous person, not by the fact that the person is generous. In our present case, 
where a man is imprisoned for a crime he committed, ‘one says: [the punishment is] 
morally right, but not: morally valuable’.85  
 With only moral value as a basic concept of the ethical, therefore, we cannot talk 
about the moral preferability of states of affairs. We can look for ways around this. If 
the innocent man in our example was imprisoned by a corrupt court, out of malice, we 
can say that the actions of the judge were morally disvaluable. But this disvalue would 
be equally present if the guilty man were imprisoned by an equally corrupt court. 
Besides, it is also possible that no such corruption took place; the court’s decision could 
                                               
84 A utilitarian might argue that the fact that the guilty person is in prison acts as a deterrent value to 
others and thus this is at least part of its value and moral justification, but the perceived valuableness 
of the deterrent effect would apply equally to whether the person is guilty or innocent. Thus the 
utilitarian cannot account for the moral preferability of the guilty over the innocent person being 
imprisoned.  
85 S.W. p. 336, paragraph 1; Appendix (II). 
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have been an honest mistake. We can at best say here that someone was negligent, that 
some piece of evidence was overlooked or that a witness was mistaken in testifying; 
again, the very same mistakes may also have taken place in the trial of the guilty man. 
In the final analysis, the best we can ever say is that the actions that led to the innocent 
man’s imprisonment were morally disvaluable, and that the action of setting him free 
would be morally valuable. We cannot say anything in terms of value about the fact of 
the man’s being imprisoned. 
 The concept of rightness allows us to say: it is right that a guilty man is 
imprisoned for his crime, it is wrong that an innocent man is imprisoned for a crime he 
did not commit. This precise example presupposes that, under the formal moral law, a 
human being who is guilty of a crime ought to be punished, and a human being ought 
not to be punished for a crime of which he or she is innocent. Such specific principles 
are all debatable individually, but the essential point here is the possibility of such 
principles, of an absolute moral ‘ought’. This is of high importance for normative 
ethics, as we will now see.  
 
3.2 .2 .3  M O R A L  O B L I G AT I O N  A N D  D U T Y  
 
The more direct importance of the sphere of rightness for Reinach’s ethics is the role it 
plays in determining moral duties. Rightness is the concept that allows us to say ‘ought’ 
or ‘should’ (Sollen). In itself, the knowledge that an action is morally valuable indicates 
that that action is to be preferred over a less valuable action or a disvaluable one, but it 
does not tell us that it is one’s duty to carry out the action, that one ought to do so. 
Several possible actions at once can be morally valuable, though to greater or lesser 
degrees. Reinach bridges this gap between non-formal preference and an absolute 
‘ought’ by introducing a concept of absolute moral duty into the framework of his 
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ethics. Statements in the form of ‘this ought to be’ or ‘I ought to do this’ belong to both 
formal ethics and to legal philosophy. The difference between a legal ought and a moral 
ought is that moral oughts bind all persons in all circumstances, while legal oughts bind 
only those persons who are subject to the particular legislating authority that enacted 
them.86  
 We saw in chapter one that Reinach distinguishes three types of obligation, 
which we called essential obligations, legal obligations and moral obligations. Essential 
obligations arise from the essences of social acts; it is in the essence of a promise that it 
places me under an obligation to fulfil that promise. To fail to meet this obligation is to 
act inconsistently with the meaning of a promise. Legal obligations arise from the 
positive law. Certain enactments of law posit something that ought to be (in a strictly 
non-moral sense), and any human being who is subject to that law is obligated to act 
accordingly. If I fail to meet my legal obligations, by doing something the law posits I 
ought not to, such as commit theft, then I break the law and am treated as a criminal. 
Moral obligations arise from the formal moral law, and apply independently of any 
prior act of positing, or any jurisdiction. Moral obligations reflect how one ought to act 
in an absolute sense. When we say that a person is morally obligated to fulfil a promise, 
‘the moral [obligation] mentioned here arises only because the [essential] obligation 
already obtains’.87 Legal and essential obligations are meaningful in their own separate 
spheres, but they are ‘non-ethical categories’.88  
 Moral obligations (Verpflichtungen), in turn, are to be distinguished from one’s 
moral duty (Pflicht). Moral obligations are not all equal; some carry more weight than 
others and should be preferred over others. The moral obligation to fulfil a promise is 
                                               
86 Again, this calls to mind the distinction between categorical imperatives and hypothetical imperatives. 
The legal ought is hypothetical, something one ought to do if one lives under a particular legal system. 
The moral ought is categorical, something that ought to be wherever and whenever it is possible. 
87 Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 159. 
88 Burkhardt, ‘Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit’, p. 156. 
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lesser than the moral obligation to refrain from murder. One’s highest moral obligation, 
at any given moment, represents one’s moral duty, that which one actually ought to do 
in practical terms. One’s moral duty is always to meet a moral obligation, but not every 
moral obligation can equal one’s duty at the same time.89   
 Reinach does not immediately make it clear how one knows which moral 
obligation is greater than the others. Given his comments elsewhere, it seems likely that 
this is where formal ethics can no longer help, and non-formal ethics is once again 
required. Formal ethics tells us as a general principle that promises ought to be kept, but 
this formal rule alone cannot tell a person in a concrete situation whether he or she 
should keep a specific promise. This is Reinach’s chief criticism of Kant’s pure 
formalism: Kant attempts to draw from the general to the specific, deriving all 
individual moral actions from formal principles. ‘[The] difficulty [lies in] deriving 
individual actions from [the] mere formal law’;90 Reinach points to the infamous ‘lie 
under specific circumstances’,91 where the categorical imperative appears to prevent me 
from deceiving one person even to save another’s life. Here, then, Reinach’s 
expectation would be that the action that realises the highest moral value takes 
precedence and becomes the individual’s moral duty. Formally speaking, a greater 
moral value ought to be realised before a lesser one. 
 As moral obligations are linked to the formal moral law, a moral obligation can 
arise in a situation that has very little to do with values.92 Morally speaking, one ought 
                                               
89 In English we reflect this idea in ordinary speech when we say that a person has ‘done the right thing’. 
This means the same as ‘he did what he ought to have done’ or simply ‘he did his (moral) duty’. The 
equality in meaning between ‘he did the right thing’ (or ‘he did what was right’) and ‘he did what he 
ought to have done’ precisely matches the equivalence between ‘rightness’ and ‘ought’. 
90 S.W. p. 501, paragraph 5; Appendix (IV). 
91 Ibid. 
92 In Grundlagen, Reinach states that ‘an action in accordance with moral obligation necessarily 
represents a moral value’. (S.W. p. 190) This can be interpreted in one of two ways: (i) that any action 
that one can be morally obligated to carry out must necessarily be morally valuable; or (ii) that the 
completion of a moral obligation necessarily realises a moral value. Both can in fact be true; if (i) is 
true, then (ii) follows from that. 
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to fulfil one’s promises. ‘The [essential] obligation to fulfil [a promise] which exists 
over and against the promisee is in addition to the [moral obligation], or better, it forms 
the basis and presupposition of that [moral obligation]’.93 Because this is a matter of a 
formal ought, the moral obligation remains unchanged regardless of whether the action 
through which the promise is to be fulfilled is morally valuable in itself, morally 
indifferent in terms of value, or even morally disvaluable. Here, the obligation and the 
content of the promise must be kept separate. If a person ‘mindlessly promises to 
murder a fellow man’,94 that person still faces a moral obligation to fulfil that promise. 
But it does not then become that person’s moral duty to commit murder. A second 
moral obligation comes into play here, one which has nothing to do with the fact that a 
promise was made, and everything to do with the content of that promise: the morally 
disvaluable action of murder. The obligation to refrain from murder outweighs the 
obligation to fulfil the promise, and the person’s moral duty is thus to break the 
promise. The essential obligation —  that which is undertaken in the social act of 
promising —  does not go away, but this is a non-ethical, amoral obligation. It remains 
because to say ‘I promise’ and not to carry out the promise creates an inconsistency 
with the meaning of the social act.  
 
3.2 .2 .4  C R I T I Q U E :  T H E  I N A C C E S S I B I L I T Y  O F  T H E  F O R M A L  M O R A L  LAW  
 
Whereas Reinach discusses in detail how we experience values and thus how the moral 
value of an action or characteristic can be known, he provides no such explanation in 
the case of the formal moral law. Rightness is determined by this formal law; a state of 
affairs is right if it is in essential compliance with a formal, universal ought-to-be. 
                                               
93 ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, p. 45; S.W. p. 186. Crosby’s translation is slightly modified 
here to be consistent with our present usage of ‘moral obligation’ and ‘duty’. 
94 Ibid. 
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‘What is right can [thus] be expressed as conformance to a general law’.95 But how do 
we know what ought to be, formally and universally? The formal moral law is not 
written down anywhere, nor do we experience it in acts of value-feeling. Even the claim 
that ‘the existence of every moral value is morally right’, from which we might deduce 
further truths about the formal moral law, is itself presented only as ‘self-evident’.96 
How can we understand the concept the rightness or use it in our moral decisions and 
assessments, if all our knowledge about the content of that law is in the form of 
assumptions or presuppositions? Can we even have confidence that the existence of a 
moral value is morally right and ought to be, and that this is not a baseless 
presupposition? 
 Below are three possible answers to the problem of how the moral law is known. 
More than one may be true at once, and to differing degrees. 
i) The principles of the formal moral law are self-evident. 
Based on certain premises —  (1) that the morally valuable is the morally good in itself, 
(2) that there is a certain order of precedence of moral values, (3) that values and 
disvalues can exist, (4) that the existence of something that is morally good is 
necessarily preferable to its non-existence, (5) that the existence of a value is 
incompatible with the existence of its opposite disvalue, and finally (6) that certain facts 
are morally right, which is equivalent with saying that they ought to be —  it seems to 
follow, as self-evident, that the existence of any moral value is morally right, that the 
non-existence of any moral disvalue is morally wrong, and so on. Likewise, if we accept 
that a person has a moral obligation to realise any moral value that it is within her power 
to realise, and yet realising one moral value may exclude the possibility of realising a 
                                               
95 S.W. p. 502, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
96 S.W. p. 503, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). 
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different moral value, it follows as self-evident from these same premises that that a 
person ought to realise the highest moral value possible at any given time.  
 Thus, some basic principles of the formal moral law can be affirmed simply on 
the basis of premises of these kinds, and it is possible that others can as well. But can 
more concrete cases referred to by Reinach —  such as the ‘intrinsic rightness of 
punishment’97 —  be equally self-evident? This can be argued either way. Punishing as a 
concept might be said to have its roots in an a priori social act of sanctioning or 
disciplining (the way a parent might do to a child for breaking an established rule),98 or 
to be an a posteriori concept that can only make sense once a person has experienced 
wrongdoing by another. After all, many of the punishments used in society —  including 
the death penalty mentioned by Reinach in Überlegung —  are incomparable with 
anything a parent would use against a child, and the act of disciplining a child would not 
usually be thought of as satisfying the cause of justice. Moreover, ‘punishment’ as a 
concept is linked to the concept of ‘wrongdoing’ (no action taken against another person 
can essentially be a punishment if that person has done nothing to deserve it), but it is 
possible to deny that there is any self-evident rightness to purely retributive punishment; 
that is, to punishing wrongdoing for the sake of punishment.99  
ii) Rightness can be felt in cognitive acts without prior knowledge of the formal 
moral law. 
It is consistent with normal experience that we may learn of a state of affairs (a fact) and 
immediately feel that it is wrong, that it ought not to be. Even though wrongness is not 
disvalue, is it possible that this ‘feeling’ of the wrongness of a state of affairs is 
                                               
97 S.W. p. 495, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
98 This in itself presupposes that all social acts are a priori, unless another argument can be put forward 
to show why the act of sanctioning or disciplining (which is certainly a social act, being necessarily 
addressed to another person and in need of being ‘heard’) is itself a priori. 
99 See, for example, Cyril McDonnell, ‘Why Punish the Guilty? Towards a Philosophical Analysis of the 
State’s Justification of Punishment’, in Maynooth Philosophical Papers, 5 (2008), ed. by Simon Nolan 
(Maynooth: Department of Philosophy, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2009), pp. 21-34. 
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equivalent to the grasping of a disvalue; that as I judge a state of affairs to be or not to 
be, its essential wrongness becomes known to me in a separate act. In other words, then, 
when in the objective attitude, we simply feel certain states of affairs to be right. This 
easily applies to the case of punishment, at the very least in the sense that it is morally 
wrong if an innocent person is punished for a crime. On learning that such a state of 
affairs subsists, one has a sense that this ought not to be. In the English language, the 
expressions ‘it does not sit right with me’ or ‘it seems only right’ evoke this sense that 
rightness is something felt, just as value is. If receptivity to value is a something for 
which different persons possess ‘different talents’,100 and if a high receptivity to value is 
itself a moral value, then the same could be true of receptivity to, or appreciation of, 
moral rightness. In this case, the formal moral law comes to be known by derivation 
from that which is morally right.  
 For all that Reinach differentiates between moral value and moral rightness as 
separate spheres of ethics, he does not directly deny this possibility. It diminishes the 
meaningfulness of his distinction somewhat, though without destroying it altogether. 
Valuability refers to the instantiation of a positive quality in an object (Gegenstand); 
rightness refers to the compliance of a state of affairs with a principle of formal moral 
law and lacks the ‘extensive nuancing’101 found among values. We need only look back 
to the basic principles that Reinach presents as self-evident to see that certain states of 
affairs are morally right because they include the existence of a moral value, and the 
existence of a moral value as such is morally right; this marks the distinction quite well. 
As long as we accept that there can be truth and falsity, true feeling and deception, in 
this sphere as well as in the sphere of values, the idea that the objective attitude includes 
attention to feelings of what is right and wrong a priori seems a defensible one. 
                                               
100 S.W. p. 485, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
101 .W. p. 486, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
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iii) The principles of the formal moral law are deducible by practical wisdom or 
reason. 
If, or where, the formal moral law is neither self-evident nor accessible through an act 
of feeling, it may be that it is possible for it to come to be known through rational 
deduction, by means of practical reason or prudence. We highlighted in chapter two 
how, in Kantian ethics, reason is able to provide us with formal maxims or imperatives 
for moral behaviour, and how, in Aristotelian ethics, practical wisdom or prudence 
allows a person to recognise virtue or excellence, the way things ought to be. Reinach 
does not discuss this kind of reason or wisdom, but he identifies wisdom as such as a 
(non-moral) value, just as appreciation of the morally good (the morally valuable) is a 
moral value of the personal character.102 Thus, a kind of practical wisdom, a rational 
understanding of the moral law and its principles, would then be itself a moral value of 
the personal character. This would be consistent with the phenomenological distinction 
—  absent in Kantian philosophy —  between a formal and a material a priori, with the 
moral law belonging to the formal a priori. 
 Reinach would certainly agree with the first of our possible answers, at least to 
some extent; those principles of the formal moral law that he writes about, he presents 
as self-evident. He might well deny our second answer on the basis that rightness is not 
something that can be intentionally grasped; but we can still have a sense that 
something is morally ‘in order’103 even if this sense is not of the same kind as the 
feeling of a value. The second and third answers are potentially linked, as a form of 
practical wisdom or reason could be both what allows us to ‘feel’ that a state of affairs 
is right or wrong and what makes it possible to reason out truths about the formal moral 
                                               
102 Reinach lists wisdom among the non-moral values in Grundzüge. S.W. p. 485, paragraph 2; Appendix 
(IV). 
103 S.W. p. 336, paragraph 2; Appendix (II). 
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law.104 In the final analysis, we can only conclude that these answers are fitting to the 
question and are compatible with Reinach’s wider views, but we cannot say definitively 
which, if any, he would agree with. Without a clear answer, though, Reinach’s 
attributing of specific principles to the formal moral law that are not self-evident (such 
as that retributive punishment is morally right) remains unsupportable.  
 
3.2 .2 .5  B U R K H A R D T ’S  C R I T I C I S M  
 
Burkhardt, in his article ‘Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in der 
Rechtsphilosophie Adolf Reinachs’, criticises Reinach’s theory of obligations for its 
failure to distinguish between ‘levels’ of obligation and for going too far in holding that 
it is right that every obligation is fulfilled. According to Burkhardt, ‘(T)he degree of the 
obligation undertaken is dependent on the importance of the content of the promise for 
the promise-holder’.105 Yet Reinach’s maxim that every promise ought to be fulfilled —  
that it is right that a promise is fulfilled —  does not recognise this difference of degree. 
As Burkhardt elaborates:  
This problem naturally does not arise with Reinach’s generic examples (‘the 
promise to visit someone or to go walking with someone’), but is clear when it 
comes to a promise given to a dying man who wants to see to it that his family is 
looked after when he is dead, or when statesmen vow to their citizens that they 
will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.106  
 
Breaking one of these latter promises is surely a transgression of a completely different 
kind from breaking one of the former.  
 Morally speaking, there can be no doubt that Burkhardt is correct. Legally 
speaking, this depends on the individual code of laws. Some legal systems may consider 
the promise to the dying man to be a verbal contract while others would require a 
                                               
104 It is precisely for this reason that Thomas Aquinas considered ‘prudence’ to be both a moral and an 
intellectual virtue.  
105 Burkhardt, ‘Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit’, p. 171. 
106 Ibid. 
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written document before the promise can be enforced; a government’s pledge 
concerning the use of nuclear weapons might be enshrined in law or in the national 
constitution. But essentially, the difference that Burkhardt expects is simply not 
recognised in Reinach’s theory. Everyday promises and promises of an ethical higher 
order are all still promises; as social acts they have the same efficacy. 
 But if a promise is a promise, by its essence, how can we account for the moral 
difference between breaking a promise to visit a friend and breaking a promise not to 
instigate global nuclear war? To do this, we must distinguish several different cases of 
how a promise can be broken.107  
i) A person makes a promise and chooses not to keep it.  
The classic and simplest case of breaking a promise is a clear violation of the meaning 
of a promise, and of the moral obligation to fulfil a promise. The decision to break a 
promise without any good reason could also evidence any of a number of flaws of 
character (laziness, fickleness, spite, or a simple callous disregard for the person to 
whom the promise was made), but no one of these is necessarily a factor, so we cannot 
make the reproach that attaches to failing to keep a promise dependent on them. As a 
formal moral principle, a person ought to fulfil their promises, so the promisor in this 
case has not done what he or she ought to do. 
ii) A person makes a promise idly, knowing that he or she will be unable to fulfil 
it.108  
 
This is an example of a ‘pseudo-performance’109 (Schein-vollzug) of promising, where 
no intention to fulfil the promised action accompanies the spoken words. This case is 
                                               
107 We must not forget that although the law cannot dismiss an essential obligation arising from a 
promise, the promisee can, through the social act of waiving. Thus, if circumstances (and particularly, 
a change in those circumstances) make it unreasonable for the promisor to be bound to his or her 
promise, then the promisee, who possesses the claim against that promisor, might be morally obligated 
to waive that claim. 
108 For example, I take payment from a person for a rare artwork and promise to deliver it to that person, 
even though I do not own or possess the artwork; I cannot physically give it to anyone, nor would it be 
mine to give if I could, and I know this at the time that I make the promise. 
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more problematic within the sphere of moral rightness, because we cannot say at all that 
the person ought to carry out the promise —  it is impossible, and we can never say that 
something impossible ought to be. Reinach considers it unclear ‘whether claim and 
obligation proceed from this pseudo-promise just as from an authentic one’, ultimately 
leaving the question unresolved.110 We might perhaps say that since the promise was 
not meant, no obligation ever arose, but that a moral reproach is deserved for idle 
promising, or any pseudo-performance of a social act with intent to deceive. 
iii) A person makes a promise in earnest, but is unexpectedly unable to carry it 
out.111  
 
Again, this scenario creates difficulties in applying a moral obligation to promising. It 
can only be my obligation to carry out an action if, at some point, the possibility of 
performing that action is before me as possible. If a person never has this opportunity to 
fulfil my promise, then he or she never breaks it, even if he or she also never keeps it. A 
person might feel bound to apologise for failing to keep the promise in some cases, but 
we cannot find that the person has evidenced any disvalue of character or done anything 
wrong. One ought to keep one’s promises, but this ‘ought’ only makes sense when 
keeping the promise and breaking it are both possibilities. 
iv) A person makes a promise in earnest, but chooses another action over fulfilling 
the promise.  
 
This is the truly problematic case for ethics, one that falls between the first and third 
cases. Here, keeping the promise is in fact possible, and the promisor may want to keep 
it —  another, more pressing action is simply given precedence, often due to a change in 
circumstances. We would judge each instance of this case on its own merits. If a man 
breaks a promise to meet with a friend in order to protect his family from harm, then 
                                                                                                                                         
109 ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, p. 22 
110 Ibid., p. 28 
111 For example, I promise to meet my friend in Munich on a given day, but on the day that I am due to 
travel, weather conditions close the airport from which I am leaving, making my planned travel 
impossible. I can make alternative arrangements to travel, but I cannot arrive on the agreed date. 
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nobody would disagree that he has chosen a higher obligation over a lesser. If a man 
breaks a promise to drive his sick neighbour to hospital for an appointment because he 
chooses that exact time to repay a trifling loan, we might feel that he has shown a poor 
sense of priority; he has failed to recognise the higher obligation, the action in which the 
greater moral value is realised, or he has simply disregarded that obligation. There are, 
of course, much less clear-cut cases. A doctor making a house call to a sick patient 
encounters a wounded man on the road, and must choose between staying to help or 
going on to meet his appointment; in each case risking the health of one person or the 
other. The medical concept of triage deals with cases of this kind, where a doctor —  
who is under oath to provide medical assistance to those who need it —  must prioritise 
between two or more patients according to their respective needs. Morally speaking, an 
agent can only follow his or her sense of which is the right thing to do —  which is felt 
as possessing or realising the greatest moral value.  
 Considering these four cases as distinct from one another, we see that the moral 
reproach due to a person for breaking a promise only applies without exception in the 
first case. In the second case, a different reproach attaches to making a false or lying 
promise. In the fourth case, whether a person deserves to be reproached depends on the 
reason why he or she did not fulfil the promise, and the degree of reproach likewise 
depends on a weighing-up of the obligation fulfilled against the one broken. 
 In the first and fourth cases, then, the problem that Burkhardt refers to is clear. 
One act of promise-breaking is worse than another because the obligations entered into 
were of different levels. In the fourth case, we cannot weigh up whether a person’s 
action was right or wrong at all without differentiating between levels of obligation. 
Since differentiating between higher and lower ethical levels is not possible in formal 
ethics (and thus in the sphere of moral rightness), this problem would have to be 
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resolved by reference to non-formal values, the order of precedence among which is 
sufficiently nuanced to distinguish between different cases of promising and promise-
breaking. In arriving at the decision of whether or not to act, a good person following 
the objective attitude would consider the moral value of action versus not acting. In 
Reinach’s example of a man promising to commit murder, a morally aware person will 
feel that breaking the promise realises the greater value, and refrain from acting. In this 
case, to break the promise is the man’s duty and to keep the promise would be evil. 
Here, Burkhardt is incorrect to say that the degree of ethical obligation depends on the 
importance of the promise to the promise-bearer. Only the moral value realised in acting 
or not acting, respectively, has a bearing on whether the promisor ought to act. The fact 
that a non-ethical obligation remains —  the simple fact of having promised —  does not 
change and cannot change. 
 
We have seen that the sphere of rightness as it stands raises questions for 
Reinach’s ethics that are not fully addressed in his work. We have shown that, at least, 
these questions can be answered, even though we cannot definitively say how Reinach 
would have answered them. Despite these problems remaining open, the sphere of 
rightness still plays an important role in Reinach’s ethics and has important potential for 
the development of phenomenological ethics.112 We will further discuss the significance 
of this distinctive aspect of Reinach’s works on ethics as a contribution to his field in 
the next chapter. 
 
                                               
112 Based on these conclusions, we find that Brettler and DuBois are incorrect to regard Reinach’s work 
on the sphere of rightness as being not sufficiently developed to be useful (Brettler, The 
Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 207) or to constitute an ‘actual contribution to practical 
philosophy’ (DuBois, ‘Adolf Reinach: Metaethics and the Philosophy of Law’, p. 332). 
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3 .2 .3 T H E  SP H E R E  O F  GO O D S : M O R A L I T Y  I N  E N T I T L E M E N T S  A N D  PO S S E S S I O N S  
 
Reinach’s third sphere of ethics is the least developed of the three, mentioned explicitly 
only in Grundzüge and never discussed as extensively as the other two spheres. Even its 
basic concept —  a ‘good’ (ein Gut)113 —  is not in any way clearly defined. A good is 
something temporal, but not necessarily tangible,114 possessing a finite duration of 
existence, that can be possessed by a human being, and that is capable of being 
promoted or diminished by human action. ‘Life’, ‘property’,115 ‘health’ and 
‘happiness’116 are all examples of goods. Reinach notes that in law, one can talk about 
‘loss of life’, ‘theft of property’, ‘promotion of happiness’; but life, property or 
happiness is not the same as a person or human being. Something else is being referred 
to in these cases, and as with obligations and claims, the fact that a good can be given or 
taken proves that it is not nothing.  
 There are several ambiguities about precisely what Reinach means by a ‘good’. 
It is possible that goods can be categorised as Reinachian objects, along with 
obligations and claims; or, perhaps, that all Reinachian objects are goods and vice versa. 
If it can be a principle of the formal moral law that ‘every promise ought to be kept’, 
that is, that ‘every essential obligation arising from an act of promising ought to be 
met’, then the essential obligation here seems to take on the role of a good. It is not 
nothing, it persists for a certain length of time, and it is something distinct from the 
person of either the promisor or the promisee. A person’s life can be considered to 
belong to the category of ‘object’ (Gegenstand): it can be lost, saved, preserved, or 
taken, and whether a person possesses life in the literal sense is an objective (sachlich) 
                                               
113 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). 
114 Of the goods named by Reinach, only ‘property’ seems to refer to a physical, tangible object, and even 
this is debatable. Intellectual property, for example, is by definition not a physical thing. If one 
considers the actual good here to be access to one’s property or control over one’s property (both of 
which are distinct from the property in its physical form) then perhaps all goods are intangible. 
115 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). 
116 S.W. p. 497, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
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matter, not one that depends on any one observation or experience. The designation of 
happiness as an object is less clear-cut; it is not certain that the question, ‘Are you 
happy?’ has an objective or factual answer. We will discuss the significance of 
happiness in the sphere of goods below. 
 Finally, goods are themselves not necessarily ‘good’ in the moral sense; the 
existence of a good is not necessarily to be ethically preferred over its non-existence. 
Reinach proposes as a principle of the formal moral law that ‘the happiness of the 
moral human being is right; that is, it is right that the moral human being is 
happy’.117 And yet this does not depend on the existence of happiness in itself being 
preferable to its non-existence. A person who is morally good deserves to be happy; a 
person who is morally evil does not deserve to be happy, so an absence of happiness for 
the morally evil person would be preferable to him or her being happy. The ‘quality of 
goodness that happiness possesses is not to be confused with moral value’.118 If 
happiness were morally valuable, the realisation of happiness would always realise 
moral value. Thus Reinach’s view on goods is in disagreement with both Aristotle and 
Kant, for both of whom happiness forms at least part of the highest good for human 
beings.  
 In Die Überlegung, Reinach at one point uses the term Strafübel, the ‘evil of 
punishment’.119 The passage in which this word appears is not a discussion of goods as 
such, and in fact precedes Reinach’s identification of this sphere, but it may still be 
relevant here to consider an ‘evil’ as the opposite of a ‘good’. Punishment is of course 
not necessarily ‘evil’ in the sense that the action of punishing someone is essentially 
morally disvaluable; but to receive punishment is always undesirable. Referring back to 
our comments on the sphere of moral rightness, then, we may have here a more precise 
                                               
117 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
118 S.W. p. 496, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
119 S.W. p. 308, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). 
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way of saying ‘It is morally wrong that an innocent person is punished’, namely: ‘It is 
morally wrong that any innocent person suffers the evil of punishment’, just as ‘it is 
morally right that the morally good person is happy’. 
 
3.2 .3 .1  T H E  R O L E  O F  T H E  S P H E R E  O F  G O O D S  I N  E T H I C S  
 
Reinach does not make it entirely clear what role goods are to have in his practical 
ethics. Certain principles of the formal moral law, for example, that ‘it is right that the 
moral human being is happy’, depend on the acceptance of the sphere of goods; as a 
principle, the example given presupposes that happiness has a certain ethical 
significance. So even though a concept of goods is not necessary for the formal moral 
law to be envisaged, an entire range of formal moral principles referring to ‘life’, 
‘health’ and ‘happiness’ depends on precisely such a concept. At the same time, since 
goods are not morally valuable in themselves, the formal moral law is necessary to 
make goods relevant in our moral decisions. I cannot say, ‘the action was morally good 
because it created happiness’, as the utilitarian interpretation would hold, but I can say, 
‘the action was morally right in its purpose because it created happiness for a person 
who ought to be happy’. This is one way that a criterion of natural justice could 
potentially be understood in Reinach’s ethics, although in Reinach’s terms, ‘justice’ 
would then be simply another way to say ‘rightness’, or a specific sub-category of 
rightness dealing with goods and what persons are entitled to.120  
                                               
120 Reinach does not develop a concept of justice (Gerechtigkeit) in either his ethics or his legal 
philosophy. In Überlegung he describes one outcome of the law on murder as an ‘obvious injustice’ 
(S.W. p. 310, paragraph 2; Appendix (III)); he also makes scattered references to ‘justice’ in 
Grundzüge, using it in much the same way as ‘morally right’. For example, ‘it is only just if the 
good are happy’; S.W. p. 486, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). Neither concept of justice is developed 
beyond these individual references. See below, chapter four, section 4.2.7. Justice, as an abstract noun, 
can refer to a just state of affairs (iusitia) or to that which, through law (ius), brings about a just state 
of affairs. Not all laws, however, are morally just laws. Thus issues concerning the relation between 
law and morality in terms of ‘justice’ will reflect issues concerning the distinction between moral and 
non-moral states of affairs with which Reinach’s theory is well-equipped to tackle, even if he does not 
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 There are indications that Reinach intended for the sphere of goods to have a 
greater role than this; that, more than being just things to be deserved or undeserved 
under the formal moral law, they are also of importance to ethics in themselves. The 
first thing Reinach tells us about goods is that they form an order of precedence 
(Rangordnung).121 Later, he states that happiness is ‘a great good’.122 This notion that 
goods that are not equal in their status, that some are more important than others under 
the objective attitude, implies a deeper role in ethics that is, ultimately, not explained. 
We will discuss one possible such role below. 
 Based on the above discussion, Reinach’s reasoning for introducing the concept 
of goods into his ethics, and for distinguishing them from the other basic concepts of 
ethics, is apparent, though this concept as presented does not appear to stand on the 
same level as do the concepts of moral value and moral rightness. 
 
3.2 .3 .2  T H E  P O T E N T I A L  O F  T H E  S P H E R E  O F  G O O D S  
 
As we noted above, Reinach refers to an order of precedence among goods without 
indicating what this means for ethics. We will here present one possible way of 
developing the role of Reinach’s sphere of goods by exploring the significance of the 
order of goods. 
                                                                                                                                         
do so himself. There is also at least one other sense in which a concept of justice could be understood 
within Reinach’s philosophy, namely the relationship between positive law and the a priori sphere of 
right. This forms part of Stein’s concept of justice; see chapter four, section 4.3.2.6. A just law would 
then be one that is well supported by the a priori foundations of positive law. Given that there are thus 
at least four different senses in which a concept of justice could be made a part of Reinach’s 
philosophy (namely, justice as a quality of states of affairs, justice as a quality of laws that bring about 
just states of affairs, justice as the requital of desert and justice as a quality of laws that are well-
founded in an a priori sense), given that no one of these can be clearly identified as Reinach’s own 
concept of justice, and given that two of the four could not be explored without first treating of 
Reinach’s philosophy of law in detail, the question of justice in Reinach’s philosophy is a matter for a 
separate investigation. 
121 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). Reinach uses the same word to describe the ordered ranks of 
values. See, for example, S.W. p. 485, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). 
122 S.W. p. 496, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
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 The only good that Reinach explicitly places above any other is happiness. 
Happiness has an important role in many branches of ethics, particularly in Aristotelian 
and utilitarian approaches. Aristotle begins from the idea that happiness is the highest 
good and that excellence of character is the route to achieve happiness.123 Reinach states 
that happiness is not the highest good, though he does not indicate what is; perhaps life 
is a higher good than happiness.124 Reinach also denies that only the good are happy: 
‘[there obtains] here no relationship of being, as so many have proposed’.125 But is he 
correct by his own understanding, and could the good of happiness have a larger role to 
play in ethics than he thinks? 
 First, we must establish what happiness is. Reinach quite perceptively indicates 
that happiness is not an emotion or feeling-state (Gefühl). Like emotions, happiness is a 
state of being, but it is not simply something one feels, like pleasure, anger, or even joy. 
Happiness and unhappiness [reside] in a completely different layer {of the I} to 
joy. Happiness and unhappiness are not experiences like moods; happiness [can 
be] present before [it is] grasped {… } Happiness relates to the entire sphere of 
existence.126  
 
If happiness is not an experience, then what kind of state is it? Reinach does not say. 
What we can say for sure at this point is that it requires more than the presence of 
pleasure or the absence of pain. A happy person has a good existence in ways that are 
not expressed in terms of emotion. At the same time, we would suggest that a person 
cannot be both happy and miserable. Even though happiness does not necessarily imply 
pleasure or cheerfulness, a person who feels bad about his or her life is presumably not 
happy. After all, a good life encompassing the entire sphere of existence suggests 
                                               
123 See above, chapter two, section 2.2.1.2. 
124 Certainly, Reinach states, ‘even [the] unhappiest’ life remains a good in itself. S.W. p. 497, paragraph 1; 
Appendix (IV). 
125 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
126 S.W. p. 496, paragraph 3; Appendix (IV). 
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freedom from great misery and hardship. Happiness can be present before it is grasped, 
but it is something that can be grasped once it is present. 
 Happiness, then, overall, is a good state of existence that can be appreciated by 
the happy person. What is a good state of existence? We have three ways to measure 
this: in terms of value, in terms of rightness, and in terms of goods. Since happiness is a 
state pertaining to the entire sphere of existence, we would suggest that all of these 
criteria must be met. A person who is happy has more value than disvalue in his or her 
life; more rightness than wrongness; more goods than evils.127  
 We still do not feel that a person of good character will necessarily possess an 
ideal state of being; that such a person will always be happy. In fact, it seems it might 
be even harder for a person who is sensitive to value, and who loves value, to be happy, 
because that person will be all the more acutely aware of each disvalue in his or her 
world, whereas a person who lacks those traits will be content to overlook those 
disvalues. Being contented, nonetheless, is not the same as being happy, either. Reinach 
does state that ‘[A] perfectly immoral human being cannot be perfectly happy [because 
it is an] essential impossibility that happiness [should be] united with ethical 
disvalue’.128 A ‘perfectly immoral’ person, however, is an extreme case, and to be 
‘perfectly happy’ is, one would think, a rare thing for any person. We can go further 
than this. 
 Reinach states that ‘Happiness is [a] great good, even if not the greatest. But 
[the] quality of goodness that happiness possesses is not to be confused with moral 
value’.129 Happiness is good, then, but not morally good; this is not problematic, as the 
same is also true of many values (such as beauty and wisdom). Now, a person who 
lacks receptivity to value will not appreciate the good and right things that are all 
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around him or her. A person, in other words, who wants for nothing and is surrounded 
by art and all the finest things in life may take pleasure in all these things, but that is not 
the same as appreciating their value in themselves. Likewise, a person who is receptive 
to value but does not love it, who even hates it, will not appreciate that which is truly 
good. Bearing this in mind, could either of these persons —  the kinds of persons 
Reinach considers to be morally bad —  ever truly be happy? A person might think he or 
she is happy, but if happiness is something that can be present before it is grasped, then 
it is possible to be deceived over whether one is truly happy, just as it is possible to be 
deceived over values and personal interest. ‘In cheerfulness we may find a hint toward 
happiness, but [it is] never infallible. Deception [remains] possible. {There is} no 
univocal connection, no univocal relationship here’.130 However much good a morally 
insensitive person has in his or her life, he or she cannot appreciate that good, and such 
a person will never be satisfied with those things that he or she has. Such a person can 
sincerely seek happiness, but that search is self-defeating since the person will not 
appreciate or be content with true happiness. 
 On the other hand, the person of good moral character, who appreciates that 
which is truly good in life —  the valuable, the right, goods in their proper precedence 
—  could never be content with just an existence of constant pleasure and freedom from 
any wants, if it meant being surrounded with disvalue and moral wrongness, or the loss 
of goods that stand higher than pleasure. Such a person need not live a life of pleasure at 
all to achieve happiness, as long as —  in the entire sphere of his or her existence —  
there is more value than disvalue, more rightness than wrongness. And such a person 
can truly be happy, because unlike the morally insensitive person, the morally good 
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person will truly appreciate the happy state of his or her sphere of existence, and will 
not constantly yearn for more. 
 We would not go as far as Aristotle in saying that the attainment of happiness is 
the ultimate end of ethics. According to Reinach, happiness is not even the greatest 
good within the sphere of goods, and it literally does not compare with the separate 
concepts of moral value and moral rightness, which it is right and good to pursue for 
their own sake. But the attainment of this great good is surely one end to which a good 
person, a person who embraces the objective attitude, can turn. After all, ‘it is right that 
the moral human being is happy’.131  
 By following this line of interpretation, we see that the sphere of goods and the 
order of precedence among goods can play a much deeper role in ethics than those laid 
out for them by Reinach. More than just something to be aspired to, moral goodness 
becomes its own reward, as a happy existence is possible only for someone who truly 
appreciates value and the morally right.  
 
SECTION THREE  
THE MECHANICS  OF  REINACH’S ETHICS :  
MOTIVATION , R EFLECTION AND FREEDOM  
 
Reinach acknowledges the problem of freedom or autonomy as an important one for 
ethics. He does not, however, see this problem in terms of the dichotomy between 
determinism and indeterminism —  whether human actions are truly free and 
undetermined by causality, or are causally determined in the same way that events in the 
physical world are. Freely-willed acts are phenomenally authored by the I;132 from 
                                               
131 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
132 ‘[To the] essential uniqueness of the process of will [belongs the] phenomenal I-authorship of all 
genuine acts of willing. Phenomenally speaking [the] grasping of a resolution {to act} goes out from 
the I spontaneously. {… } Only where [the] I emerges as the spontaneous author {of the act} does 
[the] problem of freedom of the will arise. {… } Phenomenal I-authorship delimits the realm of 
179 
Reinach’s perspective, this is where they originate and they cannot be traced back 
further. But Reinach also finds that the question of whether or not actions are causally 
free is much less relevant for ethics than the question of whether actions are 
phenomenally free. Phenomenally free actions are simply those freely chosen by the I, 
without any form of necessity or compulsion forcing them to be carried out.  
 Coupled with this concept of phenomenal freedom is the concept of the personal 
structure, sometimes simply called the ‘personality’ (Persönlichkeit),133 of the I. The 
personal structure is not easily defined; it can be seen as a set of characteristics or traits, 
including the values and disvalues of the person, that inform the decisions of each 
individual human being. Sensitivity to value and respect for value are both traits of the 
personal structure; a person whose personal structure possesses these valuable traits will 
evidence them in his or her actions.  
 
3 .3 .1 A U T O N O M Y  A N D  T H E  P E R S O N A L  ST R U C T U R E  
 
An action is truly free, and is of greatest significance for ethical assessment, if it arises 
entirely from the person of the acting subject and is a direct indication of something 
about that subject’s personal structure. Many kinds of actions do not fit this description. 
If a person jumps in response to a sudden, unexpected sound, like a thunderclap, that 
action is not freely taken. It arises not from any kind of rational motivation, but from 
what Reinach calls striving or conation (Streben).134 These inclinations, non-rational by 
definition, can take many forms. We can consciously will that toward which we have no 
inclination; equally, our inclinations can get the better of us, causing us to act without 
thinking. Such striving-driven actions are still authored by the I, but in this case, it is 
                                                                                                                                         
freedom’. S.W. pp. 508-9; Appendix (IV) 
133 S.W. p. 295, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
134 Reinach seems to have received this distinction from Pfänder’s Phänomenologie des Wollens, first 
published in 1900. See Pfänder, Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation, pp. 16-19. 
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‘the will-less prey of strivings’;135 the personal structure of the I is not expressed in 
these actions. Thus, ‘[the] boundary of the problem of freedom [runs] between striving 
and willing. Strivings [are] viewed by all as univocally determined’.136 Reinach 
emphasises that this concept of phenomenal freedom is not limited only to acts of 
willing; there are also free acts in which nothing is willed or realised. ‘Turning {one’s 
attention} towards something, affirming, judging, forgiving and so on [are also] all 
voluntary acts in which [the] I emerges as phenomenal author.’137  
 Reinach holds that while human actions can be ‘forced’, they are certainly not 
forced in the sense that one object is forced to move when struck by another. A human 
action is forced, if one is coerced into carrying it out, i.e. if one does not want to act but, 
for any reason, one feels that one has no choice. The choice to not act or refrain is 
always, in fact, present, and cannot be taken away. ‘Phenomenal necessity’ does not 
mean that the action is really inevitable in an absolute sense, only that the subject feels a 
compulsion to carry it out. Phenomenologically, such acts are and unfold from a kind of 
self-imposed coercion. Phenomenally unfree actions, nonetheless, are still 
spontaneously authored by the I, but a sense of necessitation takes the place of free 
motivation.138 ‘Where I-spontaneity is not [present] at all, freedom [and] unfreedom 
have no place.’139  
 An action that is phenomenally unfree, that a subject is forced to carry out or 
that is otherwise not a reflection of that subject’s personal structure, can still be morally 
valuable or morally disvaluable in itself, but it does not reflect on that person’s 
character in quite the same way that it would if it were phenomenally free. It would, 
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after all, be paradoxical to attempt to judge a person’s character based on actions that 
are ‘out of character’. Cases where something is indicated about the personal structure 
are the ones that are relevant and interesting for ethics.  
 
3 .3 .2 A C T I O N  V E R S U S  PR O J E C T  
 
We have seen that Reinach identifies actions among the bearers of moral values; the 
moral value of an action is the first determinant of whether that action ought to be 
carried out.140 However, values are experienced in acts of feeling and grasped in relation 
to objects, and when deciding whether or not to carry out an action —  the critical 
moment of moral choice, which truly reflects on the character of the person —  the 
action does not yet exist. It is not before the subject, as something that he or she can 
intentionally grasp or perceive. Values are only ever experienced in connection with 
intended objects, yet the moral value or disvalue of the action being considered does not 
yet have a concrete bearer. This is especially significant since the subject is not even 
necessarily anticipating something that will exist. If the subject, on reflection, chooses 
not to act, the action is never carried out, its value is never realised. Even if the subject 
does resolve to carry out the action, this does not guarantee that that action will actually 
take place, at the time or in the way that was expected, or in fact at all.  
 Reinach here uses a distinction between an action (Handlung) and a project 
(Projekt), the latter a term introduced by Pfänder.141 The action is what one actually 
performs; the project is what one resolves to carry out. As such, when one reflects on 
whether to act, and in doing so identifies the sense of a moral value or disvalue, what 
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one feels is the value-character of the project, not of the action that the project may be 
realised as. The project exists only as an idea, but nonetheless it has all the existence at 
the moment of decision that it will ever have. It may be that one fails to carry out the 
project and neither the resolved-upon action nor its moral value is ever realised. 
However, something is still indicated about the character of the agent. If a man who is 
out hunting shoots and kills another person by accident, then he is at worst negligent 
and guilty of manslaughter, but he is not a murderer, as he at no point resolved to kill 
another human being. If on the other hand the hunter resolves to commit murder, but 
does not carry it out, then his lack of sensitivity to the moral disvalue of his project, or 
disregard for that same moral disvalue, is documented in the act of resolving. 
 Reinach does not make it clear whether projects themselves are genuine bearers 
of value. They are not among the bearers of moral value specifically identified by him. 
One can imagine saying ‘the very idea of it repelled me’, suggesting that the project, 
even as a mere idea that may never be put into practice, can evoke a value-response. 
Reinach’s statement that ‘value- and disvalue-character pertain to [a] project by virtue 
of its composition’142 could be read as meaning either that the project itself is valuable 
because of the actions proposed in it, or that the project reflects those values without 
being itself valuable, in the same way that an act of willing can ‘inherit’ moral rightness 
from the fact that the willed state of affairs is right.143  
 
3 .3 .3 C O N S E Q U E N C E S  A N D  VA L U E -M O D I F I C AT I O N  
 
The fact that we resolve to carry out projects rather than actions has further 
implications. If I consider the project of taking a drive in my car, that project has in 
itself an indifferent value-character; that is, it is neither morally valuable nor morally 
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disvaluable. We can, for the sake of argument, call the action of driving a car value-
indifferent. Suppose, then, that I resolve to drive as fast as possible for my own 
enjoyment, or because I am in a hurry. The action of driving my car remains the same, 
and the project of doing so continues to have a morally indifferent value-character. But 
now, my actions are liable to put my own life and the lives of others in serious danger. 
Can this really still be morally indifferent? 
 To resolve this, Reinach proposes in Überlegung that the likely consequences —  
the danger of causing harm —  modify the value-character of the project. An action can 
be assessed not only in terms of its own value, but also ‘“in view of” or “in 
consideration of”’ certain known circumstances and possible consequences.144 In 
Reinach’s example of driving a car too fast, the likely consequences cause an otherwise 
morally indifferent act to become morally bad. The value-character of the action carried 
out remains unchanged —  it is part of the action’s essence —  but in resolving to carry 
out the project, the subject accepts its secondary consequences along with those that are 
willed purposefully. A person who resolves to drive at ‘extraordinary speed’ resolves to 
perform a value-neutral action, but also to endanger the lives of others, a decision which 
reflects badly that person’s character. We would usually say simply that the person is 
driving ‘too fast’ or ‘excessively fast’; the dangers associated with the action are the 
reason we consider it excessive. 
 However, Reinach’s position in Überlegung seems to be contradicted by his 
arguments in Grundzüge, where he criticises utilitarianism for concerning itself ‘with 
superficial details, [with the] accidental consequences of acts’.145 ‘In utilitarianism, 
there would be nothing so wrong that it could not be made right by its possible 
                                               
144  S.W. p. 293, paragraph 1; Appendix (III). 
145  S.W. p. 494, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
184 
consequences’.146 This implies that there are certain things that Reinach would not want 
to be justified or made right because of possible consequences. How can it be that ‘there 
is a value-modification of a thing through its associations with others, but there is no 
being-modification by any kind of “in view of”,’147 if in fact values have real, objective 
existence —  if the existence of a value can be, as a right state of affairs? 
 It is possible that these two arguments do not contradict each other, if we 
understand Reinach to be referring to a symbolic value-modification in Überlegung, and 
not to an actual change in the value of the action. That is, the value of the action itself 
—  driving a car —  remains value-neutral, but the decision to drive too fast suggests 
something about the character of the agent. Any decision that senselessly places other 
people in danger could be seen as symbolising recklessness on the part of the agent, 
modifying how we assess the moral value of the decision without altering the essential 
value-character of the action itself. We will discuss Reinach’s theory of symbolic 
relations of value in more detail below.148  
 
3 .3 .4 M O R A L  VA L U E  A N D  PE R S O N A L  IN T E R E S T  
 
The demand or prohibition experienced on the feeling of a value is not the only kind of 
motivational force that can affect our decisions. Reinach also points to a concept whose 
development he owes to an early work by Dietrich von Hildebrand: that of personal 
interest.149 Where value is the importance or motivational power of an object in itself, 
personal interest refers to that which is of importance or has motivational power purely 
for me. Reinach is quick to emphasise that this is not a matter of ‘objective and 
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subjective value’.150 For a start, personal interest is not value at all, and cannot be 
equated with it. The essence of value is not shared by personal interest. Besides this, to 
designate personal interest as subjective as against the objectivity of values is 
misleading. There is both truth and falsity, correct recognition and deception, when it 
comes to personal interest, as indeed there is with value. ‘There is a true interest for me 
just as much as there is a true value of the thing in itself’.151 A person can be deluded 
into thinking that an action is in his or her own best interest when it is in fact harmful to 
him or her. 
 Personal interest is not felt in the way that values are, and a felt value cannot be 
weighed up against a sense of one’s interest, like for like. Personal interest carries no 
moral weight and can never take precedence over moral value in moral terms; moral 
value takes ‘total ethical priority’ here.152 It is not morally bad to act in one’s own 
interest, but this is true only as long as doing so does not mean acting in a way that is 
morally disvaluable. 
 Although value and personal interest can never be compared or weighed up with 
one another, both have a motivational influence on the subject. ‘If I recognise that a 
project is of interest for me, then in this case I hear from the outset the “demand,” or 
here, to put it better, the “invitation,” to realise it’.153 Just as the felt moral value of a 
thought-of project lends intensity to a demand to carry that project out, so the intensity 
of this invitation (Aufforderung) depends on the degree of personal interest.  
 Reinach, nonetheless, indicates that when moral value and personal interest 
conflict, a weighing-up takes place ‘in an entirely unique way between utterly different 
things. What here makes a preference possible is its own problem, not to be discussed 
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here’.154 It is not altogether clear why this should be; if the demand of value and the 
invitation of interest are motivational experiences of the same kind, then they can 
indeed be weighed up against one another, like for like. Thus it is possible, even in the 
face of a strongly-experienced prohibition against carrying out a morally disvaluable 
project, for that prohibition to be overwhelmed by the even stronger invitation to carry 
out the project for one’s own personal interest. As respect for moral value is itself a 
moral value, to uphold moral value above personal interest is a sign of a morally 
valuable character.  
 
3 .3 .5 T H E  ST R U C T U R E  O F  W I L L I N G  
 
The question ‘Why did you do that?’ can really be interpreted as three questions, and 
can be answered in three different ways. If I am asked ‘Why did you help your friend to 
paint his wall?’, I can answer meaningfully by saying ‘because he is my friend’, ‘in 
order to help him’, or ‘out of gratitude to him for helping me before’. Each of these 
gives different information and answers one of three different questions. Corresponding 
with these different questions and answers, Reinach distinguishes from each other the 
motive (Motiv), source (Quelle) and purpose (Zweck) of an act of willing.155 The 
purpose, that which is willed, and which one means to bring about, is further to be 
distinguished from the goal (Ziel) of the action. In the scenario of helping my friend to 
paint his wall, the painting of the wall is the goal; to help my friend is the purpose. The 
motive is a present or past state of affairs, the being (or non-being) of which creates the 
environment in which the purpose is wanted; that because of which the action is 
resolved. That my friend needs help is a suitable motive for the above scenario; if I am 
helping a stranger, on the other hand, the fact of a religious precept could be my motive. 
                                               
154  Ibid., paragraph 3. 
155  S.W. p. 487, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
187 
Finally, the source of the action is that out of which the action is resolved. If I apologise 
to another person, I do so out of guilt or remorse; if I am coerced into a course of action, 
I perform the action out of fear or concern. In summary: ‘“for what” (“in order to”) 
indicates purpose, “because” indicates motive, “out of” indicates source’.156  
 We noted earlier that one of the ways in which an action can be called morally 
right is if it aims toward the realisation of a morally right state of affairs; that is, if that 
right state of affairs is willed by the agent. We can now see more clearly how the 
concept of moral rightness allows us to assess willing more deeply. The motive of an 
action can be the subsistence of a state of affairs that is morally right or wrong. If the 
motive is a morally wrong state of affairs, then the source of the willing can then be 
outrage over that state of affairs. The purpose of an action can, similarly, be the 
realisation of a state of affairs that is morally right. These can be true without the action 
that follows being morally valuable in itself. For example, the fact that an innocent 
human being is unjustly imprisoned (the being imprisoned unjustly of an innocent 
human being) is morally wrong. Another person might come to realise that the innocent 
prisoner was wrongfully convicted, and begin the procedure to overturn that conviction. 
The overturning of a conviction is perhaps not a morally valuable act in itself, but when 
we examine the motive, source and purpose of the second person’s action in doing so, 
we recognise them as a credit to his or her character. The motive is that the innocent 
man is imprisoned, which is morally wrong; outrage over this moral wrongness forms 
the source of the willing, which indicates the person’s respect for moral rightness, 
which is a morally valuable trait. The purpose, too, is to put an end to a morally wrong 
state of affairs. The action, then, is a right one by virtue of its purpose: ‘the willing 
inherits from that which is willed’.157 Even though the action may not be morally 
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valuable in its own essence, it nonetheless demonstrates a moral value of the agent’s 
character. 
 As noted above, not every action is aimed at the realisation of a specific state of 
affairs; ‘we also detect an ethical character in experiences of a non-willing nature’.158 
The act of forgiving another person of their wrongdoing stands out particularly as an act 
that is usually praised; ‘[but] could one consider it an act of willing?’159 In the case of 
non-willing actions, the motive, source, purpose and goal may be absent; Reinach does 
not make this entirely clear. If one is asked, ‘why did you forgive that person?’, one 
could still answer meaningfully with the expressions ‘because’ or ‘out of’. But if the 
action had a purpose or goal, if it was done in order to achieve some result, then it may 
be inconsistent with the meaning of forgiving as such. 
 
3 .3 .6 T H E  E T H I C A L  S I G N I F I C A N C E  O F  RE F L E C T I O N  
 
The process of resolving to carry out a project can be a matter of a single, punctual act; 
indeed, this is almost always the case. We do not usually stop to ask ourselves, ‘ought I 
to do that?’ These immediate decisions can still be motivated by values, both moral and 
non-moral. They can still be phenomenally free acts authored by the individual I. Such 
acts of deciding guide a person in their daily routine; one might only pause to think 
once or twice, about how to dress or what to eat, in the midst of a continuous flow of 
actions. Equally, one judges states of affairs to obtain or not obtain in swift, punctual 
acts of judgement based on perceptions: ‘the sky is blue’ or ‘the bus is late’. 
 The exception to this typical process of swift decision-making is when a subject 
pauses, questioning whether to carry out the action, or not. This questioning attitude of 
the subject precedes the process of reflection (Überlegung), which ‘makes a sharp 
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incision into the continuous flow of our experiences’.160 Reinach distinguishes three 
types of reflection: intellectual (intellektuelle) reflection, volitional (voluntative) 
reflection, and practical or practical-intellectual (praktisch-intellektuelle) reflection. 
Intellectual reflection is the questioning of an intellectual position —  whether a 
proposed state of affairs obtains, or does not obtain. In intellectual reflection, one 
weighs up evidence or searches one’s memory; ideally, the subject’s own personal 
inclinations or attitudes do not interfere. Volitional reflection is the questioning of 
whether to carry out a thought-of project, or not. It involves the weighing up of 
motivational forces and the attempt to analyse one’s own motivations. In this case, the 
influence of one’s own inclinations and attitudes, the participation of the personal 
structure in the decision, cannot be avoided; ‘the construal of a subject who prepares his 
or her acts of willing reflectively without any {personal} participation is not 
possible’.161 The third type of reflection, practical-intellectual reflection, is the 
questioning of how to go about realising an intended purpose. Here, one weighs up 
advantages and disadvantages, favourable and unfavourable consequences of various 
orders, that arise from different modifications of the project. Thus, it is, properly 
speaking, ‘a case of intellectual reflection’ which has practical implications.162 Both 
volitional and practical-intellectual reflection can precede the act of resolving to carry 
out a project; equally, the former can lead to the project being abandoned, and the latter 
to it taking a very different form. 
 Whether an action is reflected on or not does not change the value-character of 
the action. The value-character of an action is essential to that action. It does not even 
change the value-character of a project, which can be modified in light of its 
consequences. Nor does it change the value-character of reflection itself; ‘reflection [is] 
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always [a] positive value’.163 Yet Reinach points to four assessments of reflection that 
seem to contradict one another:  
(i) The praiseworthy action is considered less praiseworthy if it occurs ‘without 
any reflection.’ (ii) But then it is also considered less praiseworthy if, 
conversely, the acting subject undertook it ‘only after a long period of 
reflection.’ (iii) We take it as reproachable in a human being if he or she 
performs an important action without ‘reflecting for even a moment on the 
matter.’ (iv) But conversely, we assess a reprehensible action much more harshly 
if it happened ‘with reflection.’164  
 
In each of these cases, the presence or absence of reflection changes our moral 
assessment of the action, but the change is not all in one direction. In cases (i) and (iii), 
reflection seems to represent a positive value which is lacking (we ask ‘did he even he 
think about what he was doing?’). In cases (ii) and (iv), however, reflection seems to 
represent a disvalue which worsens the action. This seems self-contradictory, as 
something that is valued in one case should be valued in the others as well. 
 Reinach concludes, nevertheless, that these four assessments do not actually 
contradict one another. The assessments differ not because the value of reflection is 
different in each case, but because of what the presence or absence of reflection 
symbolises about the person of the agent. In volitional reflection, the value-character of 
a reflected-on project is highlighted. A person who reflects on whether to carry out a 
project has a better chance of fully appreciating its value-character than one who does 
not. In case (i) above, then, the person receives less praise because he or she may not 
have fully appreciated the moral value-character of the action; he or she may have been 
motivated equally by personal interest or have overlooked the possible consequences of 
the action. Thus, in this instance the lack of reflection symbolises the possibility of 
ignorance or of recklessness. In case (ii), on the other hand, a lengthy process of 
reflection suggests that the agent could not quickly and clearly recognise the value of 
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the action; thus, ‘it is assumed that long reflection can be required only by one who 
lacks ability to feel value, possesses an insensitive personality, or places his subjective 
interests above concern with values’.165 In case (iv), the agent has performed an evil 
action even after reflecting on it; here, it seems that the agent has either completely 
failed to recognise the moral disvalue of the action, or has recognised it but ignored it. 
Again, this symbolises either a lack of sensitivity to moral disvalue or a total disregard 
for it, both of which are morally disvaluable. 
 Case (iii) is slightly different from the others; it is ‘the first and only case in 
which reflection does not show itself as a value-neutral indicator of very different kinds 
of valuable realities’.166 Although reflection in itself is not morally valuable, a person 
who is habitually reflective indicates a moral value of his or her own character, ‘if a 
modest one’.167 In other words: it is not morally valuable to reflect, but it is a moral 
value of the person to be reflective. Thus in case (iii), the person’s unthinking action 
indicates a failure to be the kind of person he or she ought to be, one who always stops 
to think before making important decisions. 
 We can now see more clearly the possible parallel between the value-symbolism 
suggested by Reinach in connection with reflection, and the value-modification that 
applies to an innocuous action when it places the lives of others in danger. If we see 
another person driving at what seems to be excessive speed, that action might suggest a 
recklessness of character that we would reproach. From another point of view, the 
driver’s extraordinary speed might be the result not of mere recklessness —  for 
example, if a doctor were rushing to attend a patient who will not live long without 
treatment. 
                                               
165  Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 135. 
166  S.W. p. 302, paragraph 3; Appendix (III). 
167  Ibid. 
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 The diagram on the next page summarises the conclusions on willing and 
reflection discussed above, based on an example used by Reinach in Die Überlegung of 
a ‘typical murder’.168 A man is out hunting when he catches sight of his mortal enemy 
passing by; he reflects on what to do, then shoots and kills his victim. The action of 
unjust killing is morally disvaluable in itself, but it is the process of decision-making 
and the traits of character that are thus highlighted that make the crime seem especially 
reprehensible. Here we see how the motive, source and purpose of the action are 
distinguished and how reflection on the action affects our moral assessment of the 
agent. Any pause for reflection draws the project into deeper consideration, but it is 
volitional reflection in particular, the question ‘should I do this?’, that is expected to 
bring the disvalue of the thought-of action into focus, and thus that most clearly 
symbolises a moral disvalue in the character of the killer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
168  S.W. p. 305, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
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  1. Situation   
  A man is out hunting when he sees his enemy 
passing nearby. 
  
  2. Willing   
 
 
Motive  Source  Purpose 
The fact that the two 
men are enemies is the 
motive of the action; he 
wants to achieve the 
purpose because they are 
enemies. 
 Hatred of the enemy is 
the source of the willing; 
he wants to achieve the 
purpose out of hatred. 
 The purpose that is 
willed is the death of the 
enemy; he wants to take 
action in order to kill 
the enemy. 
 
  3. Project   
  A project arises for the hunter: he could shoot 
his enemy and kill him. 
  
  4. Reflection   
  The man takes the time to consider his 
thought-of project. 
  
 
 
Intellectual Reflection  Volitional Reflection  Practical Reflection 
The man can reflect on 
whether he has really 
seen the person he wants 
to kill.  
 The man can reflect on 
whether to carry out the 
project. The moral 
disvalue and personal 
interest connected to the 
project may become 
clearer to him.  
 The man can reflect on 
how to carry out the 
project. He may 
consider what kind of 
ammunition to use, for 
example. 
At the end of this 
reflection, the man takes 
a position: that this is the 
person he wants to kill; 
that this is not the person 
that he wants to kill; or 
he remains uncertain. 
 At the end of this 
reflection, the man takes 
a position: he resolves to 
carry out the project, or 
he does not resolve to do 
so. 
 At the end of this 
reflection, the man takes 
a position: he either 
accepts his original 
project unaltered, or he 
modifies it in some way. 
  6. Action   
  If the man resolved to 
carry out the project, he 
now does so, as modified 
by his reflections. 
  
 
Fig. 2: Anatomy of a Moral Decision 
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SECTION FO U R  
AN A LYSING REINACH’S WO R K  O N  ETHICS  
 
We can summarise Reinach’s conclusions on ethics, as discussed above, as follows. 
1. Ethics must have both formal and non-formal components. 
The non-formal sphere of ethics can tell me which value is preferable to another, but not 
whether either value ought to be realised. The formal sphere of ethics can tell me what 
ought to be, but it cannot give me any concrete method of preferring. Only together can 
these two spheres —  the formal sphere of moral rightness and the non-formal sphere of 
moral values —  tell me what I ought to do in a real situation. 
2. Ethics must assess not only actions, but also persons and states of affairs. 
Reinach states that ‘since Kant, ethics has sadly been limited to the doctrine of good 
actions’.169 This makes it impossible to be a good person or to judge that a state of 
affairs ought or ought not to be. Traits of the personal structure of the I can be morally 
good or bad, and states of affairs can essentially comply with or violate the formal 
moral law. 
3. Moral values are real and form an objective order of precedence. 
That which a human being experiences through value-feeling, the value, is good in 
itself, and that which is experienced as morally valuable, the moral value, is morally 
good in itself. The objective validity of these experiences is presupposed in our natural 
way of reacting to them and of living in the world. The fact that we can disagree and 
argue over values does not disprove this; rather, it shows how strongly we feel that our 
own experiences of value are correct. 
                                               
169  S.W. p. 501, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
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4. The character of a person is indicated in his or her actions. 
Actions have moral characters of their own —  they can be morally valuable or 
disvaluable, and their carrying-out can be morally right or wrong. That a person carries 
out a morally valuable action suggests something about that person’s character, as does 
the fact that a different person carries out a morally disvaluable action. Equally, a 
person whose action realises a morally right or morally wrong state of affairs reveals 
something about his or her character; as too does whether a person reflects on his or her 
action and whether that person then carries out the action with reflection. 
5. Goodness of character is the primary concern of ethics. 
A good person is one who is sensitive to moral value and respects moral value. Such a 
person performs morally good actions as direct expressions of his or her character. No 
number of good actions, on the other hand, can make a person good. A person who 
lacks sensitivity to moral value cannot be expected to always act in a manner that is 
morally good. Such a person, nonetheless, can be expected to be a better person and to 
show a greater appreciation for the morally valuable. 
 The guiding imperative of Reinach’s ethics can thus be expressed as: ‘Become 
the best person you can be’. With goodness of character comes sensitivity to moral 
values, the ability to correctly recognise one’s moral duty and thus to act morally; but 
these are secondary to being of good character. It is in this sense most of all that 
Reinach’s ethics resembles Aristotle’s. Although there is a formal moral law for 
Reinach, the actions we perform in concrete situations cannot be ‘derived from general 
laws’.170 A morally perfect person —  one who possesses absolute sensitivity to and love 
of value —  would not need to reflect on his or her actions to act in a manner that is 
morally good (though a reflective character is especially valuable, even so). Actions do 
                                               
170  S.W. p. 501, paragraph 7; Appendix (IV). 
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not make a person good (at least not directly);171 rather, it is in a good person’s 
character to choose good actions and reject evil ones. For a person who is not morally 
perfect, however —  which may indeed mean all persons actually living, since moral 
perfection is purely a moral ideal concept here —  it is possible to fail to recognise moral 
value, to be deceived about it, or equally to feel a moral value but yet to disregard it. For 
these persons, taking an objective attitude towards the good and reflecting before acting 
help them to correctly differentiate feelings of value, and the demands or prohibitions 
associated with those feelings, from personal interest and other motivational factors.172  
 Reinach’s work on ethics is incomplete. Several areas within it, as we have 
highlighted above, are underdeveloped or unclear. Though we cannot say that Reinach 
was unaware of these problems, or even that he did not attempt to resolve them in work 
that has not survived, we can say that any such resolution is not a part of Reinach’s 
surviving body of work. Even so, none of these are fundamental flaws with Reinach’s 
theory as such. We will now discuss some of these areas of underdevelopment in 
Reinach’s wider theory. 
 
3 .4 .1 T H E  QU E S T I O N  O F  OB J E C T I V I T Y  
 
Like Scheler, Reinach challenges Kant’s assertion that any non-formal ethics is 
necessarily based on empirical, rather than on a priori data. If Kant is correct, then any 
non-formal ethics is purely subjective, unable to make any objective claims. Reinach 
                                               
171  As noted above, one interpretation of Reinach’s comments on the objective attitude is that habitually 
good action leads to the moral development of a person’s character. 
172  Reinach acknowledges that it is extremely difficult to say for precisely how long a person should 
reflect on an important action before carrying it out. Since volitional reflection includes consideration 
of increasingly remote consequences, it ‘leads down a path without a visible end’. S.W. p. 294, 
paragraph 1; Appendix (III). It is also possible that a person does not need to reflect at all in order to 
grasp all the relevant information before acting, and if it is presupposed that reflection is always 
necessary, than this person would be ‘groundlessly denied praise’. S.W. p. 300, paragraph 2; Appendix 
(III). Thus, any assessment based on the symbolic significance of reflection can be ‘quite superficial’ 
and even ‘absolutely faulty’ in certain cases. S.W. p. 303, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
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agrees with Kant that ‘empirical ethics [is a] nonsense’,173 but not that empirical and 
formal are strict opposites, or that a priori necessarily means formal. In contrast with 
the formal a priori, he places values within a ‘non-formal a priori’ (materiale 
Apriori).174 Since ‘ethics does not have to do with [the] consciousness of values, but 
with [the] values {themselves}’,175 it is based not on experiences —  as an empirical 
ethics would be —  but on the idea that those experiences can correspond with real 
values. Reinach’s intention is not at all to argue for the validity of any specific moral 
values or for the reality of any specific value-experiences. Only the possibility of 
existent moral values and of objective value-experiences concerns his 
phenomenological approach. 
 In defending this line of argument, Reinach turns to the nature of value-
experiences themselves. Our feeling of values is just as immediate as the perception of 
the exterior world; we experience values in relation to objects and our value-feelings 
show, for the most part, great consistency. Moreover, ‘[our] entire natural way of 
reacting, our attitude towards the world {… } presupposes the objective subsistence of 
values and disvalues in [the] world’.176 Reinach states that we can be deceived about 
values, but ‘[the] dependability of value-feeling in general is not to be doubted on this 
basis’.177 That same dependability is actually presupposed whenever persons disagree 
about questions of value —  so significant are value-feelings to us that we trust in them 
without necessarily being able to explain why. In Reinach’s realist phenomenology, ‘It 
                                               
173  S.W. p. 503, paragraph 4; Appendix (IV). 
174  Ibid. 
175  Ibid. 
176 S.W. p. 504, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). Kevin Mulligan highlights the extent to which we 
presuppose the reality of our value experiences in the following way. ‘If nihilism about values 
(sometimes called “axiological nihilism”) is correct, then there are no tragedies, no murders, no 
sacrifices, no injustice, no costs, no goods, no evils, no vices, no ugly films, no mediocrity, no heroes, 
no geniuses, no saints and no heroic deeds. “And a good thing too,” say some. But of course they 
should not say this if axiological nihilism is correct. For then nothing is a good thing’. Kevin 
Mulligan, ‘Values’, in The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, ed. by Robin le Poidevin, Peter 
Simons, Andrew McGonigal and Ross P. Cameron (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 401. 
177  S.W. p. 505, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
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is senseless to cast into doubt the possibility of something which in its being (if not also 
in a real existence) is evidently given to us’.178  
 Ultimately, Reinach is here approaching the limits of what his method will allow 
him to say. That objective value-experiences are possible does not necessarily mean that 
anyone has ever truly felt a real value. Similarly, no specific expression of the formal 
moral law can be defended beyond the point that formal moral oughts are possible; if an 
ought is an object that can exist, as argued in his theory of essential legal foundations in 
Grundlagen, then it is also possible for oughts to exist without being posited, even if it 
is not known whether any specific ought exists or whether those oughts are known to 
any human being. To appeal to any kind of authority, to any specific experience, would 
go against Reinach’s fundamental phenomenological approach, and he wisely refrains 
from doing so. As a consequence, his ethics cannot be defended further than that the 
requirements for its validity are possible, and that its principles follow from the 
acceptance of that validity. From Reinach’s phenomenological perspective, nothing 
more than this is possible or necessary to found his ethics. 
 
3 .4 .2 T H E  QU E S T I O N  O F  FA L L I B I L I T Y  
 
If the concerns raised about the objectivity of ethical experiences and the development 
of the personal character (see section 3.2.1.6, above) can be resolved, another question 
still remains. Reinach’s theory holds that values are objective and there can be correct 
value-experiences, but that it is also possible to be deceived about values. How can even 
a person of high sensitivity to value trust entirely in his or her intuitive sense of the 
moral? Such a person may be highly likely to correctly recognise values, but he or she is 
                                               
178  S.W. p. 287, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). Reinach’s examples are the searching of one’s memory or 
the phenomenon of movement —  arguments can be made that either of these is impossible, yet their 
possibility is reinforced by everyday experience. The same can be said of values. 
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still potentially fallible, and indeed it would be hard to see as morally perfect a person 
who believes he or she is infallible. Both Aristotle179 and Scheler180 include in their 
ethics references to the idea of moral exemplars or role models. By following the 
example of these individuals, one can be sure of living a good life. Not only does 
Reinach not discuss this idea at all, it is possibly incompatible with his position that the 
sensitivity to moral value is itself a moral value and is part of being a good person. 
Anyone who does not recognise the moral good for himself or herself may still perform 
good actions by emulating others, but actions will not make him or her a truly good 
person. 
 For Reinach, volitional reflection seems to take the place of any external guide 
in action. Infallibility may never be possible, but in that case a person who never makes 
a mistake about value, who is morally perfect, is also impossible. As we can only ever 
say ‘B ought to be A’ if it is possible that B could be A, we can only say a person ought 
to be morally infallible if it is possible to be morally infallible. Failing that, we can only 
ask each person to be the best person that he or she can become. A person who always 
adopts an objective attitude towards the good, who reflects appropriately on his or her 
actions —  attempting to separate out the emotive influence of personal interest, to 
understand fully his or her own inclinations and to see how the likely consequences of 
the project may affect its value-character —  can still make mistakes. But mistakes do 
not detract from the character of a person who is conscientious, scrupulous and 
reflective about doing what is good wherever possible. To accept fallibility as a part of 
human nature —  even the nature of the most morally exemplary person —  is perhaps 
the best and only answer here. Development in a moral view point presupposes that one 
recognises previously held wrong moral judgements, e.g., burning witches is not the 
                                               
179  In the form of the phronimos or person of recognised practical wisdom. 
180  In the form of the Vorbild or model person. 
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right thing to do, or having slaves is not morally acceptable. Moral fallibility is thus not 
an obstacle to moral development, or an argument that ‘all is permitted’. 
 
 
SECTION F IVE  
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this chapter, we have discussed the content of Reinach’s work on ethics: the structure 
of that ethics and the reason for that structure, its principles, and some of its flaws and 
shortcomings. We have not at all exhausted the potential for discussion of Reinach’s 
ethics. We have not attempted to defend it as a system of ethics, nor to condemn it. It is 
not the viability of Reinach’s ethics as an ethics that concerns us in the present 
investigation, but its originality and significance as a contribution within the wider 
context of phenomenological ethics outlined in chapter two. Accordingly, now that we 
have examined both the context and the content of Reinach’s ethics, we are in a position 
to assess that contribution in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ASSESSING REINACH’S CONTRIBUTION 
 
In the preceding chapters, we have noted that Reinach’s work on ethics is an incomplete 
project, and so, in this regard his contribution does not stand as a complete theory of 
ethics. We have also seen that, in many ways, Reinach’s ethics closely resembles other 
phenomenological approaches to ethics developed both prior to his and concurrently 
with it. Yet none of this means that Reinach did not make significant contributions to 
the field of early phenomenological ethics. Reinach’s prominent position in the early 
phenomenological movement makes it all the more important that his contribution is 
recognised and assessed as such. In this chapter, we discuss the nature and extent of that 
contribution in detail, and show that Reinach’s work on ethics includes original 
contributions towards addressing the problem of normativity in phenomenological 
ethics, to realist value-theory, to meta-ethics, and to surveying the boundaries of ethical 
concern. 
 This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section establishes the basis 
on which we assess Reinach’s work as a contribution and examines some of the key 
terms and ideas which we shall use in this discussion. The second and third sections 
assess Reinach’s work as we have analysed it from the two points of view established in 
section one: that of originality, and that of demonstrable influence. The final section 
looks at Reinach’s work on ethics as a contribution to ethics generally, and its potential 
to hold up as the basis for a completed ethical theory. 
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SECTION ON E  
PREPARING FOR THE ASSESSMENT 
 
 
In chapter three, we examined Reinach’s ethics from a critical standpoint. Here, the 
focus of our discussion is somewhat different. Finding that Reinach’s work on ethics is 
extensive, intuitive or compelling does not suffice to prove that it represents a valuable 
contribution in a particular context; conversely, had we found Reinach’s work on ethics 
to be limited, unconvincing and fundamentally flawed, that would not suffice either to 
prove that Reinach made no significant contribution at all to the development of early 
phenomenological ethics. To assess Reinach’s work on ethics as a contribution, we 
must examine it under a different set of criteria. 
 
4 .1 .1  T H E  M E A N I N G  O F  A  C O N T R I B U T I O N  
 
Our primary concerns in this chapter are twofold: the originality of Reinach’s work on 
ethics, and the evidence of his influence on contemporaneous and subsequent work in 
the field of early phenomenological ethics. Even the comparative merits and 
shortcomings of Reinach’s ethics, when compared to other approaches to ethics, are not 
of concern here. Thus, whether Reinach’s work on ethics is superior or inferior to 
Scheler’s, to von Hildebrand’s, or to any other philosopher’s, is not relevant. When and 
where comparisons must be made here between Reinach’s work and that of others, it is 
for the purpose of identifying the two factors listed above: the distinctive and original 
characteristics of Reinach’s ethics, and his influence on other philosophers in this field. 
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4 .1 .2  E T H I C S  A N D  M ETA -E T H I C S  
 
In ‘Adolf Reinach: Metaethics and the Philosophy of Law’, DuBois concludes that 
‘Reinach’s contributions to ethics per se are rather meagre’, but that ‘his contributions 
to ethical metatheory and to the philosophy of law are significant’.1 This is partly 
because DuBois does not consider Reinach’s work on the theory of moral rightness to 
constitute a significant contribution in itself, a position that we dispute based on our 
analysis of that theory in chapter three.2 Nevertheless, DuBois is quite correct to state 
that Reinach did significant work in the areas of meta-ethics and the philosophy of law.3 
To clarify this point requires that we explore the somewhat fluid distinction between 
meta-ethics and ‘ethics per se’.4  
 Meta-ethics has been described as ‘the attempt to understand the metaphysical, 
epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of 
moral thought, talk, and practice’.5 It thus encompasses a ‘consistently abstract’6 and 
broad range of questions and problems that relate to ethics, but not to the formation of 
                                               
1  DuBois, Adolf Reinach: Metaethics and the Philosophy of Law, p. 340. 
2 ‘[Reinach] never managed to spell out how one determines what is morally right, nor what role goods 
play in such deliberations, nor again how these are related to the moral values of the person. This is 
why it is most accurate to say that his actual contributions to practical philosophy are limited to the 
spheres of metaethics and the philosophy of law’. (Ibid., p. 332) In this DuBois suggests that if 
Reinach had developed these spheres sufficiently to be useful —  which we contend Reinach in fact 
did —  then that would represent a contribution to ethics as such. Since Reinach tells us (i) that moral 
rightness is determined by conformance with a formal moral law (e.g., that any value ought to exist), 
(ii) that goods form a ranked order of precedence and are deserved by certain persons (‘that a good 
person is happy is morally right’), and (iii) that the performance of any action that it is one’s duty to 
perform, that one ought to perform under the formal moral law, is morally valuable, we have a clear 
basis on which to understand how moral rightness is determined, at least one role for goods and an 
interrelation between both and the moral values of the person. A person who undertakes to make 
another person happy wills a morally right state of affairs inasmuch as the latter person is moral, and 
thus demonstrates a morally valuable character. 
3 Reinach’s original contributions to the philosophy of law are widely acknowledged; because of this 
and the fact that they do not properly belong to his ethics, they will not be discussed here. Reinach’s 
work on distinguishing the concerns of ethics from those of the positive law is a contribution to meta-
ethics, and will be discussed below (see section 4.2.7). 
4 It should not be taken from this discussion that meta-ethics is in some way not philosophically 
important or interesting. In order to give due consideration to DuBois’s conclusions, however, we 
must arrive at a working understanding of what meta-ethics means. 
5 Geoff Sayre-McCord, ‘Metaethics’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 
Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/metaethics/> 
[accessed 30 May 2012]. 
6 Ibid. 
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normative guides for action; the distinction between ethics and meta-ethics ‘is apt to 
blur, in that different views about the structure of ethics usually have implications for 
first-order decision making’.7  
In its broadest sense, meta-ethics could be said to cover all ethics that is not 
about establishing particular ethical norms. Certainly, Reinach offers few of these; as 
we noted in chapter three, the sole moral imperative arising from Reinach’s theory is to 
become the best person you can be, and even this is not spelled out by Reinach in so 
many words. This lack of specific moral imperatives is a common feature of virtue 
ethics and ethics of values; such theories often depend on discussions of moral facts and 
of how they can become known and be acted upon, much more than on the positing of 
normative rules for action. A common belief among the proponents of these non-formal 
ethical theories is that formal, general imperatives are of little or no practical use in 
guiding individual actions, and here, too, Reinach would agree. It is not the purpose of 
Reinach’s ethics to present norms in the form ‘never steal’, ‘never kill’, ‘always tell the 
truth’, and so on. 
 If meta-ethics is to encompass any discussion of the ethical that does not involve 
prescribing specific moral norms for action, then Reinach’s work on ethics is indeed 
overwhelmingly meta-ethical. Yet Reinach’s ethics is intended to have a normative 
function, to point to moral obligations and duties. This, as we will discuss in more detail 
below, is part of the function of the sphere of moral rightness. ‘The existence of that 
which is morally valuable is morally right and ought to be’ is a rule that only makes 
sense in light of the sphere of moral rightness, and it is only in this sphere that a person 
                                               
7 ‘Metaethics’, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by Simon Blackburn (Oxford University 
Press, 2008)  
 <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.e2002> [accessed 
17 May 2012]. 
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can be morally obligated, subject to a clear moral ‘you ought’. For Reinach, just as 
much as for Kant, ‘action in accordance with duty is as such required’.8  
 What DuBois points to particularly as Reinach’s contribution to meta-ethics is 
Reinach’s investigation of the ethical assessment of reflection or deliberation in 
Überlegung, and indeed, one area with which meta-ethics is concerned is the analysis of 
moral assessments. Reinach’s explorations of the connections between value and 
motivation can also be seen as meta-ethical in character. Although Reinach emphasises 
the separateness of ethical concerns from legal ones, his comments on the relationship 
between ethics and the law and indeed the differences between legal and ethical 
assessments are significant in a meta-ethical context. We will discuss the status of 
Reinach’s work on meta-ethics as a contribution below.9  
 As ambiguous as the boundaries of meta-ethics are, however, we can certainly 
say that meta-ethics ends where normative ethics begins, and Reinach’s introduction of 
the sphere of rightness is precisely what is necessary for him to extend a non-formal 
ethics of values into the normative sphere. In contrast with DuBois’ conclusion, then, 
we maintain that at least one major area of Reinach’s work is not a contribution to meta-
ethics, but to normative ethics: namely his theory of moral rightness. If nothing else, 
Reinach provides a possible way to say what a person’s duty is, what he or she ought to 
do, even if he believes that no strictly formal rule can be used to determine this in 
specific cases. 
 
                                               
8 ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, p. 52. 
9 See section 4.2.5. 
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4 .1 .3  RE I N A C H ’S  E T H I C S  A S  A  PH E N O M E N O L O G I C A L  E T H I C S  
 
We have set out in this investigation to assess Reinach’s contribution to the field of 
phenomenological ethics. An important question to answer would, therefore, be: is 
Reinach’s work on ethics phenomenological? And what makes it so? 
 We reflected on the meaning of ‘phenomenology’ in chapter two and arrived at a 
characterisation of early phenomenology.10 Based on that characterisation, the chief test 
for the present question concerns not Reinach’s conclusions, but the method he used in 
the development of his ethics. We must, therefore, examine here whether Reinach is in 
fact applying his phenomenological method in his works on ethics. 
 To be phenomenological, Reinach’s work on ethics must attempt to describe 
what appears in experience, the phenomena as they appear. In his particular 
interpretation of phenomenology, it must attempt to describe essences, i.e., the formal 
and non-formal a priori truths underlying our experience of the ethical. Reinach meets 
this requirement in his work on ethics; he is investigating and describing the essences of 
values, oughts and goods. That means that he is attempting to show what these things 
are and in what kinds of experience (where appropriate) and the way they are grasped. 
Reinach does not want to show or stipulate which values, oughts and goods are real; that 
is for individuals to discover through experience and the objective attitude. Nor does he 
want to show why. Any attempt by Reinach to explain why moral value is good would 
go against his own phenomenological method (as well as falling victim to the ‘definist 
fallacy’11). Reinach’s phenomenological project is to show the possibility of real 
                                               
10 See chapter two, section one. To recap, we characterised early phenomenology by: (1) identification 
with a version of phenomenology as a philosophical approach; (2) description of phenomena, rather 
than explanation, as the goal of philosophy; (3) intuition based on experience as a means to 
philosophical insight; (4) the distinction of a real world, external to the experiencing subject, from the 
subject’s experiences as such; and (5) concern with accessing a priori eidetic knowledge about the 
‘things themselves’. 
11 William K. Frankena describes the definist fallacy as ‘the generic fallacy that underlies the naturalistic 
fallacy’, the latter having been named by G. E. Moore (Frankena, ‘The Naturalistic Fallacy’, p. 471). 
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experiences concerning objective values, the possibility of universally applicable moral 
oughts, the possibility of assessing certain things as goods and ordering those things in a 
hierarchy; to point to the essences of these spheres. In this, we have seen that he is 
successful. Of course he has not thereby shown that any specific value is real, or proven 
that any one value holds any specific place in the hierarchy of values. For him to 
attempt to do so would be to break with his own phenomenological method. Nor would 
it be appropriate to his method to attempt to explain why values occupy the hierarchy 
that they do. A description of what values are and how they are experienced does not 
include any causal explanation of what makes values valuable. 
 Reinach’s ambition to be comprehensive in his analysis of ethics also leads back 
to his phenomenological principles. If Reinach is to produce a phenomenological 
account of ethics by his own understanding, he must attempt to describe the ethical, in 
its essence or essences, completely and faithfully. To leave anything out —  to have a set 
of ethical questions to which his ethics cannot determine answers —  would make his 
description incomplete. Instead, Reinach intends to account for all questions of ethics, 
and the structure of his theory reflects this goal. Even if not all of the three spheres of 
ethics are equally important in moral assessments or practical decision-making, none of 
the three can be left out or reduced to one of the others.  
 
SECTION TW O  
THE ORIGINALITY OF REINA C H’S WO R K  
 
Reinach wrote and presented his first surviving work on ethics —  his ‘Vortrag über die 
Grundbegriffe der Ethik’ —  in 1906, the year after his first meeting with Husserl in 
Göttingen. This made him one of the earliest phenomenologists of ethics, though 
                                                                                                                                         
The fallacy is committed when one attempts to define or explain the good, and consists of forgetting 
that ‘goodness is what it is and not another thing’ (ibid., p. 472). 
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certainly not the first; we saw in chapter two that early phenomenological ethics had 
already begun to develop at that point. Reinach’s remaining works on ethics date from 
1912-1913, by which time there had been yet further developments in the field of early 
phenomenological ethics, including those made by Scheler, who would publish the first 
part of Formalism in 1913. 
 It is not certain that Reinach was any more influenced by Scheler than Scheler 
was by Reinach. While it is true that Reinach’s works contain more references to 
Scheler than vice versa, several of these references serve to contrast Reinach’s position 
with Scheler’s rather than indicating agreement. Neither Reinach nor Scheler was truly 
‘first’ in terms of their respective developments of phenomenological ethics; up as far as 
1914 they worked in parallel, albeit with Scheler producing the larger and more focused 
body of work directly focused on ethical questions.  
 What this means is that when it comes to identifying Reinach’s original 
contribution to early phenomenological ethics, we cannot rely on establishing whether 
Reinach was the first to put forward any of the ideas he held in common with Scheler. 
On balance, he almost certainly was not. As we saw in chapter two, the concept of value 
in ethics was well established long before Reinach first used it, and the broad strokes of 
phenomenological value theory in general were present in Brentano’s writings (on The 
Origins of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1889)) before Reinach ever wrote about 
values. However, there are ideas —  albeit mostly ones that are not directly value-related 
—  that were largely unique to Reinach’s ethics at his time of writing. These clearly 
original ideas will be the main focus of this section. First, though, we must consider the 
structural differences between Reinach’s ethics and Scheler’s. These differences are of 
importance not only in themselves but also for understanding the significance of some 
of the unique aspects of Reinach’s ethics that we will subsequently discuss. 
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4 .2 .1  RE I N A C H  A N D  SC H E L E R : C O M P A R A T I V E  D I S C U S S I O N  
 
We discussed the relationship between Reinach and Scheler briefly in chapter two. Now 
we can begin to examine the similarities and differences between their respective 
theories of ethics in more detail. A cursory examination of Reinach’s work on ethics 
shows many themes common to the wider field of early phenomenological ethics. 
Reinach’s value theory has some subtle distinctive characteristics, but is otherwise very 
similar to other theories of his lifetime, Scheler’s in particular. It is these subtle 
distinctive characteristics that we will now attempt to highlight by contrasting them 
with Scheler’s perspective. This will help us when we must gauge the originality of 
Reinach’s work on ethics below. Scheler was one of the most active and prolific 
phenomenologists of ethics in Reinach’s lifetime, publishing Ressentiment, Zur 
Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Hass and the 
first volume of Formalism prior to the outbreak of the First World War. 
 Though neither one of them ever provides a clear definition of what a value is, 
Scheler and Reinach are principally in agreement on the properties or qualities that 
characterise a value. Values exist inasmuch as they are borne by objects, and the bearers 
of moral values specifically are the same for Scheler as for Reinach: acts, actions, and 
personal qualities. Values are grasped apart from their bearers, in distinct acts of feeling. 
Scheler indicates that the grasping of an object’s value can come before the object itself 
is truly grasped. ‘A value precedes its object; it is the “first messenger” of its particular 
nature. An object may be vague and unclear while its value is already distinct and 
clear’.12 Reinach does not explicitly agree with Scheler on this point, but it would not be 
inconsistent with his theory to do so; for him, too, the value is grasped in an entirely 
                                               
12 Scheler, Formalism, p. 18. 
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separate act from the perception of its bearer,13 and in experience we often find 
ourselves drawn to look more closely at something by an immediate sense of 
appreciation, or repelled by it with an immediate sense of discomfort. 
 Where Reinach’s and Scheler’s theories of value differ very significantly is in 
the precise role of moral values in action. For Reinach, moral value naturally belongs to 
certain actions and personal qualities; those actions and qualities are good as such 
(while those that bear moral disvalue are bad as such). The as such is of importance. 
For Scheler, on the other hand, moral value —  goodness as such —  is not an inherent 
quality of anything other than God. ‘Goodness belongs to God’s essence [… ] “good” in 
itself never consists in a conceptually definable property of man’.14 Human beings do 
not choose to perform actions that bear moral value; even ‘the realization of a certain 
formal value is itself never good or evil’.15 Instead, as noted in the axioms put forward 
by Scheler early in Formalism, moral goodness attaches to the act of realising the 
highest value possible in the hierarchy of values.16 Realising each possible non-moral 
value accordingly realises a degree of moral value corresponding with this order of 
preference: the closer the realised value is to the highest value possible, the greater the 
moral value that is realised in turn. 
 Another important point of distinction is the role of love in Scheler’s value 
theory. Reinach never refers to love as more than a possible reaction to a particular 
experience; he writes of the love of value, but love here is the response to the value 
being felt. Love of value is a moral value of the personal structure, distinct from 
                                               
13 ‘It must be clear to everyone that a landscape itself is grasped apart from its beauty. The landscape is 
perceived, the beauty felt’. S.W. p. 295, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
14 Formalism, p. 14. 
15 Ibid., p. 25. 
16 Scheler, Formalism, p. 26. For the relevant passages, see above, chapter 2, section 2.3.4.3. We will 
also briefly outline some of these axioms below, in section 4.2.3. 
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sensitivity to value; disregard for felt value is a moral disvalue, as distinct from 
insensitivity to value. Scheler gives a much more important role to love: 
In love and hate our spirit does much more than ‘respond’ to already felt and 
perhaps preferred values. Love and hate are acts in which the value-realm 
accessible to the feeling of a {human} being (the value-realm with which 
preferring is also connected) is either extended or narrowed.17  
 
Love broadens the subject’s awareness of the world of values, allowing the subject to 
correctly recognise the objective hierarchy of values. Hate narrows this awareness, and 
the condition of ressentiment distorts it altogether. Thus, for Scheler, a person can grasp 
a value as a value, but assign it the wrong place in the hierarchy of values; this leads to 
wrong action. Only by embracing love can a person’s character or moral tenor 
improve.18 Reinach’s view is different; a person can completely fail to recognise a 
value, and can perform evil actions ‘without even faintly recognising a character of 
disvalue in them’.19 Reinach never suggests that a person has a direct awareness of the 
respective positions of values within their objective hierarchy; when two values are felt, 
one may be felt as higher or as greater than the other, but that is all. It is possible that 
this is simply unclear; although Reinach discusses a hierarchy of values, his is much 
less developed than Scheler’s, with many of the terms he uses (‘modalities, heights, 
magnitudes and characters of value’)20 remaining unexplained in any surviving work. 
 The difference between these viewpoints can be seen in how Reinach and 
Scheler account for the phenomenon of ressentiment. For Scheler, just as love increases 
one’s awareness of the correct hierarchy of values, feelings of ressentiment distort that 
same awareness. A person affected by ressentiment feels the same values as anyone 
else, but orders them incorrectly, devaluing certain values. Reinach takes a different 
                                               
17 Scheler, Formalism, p. 261. 
18 ‘An alteration of the moral tenor (different from a mere change in it) comes about primarily through 
the alteration of the direction of love in coloving with the love of the exemplar’. Scheler, Formalism, 
p. 581. 
19 S.W. p. 296; Appendix (III). This is an extreme and presumably rare case of obliviousness to values. 
20 S.W. p. 485; Appendix (IV). 
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view, for, in his estimation, a person affected by ressentiment does not recognise values 
at all, as he or she is not in the objective attitude but the egoistic one. For Reinach, 
ressentiment does not cause but is caused by a particular attitude of egoism, in which 
the subject is not concerned with objective values, with the good in itself, but with the 
relative importance of everything ‘for me’.21 Thus, whereas in Scheler’s view, the 
emotion of ressentiment leads to a distortion of value-experience, which itself leads to 
egoism, Reinach’s interpretation is the opposite; an egoistic, subjective attitude leads to 
the placement of oneself and one’s own interests above all objective values, which leads 
to the experience of ressentiment when value and personal interest clash.  
 Scheler and Reinach both place great emphasis on the role of the person in 
ethics. Whether they in fact mean the same thing by ‘person’ is unclear, as Reinach 
never defines the person; however, it seems that their understandings of the term are in 
fact different. Scheler clearly defines the person as a unity of acts or experiences. For 
both, the person is a key bearer of values, but Reinach’s references to a ‘personal 
structure’22 suggest a different view of what the person represents, since Scheler’s 
person is specifically lacking in structure. For Scheler, the person cannot be abstracted 
from experiences at all. Nevertheless, he agrees with Reinach that there is such a thing 
as a ‘basic moral tenor’23 or disposition (Gesinnung) of the person, which for Scheler is 
the bearer of values, and that ‘without a good moral tenor there is no good deed’.24  
 Ultimately, all we have seen here is that neither Reinach nor Scheler can easily 
be credited with any specific influence over the other’s value-theory. To the extent that 
they were in contact and collaborated, a mutual influence is very likely, but not possible 
                                               
21 ‘The deepest root of ressentiment is [this] promotion of the I: in the recognition of foreign value, it 
would feel itself diminished’. S.W. p. 491, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). In this sense, Reinach’s 
position is closer to that of his former teacher Lipps’s ethics than to that of Scheler’s. The idea that the 
attitude of egoism is incompatible with being genuinely motivated by values comes directly from 
Lipps’s Ethischen Grundfragen. 
22 For example, S.W. p. 500, paragraph 5; Appendix (IV). 
23 Scheler, Formalism, p. 111. 
24 Ibid., p. 114. 
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to prove on any particular point. Reinach’s key contributions in ethics lie principally 
outside the area of value theory, or at least at its boundaries, as we will now see. 
 
4 .2 .2  VA L U E S  A N D  T H E I R  RO L E  I N  E T H I C S  
 
Reinach’s earliest surviving discussion of values in ethics was in the 1906 paper 
Grundbegriffe, in which he also proposed the concept of moral rightness. The concept 
of values in ethics was already familiar to his audience at the Akademische Verein für 
Psychologie; it had appeared in the work of their teacher Theodor Lipps, albeit with a 
somewhat different meaning from the one given to it by Reinach, and had a longer 
history still in both psychology and philosophy. Reinach here distinguishes moral 
values from values of other kinds, and although he refrains in this early work from 
identifying the precise bearers of moral values (he would later identify them as persons, 
personal characteristics and acts25) he clearly indicates values as having bearers, in 
relation to which they are grasped. His value theory is further developed in Überlegung 
and in Grundzüge, into the form we discussed in chapter three. Yet we must 
acknowledge that the theories of values put forward by Scheler, von Hildebrand and 
others are in many ways more detailed and better articulated than Reinach’s; Reinach 
never fully explains how the order of precedence or hierarchy among values is 
structured, nor does he properly account for the way in which human persons develop 
and deepen their awareness of values. That Reinach’s points are not always clear and 
well articulated is perhaps partly a result of his writings having survived in the form of 
transcripts. 
  The clearest point of originality in Reinach’s theory of value-ethics, then, is not 
to do with values themselves, but with their role in his ethics; or, more accurately stated, 
                                               
25 S.W. p. 485, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
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with the limits of that role. Reinach discusses what values can do, but also what they 
cannot do, and why a purely non-formal ethics of values is as incomplete as a purely 
formal ethics of imperatives. As we saw above, Reinach’s descriptive 
phenomenological methodology requires him to try and capture all of ethics in his 
analysis. Thus Reinach contributes to the theory of values by showing the dependence 
of a non-formal ethics of values on formal principles to be comprehensive.  
 
4 .2 .3  T H E  SP H E R E  O F  R I G H T N E S S  A N D  T H E  F O R M A L  M O R A L  L AW  
 
We saw in chapter two that early phenomenological ethics often involves an emphasis 
on non-formal values. Some early phenomenologists —  most notably Scheler26 —  took 
up value-based ethics in direct opposition to Kant’s purely formal approach to ethics. 
Reinach is not an exception, in that he is harshly critical of Kant’s ethics and in that he 
considers a theory of non-formal values to be a key part of his ethics. What makes 
Reinach unusual is that he does not entirely reject formal ethics in favour of the non-
formal sphere of values. For Reinach, a non-formal ethics of values is not able to stand 
on its own; there are questions in ethics that cannot be resolved in terms of value. We 
saw in chapter three how Reinach addresses this problem with his concept of moral 
rightness, by taking ethics ‘into [the] world of being’.27  
 This deceptively simple concept allows Reinach’s phenomenological ethics to 
deal with important subjects that it otherwise could not: morality in states of affairs, and 
moral duties. We can see the importance of doing so by contrasting Reinach’s approach 
here with Scheler’s. We saw in chapter two that Scheler presents a series of axioms that 
he considers to be necessary presuppositions for all non-formal ethics. The first four 
are:  
                                               
26 See above, chapter two, section 2.3.4.1. 
27 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). 
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1. The existence of a positive value is itself a positive value. 
2. The non-existence of a positive value is itself a negative value. 
3. The existence of a negative value is itself a negative value. 
4. The non-existence of a negative value is itself a positive value.28  
These closely resemble the four statements of the formal moral law presented by 
Reinach in Grundbegriffe, seven years before Formalism was published: 
1. It is right that every morally valuable object exists. 
2. It is right that a morally disvaluable object does not exist. 
3. It is wrong that a morally disvaluable object exists. 
4. It is wrong that a morally valuable object does not exist.29  
The claims being made by Scheler and by Reinach here are broadly equivalent. That 
something that is valuable exists is preferable to its non-existence; that something that is 
disvaluable does not exist is preferable to its existence; and conversely in each case. 
Scheler’s formulation simply uses the concept of value to represent both ‘good’ and 
‘preferable’ here. But it still takes a formal moral principle or similar, additional 
presupposition to say that moral value ought to be realised, that a person is under a 
moral obligation to realise it. Reinach builds the concept of ought into the formal moral 
law. Reinach’s formal moral ‘oughts’ do not tell us specifically what we ought to do or 
not do; rather, they tell us what ought to be, which states of affairs ought to obtain. The 
four principles listed above tell us that every value ought to exist, which leads, in a 
roundabout way, to a moral duty: the recognition that a value could be realised leads to 
the recognition that it ought to be realised, and thus to the recognition that we ought to 
realise it.  
                                               
28 Scheler, Formalism, p. 26. 
29 S.W., p. 337; Appendix, p. 11. 
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 Thus, as we noted previously, Reinach sees the concept of rightness as necessary 
for ethics to have the normative function that both seek. Scheler ‘clearly embraces the 
concerns of a normative ethics’,30 but whether or not he can provide a basis for 
normative statements is a ‘question that haunts Scheler’s ethics’.31 Reinach agrees with 
Scheler that a theory that is unconcerned with what ought to be, that cannot guide 
persons in how they ought to act, ‘cannot be [an] ethics in the customary sense at all’.32 
So although their meanings seem similar, the difference between Reinach’s and 
Scheler’s axioms here is much more than simple semantics. Scheler’s ethics provides 
only a criterion of goodness. Reinach is proposing an answer to the problem of 
normativity that is not open to a purely non-formal ethics of values.33  
 
4 .2 .4  T H E  SP H E R E  O F  GO O D S  
 
Reinach also distinguishes a third sphere of ethics in Grundzüge, intended to account 
for the place of life, health, pleasure, happiness and other intangible factors in ethics. 
Again, the importance of this original concept is best highlighted by comparing it with 
Scheler’s handling of the same issue. Scheler establishes as the lowest level of the 
hierarchy of values the values of the pleasant and unpleasant. Pleasure is by definition 
pleasant and thus can be identified as valuable (though not as morally valuable). 
Reinach cannot agree, because for him, a value must be good in itself. The pleasant or 
unpleasant is always pleasant or unpleasant for someone in particular; pleasure, most of 
all, is the pleasure of one person. Thus, there arises the need for a separate concept of a 
                                               
30 Blosser, Max Scheler, p. 405. 
31 Ibid. 
32 S.W. p. 487, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
33 It is on this basis that we find that Reinach’s contribution is not limited to meta-ethics; his concept of 
rightness and the associated moral obligations and duties are components of a normative moral theory. 
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‘good’ in a different sense from a value or something that is valuable (or at least, which 
is a good for a reason other than because it is valuable).  
 Because goods are a separate concept from the concepts of value and rightness, 
Reinach appoints them to their own sphere of ethics. Since this sphere is 
underdeveloped and its role in an actual ethics is not clear, we must conclude that it is 
not as significant a contribution to the field as the sphere of rightness is. Although we 
saw in chapter three that there is definite potential to the sphere of goods in an ethical 
theory, that potential is only partially realised in Reinach’s own works. Crucially, we do 
not know what exactly a good is; if goods are to have a direct role in ethics, it would 
seem necessary that we better understand what they are. 
 What we do know from Reinach’s writings is that the possession of certain 
goods by certain persons is right. Without goods, then, there is a clear gap in Reinach’s 
ethics, as principles in the form ‘the happiness of the moral human being is right’34 only 
make sense if happiness can be established as something that is objectively important 
for a particular person for a reason other than being valuable. It is not much of an 
embellishment of Reinach’s theory to suggest how further principles of this kind might 
be established: when we speak of a human being’s ‘right to life’, or of a person 
‘deserving of praise’, the ‘life’ and ‘praise’ here function as goods. The sphere of goods 
is an important component of Reinach’s approach to ethics, and thus warrants further 
development.  
 
4 .2 .5  M ETA -E T H I C S  
 
As noted above, Reinach’s work spans the rather ambiguous boundary between ethics 
and meta-ethics. Leaving this question aside, we can still without doubt assign two 
                                               
34 S.W. p. 486, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
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particular areas of Reinach’s work to the field of meta-ethics: his study of the ethical 
significance of reflection in Überlegung, and that of freedom and responsibility in 
Grundzüge. While Überlegung contains significant parts of Reinach’s work on values 
and how they are experienced, Reinach’s main focus in the second part of Überlegung 
is on the discussion and reconciliation of different moral assessments of reflection and 
attempts to understand them, which is principally a question that belongs to meta-ethics. 
Of all the content of Überlegung, it is these meta-ethical conclusions that represent the 
most significant contribution. Both Brettler35 and DuBois36 give credit to Reinach for 
showing the ambiguous and unreliable nature of assessments based on the sheer 
presence or absence of ‘reflection’ as a factor in decision-making.  
 Many early phenomenologists have a concept of phenomenological reflection 
(Reflexion) that is central to their work,37 but Reinach’s eidetic analysis of reflection, in 
the sense of consideration or deliberation, is largely unique. Indeed, it perhaps took a 
slightly unconventional viewpoint to see that there was a problem worth discussing; 
Reinach was not inspired, first and foremost, by the intellectual or ethical spheres in 
which he discusses reflection, but by a question of legal philosophy. The criminal law 
of Reinach’s day employed ‘reflection’ as a legal term without proper attention to what 
that word means. By discussing the experience of reflection in full, ‘Reinach succeeded 
in portraying the ambiguity of “reflection” which renders it an unsuitable criterion for 
                                               
35 Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 137. 
36 DuBois, ‘Adolf Reinach: Metaethics and the Philosophy of Law’, pp. 336-37. It is worth noting that 
the point that DuBois finds ‘perhaps most interesting [… ] from a philosophical point of view’, that the 
definition of murder solely on the basis of reflection has the potential to spare criminals with ‘a 
fundamental disregard for all values’ (ibid.), is not an entirely original idea of Reinach’s. Reinach’s 
quotation from Katzenstein (S.W. p. 309, paragraph 1; Appendix (III)) suggests that this was already 
an active concern among jurists at the time when Reinach wrote his article. 
37 In Husserlian terminology, as expressed by Moran and Cohen, ‘reflection occurs when any conscious 
act turns back on itself and becomes conscious of itself, e.g., when I become aware that I am looking 
closely at something’. Moran and Cohen, The Husserl Dictionary, p. 276. Thus when Reinach 
investigates the experience of reflection, he is in a sense reflecting on reflection. Husserl, however, 
does distinguish between straightforward ‘natural reflection’ and ‘phenomenological reflection’. The 
latter involves bringing experiences themselves into the open for reflection, and thus is an unnatural 
act of reflection in many respects.  
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determining the punishment to be allotted to the person who has caused another’s 
death’.38 While it is important to be aware that this was the main purpose of the text, 
this does not undermine the significance of Reinach’s ethical or meta-ethical work in 
this text.  
 Reinach’s furthest-reaching contribution to meta-ethics, then, is his theory of 
symbolic ethical relevance. This is how he accounts for the seemingly contradictory 
ethical assessments of volitional reflection, and his comments open up a wide range of 
possibilities for considering cases where circumstances and likely consequences seem to 
alter the value-character of an action. These symbolic relations cannot be translated into 
absolute formal or non-formal ethical norms, because the symbolic relations involved 
are not a matter of necessity, but are only interpretations of ambiguous data.39 Thus the 
symbolic relationships we see and anticipate in connection with values belong among 
the presuppositions of moral thought, within the territory of meta-ethics. 
 Reinach’s work on freedom and responsibility is also notable in that he argues 
that the entire debate of determinism versus indeterminism —  usually considered to be 
the central problem of freedom —  is not, in itself, relevant for ethics. Rather, Reinach 
considers the more important issue to be phenomenal freedom, the degree to which the 
action reflects the character of the agent and his or her personal values. ‘The fact that 
acts are carried out by the I could not be changed by any possible determinedness 
through circumstances’.40 Again, this does not have a direct bearing on a normative 
ethics, but is of relevance when discussing how we make ethical assessments. While 
Reinach’s work here is clearly influenced by Pfänder’s work on striving or conation 
                                               
38 Brettler, Adolf Reinach, p. 137. 
39 Reinach states that ‘there are necessary and universally-existent symbolic relationships’. The 
relationships underlying the ethical assessments of reflection simply ‘do not belong among them’. 
S.W. p. 300, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
40 S.W. p. 510, paragraph 2; Appendix (IV). 
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(Streben),41 and while the view that a person’s actions are indicative of the values of his 
or her character is common in early phenomenology, Reinach’s decision to turn away 
from the issue of determinism and indeterminism and frame the problem of freedom in 
entirely different terms is worthy of note. Since a meaningful sense of freedom is a 
necessary presupposition of a normative ethics —  there can be no ‘ought’ without the 
possibility that something can either be or not be which, in turn, presupposes that one is 
free do to or not to do what ought to be done and what ought to be —  this contribution, 
too, is to be considered part of meta-ethics.  
 
4 .2 .6  T H E  T H E O R Y  O F  SO C I A L  A C T S  
 
Though originally proposed as part of his legal philosophy in defence of the existence 
of an a priori or essential sphere of law, Reinach’s theory of social acts has definite 
implications for ethics. We would consider it a significant oversight if a theory of ethics 
were unable to account for the moral significance surrounding acts such as promising 
and forgiving. Yet even the fact that we identify such ethical significance with these 
seemingly simple, everyday acts points to the importance of Reinach’s insight in 
showing that certain social acts have particular unique qualities. 
 In the case of the promise, for example, Reinach is at pains to show that it is not 
simply ‘an expression of intention or of will’.42 When looked at from an ethical point of 
view it is strange that he would even need to say this; who would ever say that a mere 
statement of intent carries the same weight, ethically speaking, as a promise? At the 
same time, Reinach is also careful to distinguish the essential obligation that arises from 
every promise, as a product of that promise’s efficacy as a social act, from a moral 
obligation. These distinctions reflect the complex nature of how we assess morality in 
                                               
41 See chapter two, section 2.3.2.2, and chapter three, section 3.3.1. 
42 ‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by Crosby, p. 26. 
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relation to promising; we believe at one and the same time that it is morally right to 
keep one’s promises and that it is morally wrong to make false promises, yet there are 
also many cases where we would consider a person morally obligated to break a 
promise, if the content of that promise is itself immoral. To do justice to the ethics of 
promising and promise-keeping requires this careful investigation of what a promise is, 
in its essence and in its efficacy. 
 The act of forgiving is a slightly different case; it involves no obligation or claim 
for any involved party. In fact, the ethics of forgiving is a problematic issue. Forgiving 
is generally considered a good act, yet we would not normally say that one person is 
morally obligated to forgive another who has wronged him or her. Unless we are to say 
that everyone ought to forgive every wrong done to him or her, we cannot ascribe a 
moral value to forgiving as such. Instead, we might consider the act of forgiving to have 
a symbolic value, in that it represents a particularly generous or forbearing disposition. 
But even for this symbolic value to make sense, we must accept that forgiving is a 
unique social act with its own particular meaning, which can be performed genuinely or 
pseudo-performed. It is not a ‘judgment that the wrong done is, after all, not so serious, 
or really is no wrong at all’,43 nor is it a ‘cessation of anger {… } a mere forgetting or 
disappearing’.44 None of these acts or processes could possibly carry the ethical 
significance ascribed to the act of forgiving someone. Thus the very recognition of 
social acts as unique acts of a unique kind, with important implications for human 
interaction, is part of Reinach’s contribution to ethics.  
 
                                               
43 S.W. p. 535; Über Phänomenologie. 
44 Ibid. 
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4 .2 .7  T H E  C O N C E R N S  O F  E T H I C S  A N D  T H O S E  O F  T H E  PH I L O S O P H Y  O F  L AW  
 
In assessing Reinach’s work on ethics, it is important to remember that Reinach draws a 
clear distinction between ethics and the philosophy of law. Reinach is best remembered 
today for his work on the philosophy of law, and his contributions in that field are 
widely acknowledged, though they do not directly concern us here. As one of the first 
phenomenologists to turn his attention to the philosophy of law, however, Reinach is 
also unusual in describing the differences and boundaries between the philosophy of 
law and ethics. As we noted in chapter three, Reinach’s project is ultimately to describe 
the entire realm of ethical experience. This must include charting out the boundaries and 
limits of ethics, showing where the realm of the ethical overlaps with the realm of law 
and how the two are separate while still being related. Reinach highlights the dangers of 
failing to do this in his discussion of utilitarian ethics. The utilitarians sought to reform 
the law along the lines of their ethics. According to a utilitarian viewpoint, 
punishment [is seen] only as education in relation to a purpose to be achieved, 
rather than as a separate purpose {in itself}. [In this, the] intrinsic rightness of 
punishment in itself goes unrecognised. Strictly speaking, punishment [is then] 
only wanted for [its] consequences, which can also be achieved in other ways. 
Medical treatment could just as well take [its] place.45  
 
 In her dissertation, Lucinda Brettler discusses Reinach’s view that sensitivity to 
value is itself a moral value, and that a person must possess that sensitivity in order to 
be morally good. As we saw in chapter one, Brettler expresses concern about the 
‘quagmires into which use of the criterion of “ability to feel value” may lead legal 
                                               
45 S.W. p. 495, paragraph 1; Appendix (IV). Reinach is correct to argue that reform and deterrence that 
justifies the infliction of punishment, from a utilitarian point of view, may be achieved by means other 
than punishment (and achieved better), hence the justification of the necessity of punishment, from a 
utilitarian-consequentialist point of view, is suspect. This, nevertheless, still leaves open to moral 
evaluation the question of the intrinsic rightness of punishment itself (as retribution). Reinach is 
correct to note that what needs to be addressed in the issue of the morality of punishment is the fact 
that punishment is retribution, not its educational or deterrent or reformative value, as utilitarians hold, 
but whether the deliberate infliction of an evil on someone who (at least allegedly) committed a crime, 
by a publicly acceptable authority, is itself a right or wrong thing to do, is the moral question. 
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philosophy’.46 While Brettler is correct that the use of such a criterion in the criminal 
law would lead to an array of problems, Reinach never meant to apply the criteria of 
ethics to the philosophy of law or vice versa. Rather, Reinach’s point against utilitarian 
justifications of punishment is that the intrinsic rightness of punishment itself is not a 
moral basis for their theory, but the educational or reformative or deterrent benefits that 
(allegedly) accrue from the infliction of punishment on the prisoner (and others). If, 
however, such benefits or consequences are achievable via non-punitive means, such as, 
mandatory psychological-reformative-medical treatment of prisoners, then utilitarians 
would have no argument against such practices in law. At any rate, this is why the 
division between the second and third parts of Die Überlegung in itself exists: Reinach 
wishes to show that an assessment that makes sense in ethical terms does not 
necessarily hold the same validity in legal philosophy.  
 In Die Überlegung, Reinach examines the ethical significance of reflection, and 
finds that it has some symbolic meaning; an evil act carried out with reflection indicates 
an especially immoral disposition. But he points out that there is an important difference 
between this immoral or unethical disposition and an ‘antisocial’ one. The law is not 
concerned, essentially, with punishing evil in a moral sense. Whether one understands 
the purpose of punishment to be retribution, rehabilitation or deterrence, the 
surrounding law is concerned only with crimes that are actually committed, not with the 
reasons why a person commits or does not commit a crime. Ethically speaking, a person 
who refrains from committing an evil action only out of fear of being punished indicates 
at best an amoral character (which is morally disvaluable, because to be amoral requires 
a lack of respect for moral value). A person who commits a good action despite a 
                                               
46 Brettler, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, p. 138. Notably, in light of the preceding quotation 
from Reinach, one of Brettler’s concerns is that too great an emphasis on the moral dispositions or 
characters of persons will lead to excessive attempts to rehabilitate criminals, amounting to 
‘psychological torture’. (Ibid.) 
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threatened punishment indicates no certain moral disvalue, and indeed may indicate an 
especially high regard for value, to choose a good action over his or her self-interest. In 
the criminal law, these judgements are reversed. The law does not care why a person 
refrains from a crime, as long as he or she does refrain; and ‘unreceptivity to the evil of 
punishment’ belongs to the anti-social disposition that is most dangerous in the eyes of 
the law.47 ‘It is not at all an ethical minimum that the criminal law calls for, but 
something that lies beyond all ethical positives’.48 This is part of the reason why 
Reinach argues that the criterion of reflection is inadequate for its legal purpose in 
distinguishing murder from manslaughter; however valid the symbolic moral 
assessments of it may be, the law is not essentially concerned with them. Receptivity to 
and respect for value have no place as criteria in the criminal law.49 Establishing 
whether the person on trial was morally right or wrong to steal the loaf of bread to feed 
her starving child is not a function of the criminal law, but ascertaining whether the 
person did, or did not, steal the bread, and that this breaks a law, is. 
 There is a question as to whether Reinach in fact understates the importance of 
the relationship between positive law and the a priori sphere. Reinach ‘claims that the 
name “natural law” would poorly describe what he has investigated’ in Grundlagen.50 
The a priori relations on which legal concepts are founded are presented by Reinach as 
‘simply laws of being, laws about what it is to be a promise or an obligation’.51 Indeed, 
                                               
47 S.W. p. 109. 
48 Ibid. 
49 This does not mean that Reinach in any way exempts lawmakers or the state from moral duties; those 
apply universally. He writes in Grundlagen that it is ‘quite understandable’ if the civil law prescribes 
that ‘a legal transaction which offends against morals is void’ (‘Apriori Foundations’, trans. by 
Crosby, pp. 45-46). However, Reinach does not explore in any detail this particular notion of ‘justice’, 
here meaning the degree to which the positive law is correct from an ethical standpoint. This could 
simply be because it was not relevant to his discussions in Grundlagen; in Überlegung he argues at 
somewhat greater length on whether a particular definition of murder is ‘suitable’ (tauglich) for use in 
the criminal law. As we will see below, there are still questions as to whether Reinach fully thought 
through the relationship between the positive law and the a priori sphere of right. Certainly, Reinach’s 
discussion of this relationship in Grundlagen is far from comprehensive. 
50 DuBois, ‘Adolf Reinach’, p. 340. 
51 Ibid. 
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Reinach’s comments in Grundlagen ‘assert an absolute sovereignty and freedom of 
positive law in relation to prepositive apriori law’.52 Yet, amid these assertions, Reinach 
does not examine the state’s authority to enact laws in the first place, which must be 
rooted, if anywhere, in an a priori right. The state’s laws may posit which crimes will 
be punishable, and in what way, but ‘the foundations of the authority of the state to 
punish at all’ must exist first.53 If Reinach had followed this logical extension of his 
own a priori theory of right, he might have arrived at something closer to Edith Stein’s 
theory of the pure law, and thus by extension a fully-developed concept of justice.54 In 
any case, Reinach’s work on this subject helps not only to delineate the separate 
domains of ethics and the philosophy of law, but can also show the importance of a 
normative foundation for the existence of positive law, particularly when it comes to 
criminal law.  
 
SECTION THREE  
THE INFLUENCE OF  REINACH’S ETHICS  
 
 
The second criterion we established for our assessment of Reinach’s contribution, after 
originality, is its influence on the development of phenomenological ethics. The 
influence of Reinach on the development of phenomenology in general is well 
documented, but evidence is sparse of any of the original ideas outlined above —  even 
those for which he is well known, such as his theory of social acts —  being adopted by 
others in the field at the time.55 In this section we will discuss evidence that Reinach’s 
                                               
52 Josef Seifert, ‘Is Reinach’s “apriorische Rechtslehre” more important for positive law than Reinach 
himself thinks?’, Aletheia, 3 (1983), p. 201. Seifert notes that Reinach does not assert that the positive 
law has this same independence ‘in reference to values and ethical considerations’. 
53 Ibid., p. 216. 
54 See below, section 4.3.2.4. 
55 Reinach’s theory of social acts has since become more widely acknowledged; see Crosby, ‘Adolf 
Reinach’s Discovery of the Social Acts’, and Lundsten, Communication as Experience, both of which 
investigate Reinach’s social act theory alongside the speech act theory of Austin and Searle. 
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work influenced the development of phenomenological ethics. Dietrich von Hildebrand 
and Edith Stein are the two foremost examples of early phenomenologists who were 
influenced by Reinach’s method and who went on discuss themes of ethics in their 
work, so it is with them that we will look for this evidence first and foremost. 
 
4 .3 .1  D I E T R I C H  V O N  H I L D E B R A N D  
 
We discussed the ethics of Dietrich von Hildebrand in chapter two, alongside Reinach’s 
other influences and contemporaries. Comparing that sketch with Reinach’s ethics as 
laid out in chapter three, we can see definite similarities in how the two approach value-
ethics and in their conclusions. This is not surprising given the degree to which they 
shared the same phenomenological methodology. Hildebrand himself wrote that ‘from 
1910 on, [Reinach] was my only teacher’,56 though he also ‘acknowledged receiving 
immeasurably much for his moral philosophy from his fifteen-year association with 
Scheler’.57 It is this connection of von Hildebrand’s ethics with both Reinach’s and 
Scheler’s that makes it difficult for us to establish how Reinach’s value-theory 
influenced von Hildebrand’s. The task is made still more difficult by the fact that, as we 
saw in chapter two, Reinach acknowledges some influence of von Hildebrand’s ethics 
on his own. We must examine the points of similarity and difference in detail to 
discover where Reinach’s work on values might have influenced von Hildebrand’s. 
 One important similarity between Reinach’s and von Hildebrand’s respective 
value theories is the view that goodness or preferability for me is not value —  value is 
to be understood as goodness in itself.58 Reinach first states this view in relation to 
                                               
56 ‘Reinach as a Philosophical Personality’, trans. by John F. Crosby, in Aletheia 3 (1983), p. xx. 
57 Crosby, Dietrich von Hildebrand, p. 475. 
58 This contrasts with Scheler’s view, for example, that the sensorily agreeable and disagreeable are 
values, distinct from the spiritual or cultural value of aesthetic beauty (Scheler, Formalism, pp. 105-
109). Agreeable or disagreeable is always for me or for someone, not in itself. These are not values in 
the sense used by Reinach. In Überlegung, Reinach designates ‘pleasantness’ (Annehmlichkeit) as a 
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moral values in Grundbegriffe: ‘useful and morally valuable are equivocations, because 
[one can ask]: “useful for what?”. “Morally valuable for what?”, [conversely,] is 
meaningless’.59 The morally valuable is valuable in itself, not for someone or 
something. Reinach later indicates that this is true of all values.60 Von Hildebrand takes 
a similar view in his Christian Ethics when he distinguishes ‘the merely subjectively 
satisfying, the objective good for the person, and the value’.61 However, noted 
previously, Reinach credits von Hildebrand with developing the distinction between 
value and personal interest; thus, this similarity does not necessarily prove Reinach’s 
influence on von Hildebrand, but may in fact also be the other way around. 
 Apart from the similarities in their respective theories of values, though, there is 
another significant point of similarity between Reinach’s and von Hildebrand’s ethics; 
moreover, one that is distinctive to Reinach’s work. In Die Idee der Sittlichen 
Handlung, von Hildebrand discusses the ethical significance of states of affairs. He 
agrees with Reinach that states of affairs can indeed have this significance. ‘When we 
regret having been prevented from completing an appealing project, the fact that this 
same good does not exist stands before us as an evil’.62 At its basic level, he does not 
consider this to require a separate concept from moral value, as Reinach does. ‘Not only 
a noble human being is a bearer of certain values, such as the noble and the good, but 
                                                                                                                                         
basis of personal interest. S.W. p. 298, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). Von Hildebrand’s inclusion of the 
word ‘merely’ in ‘the merely subjectively satisfying’ is helpful for clarifying this. Aesthetic values can 
be ‘agreeable’ or ‘pleasant’, but they are never merely agreeable or pleasant. The merely agreeable is 
what Reinach does not consider to be a value, and what Scheler consigns to the lowest point on the 
hierarchy of values. 
59 S.W. p. 335, paragraph 2; Appendix (II). 
60 In Grundzüge, for example, Reinach writes: ‘[The] phenomenon that forms the basis of egoism is [an] 
attitude which cannot see anything in the world except through its relationship to the I. Egoism [is 
this] dislocation of one’s own I and [the] orientation of all things toward one’s own I. Everything 
becomes greater-than, pleasant for, and suchlike. [The] height of a human being [is then] always 
“bigger than me.” No pure viewings of facts [are] possible here’. S.W. p. 489, paragraph 2; Appendix 
(IV). Thus, any relation to the individual I is incompatible with the objective grasping of anything 
real, such as a value. 
61 Von Hildebrand, Ethics, p. 80. 
62 Von Hildebrand, Die Idee der Sittlichen Handlung; Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), p. 69. 
228 
also the state of affairs that this human being exists [… ] is, in a certain way, valuable’.63 
However, he argues for a certain precision in terminology here. ‘It is better to say that 
the existing state of affairs is valuable, rather than that it is a bearer of value’.64 Like 
Reinach, he relates the valuability of states of affairs to the concept of rightness 
(Rechtheit) and to the idea that the state of affairs ‘“ought to be so”’.65 The values borne 
by states of affairs are different from those borne by persons, acts and objects. A state of 
affairs cannot be noble or beautiful, but equally, a person cannot be ‘tragic’, or 
‘pleasant’ (erfreulich) in the sense that a state of affairs can be (when one hears 
welcome news, for example).66 For Reinach, on the other hand, to find something 
‘pleasant’ is an emotional reaction, rather than the feeling of a value, and so the fact that 
such a reaction is possible in connection with a state of affairs does not indicate that the 
state of affairs is valuable. It might speak well of a person’s character that he or she 
finds a right state of affairs pleasant, but the state of affairs is not pleasant in itself. 
Whether being tragic is a characteristic of the state of affairs in itself is less clear. 
Primarily, to find something tragic is also an emotional reaction, and is not necessarily 
an assessment that it is morally wrong. However, none of that proves that tragedy is not 
a kind of value or disvalue, even if an aesthetic rather than a moral one. 
 It is particularly notable that von Hildebrand is hesitant to describe the state of 
affairs as a bearer of value, even if it is valuable. This suggests that although von 
Hildebrand disagrees with Reinach’s introduction of a separate concept of rightness, he 
does agree with Reinach that states of affairs are not appropriate bearers of value. Von 
Hildebrand’s decision not to distinguish value and rightness in absolute terms is perhaps 
                                               
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., p. 71. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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due to an unwillingness (like Scheler’s) to embrace a formal moral law, distinct from 
non-formal values, as the basis on which the concept of rightness would be established.  
 Thus, although von Hildebrand did not strictly embrace Reinach’s concept of 
moral rightness, he recognised both the need for a way to assess the ethical bearing of 
states of affairs, and some of the difficulties in applying the concept of value to states of 
affairs. In other words, he agreed with the broad concerns laid out by Reinach in 
Grundbegriffe. This strongly suggests an influence, though it is hard to prove one; while 
von Hildebrand specifically credits Reinach with important work on the theory of 
knowledge that he uses in Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung,67 he makes no reference to 
Reinach’s theory of moral rightness. This is understandable, as none of Reinach’s 
writings on moral rightness had appeared in print by 1916, when von Hildebrand 
published the work in question. Von Hildebrand would have been familiar with 
Reinach’s ideas from lectures and personal exchanges, with no printed source from 
which to quote.  
 
4 .3 .2  E D I T H  ST E I N  
 
Edith Stein (1891-1942) was one of Reinach’s most prominent students in Göttingen, 
and became the chief editor of the 1921 edition of his collected works, the Gesammelte 
Schriften, for which she also completed his posthumous article Über das Wesen der 
Bewegung. Her own early, phenomenological philosophy touched on a wide range of 
subjects, from the phenomenon of empathy to the nature of the state, community, 
education and social justice. 
 There is no particular evidence of Stein having influenced Reinach’s ethics, such 
as exists in von Hildebrand’s case. Stein, on the other hand, freely acknowledges 
                                               
67 Ibid.; see footnote 1 on p. 19 and on p. 69. 
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Reinach’s profound influence on her work, and this provides us with an essential source 
of evidence for Reinach’s legacy in early phenomenological ethics. 
 While what Spiegelberg calls Stein’s ‘phenomenological dowry’68 remains 
important throughout her work, other influences are to be recognised in her later 
writings:  
During the years from 1922 to 1931, when [Stein] was teaching at St. 
Magdalena’s [… ] her association with Catholic scholars [… ] and her study of 
the works of Thomas Aquinas marked a change in the scholarly dimensions of 
her thought. In this period, Stein extended her phenomenological problematic to 
metaphysical questions, which Husserl had considered off-limits for his 
‘rigorous science’.69  
 
These influences are most pronounced in her posthumous work Endliches und ewiges 
Sein, but are also present earlier in her attempted habilitation thesis ‘Potenz und Akt’ 
(1931) and her lectures on Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person (1932). 
 As had been the case with Reinach, Stein’s philosophical career was tragically 
cut short, in her case by imprisonment and death at the hands of the Nazi regime.70 
Unlike Reinach, Stein’s contributions to phenomenology were not widely recognised 
during her lifetime.71  
 
4.3 .2 .1  S T E I N  A N D  E T H I C S  
 
Although Stein ‘did not leave a treatise on ethics per se’,72 her works of philosophical 
anthropology —  discussing the person, empathy, community and the state —  have 
significant implications for ethics. Stein was not, of course, the first phenomenologist to 
                                               
68 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 238. 
69 Mary Catharine Baseheart, Person in the World: Introduction to the Philosophy of Edith Stein 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 23. 
70 Forty-five years after her death, Stein was acknowledged as a martyr by the Catholic Church, and she 
was canonised as Saint Teresia Benedicta of the Cross in 1998. 
71 As Stein edited Husserl’s manuscripts for Ideas II and III, she was forced to watch Husserl ‘struggle 
with issues she thought she had resolved, without his being willing to revisit her contribution’. 
Lebech, ‘Why Do We Need the Phenomenology of Edith Stein?’, p. 695. 
72 Kathleen M. Haney and Johanna Valiquette, Edith Stein: Woman as Ethical Type, in 
Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy, pp. 460. 
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examine questions about empathy, but her work on the topic in her dissertation is 
original and strikingly perceptive. Stein also went further than theoretical discussion of 
ethics with her attempts at practical reform; she saw the German education system as 
deeply flawed.73 In particular, she drew attention to the problems faced by women 
within the German educational system of her day.  
 
4.3 .2 .2  S T E I N ’S  V A L U E  T H E O R Y  
 
Values play an important role in Stein’s phenomenology, as they do for most early 
phenomenologists. Her precise interest in and interpretation of value theory, however, is 
quite unique. ‘Stein’s phenomenological value theory [… ] stands in many ways 
between Scheler’s theory, stressing the a priori of the values and of the hierarchy they 
form and Husserl’s, which is interested in describing the act of valuation and sees 
values as founded on things’.74 Unlike Scheler and Reinach, who describe the grasping 
of value simply as a cognitive act of feeling, Stein has a much more complex 
understanding of how we come to recognise values, in which feeling is only the ‘most 
important’ means to gain insight into values.75 Stein also saw her work on empathy as a 
way to repair flaws in Husserl’s phenomenological approach to these problems; 
Husserl, however, does not seem to have acknowledged (or perhaps understood) her 
contribution.  
 For Stein, values ‘are their motivating power of which we always have 
expandable experience’.76 We are always constituting objects as valuable; indeed, ‘all 
                                               
73 Mary Catharine Baseheart, Person in the World (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 
78. In Baseheart’s words the system was sufficiently flawed to be in need of ‘complete demolition and 
reconstruction from the ground up’. 
74 Mette Lebech, ‘Stein’s Phenomenological Value Theory’, in Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical 
Society (2010), p. 139. 
75 Ibid., p. 142. The ability to calculate the motivational power of a value or values requires ‘“emotional 
intelligence”’ (p. 146). 
76 Ibid., p. 148. 
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objects are values, and thus every act of object-constitution must register within the 
constituting i [sic] as an inclination toward or against the object’.77 But our constituting, 
in itself, is motivated: ‘we interpret reality or objectivity, and our motivation in doing so 
is reflected in what we see’.78 Being motivated is not an act; it precedes the act it 
motivates, and reflecting on one’s own motivations thus forms a hermeneutic process of 
recursive interpretation. We seek not only to understand which values motivate us, but 
what motivates us to constitute these values in the way that we do.  
 Although values are constituted as such by the I, they are also objective. This is 
where empathy takes up such a central role in value theory. ‘It is only by means of 
empathy that values can be seen as objective, i.e., as something that also exists for 
others as motivators’.79 Values are still intentionally grasped for Stein; for example, ‘in 
the act of loving, one experiences a grasping or intending of the value of a person’.80 
For Stein, as for most phenomenologists of ethics, there is both sense and nonsense in 
the world of values. ‘If someone is “overcome” by the loss of his wealth {… } he feels 
“irrational.” He inverts the value hierarchy or loses sensitive insight into higher values 
altogether’.81 The references to a hierarchy and to higher values indicate (as does the 
pure law, referenced below) that Stein considers values to have real and objective status, 
though this is not emphasised by to the same extent as by Reinach or Scheler. For Stein, 
‘our reasons for evaluating certain values as highest can amount to social conformism, 
choice and experiences of the values themselves’.82 But there is still a character of 
objectivity to values and their hierarchy. ‘The grasping of the objective world of values 
                                               
77 Marianne Sawicki, Body, Text and Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 227. In 
his works, Reinach never refers to the constituting role of the I, which is very important in both Stein’s 
and Husserl’s later phenomenology. 
78 Lebech, ‘Stein’s Phenomenological Value Theory’, p. 141. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Baseheart, Person in the World, p. 40. 
81 Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, trans. by Waltraut Stein, p. 101. 
82 Lebech, ‘Stein’s Phenomenological Value Theory’, p. 148. 
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(objektiven Wertewelt) occurs {… } when the value as such is recognised intellectually 
as an object (Objekt). At this point, the value-hierarchy comes to light’.83  
 Rather than stress direct value-intuition and the ‘sensitivity to value’ or ‘love’ so 
important in Reinach’s or Scheler’s ethics respectively, Stein turns to empathy as the 
key means by which we develop our awareness of values. Empathy allows the subject to 
gain an insight into another person’s character, to recognise the values that motivate that 
person. ‘I experience {a person’s} every act as proceeding from a will and this, in turn, 
from a feeling. Simultaneously with this, I am given a level of his person and a range of 
values in principle experienceable by him’.84 Accordingly, in empathising with others, 
we can come to recognise values that we have never appreciated before. In this way, we 
grow as persons in our knowledge of the value-world. 
 Stein further develops her value theory in Philosophy of Psychology and the 
Humanities.85 In addition to the manner in which values are experienced and their role 
in motivating attitudes or dispositions, she here discusses the constitution of values. 
‘The value-free world of mere things’, she writes, ‘is an abstraction that’s suggested to 
us by the fact that we aren’t equally persuaded by all the intentions that can arise on the 
basis of available material’.86 We never experience such a world without values because 
every object that we constitute, we constitute in terms of value, implicitly or explicitly 
appreciating its importance in one way or another. 
 
                                               
83 Berhard Augustin, ‘Ethische Elemente in der Anthropologie Edith Steins’, in Die unbekannte Edith 
Stein: Phänomenologie und Sozialphilosophie, ed. by Beate Beckmann-Zöller and Hanna-Barbara 
Gerl-Falkovitz (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 193-199 (p. 197). Trans. by Mette Lebech. 
84 Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, trans. by W. Stein, p. 101. 
85 Originally written as two articles, ‘Psychische Kausalität’ and ‘Individuum und Gemeinschaft’, 
published together as Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der 
Geisteswissenschaften in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 5 (1922), 1-
283. 
86 Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, trans. by Baseheart and Sawicki, p. 160. 
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4.3 .2 .3  C O M M U N I T Y  E T H I C S  
 
In accordance with her phenomenology of empathy, Stein takes a rather different 
approach to ethics from that followed by Reinach or Scheler. Since empathy with other 
persons is key to how we develop our own awareness of values, shared values and the 
empathic process of discovering other persons’ values become key to ethics. ‘Every 
person requires other persons in order to be able to unfold herself and her personality’.87 
This goes beyond one-to-one empathising as Stein develops her phenomenology of the 
community. ‘As the goal of ethics, [Stein] proposed a perfected humanity, one that 
respects and integrates the value of each of its members.’88 A community has a shared 
current of life that flows through all its members, influencing them even if they are not 
aware of being influenced; thus, a perfected community would be an entirely positive 
influence on the persons who make it up. Many factors can influence how a community 
develops, but, as Baseheart writes: 
Even more important [than inanimate factors such as weather and landscape] for 
the development of community is the value-world in which it lives: the esthetic 
values of its environs; the ethical values which have been received in its morals; 
the religious values in its religions; the personal values encountered in the great 
figures of its past or those whose bearer is the community itself. All these values 
are motives, direction-giving factors for the behaviour of the community.89  
 
It is, therefore, easy to understand why Stein made efforts to promote political and 
social reform, and why she went on to closely examine the essence of the state —  and 
even the essential purpose for the state’s existence. The proper development of 
community and society is important, perhaps even necessary, for the proper 
development of individual persons.  
 
                                               
87 Augustin, ‘Ethische Elemente in der Anthropologie Edith Steins’, p. 197. Trans. by Lebech. 
88 Haney and Valiquette, Edith Stein, p. 452. 
89 Baseheart, Person in the World, p. 61. 
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4.3 .2 .4  THE STATE AND LAW  
 
Of greatest importance in the present investigation, as we will see below, is Stein’s 
post-war treatise An Investigation Concerning the State. Stein here discusses whether or 
not the state is essentially a bearer of value. She concludes that it is not —  states are not 
valuable or disvaluable in themselves —  but the freedom from danger granted by the 
state is key to proper ethical development. ‘Persons develop toward morality through 
awakening to freedom, through training in receptivity to values of all kinds, and through 
progressive use of freedom to realize values’.90  
In addition to discussions of values, Stein here introduces the concept of a 
‘reines Recht’, ‘pure law’ or ‘pure right’. It is based on this idea of pure law, she 
suggests, that some laws are considered to be too deeply rooted in tradition to be altered 
or overturned today. ‘It’s absurd to suppose that the fact of [a law] having been made 
long ago should require unalterability’;91 rather, the idea instead originates from the 
belief ‘that what is right (in a material sense) always holds steady’92 and does not 
change, so a law that was just (gerecht) at the time of its enactment long ago is no less 
just today.93  
 
                                               
90 Marianne Sawicki, The Humane Community: Husserl versus Stein, in Husserl and Stein, ed. by Feist 
and Sweet, p. 144. 
91 Stein, An Investigation Concerning the State, trans. by Sawicki, p. 83. 
92 Ibid. 
93 In the present day, this kind of appeal to long-standing tradition often relates to a national constitution 
(for example, the continuance of any constitutional monarchy past the point where the monarch no 
longer plays a real role in government), or to religious beliefs (for example, in the presently very live 
debate about same-sex marriage). Stein’s argument does not mean that all of these appeals to tradition 
are just, but that the idea that certain traditions should be indefinitely maintained is based on the idea 
of natural justice. Stein herself lived in a time of transition when the rights of women in Germany 
were still severely curtailed by tradition, and she was an active proponent of reform. 
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4.3 .2 .5  S T E I N  A N D  R E I N A C H  
 
Stein’s autobiography94 is among the chief historical sources on phenomenology in 
Göttingen, including on Reinach and his relationship with the Göttingen students. Stein 
arrived in Göttingen in 1913, in the latter half of Reinach’s time there as Husserl’s 
teaching assistant. Reinach left for the war less than two years after Stein’s arrival in 
Göttingen, but he left a lasting impression on her from the beginning. Her experiences 
of Reinach, both personally and as a teacher, are described in highly complimentary 
terms, from her first meeting with him95 to his encouragement of her doctoral 
research.96 Stein attended Reinach’s 1913 lecture course Einleitung in die Philosophie97 
and his exercises for advanced students, which took place at his home. Of the latter 
Stein wrote, ‘The hours spent in [Reinach’s] beautiful study were the happiest of all my 
time in Göttingen. We [students] were probably unanimous in the opinion that, when it 
came to method, we learned more here than anywhere else.’98  
 The influence of Reinach’s methodology on Stein is highlighted by her 
membership, after the war and Reinach’s death, in the Bergzabern circle. Based at the 
farm owned by Theodor Conrad and Hedwig Conrad-Martius at Bad Bergzabern, this 
group of phenomenologists included Jean Hering, Alexandre Koyré, Hans Lipps, Alfred 
von Sybel, as well as Stein herself, who underwent her baptism into the Catholic 
Church during this time.99 The members of the Bergzabern circle found that the 
changing views of the Master, Husserl, had placed a considerable distance between his 
                                               
94 Published in a single volume as Edith Stein, Aus dem Leben einer jüdischen Familie und weitere 
autobiographische Beiträge (Freiburg; Basel; Vienna: Herder, 2007). For an English translation, see 
Stein, Life in a Jewish Family, trans. by Josephine Koeppel (Washington DC: ICS Publications, 1986). 
95 Stein, Life in a Jewish Family, trans. by Koeppel, pp. 247-249. 
96 Ibid., pp. 281-284. 
97 Of which Grundzüge der Ethik is part. 
98 Stein, Life in a Jewish Family, trans. by Koeppel, p. 274. 
99 Joachim Feldes has written a detailed account of Stein’s time at Bad Bergzabern, to appear in the 
proceedings of the IASPES Inaugural Conference, Intersubjectivity, Humanity, Being. Edith Stein’s 
Phenomenology and Christian Philosophy, ed. by Haydn Gurmin and Mette Lebech (Traugot-Bautz, 
libri nigri, forthcoming). Feldes shows that Bergzabern was not merely a transition between stages in 
Stein’s life, but a stage in its own right. 
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transcendental idealist form of phenomenology and their realist one; they identified 
Reinach as their model for the type of phenomenology to which they wanted to remain 
true.100  
 
4.3 .2 .6  T H E  I N F L U E N C E  O F  R E I N A C H ’S  E T H I C S  O N  S T E I N ’S  P H I L O S O P H Y  
 
As in the other cases discussed so far, it is very difficult to prove that Stein’s work on 
value theory was influenced directly by Reinach’s. Reinach’s and Stein’s respective 
theories of value share no particular characteristics that are not also shared by others. 
Indeed, the theory of values in Stein’s dissertation shows a greater level of attention 
than Reinach’s to the development of personal values, and to how we recognise not only 
the values of another person’s character but the values experienceable by that person as 
well. Stein’s work provides possible solutions to several of the unanswered questions 
surrounding Reinach’s ethics, for example, by accounting for how a person can come to 
recognise new and higher values than was possible for him or her before. 
 The most obvious evidence that Stein was influenced by Reinach’s work on 
ethics relates to the sphere of moral rightness. In her treatise Eine Untersuchung über 
den Staat (An Investigation Concerning the State), Stein refers to a concept of moral 
rightness identical with Reinach’s.101 She writes: ‘There is ethical significance to what 
we designate as “morally right.” This is a predicate of certain states of affairs. “That the 
                                               
100  The issue is complicated further by Husserl’s relationship with Heidegger, whose version of 
phenomenology was particularly distant from that recognised by the Bergzabern circle. Husserl, too, 
would later come to see Heidegger’s phenomenology as incompatible with his own, but his initial 
support of Heidegger perhaps put a greater distance between him and the Bergzabern 
phenomenologists than would otherwise have existed. 
101  Unlike in her comments about the pure law, Stein does not cite this concept of rightness as coming 
from Reinach’s philosophy. As in the case of von Hildebrand, this may be in part because Reinach’s 
theory of rightness had not appeared in a printed form that Stein could reference directly. 
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needy are helped,” or “that X.Y. has declined to take part in a vile deed” —  this is 
right’.102 Thus, in relation to the existence of the state, she asks: 
Is there any value to the state as such, that is, to the ontic fabric [of the state]? If 
that question can be answered affirmatively, then it is right a priori for there to 
be states in the world (or, of course, wrong a priori if the value that attaches to 
the state as such is a negative one).103  
 
Stein’s use of the term ‘morally right’ (sittlich recht) here precisely matches Reinach’s 
understanding of it: rightness is a predicate of states of affairs that, at least in some 
cases, relates to the realisation of value in that state of affairs. 
 Stein also credits Reinach with having originated the theory of what she calls 
reines Recht (the pure law or pure right). Stein introduces her writings on the pure law 
as ‘merely implications’104 of Reinach’s work; this is an understatement of her own 
contribution here, as the pure law is conceptually distinct from anything appearing in 
Reinach’s work. The idea of the pure law relates both to Reinach’s theory of the a priori 
foundations of law —  the essences of the social acts and the Reinachian objects that 
provide a basis for positive law —  and to his formal moral law (Sittengesetz), the 
criterion of moral rightness. That is, while Stein connects the pure law with the essential 
structure of acts such as promising, she also states that ‘The idea of pure law is not yet 
separated from the idea of morality, and apart from the latter is falsely interpreted’.105 
Stein does not explicitly connect the pure law with moral rightness (sittliche Rechtheit), 
but with justice (Gerechtigkeit). ‘The idea of justice is related to the pure law. Where 
the pure law is in force, there “justice reigns.”’106 The ideal situation in terms of justice 
is when ‘the pure law materially implemented is discovered and becomes articulated, 
                                               
102  Stein, An Investigation Concerning the State, trans. by Sawicki, p. 155. 
103  Ibid., p. 148. 
104  Ibid., p. 38. 
105  Ibid., p. 83. 
106  Ibid., p. 151. 
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and in regard to it there is only the one task: to cherish it’.107 While Reinach does not 
discuss justice in relation to the law and emphasises that law-making bodies are in no 
way bound to put the essential law into force, it is entirely in keeping with the concept 
of moral rightness that a positive law could be considered to be just because it is in 
agreement with the formal moral law. 
 We can see, therefore, that Stein makes use of a concept of moral rightness and 
of a formal moral law in her ethics, even if her terminology is slightly different to 
Reinach’s. Stein develops the relationship of justice between the formal moral law (the 
pure law in her terminology) and the positive law in ways that Reinach does not; 
Reinach’s emphasis is generally on distinguishing the realms of law and ethics, and a 
discussion of justice in Stein’s sense would have been a significant deviation from the 
topic of any of his surviving works. Given that Stein explicitly links her work on the 
pure law to Reinach’s legal philosophy, given the close similarities between Reinach’s 
and Stein’s respective uses of the concept of moral rightness, and taking into account 
the short-lived but significant personal and academic contact that they had with one 
another, we conclude that Reinach’s work on ethics directly influenced Stein’s. 
Reinach’s legacy in the field of ethics, however limited, is nonetheless real.  
 
4 .3 .3  T H E  W I D E R  F I E L D  O F  P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L  E T H I C S  
 
We can find little evidence of Reinach’s ethics having influenced the development of 
phenomenological ethics beyond the narrow confines of the early movement, and his 
Göttingen students in particular. His name appears frequently in connection with the 
phenomenology of the promise and other social acts, if only in acknowledgement of his 
pioneering work on that subject. Likewise, discussions of the phenomenology of law 
                                               
107  Ibid., p. 84. 
240 
will often acknowledge Reinach’s work in that field. However, Reinach’s name is not 
one of those immediately associated with the early development of phenomenological 
ethics, nor is there any evidence that the distinctive traits of Reinach’s ethics, as they are 
outlined in this chapter, have been adopted to any significant degree in the wider field of 
ethics or value theory.108 In these terms, the influence of Reinach’s ethics has simply 
not been extensive in terms of either time or geography. 
 There are many possible explanations for this lack of impact. Reinach’s 
philosophy as a whole is relatively obscure, enough so that the entire field of speech act 
theory surrounding Austin and Searle developed completely independently of Reinach’s 
influence. Until 1989, Reinach’s works on ethics were particularly inaccessible; prior to 
that, Reinach’s ideas in Grundzüge had never seen print, and only those few individuals 
who had both attended Reinach’s lectures and read his articles would have been familiar 
with his full work on ethics. Further complicating the issue is the incompleteness of 
Reinach’s ethics, as his surviving body of work on the subject is still undeniably an 
incomplete project, not a fully finished ethics. No single article fully reflects the depth 
and extent of Reinach’s work in this area. The gradual rediscovery of Reinach’s 
surviving posthumous works and their publication in the Sämtliche Werke provided, for 
the first time since 1922, new opportunities for the study of Reinach’s ethics.  
 Value ethics in general also waned in popularity in the post-war years, and as 
such, Reinach’s ethics was pushed yet further into the background. This was in large 
part due to the rising influence of Heidegger: 
                                               
108 Reinach’s comments on value-theory have been recognised and cited, for example, by Kevin 
Mulligan, in his detailed paper ‘On Being Struck by Value’. However, the distinctive and original 
aspects of Reinach’s work on ethics that we have identified above do not play a role here. Other 
contemporary philosophers investigating phenomenological value theory include Roberta De 
Monticelli. See, ‘The Feeling of Values: For a Phenomenological Theory of Affectivity’, in Sebastiano 
Bagnara and Gillian Crampton Smith, eds., Theories and Practice in Interaction Design (Mahwah, 
NJ: LEA, 2006), pp. 57-76. 
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Probably no other single factor has been more corrosive of value-based ethical 
theories than the pervasive impression that Heidegger’s profound ontological 
preoccupations, together with his negative remarks about Scheler, Lotze, and 
Rickert, have somehow discredited the entire enterprise of value theory.109  
 
Thus, Scheler, despite his prominence in Germany at the end of the war and even up to 
his death, was ultimately to become ‘one of the “great unknowns” of modern 
philosophy’.110 Scheler’s influence after his death ‘has always been “inspirational”, 
scattered and personal, rather than institutional’.111 The same appears to be true of 
Reinach; general attention to Reinach’s already obscure work on ethics was bound to be 
sparse. There has, however, been a gradual revival of scholarly interest in 
phenomenological ethics in recent years. The handbook edited by John J. Drummond on 
Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy is one sign of this; another is the 
founding of societies to study of the work of early phenomenologists. Some of these 
societies focus on individual philosophers, including Scheler,112 von Hildebrand113 and 
Stein;114 others, such as the North American Society for Early Phenomenology115 and 
the Forum Münchener Phänomenologie International,116 are dedicated to the wider 
field of early phenomenological thought. 
 The twentieth century saw the rise of modern virtue-ethics, independent of 
phenomenological value-ethics but sharing many parallels with it. Thus, approaches to 
ethics based on practical wisdom or intuition and emphasising the importance of moral 
                                               
109  Blosser, Max Scheler, p. 403. 
110  Dunlop, Thinkers of our Time: Scheler, p. 6. Dunlop noted in 1991 that his was ‘the first book 
entirely devoted to Scheler to be published in the United Kingdom’. 
111  Ibid., p. 16. 
112  The International Max Scheler Society (Internationale Max-Scheler-Gesellschaft) was founded in 
1993 at the University of Cologne. It has held conferences on a biannual basis since then, the most 
recent at the time of writing having been held at the University of Erfurt in June 2011. 
113  The Dietrich von Hildebrand Legacy Project was founded in 2004 and, at the time of writing, has 
commissioned translations into English of works by von Hildebrand including Die Idee der sittlichen 
Handlung (1916) and Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis (1922). 
114  The International Association for the Study of the Philosophy of Edith Stein held its inaugural 
conference at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth in June 2011 and included papers on 
Stein’s studies of empathy and the state. 
115  Founded in 2010, NASEP held its first official conference in Toronto in 2012. 
116  Despite its name, the FMPI also encompasses Göttingen phenomenology in its area of study. 
242 
qualities of character have more philosophical currency than they did in the past. To the 
extent that the credibility of virtue- and value-based ethics has been restored, it is 
especially important now to recognise the contributions of pioneers in that field, 
including Reinach. 
 
SECTION FO U R  
TOWARDS ASSESSING R EINACH’S  
CONTRIBUTION TO E THICS IN GENERAL  
 
The goal of this investigation has been to answer the question: what was Adolf 
Reinach’s contribution to early phenomenological ethics? In these four chapters, we 
have discussed all of the necessary information to be able to answer this question fully. 
As noted in the previous chapter, we have not exhaustively discussed Reinach’s ethics; 
nor have we, in this chapter, established the full significance of Reinach’s contribution 
to ethics in a context any wider than that of early phenomenology. The importance of 
Reinach’s ethics as such, the viability of his ethics as an ethics, we have so far left 
completely aside. Here, we will discuss Reinach’s work on ethics as a contribution 
beyond the field of early phenomenology. 
 The scope of this discussion is, of course, limited by the available material for 
assessment. Reinach did not produce a complete theory of ethics; he wrote only about 
what he described as the basic questions or foundations of ethics. He asked and 
attempted to answer many questions in relation to ethics, but a set of plausible answers 
to ethical questions does not, in itself, constitute a theory of ethics. Moreover, we saw in 
chapter three that Reinach’s works leave many questions unanswered, although answers 
to those questions are certainly possible. Since we cannot assess an ethics that does not 
fully exist, we will instead discuss the potential of the theory Reinach began to form. 
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Reinach’s surviving works will be understood here as a foundation for a possible 
Reinachian ethics. 
In chapter three, we summarised Reinach’s conclusions with regard to ethics in the 
following points: 
1) Ethics requires both a formal and a non-formal dimension. 
2) Ethics must assess not only actions, but also persons and states of affairs. 
3) Moral values are real and form an objective hierarchy. 
4) The character of a person is indicated in his or her actions. 
5) Goodness of character is the primary concern of ethics. 
Reinach has established a basis for assessing actions, persons and states of affairs from 
a moral perspective: actions and persons can be assessed by reference to non-formal 
values, while states of affairs are assessed under the formal moral law. Value of the 
personal character is the most important consideration; the goal of each human being is 
to be a good person, by acting in such a way as to embody moral values. These include 
the key values of receptivity to value and love of value, which in turn lead the good 
person to perform good actions precisely because they are good. As the existence of 
every moral value is right under the formal moral law, a person who does good and 
becomes good thereby realises that which ought to be; such a person fulfils his or her 
moral duty.  
 Thus we understand Reinach’s answers to the basic questions of ethics. We must 
now assess those answers as the foundation of a potential ethics. 
 
4 .4 .1  C R I T E R I A  F O R  A S S E S S M E N T  O F  A N  E T H I C S  
 
Assuming that Reinach is correct, that values are real and objective, that moral value is 
the same as moral goodness, and that there is a formal ethics under which the existence 
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of a moral value is morally right, can a Reinachian ethics satisfy the requirements to 
function as a moral theory? There is no single, universally accepted set of criteria for the 
assessment of an ethical theory; yet we must have some standard here against which we 
can hold up a Reinachian ethics. Mark Timmons, in Conduct and Character: Readings 
in Moral Theory, presents a set of criteria for the assessment of a moral theory, 
according to which we will structure this assessment.  
1. Consistency: ‘A moral theory should be consistent in that its principles, together 
with relevant factual information, yield consistent moral verdicts about the 
morality of actions, persons, and other items of moral evaluation’.117  
 
Reinach predicts consistency as a product of a value-based ethics. Value is goodness in 
itself, and values form a fixed hierarchy; they do not change over time or based on 
circumstances. Those things that bear value do so objectively, independently of whether 
those values are grasped, or by whom. Thus, if two persons approach the same ethical 
question with an objective attitude and a sufficient sense of what is valuable, both are 
predicted to arrive at the same answer concerning what ought to be done or how 
something ought to be assessed. 
2. Determinacy: ‘A moral theory should feature principles that, together with 
relevant factual information, yield determinate moral verdicts about the morality 
of actions, persons, and other items of moral evaluation in a wide range of 
cases’.118  
 
Again, Reinach’s understanding of what moral value is leads to a univocal 
determination of the good and the bad in each case. The verdicts of ‘valuable’ and 
‘disvaluable’, ‘right’ and wrong’, can indeed be challenged, but there is only one correct 
answer; where two people disagree on the moral good or the morally right, one of them 
is in error. Of course, it is possible to be honestly mistaken, and one would need to be 
aware that one’s own sense of what is good is always fallible. 
                                               
117  Mark Timmons, Conduct and Character: Readings in Moral Theory, 4th edn (Toronto: Wadsworth, 
2003), pp. 9-10. 
118  Ibid., p. 10. 
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3. Applicability: ‘The principles of a moral theory should be applicable in the 
sense that they specify relevant information about actions and other items of 
evaluation that human beings can typically obtain and use to arrive at moral 
verdicts on the basis of those principles’.119  
 
It is ambiguous whether or not a Reinachian ethics satisfies this criterion. The core 
principle of a value ethics —  act to realise moral value —  is applicable in theory to 
every possible situation, and yet it is not actually useful in arriving at moral verdicts; as 
we saw above in our discussion of the situation of the moral dilemma, it does not help 
to arrive at judgements in cases where the agent feels unsure about what to do. As we 
did above, we conclude here that Reinachian ethics has the potential to satisfy 
applicability, but that that potential is unfulfilled in its present form. 
4. Internal support: ‘A moral theory whose principles, together with relevant 
factual information, imply our considered moral beliefs receives support —  
internal support —  from those beliefs’.120  
 
This is perhaps the strongest point to a value-based ethics: values are synonymous with 
our moral beliefs. No ethics could be more consistent with our considered moral beliefs 
because those beliefs are how a value ethics asks us to decide on actions. 
5. External support: ‘The fact that the principles of a moral theory are supported 
by well-established nonmoral beliefs and assumptions (especially those from 
areas of nonmoral inquiry) is some evidence in favour of the theory’.121  
 
Value ethics is supported externally by the broader phenomenological theory of values, 
which is concerned not only with moral facts, but with motivation and preference in a 
very wide sense. Likewise, Reinach’s sphere of moral rightness is supported externally 
by his work on the a priori sphere of right and the essences of ‘ought’, the social acts, 
and obligation as such. 
                                               
119  Ibid., p. 11. 
120  Ibid., p. 12. 
121  Ibid. 
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6. Explanatory power: ‘A moral theory should feature principles that explain why 
actions, persons, and other items of evaluation are right or wrong, good or 
bad’.122  
 
Reinach is able to explain why certain actions and personal qualities are assessed as 
good (because they are morally valuable) and why certain states of affairs are assessed 
as morally right (because they are in accordance with the formal moral law). He is less 
able, or willing, to explain why the morally valuable is morally good, beyond the 
position that the morally valuable is the morally good. We are reminded once again here 
of Moore and Frankena’s naturalistic or definist fallacy, and of Reinach’s distaste with 
the practice of defining or explaining something as other than what it is. Reinach cannot 
quite meet Timmons’ requirement here, but perhaps it is better that he does not try. 
 To satisfy all of Timmons’ criteria for assessment at a basic level, then, a 
Reinachian ethics would need to have three things added to it that are not found in 
Reinach’s works. First, it would need a full and complete explanation of the hierarchy 
of values and the methods of preference between values; second, connected with the 
first, a full and complete explanation of how the formal moral law is to be known. Both 
of these would relate to the criterion of applicability, to make it clear how Reinach’s 
system of assessments is to work in all real-world situations. Thirdly, the theory would 
also need to provide an answer to the question ‘why are values good?’ other than, 
‘because it is in their essence to be good’, or in other words, ‘because they are’. We 
suggest that this third point, though certainly worthy of note, is not one that Reinachian 
ethics can or should attempt to answer. That moral value is good(ness) in itself, sui 
generis, is simply an essential truth that can be explained no more easily than why 
1+1=2, or why the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter is an irrational 
number. 
                                               
122  Ibid., p. 13. 
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 We can conclude, then, that Reinach’s work points to an ethics with the potential 
to pass Timmons’ criteria. Structurally, and assuming the acceptance of some of its 
basic principles, it has the characteristics of a functioning ethics. But there are other, 
more specific challenges that we may consider; first and foremost, whether in fact the 
basic assertions and principles that we have so far presupposed are supportable. 
 
4 .4 .2  QU E S T I O N S  FA C I N G  A  RE I N A C H I A N  E T H I C S  
 
The first question of ethics could be said to be: what is good? Against what standard 
shall good and bad be measured? Reinach answers that value is good, and that good and 
bad will be measured against a standard of value and disvalue. In this, he makes the 
same claim as any other value-realist, but that alone does not prove that his answer is a 
credible one. Can we in fact believe Reinach when he says that this is how we shall 
decide good and bad? 
 
4.4 .2 .1  D O E S  R E I N A C H  P L A U S I B L Y  A N S W E R  T H E  Q U E S T I O N S  O F  E T H I C S?  
 
On the surface, Reinach’s ethics of values, like almost all ethics of values, is plausible 
more or less by definition. As Reinach shows, we presuppose the reality of our value-
experiences at all times; we can almost not fail to believe that they are correct. Even 
when we question our value-feelings (which is only wise, since they are fallible), 
something motivates us to question: the assessment, perhaps, that knowing the truth is 
better than not knowing it. Can we, though, rationally accept that our intuitive grasping 
of which things are good and which are bad can be the basis for an ethics? It seems we 
can. Timmons’s fourth standard for assessment of a moral theory, as noted above, is 
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based on whether the theory’s principles ‘imply our considered moral beliefs’,123 and 
much of the debate around different moral philosophies involves appeals to pre-existing 
moral beliefs of various kinds. Reinach, like other value-theorists and like ethical 
intuitionists before and after him, gets to the root of this —  our intuition is in fact the 
only guide we trust, and must trust, to tell us what is good and what is bad. Whatever 
flaws can be found in it, Reinach’s answer to the first question of ethics —  what is 
good? —  is by definition plausible, because we already believe it instinctively in our 
everyday lives.  
 Reinach, nonetheless, is not content to answer only this question. He poses 
another (‘What is morally right?’), and attempts to answer it as well. Reinach suggests 
that there are formal moral ‘oughts’, and that a state of affairs is morally right if it 
essentially conforms to one of these oughts. Again, superficially, this is certainly 
plausible. We can accept the idea of principles that we follow, and we can imagine a set 
of such principles that was not enacted by any temporal authority. However, as we saw 
in chapter three, Reinach does not tell us in any certain terms how we know what this 
formal moral law is; thus, his answer is incomplete. It is theoretically plausible, but does 
not address the question in practical terms. 
 
4.4 .2 .2  D O E S  A  R E I N A C H I A N  E T H I C S  P R O V I D E  A  B A S I S  F O R  M A K I N G  N O R M AT I VE  
S T A T E M E N T S ?  
 
 
Normativity can be a problem for non-formal approaches to ethics, because the 
universal statement ‘X ought to be’ is formal in structure, even if X is a non-formal 
value. Thus it is difficult for an ethics of values to make any normative statements about 
what persons ought to do. Reinach’s solution to the problem of normativity can be 
summed up in four points: 
                                               
123   Timmons, Conduct and Character, p. 12. 
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1) Certain types of actions are, by their essence, bearers of moral value (that is, 
good in themselves). 
2) The existence of something that is good in itself is, by a self-evident formal 
principle, morally right (that is, it ought to be). 
3) Therefore, an action that bears moral value ought to be realised (while an action 
that bears moral disvalue ought not to be realised). 
4) When it is possible for a person to realise an action that is morally valuable, that 
person ought to do so. 
Reinach has again here invoked the formal moral law, but this time he invites less 
difficulty than he does above. We know that Reinach considered some principles of the 
formal moral law to be self-evident, chief among them the principle that the existence of 
a moral value is morally right (and thus ought to be). We do not, therefore have any 
ambiguity as to how we are to know that this principle holds true. We either agree with 
Reinach that it is self-evident, or we do not. If we accept that moral value is morally 
good in itself, and that there is a formal ethics, it does follow that the existence of a 
moral value is right according to the formal moral law. 
 
4.4 .2 .3  D O E S  A  R E I N A C H I A N  E T H I C S  P R O V I D E  A  M E A N S  O F  R E S O L V I N G  M O R A L  
D I L E M M A S?  
 
 
The concept of a hierarchy of values carries with it the implication that some values can 
be (and rightly are) preferred over others. This is a straightforward basis for the 
resolving of moral dilemmas: when two moral values can be realised, the greater one is 
to be preferred over the other. Reinach unifies this simple principle with his answer to 
the problem of normativity when he makes the distinction between a moral obligation 
(Verpflichtung) and a person’s moral duty (Pflicht). Just as the higher of two values in 
the value-hierarchy is to be preferred over the lower one, the moral obligation to realise 
250 
a higher value outweighs the obligation to realise a lower one, and the greater of the two 
obligations becomes the person’s duty, that which he or she ought to do.  
 However, this only answers half of the question, that of whether a correct 
answer exists to the moral dilemma. The task of finding that answer still falls to the 
subject and to his or her own feelings of value. Since formal moral rules cannot help 
with specific decisions in concrete situations, an ethical theory can only ever offer very 
general guidance. As we noted in chapter three, the issue of fallibility in value-feeling is 
one of the potential problems facing Reinach’s ethics. Acceptance of his theory may 
mean acceptance that the correct solution to a moral dilemma is out of reach. A human 
being can pause, reflect, focus on grasping the moral value to be realised in each 
project, consider possible consequences and their bearing on the choice —  a process 
that ‘ideally thought of’, can ‘go on forever’.124 But no amount of reflection is 
guaranteed to resolve the dilemma. If, after lengthy consideration, two or more projects 
still seem to be equally ethically demanded, then the subject may have no choice but to 
conclude that they are, in fact, equally ethically demanded. 
 
4.4 .2 .4  I S  A  R E I N A C H I A N  E T H I C S  C A P A B L E  O F  A C C O U N T I N G  F O R  E T H I C A L  D I S P U T E S?  
 
Connected to the issue of resolving moral dilemmas is the meta-ethical challenge faced 
by any theory of ethics when it comes to differing ethical points of view. In a pluralist 
society (i.e., one where persons with differing ethical views must co-exist), it is 
important to be able to mediate between opposed viewpoints. Since Reinach posits that 
values are real and their hierarchy is objective, it is not possible for two different 
opinions on what is good to both be correct; this is further highlighted by Reinach’s 
position that, under the formal moral law, moral values ought to exist and persons out to 
                                               
124  S.W. p. 293, paragraph 2; Appendix (III). 
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act in order to realise them, even if the persons in question do not recognise those 
values. 
 There are two points in Reinach’s work on ethics that are worth noting here. The 
first is that although values are real and their hierarchy is objective, the objective 
attitude —  the attitude of practical reason in which one is concerned with values —  
includes the acceptance that one’s own value-judgements may be incorrect. Moral 
values are open to discovery. A person faced with an opposing ethical point of view 
would at least have to reflect on whether his or her viewpoint is in fact correct. Thus, a 
meaningful discussion of ethical questions is certainly possible between two persons in 
the objective attitude; although each believes that there is only one correct answer, each 
must also be open to correction of his or her own position. 
 The second, and perhaps more meaningful point to consider is Reinach’s 
discussion on values of the personal character and symbolic relationships of value. If 
two persons disagree on whether an action is valuable, their disagreement may not be 
rooted in the action itself, but in what the action symbolises about the character of the 
agent. Disagreements over whether an action is good may not focus on the action itself, 
but on whether than action symbolises a value (such as courage) on the part of the 
agent. Few if any people would disagree that courage is a valuable trait (or simply, a 
value) of the person. What we mean by an ‘act of courage’ or of bravery is an action 
that symbolises the courage of a person’s character; but those actions can take many 
different forms. One might think of the character of Atticus Finch in Harper Lee’s novel 
To Kill a Mockingbird. Atticus’s children see him take a rifle from the county sheriff to 
shoot a rabid dog, and are impressed by his display of a courage they never knew he 
possessed. But the novel shows Atticus to display his courage in another, more 
profound way in his decision to provide a strong legal defence of Tom Robinson, a 
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black man, despite the public scorn that this attracts to him and his family. In point of 
fact, Atticus’s actions in the courtroom are relatively mundane; he simply does his job 
by defending Tom Robinson. However, Atticus hopes for his children, and others —  
and the author expects her reader —  to recognise the latter action as displaying greater 
courage.125 So, a new avenue for moral debate is opened up by the analysis not of the 
value-content of specific actions, but of the values symbolised in actions, which may 
lead closer to an ethical common ground. 
 
4.4 .2 .5  W H A T  D O  R E I N A C H ’S  C O M M E N T S  O N  E T H I C S  H A V E  T O  O F F E R  T H E  W I D E R  
F I E L D ?  
 
 
Despite the obscurity and the relative shortness of Reinach’s discussions of ethics, he 
makes a number of points that deserve to be recognised and further discussed, even 
outside of an attempt to construct a Reinachian ethics. Any moral philosopher who 
advocates a purely non-formal ethics of values or virtues would do well to consider 
Reinach’s arguments that such an ethics either cannot account for ‘an array of questions 
that are designated as moral questions’,126 or risks distorting the sense in which ‘value’ 
is meant. Anyone promoting a voluntaristic ethics, or any other approach that isolates a 
single object of moral assessment, might consider whether in doing so they carry out 
‘an enormous reduction of the province of ethics’,127 excluding the assessment of the 
character of the person —  and thus the potential to become and be a morally good 
person. Reinach’s detailed discussions of the different kinds of obligation and of the 
experience of reflection are both (at least) ‘significant [… ] contributions to ethical 
                                               
125 This depends on the point of view that all courage is qualitatively, essentially, the same value; that the 
physical courage needed to face a physical challenge is not an entirely different value to the moral or 
spiritual courage needed to face a challenge of a very different kind. We cannot explore this question 
in full here, but in brief, if physical courage and spiritual courage are to be seen as separate kinds of 
courage, they nevertheless share that common essence —  courage. 
126 S.W. p. 335, paragraph 3; Appendix (II). 
127 S.W. p. 500, paragraph 5; Appendix (IV). 
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metatheory’,128 however one addresses the questions of normative ethics; and his work 
on the theory of social acts, though not unique today, stands as a landmark in the history 
of philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of communication. 
 
SECTION F IVE  
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this chapter, we have seen that Reinach made contributions to the development of 
early phenomenological ethics that are highly distinctive, even unique. We have seen 
that some of these ideas demonstrably influenced his students, while other ideas did not 
have the same impact. We have seen that Reinach’s writings about ethics have at least 
the potential to serve as the foundation of a compelling ethical theory; and we have seen 
that the comments made about ethics by Reinach raise questions and challenges that 
deserve at least to be noticed by the wider field of ethics. By the standards we set at the 
beginning of the chapter —  originality and influence —  Reinach’s contribution to the 
development of early phenomenological ethics is clear, and we have begun to see his 
work as a contribution in a much wider sense as well. 
                                               
128 DuBois, ‘Adolf Reinach’, p. 340. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the preceding four chapters, we have discussed the question, ‘What was Adolf 
Reinach’s contribution to the development of early phenomenological ethics?’ Such a 
question could not have a concise answer; nor could it be properly answered without the 
proper preliminary discussions. We have seen what Reinach wrote about ethics, 
examined the context in which he wrote it, and concluded that there is significant 
evidence of Reinach’s contribution in two senses: original work, with important 
implications for phenomenological ethics, and direct influence on at least two of the 
important figures of the early phenomenological movement. The conclusion to these 
discussions is also the conclusion to the question, but it is the beginning of the 
discussion of Reinach’s work on ethics. 
 In discussing these topics, we have faced the many difficulties that arise from 
interpreting an incomplete body of work. Überlegung and Grundlagen were completed 
and published, but do not primarily address ethics; Grundbegriffe and Grundzüge are 
focused on the problems of ethics, but survive only as transcripts. Yet it would be 
entirely wrong to dismiss Reinach’s discussions of ethics as asides or afterthoughts. 
Reinach, after all, attached a high importance to ethics and its problems, perhaps the 
greatest importance of all, as noted in the introduction to our study.  
 We also established in the introduction that the purpose (as opposed to the goal) 
of this investigation has been to make Reinach’s work on ethics more accessible to 
scholarship. To this end, we have sought to win recognition for Reinach’s work and to 
show some of the key points that bear further discussion —  the good and the bad, since 
it is clear that there is much work to do before a Reinachian ethics could be called 
complete. We do not intend to make an apology, in any sense of that word, for 
Reinach’s work. It stands as it is, and deserves to be recognised simply for what it is.  
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 Reinach’s work on value theory was pioneering, though its influence is hard to 
measure. Although Reinach took up the term ‘values’ from both Lipps and Husserl, 
value realism of the kind espoused by the realist phenomenologists was still very much 
in its infancy when Reinach first addressed it in his 1906 paper, and the development of 
Reinach’s particular theory of values ran parallel with that of Scheler, and later that of 
von Hildebrand, until 1913. Like his fellow value-realists, Reinach believed that non-
formal values represent the best way to approach the problem of moral goodness, but he 
went further by discussing the limitations of values as a part of ethics, and by raising 
questions in ethics that could not be resolved in terms of value. 
 In the context of phenomenological ethics, Reinach’s approach to the problem of 
normativity is perhaps his most important contribution. Reinach was not alone in his 
belief that a theory must be able to make normative claims —  ‘you ought to do this,’ 
‘this ought to be’, ‘you ought not to have done that’ —  in order to be a true ethics, and 
not merely a set of factual observations or statements that are reducible to want-
statements or factual-psychological-interest statements. To say ‘persons grasp certain 
objects as bearers of values’ and ‘those objects that are valuable are essentially 
preferable to those that are less valuable’ does not deductively show that ‘persons ought 
to realise values.’ In Aristotelian ethics, the missing link is provided by a highest good 
—  the call for agents to act virtuously is here a hypothetical imperative, the best course 
of action if one wishes to live a good, happy life. Reinach wants his ethics to have the 
weight of a categorical imperative, and so, he roots his normative claims in an absolute, 
formal moral law, just as Kant did his own ethics. 
 Many of the finer details of the ethics discussed by Reinach are vague, or in 
need of further development: the problem of how one develops a better appreciation of 
value, the problem of how circumstances and likely consequences modify the essential 
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value character of an action, the problem of how the formal moral law becomes known 
to us. Yet others stand, even outside the field of Reinach’s own ethics, as important 
insights. Reinach’s study of the role of symbolism in moral assessments explains the 
different (and superficially contradictory) ways in which we assess reflection on an 
action. He sees the need to recognise the goods represented by happiness, life and health 
while still distinguishing them from values. He explores the relationship between the 
positive law and the essential truths in which its operating principles are founded, and in 
the process producing a detailed theory of obligation and right. 
 The members of the early phenomenological movement identified with the 
collaborative nature of work in the natural sciences, each researcher contributing data 
towards the general advancement of knowledge. And Husserl, with his conviction that a 
community of scholars could conduct eidetic analysis of specific domains of 
experiences and further the advancement of ‘phenomenology’, is equally taken up and 
incorporated by Reinach. Within this mindset, Reinach’s work on ethics —  though 
incomplete and somewhat sporadic —  deserves to be recognised. Even if his ideas had 
only a limited influence on phenomenological ethics going forward, that influence in 
itself speaks for the value of his contribution. Ultimately we must remind ourselves that 
although Reinach did not produce a complete ethics, his efforts in this field do not 
represent a failure on that account. Reinach did exactly what he set out to do: to add in 
whatever way he could to a project that he knew would be ongoing, that was not his 
work alone but the work of philosophy and philosophers in general. In chapter four we 
repeatedly referred to a ‘Reinachian ethics’, indicating a theory of ethics inspired by and 
based upon Reinach’s writings on the subject; but the expression could also be read as 
meaning an ethics belonging to or specific to Reinach. Reinach’s goal was not to build 
his own one-man system of ethics but to contribute to phenomenological ethics. 
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 This dream of a shared, collaborative phenomenological project of ethics was 
not truly realised in Reinach’s lifetime, nor in the post-war years before 
phenomenological value-ethics declined in influence. Scheler, von Hildebrand and 
others each set out to form their own theory of ethics, their conclusions diverging as 
their methodologies became more distinct. The possibilities of future investigation into 
the possibilities of phenomenological ethics have in no way diminished today, however; 
on the contrary, developments in ethical thought generally and modern virtue-ethics in 
particular have the potential to enrich a modern approach to an ethics of values. This 
only serves to highlight the importance of recognising what early phenomenologists, 
including Reinach, contributed to the development of ethical theory. 
 The particular attitude of the early phenomenologists toward scholarship has 
also made the goal of identifying Reinach’s influence on his contemporaries somewhat 
more difficult. It was part of the culture in Göttingen that members of the 
phenomenological movement did not extensively reference or cite each other’s work, or 
indeed make much use of citations at all; this is visible in Reinach’s works as much as 
anywhere. Further, taking into account the differences in how different 
phenomenologists understood the phenomenological method —  from the subtle to the 
radical —  the process of tracing lines of influence among phenomenologists becomes 
quite limited in its scope. Yet we have been fortunate to find some direct evidence of 
Reinach’s influence, particularly in the case of Stein, who was in many ways more 
willing than many of her colleagues to acknowledge openly her debts to the work of 
others. Ultimately, the best evidence for Reinach’s influence and importance in the early 
phenomenological movement is biographical and historical —  resting in the personal 
testimonies of those who knew him —  rather than academic in nature, and is thus not 
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specific to any particular philosophical field, but points to the quite generally 
inspirational quality of Reinach’s teaching and his friendship. 
 We must also accept that the passage of years, the loss of manuscripts, and the 
fragmentation of phenomenology —  the latter leading to a corresponding and 
reasonable fragmentation in scholarship concerning phenomenology —  have placed 
barriers in the way of fully appreciating the contribution of any early phenomenologist 
to any of their shared projects. In light of this we are reminded not to lose sight of the 
purpose for which the goal of this investigation was pursued: to make Reinach’s work 
on ethics more accessible to contemporary study, particularly in the English-speaking 
world. It is to be hoped that in the future, scholarship will further explore and evaluate 
Reinach’s work on ethics in itself, and fully recognise what Reinach’s work has to add 
to the project of phenomenological ethics in the present day.
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APPENDIX (I) 
PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATIONS 
 
The German texts translated in Appendices (II), (III) and (IV) are taken from the 1989 
compilation Sämtliche Werke. They have been arranged in chronological order 
according to when they were first delivered or published. Details of how these works fit 
into the chronology of Reinach’s philosophical writings can be found in chapter one of 
the thesis. 
 The translated texts are here presented in parallel format, with the German in the 
left-hand column and the English to the right. The German text is provided for the use 
of readers familiar with the language, as the understanding of the text is greatly aided by 
access to the exact wording and context. The glossary below contains details of key 
terms and how they have been translated here. 
 Since Grundbegriffe, Appendix (II), and Grundzüge, Appendix (IV), are already 
the product of extensive editing, the English text below contains two types of editorial 
notes. Notes by the editors of the Sämtliche Werke appear, as they did in that edition, in 
square brackets, i.e. [… ], while my own in-text notes appear in braces, i.e. {… }. In 
order to be consistent, this usage is preserved in Überlegung, Appendix (III). 
 The text of Grundbegriffe was reconstructed by the editors of the Sämtliche 
Werke from notes transcribed by Alexander Pfänder and Johannes Daubert. Sections 
taken from Daubert’s text or which are identical between the two are represented in 
normal typeface, while those that appear only in Pfänder’s text are shown in italics. 
Similarly, the text of Grundzüge was reconstructed from a set of notes transcribed by 
Winthrop Bell and one by Margarete Ortmann. As Bell’s notes are considerably longer 
than Ortmann’s, material present in Bell’s transcript or in both appears in the text in 
normal typeface, while material drawn only from Ortmann’s appears in italics. For 
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Überlegung, this distinction is unnecessary; italic text instead indicates words 
emphasised by Reinach in the German text by the use of letter spacing. 
 In order to preserve the flow of the dual-text translation, any additional editorial 
notes not included in line with the text will appear as endnotes. Reinach’s own notes, 
which appear as footnotes in the original text of Überlegung, are included with the 
endnotes in Appendix (II) and are marked with an asterisk (i.e. as 1*, etc.). The 
structure of paragraphs in the original text is preserved in the English translation; some 
additional line spacing is used to keep the start of each paragraph parallel in both 
columns. These additional line breaks do not indicate the start of a new paragraph, 
which is always marked with the indentation of the first line. Numbers in braces (e.g. 
{335}) indicate the pagination of the text in Sämtliche Werke. 
 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Original German Translated As Notes 
Akt Act A single, temporally punctual experience. 
The judgement that a state of affairs 
obtains, the perceiving of an object and 
the feeling of a value are all acts. 
(sich) aufbauen to form (-self) Reinach uses this expression to refer to 
the way in which emotional states 
(Gefühle) arise in response to certain 
intentional experiences. The verb is used 
reflexively, indicating that the emotional 
states are not formed or constructed by the 
subject, but rather form themselves. This 
appears to be distinct from Husserl’s 
technical sense of ‘construction’. 
Einstellung Attitude Einstellung and Haltung both denote a 
kind of ‘attitude’. 
Erfassung/erfassen Grasping Denotes grasping an object in an act of 
perception or value-feeling. 
emotional emotive Not to be confused with gefühlsmäßig (see 
below), the emotive life refers to being 
motivated by values. 
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Ethik/ethisch Ethics/ethical ‘Ethik’ is translated here as ‘ethics,’ in 
contrast with ‘Sitten’ (which is translated 
here with ‘morals’). 
Reinach does not give clearly distinct 
meanings to ethics and morality. In 
general, he uses Ethik to refer to the 
philosophical field rather than Sittlichkeit 
or Moral, and refers to ‘sittliche Werte’ 
and ‘sittlich recht’ (‘moral values’ and 
‘morally right’) more often than ‘ethische 
Werte’ and ‘ethisch recht’. 
Forderung/Verbot Demand/Prohibition The ‘demand’ to carry out a project or the 
‘prohibition’ against doing so is 
experienced (though not literally heard) 
on experiencing that project’s character of 
moral value or disvalue. 
fühlen to feel Fühlen (used mainly in the context of 
value-feeling or value-grasping) is an 
intentional act of the subject, to be 
distinguished from emotions or feeling-
states (see below). 
Geist/geistig Spirit/spiritual Also translates as ‘mind’ and ‘mental,’ but 
the connotation of ‘spirit’ is inherent in the 
German term. 
Gefühl/ 
gefühlsmäßig 
Emotion/ 
emotional 
A condition or state of the subject. Unlike 
the act of feeling (see above), an emotion 
has a duration in time and is not 
intentional or objective in character. An 
emotion can be the source of an action, 
but it is not a motive. 
Note that ‘das Gefühlte’ refers to 
something that is felt, not to an emotion; 
see fühlen. 
Gegenstand Object Generally denotes the object of 
intentionality; contrast with the content of 
an experience. 
Haltung Attitude  
Mensch/menschlich Human being/human ‘Mensch’ corresponds to the traditional 
usage of ‘man’ and ‘mankind’ in English 
to refer to a human being or humanity 
respectively in a gender-neutral sense. As 
Mensch is masculine in German, it is 
represented in the text as a ‘he’; however, 
the term as used here does not refer to a 
specifically male or female human being. 
Moral/moralisch Morality/moral Reinach rarely uses these terms himself. 
In most cases, ‘moral’ is used to translate 
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‘sittlich’. 
Motiv motive A state of affairs that motivates me to will 
something to be. One of the three 
components of willing (see also Quelle 
and Zweck). 
Person Person As with Mensch, the phenomenological 
person has no connotation of gender but in 
this case is linguistically feminine. The 
associated pronouns have been translated 
as female. 
psychisch psychical  
Quelle source That which gives a motive its motivational 
power; that out of which I will something 
to be. One of the three components of 
willing (see also Motive and Zweck). 
Rangordnung hierarchy Here, ‘hierarchy’ is used to mean a ranked 
order of precedence, not an order of 
authority or of holiness. 
Recht Law or Right The distinction between the two meanings 
of the noun Recht is context-based. This is 
not to be confused with Reinach’s use of 
the adjective form of recht for ‘right’. 
(sittlich) 
recht/Rechtheit/ 
unrecht/Unrechtheit 
(morally) 
right/ rightness/ 
wrong/ wrongness 
Moral rightness or wrongness belongs to a 
state of affairs by virtue of its essence and 
conformance with formal ethical 
principles. 
richtig/Richtigkeit correct/Correctness To be contrasted with recht/Rechtheit. 
Correctness applies to intellectual 
positions. 
Properly speaking there is no such thing 
as ‘moral correctness’ according to 
Reinach’s own distinction, but that 
expression does appear, perhaps due to 
transcriber’s error, in Grundbegriffe. 
Sache Thing The meaning of ‘Sache’ varies depending 
on context. It has three main meanings 
here: 
1) A thing, or a material object. ‘Die 
Sachen selbst’ are ‘the things themselves’ 
to which phenomenology was considered 
by Husserl to be a return. 
2) A fact (also ‘Tatsache’). 
3) Matter, especially in the sense of ‘the 
matter at hand.’ 
sachlich/ 
Sachlichkeit 
objective/ 
Objectivity 
This indicates a relation to Sachen, i.e., 
facts or real things. Objectiv also 
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translates as ‘objective’, Objectivismus as 
‘objectivism.’ 
Sachverhalt State of affairs A common phenomenological term, but 
with a particular significance in Reinach’s 
philosophy. A state of affairs takes the 
form ‘the being a of B’ (which can include 
the existence of an object). 
Seele/ 
seelisch 
Soul/ 
of the soul 
The German word seelisch (‘soulish’) has 
no direct English equivalent. 
Sitten/Sittlichkeit/ 
sittlich 
Morals/Morality/ 
moral 
See Ethik. 
Stellungnahme position-taking At the end of intellectual reflection, the 
subject arrives at an intellectual ‘position’ 
on the theme of the reflection. The 
Stellungnahme refers to the taking of this 
position or stance. 
Überlegung Reflection A durational process of consideration or 
deliberation. Reinach identifies three 
particular kinds: 
Intellektuelle (Intellectual), where the 
subject considers the truth of a state of 
affairs; 
Voluntative (Volitional), where the subject 
considers whether to carry out a project of 
action; 
Praktisch-intellektuelle (Practical-
intellectual), where the subject considers 
how best to achieve the purpose of a 
project. (This is a kind of intellectual 
reflection.) 
Verbot Prohibition See Forderung. 
Vergegenwärtigung Presentiation To be distinguished from ‘presentation’. 
This indicates that something is made 
present (gegenwärtig) to the mind. 
Verhalten Behaviour Unlike an ‘attitude’ or ‘intellectual 
position’, which are inner responses or 
ways of responding, ‘Verhalten’ refers to 
the way in which one behaves or comports 
oneself, in both an inner sense (e.g. 
reflective behaviour) and an outer one 
(e.g., behaviour based on reflection). 
Vorsatz Resolution A resolve or intent to do something (to 
carry out a specific thought-of project). 
Vorstellung Presentation Refers to the way in which I present an 
object to myself; the idea of an object as 
formed in my mind. 
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Wert/Unwert Value/Disvalue For Reinach a value is objective (that is, 
carried by an object and intentionally 
grasped), and is to be contrasted with 
personal interest. 
Reinach distinguishes moral value 
(sittliche Wert) from other kinds of value, 
such as beauty (aesthetic value), vitality 
and wisdom. Any intended object can be a 
bearer (Träger) of value, but moral values 
are specifically borne by persons, personal 
qualities, acts and actions. 
wollen/Wollen to will/will(ing) ‘Das Wollen’ can refer to ‘the will’ or to 
an individual act of willing. The emphasis 
is that something is willed; there are non-
willing acts. 
Ziel Goal To be distinguished from Zweck, below. If 
I paint a wall in order to help a friend, the 
completed painting of the wall is my goal. 
Zweck Purpose To be distinguished from Ziel, above. If I 
paint a wall in order to help a friend, the 
helping of a friend is my purpose. One of 
the three components of willing (see also 
Motiv and Quelle. 
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APPENDIX (II) 
VORTRAG ÜBER ‘GRUNDBEGRIFFE DER ETHIK’ 
 
Written and delivered to the Akademischen Verein für Psychologie, Munich, in 1906. 
First published in Sämtliche Werke, pp. 335-337. 
 
 
DIE GRUNDBEGRIFFE DER ETHIK THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF ETHICS 
{335}[Wir wollen] vom landläufigen 
Begriff der Ethik ausgehen. [Die] 
gemeinsame Frage der verschiedenen 
ethischen Systeme [lautet]: »Was ist 
sittlich?« oder »Was ist sittlich 
wertvoll?« [Dabei steht] nicht im Subjekt 
ein Gegenstandsbegriff, dessen Prädikate 
nun gesucht würden (wie in der 
Psychologie). Die Ethik sucht die 
Gegenstände ihrer Prädikate. [Die] Frage 
ist, welchen Gegenständen der Begriff 
des Sittlichen zukomme. Die 
Bestimmungen der Gegenstände mögen 
verschieden sein (dies letztere [wird] 
nicht hier in Betracht gezogen), aber alle 
sind sittlich wertvoll,1 und dadurch 
beziehen sich die Sätze der Ethik auf 
sittliche Gegenstände und sittliche Werte. 
{335}[We wish] to take our point of 
departure in the commonly used concept 
of ethics. [The] question shared by the 
different ethical systems [goes]: ‘What is 
moral?’ or ‘what is morally valuable?’ 
What is at issue [here] is not the concept 
of an object whose predicate would now 
be looked for (as in psychology). Ethics 
seeks the objects of its predicates. [The] 
question is which objects correspond to 
the concept of the moral. The 
determinations of the objects may be 
different (these latter will not be 
considered here), but all are morally 
valuable, and thus ethical statements 
relate to moral objects and moral values. 
 An der Spitze [steht] also ein 
Gegenstandsprädikat. »Das Sittliche« ist 
der Grundbegriff der Ethik. Es gibt der 
Ethik Einheit. Völlige Aufhellung dieses 
 So at the forefront [stands] a 
predicate of an object. ‘The moral’ is the 
fundamental concept of ethics. It gives 
ethics its unity. Complete clarification of 
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Prädikates [ist] erst das Ziel. Vorläufige 
Bestimmung des sittlich Wertvollen: 
Gewöhnlich wird sittlich wertvoll gleich 
gut gesetzt, unwert gleich böse oder 
schlecht. Was ist »sittlich gut« und 
»sittlich böse«? Geschichten sind gut 
oder schlecht, ebenso Gemälde. Aber 
dieses sind nur Äquivokationen zu sittlich 
gut oder schlecht. Wert können auch 
praktische Gegenstände haben. Aber 
nützlich und sittlich wertvoll sind 
Äquivokationen, denn [man kann fragen]: 
»nützlich wozu?«. »Sittlich wertvoll 
wozu?« hat [dagegen] keinen Sinn. 
Negative Bestimmung des sittlich Guten: 
nicht nützlich, nicht gleich ästhetisch 
wertvoll, nicht gleich angenehm usw. All 
dieses ist in anderem Sinn wertvoll als 
das Ethische. Positiv [ist] nur ein 
Hinweis auf das Gemeinte möglich. 
Weitere Begründungen [sind] unnütz. Es 
ist ganz einerlei, ob es in der Welt etwas 
gibt, dem sittlicher Wert zukommt. 
this predicate [is] initially the goal. 
Preliminary determination of the morally 
valuable: customarily, morally valuable 
would be equated with good; disvaluable 
with evil or bad. What is ‘morally good’ 
and ‘morally evil’? Stories are good or 
bad, likewise paintings. But these are just 
equivocations with the morally good or 
bad. Value can also be had by practical 
objects. But useful and morally valuable 
are equivocations, because [one can ask]: 
‘useful for what?’. ‘Morally valuable for 
what?’, [conversely,] is meaningless. 
Negative determination of the moral 
good: not useful, not exactly like 
aesthetically valuable, not exactly like 
pleasant, etc. All of these are valuable in 
a sense different to that of the ethical. 
Positively, only a reference to what [is] 
meant is possible. Further justifications 
[are] of no use. It makes no difference at 
all whether there is anything in the world 
to which moral value belongs. 
 Genügt der Begriff des Sittlichen,2 
um das Gebiet der Ethik abzugrenzen? 
Lassen sich alle Sätze der Ethik auf die 
Form bringen: »Dieses ist sittlich 
wertvoll«? Nein. Es gibt eine Reihe von 
Fragen, die als sittliche Fragen 
bezeichnet werden, die nicht dadurch 
bestimmt werden. Die Ethik hat es nicht 
nur mit der Frage zu tun, was sittlich 
wertvoll ist, sondern3 [wichtig ist] noch 
 Does the concept of the moral 
suffice to delimit the domain of ethics? 
Can all statements of ethics be put in the 
form: ‘This is morally valuable’? No. 
There is an array of questions that are 
designated as moral questions, {but} that 
would not be determined by that. Ethics 
does not only have to do with the 
question of what is morally valuable; 
another basic concept of ethics [is 
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ein anderer ethischer Grundbegriff: 
sittlich recht und sittlich unrecht. 
important]: morally right and morally 
wrong. 
 Bestimmung von sittlich recht und 
sittlich unrecht: Beide Prädikate sind 
nicht äquivalent den Prädikaten wertvoll 
und unwert. Man versteht unter »sittlich« 
dann etwas anderes. Z. B. daß sittlich 
Unwertes nicht existiert, ist sittlich recht 
{336} bzw. unrecht, aber nicht wertvoll. 
Beispiele hierzu aus dem Zivilrecht und 
dem Strafrecht. Juristische4 Fragen 
(Verpflichtung zum Schadenersatz) 
können zu der Frage führen: Ist der Satz 
richtig? Schadenersatz ist doch nicht 
sittlich wertvoll. Ebenso kann nicht 
gefragt werden: Ob es wertvoll [ist], daß 
die Strafe der Vergebung diene. Dennoch 
sind es ethische Sätze. Man sagt: [Die 
Strafe ist] sittlich recht, aber nicht: 
sittlich wertvoll. Wertvoll und recht 
gelten als Prädikate von Verschiedenem. 
Ist beides [tatsächlich] verschieden? 
 Determination of the morally right 
and morally wrong: these two predicates 
are not equivalent to the predicates of 
valuable and disvaluable. One 
understands something different by 
‘moral’ in this case. For example, for a 
moral disvalue not to exist is morally 
right {336} as opposed to wrong, but not 
valuable. Examples of this from the civil 
law and criminal law. Juridical questions 
(obligation5 to compensate) can lead to 
the question: is the statement correct? 
Compensation is not morally valuable. In 
the same way it cannot be asked whether 
it [is] valuable that the punishment serves 
forgiveness. Nevertheless, they are 
ethical statements. One says: [the 
punishment is] morally right, but not: 
morally valuable. Valuable and right 
function as predicates for different things. 
Are they both [in fact] different? 
 Mut, Tatkraft sind sittlich 
wertvoll, Neid ist unwert. »Daß der 
Unsittliche unglücklich ist, ist sittlich 
wertvoll«? Das geht nicht. Daß der 
Unsittliche glücklich ist, ist [nicht] 
unwert, sondern nicht recht. Wert und 
Unwert [sind] etwas anderes als 
Richtigkeit und Unrichtigkeit. Mut, 
Energie und Tatkraft sind alle nicht 
sittlich recht, sondern sittlich wertvoll. 
 Courage and vitality7 are morally 
valuable, envy is disvaluable. ‘That the 
immoral one is unhappy, is morally 
valuable?’ That does not work. That the 
immoral one is happy is not of disvalue, it 
is not right. Value and disvalue [are] 
something different from rightness and 
wrongness. Neither courage nor energy 
nor vitality is morally right, but morally 
valuable. That must be founded in the 
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Das muß im Gemeinsamen, in der 
Gegenstandsform begründet sein. »Es ist 
recht« [ist] gleich »es ist in Ordnung«. 
Wertvoll sind Gegenstände. Dagegen 
sind Sachverhalte das, was sittlich richtig 
oder unrichtig ist.6 Gegenstand und 
Sachverhalt sind verschieden (wie, das 
kümmert uns [hier] nicht). A und B sind 
wertvoll oder unwert. Daß A b ist, ist 
recht oder nicht recht. Aber es ist nicht 
wertvoll bzw. unwert. Nur Gegenstände 
können sittlich wertvoll sein, niemals 
Sachverhalte. Nur Sachverhalte können 
sittlich richtig sein, niemals Gegenstände. 
general, in the objective form. ‘It is right’ 
[is] like ‘it is in order’. It is objects that 
are valuable. States of affairs, on the 
other hand, are what is morally right or 
wrong. Object and state of affairs are 
different (exactly how does not concern 
us [here]). A and B are valuable or 
disvaluable. That A is b is right or not 
right. But it is not valuable or disvaluable 
respectively. Only objects can be morally 
valuable, never states of affairs. Only 
states of affairs can be morally correct,8 
never objects. 
 Einwände: Scheinbare Ausnahme 
hier ist, daß wir ein Handeln oder Wollen 
auch »sittlich recht«9 nennen. Aber hier 
ist das Gewollte selbst gemeint. Aber 
freilich [wird] das Wollen selbst »sittlich 
richtig« genannt. Dann [hat] »sittlich 
richtig« einen anderen Sinn. Ein Wollen 
ist nicht an sich richtig, so wie es etwa 
lustbetont ist. Es ist recht, sofern das, was 
gewollt ist, recht ist, aber nicht an sich. 
[Also] übertragen vom Gewollten auf das 
Wollen. Dieses [liegt am] Doppelsinn von 
Worten wie Handlung usw.: einmal 
[meint es] das Handeln und dann das, 
worauf sich das Handeln bezieht. Logisch 
richtig ist das Urteil, nie der Sachverhalt 
(= richtig). Ethisch richtig ist der 
Sachverhalt, niemals das Urteil (= recht). 
So werden allgemein Bewußtseinsakte als 
recht bezeichnet, wo eigentlich nur der 
 Objections: an apparent exception 
here is that we also refer to actions or 
willings as ‘morally right’. But here, that 
which is willed is what is meant. But 
really, the willing itself [is] called 
‘morally correct’. Here ‘morally correct’ 
[has] another meaning. A willing is not 
correct in itself, in the way it can be 
tinged with pleasure. It is right insofar as 
that which is willed is right, but not in 
itself. [So] the willing inherits from that 
which is willed. This [results from] the 
double sense of words like action etc.: 
firstly [it means] the acting, and then that 
to which the acting relates. A judgement 
is logically correct, but never a state of 
affairs (=correct). A state of affairs is 
ethically correct, but never a judgement 
(=right). Thus acts of consciousness are 
in general designated as right, even if it is 
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recht bezeichnet, wo eigentlich nur der 
bewußte Sachverhalt recht ist. 
in general designated as right, even if it is 
really only the state of affairs of which 
one is conscious that is right. 
 Damit [ist] der Unterschied 
zwischen sittlich wertvoll und sittlich 
recht geklärt. Also in der Ethik kommt 
man mit dem Begriff des sittlich 
Wertvollen nicht aus, es muß der des 
sittlich Rechten hinzugenommen werden. 
 Thereby the difference between 
morally valuable and morally right [is] 
clarified. So in ethics, one cannot get by 
with just the concept of the morally 
valuable; {the concept of} moral 
rightness must be added to it. 
 Anknüpfend an Lipps’ 
»Grundfragen«: Die Verbindung dieser 
beiden ethischen Grundbegriffe bei 
Lipps. Eine Handlung ist sittlich richtig, 
wenn sie aus wertvoller Gesinnung 
entspringt.10 Dieses [ist] doppeldeutig: 
1. Nicht an sich kommt dem Sachverhalte 
Richtigkeit zu, sondern nur in Hinblick 
auf den wertvollen notwendigen 
Ursprung. 
 Continuing from Lipps’ ‘Basic 
Questions’11: The combining of this 
pair of ethical concepts {the valuable 
and the right} by Lipps. An action is 
morally correct if it arises from a 
valuable disposition. This [is] 
ambiguous: 
1. Correctness does not pertain to the 
state of affairs in itself, but only in view 
of its valuable necessary origin. 
2. Nur der Sachverhalt ist sittlich recht, 
den ein sittlich vollkommener Mensch 
mit Notwendigkeit will. Aber in der 
sittlichen Vollkommenheit liegt schon der 
rechte Sachverhalt vorausgesetzt. Daher 
sagt dieser Satz nichts Neues. Sittliche 
Vollkommenheit wird hier gefaßt als 
Inbegriff aller möglichen sittlichen 
Werte. Wenn ein Sachverhalt richtig ist, 
so ist das {337} Wollen, was auf seine 
Richtigkeit gerichet ist, wertvoll. Dem 
auf eine Handlung um ihrer Richtigkeit 
[willen] gerichteten Wollen sprechen wir 
Wert zu. Um der sittlichen Rechtheit des 
2. Only that state of affairs is morally 
right which a perfectly moral human 
being necessarily wants. But in moral 
perfection, the right state of affairs is 
already presupposed. Therefore, this 
statement says nothing new. Moral 
perfection is here grasped as the 
quintessence of all possible moral values. 
If a state of affairs is correct, then the 
{337} willing that is directed toward that 
correctness is valuable. We ascribe value 
to the willing of an action which brings 
about something that is [willed] because 
of its correctness. One calls the willing 
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gewollten Sachverhaltes willen nennt 
man das Wollen sittlich wertvoll. Unwert 
ist eine Handlung oder Gesinnung, 
welche auf Handlungen um ihrer 
Unrichtigkeit willen gerichtet ist. »Wenn 
ein Sachverhalt recht12 ist, so muß ihn ein 
sittlich vollkommener Mensch mit 
Notwendigkeit13 wollen«, weil er sonst 
nicht sittlich vollkommen wäre.14 
morally valuable because of the moral 
rightness of the willed state of affairs. 
That action or disposition is disvaluable 
which is oriented toward an action 
because of its incorrectness. ‘If a state of 
affairs is right, a perfectly morally human 
being must necessarily want it,’ because 
if he did not he would not be perfectly 
moral. 
 Zusammenhang zwischen sittlich 
recht und sittlich wertvoll: Es gibt 
vermittelnde Sätze zwischen Wert und 
Rechtheit. Vom Gegenstand [werden 
diese Prädikate] auf den Sachverhalt, von 
dem Sachverhalt auf einen Gegenstand 
übertragen. »[Der] Wert eines 
Gegenstandes >bedeutet< das Recht 
seiner Existenz«: Das ist nur 
uneigentlich, aber es bedeutet nicht das 
eine das andere. Wohl aber: »Mit dem 
Wert eines Gegenstandes ist notwendig 
verknüpft die Rechtheit seiner Existenz«, 
scheint sinnvoll. Wenn man sagt: »Es ist 
recht, daß dieser Gegenstand existiert, 
denn er is sittlich wertvoll«, und: »Weil 
der Gegenstand wertvoll ist, [ist seine 
Existenz recht«, so ist] darin ein 
Obersatz vorausgesetzt: »Es ist recht, daß 
jeder sittlich wertvolle Gegenstand 
existiert«. Ferner [gelten die Sätze: »Es 
ist recht, daß ein unsittlicher Gegenstand 
nicht existiert«;]»Es ist unrecht, daß ein 
unsittlicher Gegenstand existiert«; »Es ist 
 Connection between morally right 
and morally valuable: There are 
mediating statements between value and 
rightness. From the object [these 
predicates are] transferred to the state of 
affairs, from the state of affairs they are 
transferred to an object. ‘[The] value of 
an object “means” the rightness of its 
existence’: That is only inexact, but one 
does not mean the other. However, ‘with 
the value of an object the rightness of its 
existence is necessarily linked’ appears 
to make sense. If one says: ‘It is right that 
this object exists, because it is morally 
valuable’, and: ‘Because the object is 
valuable, [its existence is right’, so] an 
overarching statement [is] presupposed: 
‘It is right that every morally valuable 
object exists’. Further, [the statements 
apply: ‘It is right that an immoral object 
does not exist’;]‘it is wrong that an 
immoral object exists’; ‘it is wrong that a 
moral object, which is valuable, does not 
exist’. So four statements. 
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unrecht, daß ein sittlicher Gegenstand, 
der wertvoll ist, nicht existiert«. Also vier 
Sätze. 
 Dafür [sagt man auch]: Ein 
unwerter Gegenstand »soll« nicht 
existieren, ein werter »soll« existieren. 
Rechtheit ist [aber] nicht Sollen. Zwar 
[sind beide] äquivalent, aber wie? Hier 
[sei] vom Sollen abgesehen. 
 Therefore [one also says]: A 
disvaluable object ‘should’ not exist, a 
valued one ‘should’ exist. Rightness, 
[though,] is not ought-to-be. It is true 
that [the two are] equivalent, but how? 
Here, the ought will be left aside. 
 Die vier Sätze [sind] noch nicht 
ohne weiteres evident. Vorfragen: Was 
heißt sittlich wertvoll, was heißt das 
»zukommen«, das »sittlich wertvoll«? 
Ebenso [das] »sittlich recht«? Damit 
[würde] auch aufgeklärt, warum sittlich 
wertvoll und sittlich recht so oft 
verwechselt werden. In gewisser Weise 
setzt die Frage nach dem sittlichen 
Rechtheit der Existenz eines 
Gegenstandes die Frage nach dem 
sittlichen Wert voraus. Aber die Sätze 
führen nicht auf die Frage nach dem 
Wertvollen zurück. 
 The four statements [are] still not 
readily evident. Preliminary questions: 
what does morally valuable mean, what 
do the ‘correspondence’, the ‘morally 
valuable’ mean? Likewise [the] ‘morally 
right’? This would also clarify why 
morally valuable and morally right are so 
often confused. In a certain sense the 
question of the moral rightness of the 
existence of an object presupposes the 
question of its moral value. But the 
statements do not lead back to the 
question of the valuable. 
                                               
1 Daubert’s version. In Pfänder’s text, the words ‘… Gegenstände mögen verschieden 
sein {… } aber alle sind sittlich wertvoll’ are replaced with ‘Verschiedenheit der 
Bestimmung der Gegenstande, die sittlich wertvoll sind’. 
2 In Daubert’s text, simply ‘Genügt dies… ’ 
3 In Daubert’s text this is followed by the words ‘auch mit der… ’ 
4 Editors’ version. In Pfänder’s text, ‘Z.B. juristische… ’ 
5 Here, ‘Verpflichtung’. Reinach later made a distinction between ‘Verpflichtung’ 
(moral obligation) and ‘Verbindlichkeit’ (legal obligation) in Grundlagen. 
6 In Daubert’s text, simply ‘Richtig sind Sachverhalte’. 
7 ‘Tatkraft’ is very difficult to translate in this context. It refers literally to vitality, 
energy or drive. Determination or zeal might also be indicated here.  
8 Reinach distinguishes ‘recht’ (right) and ‘richtig’ (correct) in the next paragraph. 
There may have been some confusion of the terms by Daubert and Pfänder. 
9 Daubert’s version. In Pfänder’s text, ‘sittlich richtig’. 
1010 In Daubert’s text, ‘fließt’. 
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11 Referring to Lipps, Die ethischen Grundfragen. Zehn Vorträge. 
12 Pfänder’s version. In Daubert’s text, ‘richtig’. 
13 Daubert’s version. In Pfänder’s text, ‘mit notwendigkeit’ is simply ‘notwendig’. 
14 Pfänder notes here: ‘Ist nun das “Wollen” oder der “Wille” oder die 
“Persönlichkeit” sittlich wertvoll? Das im zweiten Vortrag.’ (‘Is it the “volition” or 
the “will” or the “personality” that is morally valuable? This in the second lecture.’) 
No such follow-up lecture has survived, but Reinach answers this question in later 
works; he concludes that the personality is the only one of these three that is a bearer 
of moral values. 
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First published in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, vols. 148 
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Drs. H. Siebeck, J. Volkelt and R. Falckenberg (Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius 
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Republished in Gesammlte Schriften, pp. 121-165, and in Sämtliche Werke, pp. 279-
311. 
 
DIE ÜBERLEGUNG:  
IHRE ETHISCHE UND 
RECHTLICHE BEDEUTUNG 
REFLECTION:  
ITS ETHICAL AND  
LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE 
{279}Als eine eigenartige innere 
Haltung des Subjektes, die einen 
scharfen Einschnitt macht in den 
kontinuierlichen Abfluß unserer 
Erlebnisse, beansprucht die 
Überlegung eine genauere Analyse. 
Durch die Rolle, welche sie innerhalb 
der ethischen und rechtlichen 
Bewertung spielt, macht sie eine solche 
Analyse besonders dringlich. 
Merkwürdige Antinomien scheinen 
hier zu bestehen. Die verdienstvolle 
Handlung gilt als minder verdienstlich, 
wenn sie »ohne jede Überlegung« 
geschehen ist. 
{279}As a distinctive inner attitude of 
the subject that makes a sharp incision 
into the continuous flow of our 
experiences, reflection deserves a more 
precise analysis. Such an analysis is 
made especially important by the role 
which it plays in ethical and legal 
assessments. Peculiar antinomies seem 
to obtain here. The praiseworthy action 
is considered less praiseworthy if it 
occurs ‘without any reflection’. 
Sie gilt aber auch dann als minder But then it is also considered less 
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verdienstlich, wenn umgekehrt das 
handelnde Subjekt sie »erst auf Grund 
einer langen Überlegung« vollzog. Wir 
machen es einem Menschen zum 
Vorwurf, wenn er eine wichtige 
Handlung begeht, ohne »sich die Sache 
auch nur einen Augenblick lang zu 
überlegen«. Wir beurteilen aber 
umgekehrt eine verwerfliche Handlung 
um vieles härter, wenn sie »mit 
Überlegung« geschah. In schroffster 
Weise kommt dieser letzte 
Gesichtspunkt in unserem 
Strafgesetzbuch zur Geltung. Die 
Tötung eines Menschen, die ohne 
Überlegung geschieht, wird mit 
Zuchthaus nicht unter fünf Jahren, 
beim Vorliegen mildernder Umstände 
mit Gefängnis nicht unter sechs 
Monaten bestraft (StGB §§ 212, 213). 
Die Tötung eines Menschen, die mit 
Überlegung ausgeführt ist, wird unter 
allen Umständen mit dem Tode bestraft 
(StGB § 211). Sechs Monate Gefängnis 
und der Tod: ein ungeheurer 
Unterschied, für den die Überlegung 
allein ausschlaggebend ist, dieselbe 
Überlegung, die wir an sich doch 
schätzen und von den Menschen 
verlangen. Alle diese 
entgegengesetzten Beurteilungen 
werden von uns im täglichen Leben 
mit großer Sicherheit vollzogen, aber 
praiseworthy if, conversely, the acting 
subject undertook it ‘only after1 a long 
period of reflection’. We reproach a 
human being if he or she performs an 
important action without ‘reflecting for 
even a moment on the matter’. But 
conversely, we assess a reprehensible 
action much more harshly if it 
happened ‘with reflection’. This last 
viewpoint is illustrated in a pronounced 
sense in our Criminal Code. The killing 
of a human being which occurred 
without reflection is punished with 
imprisonment for not less than five 
years; with the presentation of 
mitigating circumstances, for not less 
than six months (Criminal Code 
articles 212, 213). The killing of a 
human being which is carried out with 
reflection is punished under all 
circumstances with death (Criminal 
Code article 211). Six months’ 
imprisonment versus death: a 
tremendous difference, for which 
reflection alone is responsible, the 
same reflection which we yet esteem 
and expect from people.2 All of these 
juxtaposed assessments are made by us 
in everyday life with great certainty, 
but never understood in full clarity. 
The contradictions pointed out here are 
generally explained as merely 
apparent. But one does not thereby 
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keineswegs in voller Klarheit 
verstanden. Die aufgezeigten 
Widersprüche wird jeder für nur 
scheinbare erklären. Aber eine 
wirkliche Einsicht in die hier 
obwaltenden Verhältnisse besitzt man 
damit nicht. Hierzu bedarf es in erster 
Linie einer phänomenologischen 
Analyse des Momentes, von dem wir 
so oft reden, dessen Vorhandensein in 
uns wir mit so großer Sicherheit 
feststellen, und das wir doch so wenig 
kennen: der Überlegung. 
possess an actual insight into the 
relationships that prevail here. For this 
is primarily required a 
phenomenological analysis of the 
factor of which we so often speak, 
whose presence in ourselves we 
diagnose with such great certainty, and 
which we yet know so badly: 
reflection. 
 Phänomenologisch soll die 
Analyse sein. Das bedeutet hier, daß 
wir nicht geläufige Begriffe 
heranschleppen dürfen, Vorstellung, 
Denken, Fühlen, Wollen usf., um 
daraus die Überlegung »aufzubauen«, 
wobei mit absoluter Sicherheit das ihr 
Wesentliche verloren gehen würde, daß 
wir vielmehr uns bemühen {280} 
müssen, in das Phänomen selbst uns 
hineinzuversetzen, um getreu das 
wiederzugeben, was wir da lebendig zu 
schauen vermögen. Nur soweit soll 
diese Analyse hier geführt werden, als 
es notwendig ist, um die ethische und 
strafrechtliche Bedeutung der 
Überlegung aufzuklären. 
 The analysis shall be 
phenomenological. That means, here, 
that we may not haul along customary 
concepts like presentation, thinking, 
feeling, willing and suchlike, out of 
which to ‘build up’ reflection, whereby 
with absolute certainty that which is 
essential to it would be lost. We must 
rather make a great effort {280} to get 
inside the phenomenon itself, in order 
to faithfully reproduce what we are 
able to see there ‘live’. We shall pursue 
this analysis here only so far as is 
necessary in order to clarify the 
meaning of reflection for ethics and the 
criminal law. 
 
 
 
I. I. 
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Wir suchen die Überlegung zuerst in 
der intellektuellen Sphäre auf. 
Versetzen wir uns in einen 
kontinuierlichen, rasch abfließenden 
Denkverlauf hinein, denken wir etwa 
an den Vortragenden, der sein fertiges 
Wissen, Satz auf Satz, Gedanken auf 
Gedanken seinen Hörern darlegt. Hier 
können wir das reinste Beispiel des 
überlegungsfreien Denkens finden. 
Lassen wir nun aber plötzlich eine 
Überlegung eintreten, so wird das in 
jedem Falle eine Stockung bedeuten. 
Folgten sich vorher Behauptung auf 
Behauptung, intellektuelle 
Stellungnahme auf intellektuelle 
Stellungnahme, so ist dieser Fluß jetzt 
durchbrochen: die nächste 
Stellungnahme ist aufgehoben. Aber es 
handelt sich um eine Stockung ganz 
eigener Art. Auch ein plötzlicher Lärm 
mag eine Stockung verursachen. Aber 
der Lärm reißt den Denkenden aus dem 
Denkverlauf heraus, die Überlegung 
zieht ihn besonders tief hinein. Sie hält 
die Stellungnahme auf, aber sie bereitet 
sie gleichzeitig vor. 
We shall first investigate reflection in 
the intellectual sphere. Let us imagine 
a continuous, fast-flowing process of 
thought; {let us imagine} a lecturer, 
perhaps, who lays out his completed 
knowledge before his listeners, 
statement by statement, thought by 
thought. Here we may find the purest 
example of reflection-free thought. But 
should we now suddenly allow a 
reflection to enter in, that would 
certainly constitute a halting. Where 
previously, assertion followed on from 
assertion, forming of intellectual 
position followed on from a previous 
position, this flow is now broken: the 
next position-taking is suspended. But 
this halting is of a quite distinctive 
kind. A sudden noise may also cause a 
halt. But the noise tears the thinker 
away from the process of thought; 
reflection pulls him especially deep 
within it. It postpones the taking of the 
position, but at the same time it 
prepares it. 
 Die Überlegung ist ein 
teleologischer Prozeß. Das heißt, daß 
ihre Stadien sich nicht selbst genügen, 
in der Weise wie etwa in einem 
Panorama Bild auf Bild an uns 
vorüberzieht. Eher werden wir an eine 
 Reflection is a teleological 
process. That means that its stages are 
not self-sufficient, in the sense that in a 
panorama, for example, picture after 
picture passes before us. We would 
sooner think of a melody, in which 
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Melodie denken, bei der jeder Ton das 
Ganze vorbereitet. Aber auch hier ist 
die Analogie ungenau. Sowenig der 
einzelne Ton Selbstzweck ist, so erhält 
er doch im Ganzen der Melodie seine 
Stelle und Mitwirkung. Das erste 
Stadium einer Überlegung aber ist in 
keinem Ganzen aufgehoben. Seine 
einzige Funktion ist es, das letzte 
Stadium zu ermöglichen. Dieses letzte 
Stadium aber, auf welches die 
Überlegung hinzielt, ist allemal eine 
Stellungnahme des Subjektes. Auch 
innerhalb der intellektuellen Sphäre, 
auf die wir uns jetzt beschränken, kann 
diese Stellungnahme mannigfach 
abgestuft sein. Es gibt in erster Linie 
die auf einsichtiger Erkenntnis 
beruhende Überzeugung: sie gibt der 
Überlegung die eigentliche Erfüllung. 
Daneben können aber auch in 
unvollkommenerer Weise —  als 
Ersatzerfüllungen gleichsam —  
auftreten die Vermutung, die kritische 
Indifferenz, der Zweifel. Innerhalb des 
Zweifels und der Vermutung sind noch 
beliebig viele Abstufungen möglich. 
Aber stets sind es notwendig 
Stellungnahmen, auf welche die 
Überlegung abzielt. Endet sie mit dem 
Mangel oder mit der Enthaltung von 
jeglicher Stellungnahme, mit einem 
absoluten »ich weiß nicht«, dann hat 
every tone prepares the whole. But 
here too, the analogy is not exact. As 
little as the individual tone is an end in 
itself, it nevertheless holds its place in 
and contribution to the whole of the 
melody. The first stage in a reflection, 
however, is contained in no whole. Its 
sole function is to make possible the 
last stage. This last stage, however, 
towards which the reflection is aimed, 
is always a position-taking by the 
subject. Even within the intellectual 
sphere, to which we currently limit 
ourselves, this position-taking can be 
be many-layered. There is in the first 
place the conviction brought about by 
insightful cognition: this gives the 
reflection its genuine fulfilment. 
Besides that, though, suspicion, critical 
indifference and doubt can also, in an 
imperfect way, enter in —  as substitute 
fulfilments, so to speak. Within doubt 
and suspicion, any number of 
gradations are still possible. But it is 
always necessarily position-takings 
towards which reflection aims. Should 
it {reflection} end with the lack of or 
with the abstention from taking any 
position, with an absolute ‘I don’t 
know,’ then it has failed in its 
immanent purpose; then the process 
has failed. 
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sie ihr immanentes Ziel verfehlt, dann 
ist der Prozeß gescheitert. 
 Jede intellektuelle 
Stellungnahme ist notwendig 
Stellungnahme zu etwas. Sie bezieht 
sich, spezieller gesprochen, notwendig 
auf einen Sachverhalt. Auch der 
Überlegung ist die lntentionalität 
wesentlich. Es kann keine Überlegung 
geben, die nicht Überlegung über etwas 
wäre, die nicht ihr »Thema« hätte. Das 
Thema der Überlegung muß natürlich 
in naher Beziehung stehen zu dem 
intentio- {281} nalen Korrelat der 
Stellungnahme, auf welche sie abzielt. 
Im einfachsten Falle sind beide 
identisch. In anderen Fällen sind 
mehrere einander widerstreitende 
Sachverhalte Thema der Überlegung. 
Dann kann sich eine positive 
Stellungnahme nur auf einen dieser 
Sachverhalte beziehen; sie wird aber 
zugleich eine entsprechende negative 
Stellungnahme zu dem 
widerstreitenden Sachverhalte in sich 
schließen. Auch der Fall kommt häufig 
vor, daß das Thema der Überlegung 
zunächst noch mehr oder minder 
unbestimmt ist und erst allmählich 
diejenige Spezialisierung erfährt, auf 
die sich die endgültige Stellungnahme 
bezieht. Eine Differenzierung der 
einzelnen Fälle ist hier in weitem 
Umfange möglich. Wir halten uns an 
 Every intellectual position-
taking is necessarily a taking of a 
position towards something. It directs 
itself, more specifically, necessarily 
towards a state of affairs. Also to 
reflection is intentionality essential. 
There can exist no reflection which is 
not reflection concerning something, 
which does not have its ‘theme’. The 
theme of the reflection must naturally 
stand in a close relationship to the 
intentional {281} correlate of the 
position-taking towards which it aims. 
In the simplest cases, both are 
identical. In other cases, several 
opposing states of affairs are the theme 
of the reflection. Then a positive 
position-taking can only direct itself 
towards one of these states of affairs; at 
the same time, though, a corresponding 
negative position-taking towards the 
opposing states of affairs is contained 
within it. The case also commonly 
comes about where the theme of the 
reflection is initially still more or less 
nonspecific and then, gradually, 
undergoes the specialisation towards 
which the final position-taking relates. 
A differentiation of the individual 
cases here is possible to a large extent. 
We shall concentrate on the first and 
simplest case. 
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Umfange möglich. Wir halten uns an 
den ersten und einfachsten Fall. 
simplest case. 
 Innerhalb der Überlegung 
können wir viele Stadien herausheben, 
und diese Stadien charakterisieren sich 
als ein bestimmtes inneres Verhalten 
des Ich. Durch sie alle hindurch aber 
zieht sich eine Identität, eine bestimmte 
»Einstellung« oder »Haltung« des Ich, 
die sie zu einer teleologischen Einheit 
gestaltet, und aus der alles überlegende 
Tun entfließt, jene Haltung, in die das 
Subjekt sich konzentriert, wenn es 
überlegen will, und die es ängstlich vor 
jeder Störung und Ablenkung zu 
schützen sucht. Ihre Eigentümlichkeit 
wird uns besonders klar bewußt, wenn 
wir bemerken, daß sie eingenommen 
wird oder eingenommen werden kann, 
bevor noch ein inneres Tun des Ich 
beginnt, daß sie dann dieses innere Tun 
begleitet und erst durch die endgültige 
Stellungnahme ihre Auflösung und 
Erfüllung findet. Wir werden diese 
Haltung des Subjekts am besten als 
Fragehaltung bezeichnen. Sie bedeutet 
etwas Letztes und nicht weiter 
Zurückführbares, etwas, dessen 
Definition nicht nur unmöglich ist, 
sondern auch zwecklos wäre. Es kann 
sich nur darum handeln, es dem 
näherzubringen, der sehen will und zu 
sehen versteht. 
 We can distinguish many 
different stages within reflection, and 
these stages can be characterised as a 
specific inner behaviour of the I. But 
throughout them all there is indicated 
an identity, a specific ‘attitude’3 of the 
I, which melds them into a teleological 
unity, and out of which all reflective 
activity flows, every attitude in which 
the subject concentrates himself when 
he wants to reflect, and which he 
anxiously seeks to protect from any 
interruption or distraction. We become 
especially clearly aware of {this 
attitude’s} peculiarity when we take 
note of the fact that it is taken up, or 
can be taken up, before an inner 
activity of the I has yet begun —  that it 
then accompanies this inner activity 
and only finds its solution and 
fulfilment through the final taking of a 
position. We designate this attitude of 
the subject best as a questioning 
attitude. It means something final 
which cannot be traced further back; 
something of which definition is not 
only impossible, but would also be 
pointless. It can only be a matter of 
bringing it closer to the one who wants 
to see and who understands how to see. 
291 
 Einer Sache gegenüber, die mir 
vorgetragen wird, oder die ich mir 
selbst vorlege, kann ich mich 
verschieden benehmen. Ich kann sie 
glauben, an ihr zweifeln, sie für 
möglich halten; ich kann auf jede 
Stellungnahme ausdrücklich 
verzichten, ich kann auch noch weniger 
tun als dies: ich kann mich ihr innerlich 
verschließen, sie einfach abweisen. Das 
alles sind wohlgeschiedene 
Verhaltungsweisen des Subjekts; die 
fragende ist noch nicht darunter. Viel 
näher liegt die Vermengung mit ihr, 
wenn wir an den Zustand der inneren 
Fassungslosigkeit einer Sache 
gegenüber denken. Dieser Zustand 
bedeutet nicht, daß ich an der Sache 
zweifle, denn ich nehme in ihm 
überhaupt keine kritische Stellung. Er 
bedeutet auch nicht, daß ich sie einfach 
abweise, mich ihr verschließe oder gar 
ausdrücklich auf eine Stellungnahme 
verzichte. Ich vollziehe überhaupt 
keinen Akt, sondern bin der Sache in 
absoluter Passivität preisgegeben. 
 If a fact is presented to me, or if 
I present one before myself, I can 
behave towards it in different ways. I 
can believe it, doubt it, take it as 
possible; I can expressly abstain from 
taking any position; I can also do still 
less than this: I can close myself to it 
inwardly, simply reject it. All of those 
are well-distinguished manners of 
behaviour of the subject; the 
questioning {one} is still not counted 
among them. Much closer to being 
mixed up with it is the condition of 
inner bewilderment concerning a fact. 
This condition does not mean that I 
doubt the fact, because I take no 
critical stance towards it at all. It also 
does not mean that I simply reject it, 
close myself off to it or equally 
expressly abstain from taking a 
position. I perform no act at all, but am 
exposed to the matter in absolute 
passivity. 
 Jede solche Fassungslosigkeit 
schließt eine Ungewißheit in sich über 
den betreffenden gedanklichen Inhalt. 
Man hüte sich davor, diese 
Ungewißheit zu verwechseln mit dem 
Zweifel oder einer anderen 
Stellungnahme. Ein Zweifel kann ja 
ebenso gewiß sein wie eine 
 Every such bewilderment 
contains in itself an uncertainty 
regarding the cognitive content which 
it concerns. One should guard oneself 
against confusing this uncertainty with 
doubt or another position-taking. A 
doubt can indeed be just as certain as a 
conviction and a conviction just as 
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ebenso gewiß sein wie eine 
Überzeugung und eine Überzeugung 
ebenso ungewiß wie ein Zweifel. Die 
Ungewißheit ist ein eigenartiges 
Moment, das {282} sowohl als Färbung 
von Stellungnahmen auftreten kann 
wie auch als selbständige, vor aller, 
auch vor der zweifelnden 
Stellungnahme liegende Einstellung 
des Subjektes. Auch sie ist nicht 
fragende Einstellung, aber sie kann zu 
ihr führen und muß zugrunde liegen, 
wo immer ein solches Fragen vorliegt. 
Dem Range nach steht die fragende 
Einstellung höher als die Ungewißheit 
und tiefer als jede Stellungnahme. Sie 
wurzelt in der Ungewißheit und hat die 
immanente Tendenz, zu einer 
Stellungnahme zu führen. Sieht man 
das klar, so ist es nicht mehr möglich, 
sie zu verwechseln mit der 
stellungnehmenden Vermutung oder 
dem stellungnehmenden Zweifel, in die 
sie evtl. einmündet, mit der 
Ungewißheit, aus der sie entspringt, 
oder mit der Fassungslosigkeit, die in 
ihr bereits überwunden ist. Sie bildet 
den genauen Gegensatz zu den Fällen, 
in denen sich das Subjekt dem Problem 
gegenüber verschließt; denn ihr ist die 
Tendenz wesentlich, zu einer 
»Einsicht« zu gelangen. In dieser 
Einsicht, welche als Überlegungs-
conviction and a conviction just as 
uncertain as a doubt. Uncertainty is a 
unique factor, which {282} can appear 
as a colouration of a position-taking 
just as well as independently, before 
everything, also before the attitude of 
the subject to the doubted position-
taking. This too is not a questioning 
attitude, but it can lead to such and 
must be the reason whenever such 
questioning exists. On a scale, the 
questioning attitude stands higher than 
uncertainty and lower than any 
position-taking. The questioning 
attitude is rooted in uncertainty and has 
the immanent tendency to lead to the 
taking of a position. If one sees this 
clearly, it is no longer possible to 
confuse the questioning attitude with 
the position of suspicion or doubt into 
which it may flow, with the uncertainty 
from which it originates, or with the 
bewilderment which is, in it, already 
overcome. It forms the exact opposite 
to the cases in which the subject closes 
himself off from the problem; because 
it has the essential tendency to reach 
for an ‘insight’. In this insight (which 
as the destination-point of reflection 
possesses a distinctive descriptive 
character), and in the conviction which 
is founded in it, it {the questioning 
attitude} finds its total fulfilment. 
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Zielpunkt einen eigenen deskriptiven 
Charakter trägt, und in der 
Überzeugung, die in ihr gründet, findet 
sie ihre totale Erfüllung. Auch 
Vermutungen, sogar Zweifel können 
ihr Antwort geben, ohne doch ganz das 
zu leisten, was sie verlangt. Wo aber 
überhaupt keine Stellungnahme sie 
abzuschließen vermag, da ist sie ins 
Dasein getreten, ohne ihr natürliches 
Ziel auch nur unvollkommen zu 
erreichen. Mag sie dann eintrocknen 
oder in einem eigenen Akte 
aufgehoben werden —  das ihr 
natürliche Ende hat sie nicht gefunden. 
Suspicions and even doubt can answer 
it {the questioning attitude} without, 
however, quite achieving what it 
demands. But where no position-taking 
at all is able to conclude it, then it has 
come into existence without reaching 
its natural goal even imperfectly. 
Whether it then dries up or is annulled 
in a special act, it has not found its 
natural end. 
 Es hat nicht großen Zweck, hier 
noch nach umschreibenden 
Ausdrücken zu suchen, wo wir mit 
dem Worte Frageeinstellung das 
Wesentliche am besten treffen. Es ist 
die Haltung des Subjektes einem 
Probleme gegenüber, die man in Worte 
etwa so zu übersetzen vermag: ist A 
wirklich b, oder: ist A b oder c usw. In 
dieser Haltung »öffnet« sich gleichsam 
das Subjekt: es ist in Bereitschaft, die 
Antwort zu hören, d. h. die Einsicht in 
die Sachlage zu empfangen. Je nach 
dem Umfang des Fragethemas dehnt 
sich diese Bereitschaft auf ein engeres 
oder weiteres Feld möglicher 
Antworten aus, um dann in einer 
einzigen Antwort ihre Erfüllung zu 
 There is no real point here in 
still seeking out descriptive 
expressions, when we capture the 
essential point best with the word 
‘questioning attitude’. It is the attitude 
of the subject towards a problem which 
one could perhaps translate into words 
as: is A really b, or: is A b or c, etc. In 
this attitude the subject at the same 
time ‘opens’ himself: he is ready to 
hear the answer, that is, to receive 
insight into the facts of the matter. 
Indeed, in accordance with the breadth 
of the theme of the question, this 
readiness stretches itself to cover a 
narrower or wider field of possible 
answers, in order then to find its 
fulfilment in a particular answer. 
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finden. 
 Wir haben von einer 
»Übersetzung« der Frageeinstellung in 
Worte gesprochen. Auch diese 
Formulierungen, falls sie sinnvoll 
vollzogen werden, werden als ein 
»Fragen« betrachtet. Man kann von 
Akten des Fragens reden, deren 
Umkleidung hier die Worte sind, 
ähnlich wie es Akte des Behauptens in 
Worten gibt. Aber man darf diese 
wortumkleideten Frageakte nicht 
verwechseln mit der Frageeinstellung, 
aus der sie entspringen, und der sie in 
bestimmtem Sinne Ausdruck verleihen. 
Zwei Punkte mögen genügen, um die 
Scheidung zu befestigen. Eine 
Frageeinstellung ist möglich, ohne eine 
ausdrückliche Frage nach sich zu 
ziehen. Und: das ausdrückliche Fragen 
ist ein Akt im echten Sinne, ein inneres 
Tun des Subjektes, aber keine innere 
Einstellung des Subjektes wie die 
Fragehaltung. Darum auch ist jene 
zeitlich punktuell, während diese einer 
beliebigen zeitlichen Dauer fähig ist. 
Die Fragehaltung ist das 
Grundphänomen: von ihr hätte eine 
Phänomenologie der Frage ihren 
Ausgang zu nehmen. 
 We have spoken of a 
‘translation’ of the questioning attitude 
into words. These formulations, too, 
should they be performed sensibly, 
would have to be regarded as a 
‘questioning’. One can speak of acts of 
questioning, whose clothing the words 
here are, similarly with how there exist 
acts of assertion in words.4 But one 
ought not to confuse these word-
clothed acts of questioning with the 
questioning attitude in which they 
originate, and to which in a specific 
sense they lend expression. Two points 
may suffice to reinforce this difference. 
A questioning attitude is possible 
without drawing with it any expressed 
question. And: the expressed 
questioning is an act in the genuine 
sense, an inner doing of the subject, but 
not an inner attitude of the subject like 
the questioning attitude. Furthermore, 
the former is temporally punctual, 
while the latter lends itself to any 
temporal duration. The questioning 
attitude is the founding phenomenon: 
from it, a phenomenology of the 
question would have to start. 
 {283}Fragehaltung ist nicht 
überlegendes Tun. Es braucht nicht 
einmal notwendig ein solches Tun aus 
ihr zu entspringen. Denken wir an den 
 {283}The questioning attitude 
is not a reflective activity. It is not even 
necessary for such an activity to 
originate from it. Let us think of the 
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ihr zu entspringen. Denken wir an den 
Zuhörer, vor den der Redner zunächst 
sein Problem hinstellt, um ihn in die 
Fragehaltung zu versetzen. Er ist nun 
innerlich »geöffnet«, der Einsicht 
gewärtig, die er empfangen wird. Von 
einem eignen Tun braucht hier keine 
Rede zu sein. Schritt für Schritt, so wie 
der Redner sie vorträgt, strömen ihm 
die Erkenntnisse zu. Keine von ihnen 
bietet sich ihm als Selbstzweck dar; 
alle sind sie für ihn nur Stadien zu der 
Endeinsicht in das aufgeworfene 
Problem. Es ist ein teleologischer 
Prozeß des Verstehens, der sich da 
vollzieht; das, was dem Ganzen die 
zielstrebige Einheit gibt, ist die 
Fragehaltung des Subjektes mit ihrer 
dauernden Bereitschaft, die endgültige 
Antwort zu hören. Ein solcher Vortrag 
gleicht einer Bergbesteigung, die uns 
zu einem Aussichtspunkte führen soll, 
und bei der ein jeder Schritt nur als 
Mittel zur Erreichung des Zieles gilt, 
im Gegensatz zu Spaziergängen, bei 
denen jades Stadium als solches schon 
genossen wird. Von einer Überlegung 
ist in unserem Falle noch nichts zu 
finden, solange kein eignes inneres Tun 
des Subjektes vorliegt. Freilich ist das 
nicht der ideale Zuhörer, der sich mit 
dem bloßen Zuströmen der Einsichten 
begnügt, und es ist, besonders vom 
originate from it. Let us think of the 
listener before whom the speaker 
initially sets out his problem in order to 
bring him into the questioning attitude. 
He is now inwardly ‘opened,’ awaiting 
the insight which he will receive. Of an 
activity pertaining to him {the 
listener}, we need not speak here. Step 
by step, as the speaker lays them out, 
recognition streams to him {the 
listener}. None of them offers itself to 
him as an end in itself; all are, for him, 
merely stages towards the final insight 
into the problem that was thrown up. It 
is a teleological process of 
understanding that takes place here; 
that which gives the whole its goal-
conscious unity is the questioning 
attitude of the subject with its 
persistent readiness to hear the 
concluding answer. Such a lecture 
resembles the climbing of a mountain, 
which should lead us to a viewing 
point and in which every step functions 
only as a means to reaching that goal, 
in contrast with strolling, in which 
every stage as such already is enjoyed. 
There is still nothing of a reflection to 
be found in our current case, as long as 
no actual inner doing of the subject is 
present. In fact, it is not the ideal 
listener who is satisfied with the plain 
streaming to him of the insights, and 
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didaktischen Standpunkte aus, auch 
nicht der beste Redner, der ein solches 
Verhalten begünstigt. Nicht nur die 
Fragehaltung soll der Hörer einnehmen 
und sich in ihr der Lösung 
entgegenöffnen; er soll auch mittun, 
»selbst überlegen«. Und hier nun 
stoßen wir zum ersten Male auf das 
überlegende Verhalten selbst. 
Abgeschieden von der Frageeinstellung 
und doch auf ihr beruhend und sich aus 
ihr entwickelnd. Sehen wir von den 
Komplikationen unseres Beispiels ab 
und suchen wir die Überlegung im 
einsamen Denken zu erfassen. 
equally it is not the best speaker, 
especially from a didactic standpoint, 
who encourages such a behaviour. The 
hearer should not only adopt the 
questioning attitude and open himself 
towards the solution; he should also 
collaborate, ‘reflect himself’. And here, 
now, we strike for the first time upon 
the reflective behaviour itself. Distinct 
from the questioning attitude and yet 
based on it and developing from it. Let 
us ignore the complications of our 
example and seek to grasp reflection in 
{the activity of} thinking on one’s 
own. 
 Wir betrachten den einfachsten 
Fall: Ein einzelner Satz, ein Axiom 
etwa, sei Thema der Überlegung. Es 
werde gehört und verstanden.5* 
Ungewißheit in bezug auf seinen Inhalt 
möge sich einstellen, eine fragende 
Einstellung mag daraus erwachsen und 
eben damit eine Tendenz des Subjektes 
auf vollgültige Einsicht. Wie kann 
diese Tendenz ihre Erfüllung finden, 
wenn das Subjekt ohne Einwirkung 
von außen in sich selbst eingeschlossen 
ist? Sicherlich nur durch ein 
überlegendes Verhalten des Subjekts. 
In diesem einfachsten Falle müssen wir 
finden, was wir suchen. Gerade durch 
seine Einfachheit ist dieser Fall 
besonders schwierig. Man kann sich 
 We look at the simplest case: an 
individual statement, perhaps an 
axiom, is the theme of the reflection. It 
is heard and understood.6* Uncertainty 
in relation to its content may present 
itself, a questioning attitude may grow 
from that and likewise a tendency of 
the subject towards a complete insight. 
How can this tendency of the subject 
find its fulfilment if the subject is 
locked into himself without input from 
outside? Certainly only through a 
reflective behaviour of the subject. In 
this simplest case we must find what 
we seek. {But}, precisely because of 
its simplicity, this case is especially 
difficult. One cannot here help oneself 
through any sort of ‘associations of 
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hier nicht helfen durch allerlei 
»Ideenassoziationen«, man kann nicht 
hinweisen auf ein Tun des Ich, das 
nach Gründen und Gesichtspunkten 
hinauslangt, all das wird 
gegenstandslos, wo es sich um eine 
unmittelbare Einsicht in ein gedanklich 
bereits Vorhandenes handelt. Der 
gedankliche Stoff wird durch die 
Überlegung in keiner Weise vermehrt. 
Wenn es aber so ist, so erhebt sich die 
Frage, was dann eine Überlegung hier 
überhaupt zuwege bringen kann. Man 
ist gezwungen, auf feinere Nuancen zu 
achten, die man sonst {284} allzuleicht 
übersieht, und die man doch nicht 
übersehen darf, da in ihnen schon ein 
überlegendes Verhalten des Subjektes 
in Erscheinung tritt. 
ideas,’ one cannot point to a doing of 
the I which reaches out beyond itself 
towards reasons and viewpoints; all of 
that becomes invalid if it depends on 
an immediate insight into something 
that already exists cognitively. The 
cognitive matter is in no sense 
increased by reflection. But if this is 
so, it raises the question of what 
reflection can achieve here at all. One 
is forced to pay attention to finer 
nuances, which one otherwise {284} all 
too easily overlooks, and yet which one 
ought not to overlook, as it is already 
in these that a reflective behaviour of 
the subject appears. 
 Man wird vor allen Dingen 
bemerken, daß nicht jedes beliebige 
»Dasein« eines Gedankens die Einsicht 
in seinen Inhalt gestattet. Beim 
Verstehen eines Satzes »empfange« ich 
zwar den Satzgedanken, aber ich lebe 
in ihm, der gedankliche Inhalt stellt 
sich mir nicht dar. Auch Ungewißheit 
oder Zweifel können sich bezüglich 
seiner einstellen, ohne daß das 
Gedachte mir dadurch präsent zu 
werden brauchte. Die Intentionalität 
dieser Erlebnisse, ihre notwendige 
Beziehung auf den gedanklichen 
 One notices first of all that not 
every ‘existence’ of a thought permits 
the insight into its content. With the 
understanding of a statement I indeed 
‘receive’ the thought of the statement; 
but I live in it, the cognitive content 
does not present itself to me. 
Uncertainty or doubt, too, can establish 
themselves regarding that {content}, 
without that which I think about 
thereby needing to become present for 
me. The intentionality of these 
experiences, their necessary relation to 
the thought content, will not be 
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Inhalt, wird niemand bestreiten. Aber 
durchaus irrig ist es, als Grundlage 
eines jeden intentionalen Erlebnisses 
stets eine »Vorstellung«, ein 
»Erscheinen« des intentionalen 
Inhaltes zu postulieren. Oder will man 
das wirklich in allen Fällen finden, in 
denen ein Zuhörer den komplizierten 
und rasch aufeinander folgenden 
Entwicklungen eines Redners 
verstehend und glaubend folgt? Auch 
in der Frageeinstellung braucht das 
Subjekt sein Verhältnis zu dem in 
Frage gestellten Inhalt nicht zu ändern; 
es hat den Gedanken, und es stellt das 
Gedachte in Frage, ohne daß es ihm in 
einer Vorstellung »gegenwärtig« zu 
sein, »vorzuschweben« brauchte. Die 
Überlegung dagegen treibt aus diesem 
Verhältnis heraus. Sie zielt ja ab auf 
eine Einsicht in den Gedankeninhalt; 
eine solche Einsicht ist aber nicht 
möglich, solange wir, glaubend oder 
nichtglaubend, in den zugeführten 
Gedanken leben. Sie setzt voraus, daß 
der Inhalt dem Subjekte mehr oder 
minder deutlich gegenwärtig ist, daß er 
ihm zur Gegebenheit kommt. In der Art 
und Weise freilich, wie diese 
Gegebenheit erzielt werden kann, 
bestehen mannigfache Unterschiede. 
disputed by anyone. But it is downright 
erroneous to always postulate a 
‘presentation,’ an ‘appearing’ of the 
intentional content as the basis of every 
intentional experience. Or does one 
really find this in all cases where a 
listener comprehendingly and 
believingly follows a speaker’s 
complicated and rapidly sequenced 
elaborations? In the questioning 
attitude, too, the subject does not need 
to alter his relationship to the content 
in question; he has the thoughts, and he 
puts that which is thought of in 
question, without it needing to be 
‘present’ for him in a presentation. 
Reflection, on the other hand, drives 
one out of this situation.7 It aims at an 
insight into the cognitive content; but 
such an insight is not possible as long 
as we, believingly or not, live in the 
led-to thoughts. It assumes that the 
content is more or less clearly present 
for the subject, that it comes to 
givenness for him. There are many 
different ways in which this givenness 
is aimed for, of course. 
 Es gibt Fälle, in denen schon 
während des Verstehens eines 
 There are cases in which even 
during the understanding of a 
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Satzgedankens der ausgesagte Inhalt 
uns vorschwebt. Es sagt jemand: 
draußen ist blauer Himmel und die 
Sonne scheint; und sofort steht das 
entsprechende Bild mir vor Augen, in 
ihm ist mir der als bestehend 
ausgesagte Sachverhalt gegenwärtig. 
Es wäre fehlerhaft, das eigentliche 
Satzverständnis in dies Bild oder in 
sein Erfassen verlegen zu wollen. Denn 
beides kann fehlen oder verschwinden, 
ohne doch das Satzverständnis 
aufzuheben, ja sogar ohne es 
notwendig zu tangieren. Nehmen wir 
an, es sei zunächst nichts anderes da als 
das unanschauliche und präsenzlose 
Satzverständnis, so ist es in Fällen von 
der Art des eben erwähnten sehr leicht, 
eine Präsenz des Ausgesagten zu 
erlangen. Es bedarf dazu keines 
phänomenologisch aufweisbaren Tuns; 
ein fast unmerklicher Impuls genügt, 
um den betreffenden Sachverhalt in der 
Stellung vor sich zu haben, welche die 
Überlegung erfordert. Freilich können 
wir die Überlegung selbst an diesem 
Beispiel nicht studieren. Sie hat hier 
keine Stelle, da auch die genaueste 
Vergegenwärtigung eines derartigen 
Sachverhaltes keine Einsicht in ihn zu 
gewähren vermag. Hier ist vielmehr 
erforderlich und hier genügt zugleich 
ein Blick in die Welt da draußen, um 
statement-thought, we have the 
expressed content in mind. Someone 
says: outside the sky is blue and the 
sun is shining, and with that the 
corresponding picture stands before my 
eyes; in this, the expressed state of 
affairs is present for me as obtaining. It 
would be erroneous to want to lay the 
actual understanding of the statement 
in this picture or its grasping. Because 
both can be absent or disappear without 
the understanding of the statement 
being lost, indeed, without necessarily 
affecting it. If we were to accept that 
there was initially nothing else there 
but the non-visual, non-presented 
understanding of the statement, then in 
the sort of cases just mentioned it will 
be very easy to achieve a presence of 
what is expressed. No 
phenomenologically demonstrable 
doing is needed for this; an almost 
unnoticeable impulse suffices to have 
the relevant state of affairs which 
reflection requires in the position 
before oneself. But we cannot study 
reflection itself with this example. It 
has no place here, as even the most 
precise presentiation of a state of 
affairs of that kind yields no insight 
into it. Here, a glance into the outside 
world is necessary and at the same time 
sufficient to convince us of the being 
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uns von dem Sein des betr. 
Sachverhaltes zu überzeugen. Ein 
Blick in die Welt da draußen ist aber 
nichts, was in die Einheit des 
Überlegungsprozesesses eingehen 
könnte. Niemals kann das überlegende 
Tun in einem solchen {285} Hinsehen 
auf ein Existierendes bestehen. Ein 
anderes Beispiel vermag uns hier 
weiterzuführen. 
of the regarded state of affairs. But a 
glance into the outside world is not 
something that can enter into the unity 
of the reflective process. The reflective 
doing can never consist in such {285} 
an outward looking at an existent. A 
different example can lead us further 
here. 
 Ich höre den Satz »Orange liegt 
zwischen Gelb und Rot«, und ich 
verstehe diesen Satz. Ich kann ihn 
verstehen, ohne daß der gemeinte 
Sachverhalt mir in irgendeiner Weise 
vorschwebt. Das Verständnis kann 
durchaus unanschaulich sein, und auch 
da, wo allerlei Bilder und Schemata 
auftauchen, darf dieses Fluktuieren 
nicht verwechselt werden mit dem 
anschaulichen Dastehen des 
Sachverhaltes. Aber auch hier genügt 
eine unmerkliche und unsagbare 
Einstellung des Subjektes, um dies 
letztere Ziel zu erreichen. Man sieht 
sofort, daß diese Einstellung notwendig 
erfolgen muß immer da, wo ich mich 
nicht mit dem leeren Satzverständnis 
begnüge, sondern das Ausgesagte in 
Überlegung ziehe. Vor mir schwebt 
nun etwa eine rote und eine gelbe 
Fläche und zwischen beiden eine 
orangegefärbte. In diesem Bilde erfasse 
ich den gemeinten Sachverhalt nicht 
 I hear the statement ‘orange lies 
between yellow and red,’ and I 
understand this statement. I can 
understand it without the meant state of 
affairs in any sense being held in my 
mind. The understanding can be 
thoroughly non-visual; and also, where 
all kinds of pictures and schemata 
emerge, these fluctuations should not 
be confused with the visual presence of 
the state of affairs. But here too an 
ordinary and inexpressible attitude of 
the subject suffices to reach this last 
goal. One sees immediately that this 
attitude must always necessarily follow 
where I do not content myself with the 
empty understanding of the statement, 
but draw what is expressed into 
reflection. Now perhaps something like 
a red and a yellow surface hover in my 
mind and between the two an orange-
coloured one. In this picture I do not 
directly grasp the meant state of affairs. 
The immediately corresponding state 
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ich den gemeinten Sachverhalt nicht 
direkt. Der unmittelbar zugehörige 
Sachverhalt würde ja den Ausdruck 
finden: diese orangegefärbte Fläche da 
liegt räumlich zwischen der gelb- und 
rotgefärbten. In unserem Beispiele aber 
handelt es sich um die reinen 
Farbenqualitäten schlechthin und um 
die eigenartigen Beziehungen, in denen 
solche Qualitäten in der Farbenskala 
zueinander stehen. Das Bild dient mir 
nur als Unterlage, auf Grund deren ich 
den ausgesagten Sachverhalt erfasse. In 
den einzelnen vorschwebenden 
Farbenflächen erfasse ich die 
Qualitäten, während mir die räumliche 
Ordnung zugleich jene ganz 
andersartige Qualitätenordnung 
repräsentiert. Zur Einsicht in den erst 
verstandenen Gedankeninhalt genügt 
also keineswegs jene Einstellung, 
durch die das Bild sich uns gibt. Der 
weitere Gang der Überlegung kann 
etwa so verlaufen, daß das Subjekt, 
unter Vernachlässigung der Form der 
Farbenflächen, ihrer Ausdehnung u. 
dgl., sich in die Qualitäten selbst 
hineinversetzt, und daß es zugleich die 
Qualität Orange in einem Akte 
synthetischer Apperzeption in 
Beziehung setzt zu den Qualitäten Gelb 
und Rot. Nun erst, wenn es das tut, 
leuchtet es ihm auf: Orange liegt in der 
The immediately corresponding state 
of affairs would indeed find 
expression: this orange-coloured 
surface lies there in the space between 
the yellow- and red- coloured ones. In 
our example, though, what is important 
are the pure colour-qualities in 
themselves and the unique relations in 
which such qualities stand to one 
another in the scale of colours. The 
picture offers me only an underlay on 
the basis of which I grasp the 
expressed state of affairs. In the 
particular represented coloured 
surfaces I grasp the qualities, while the 
spatial ordering simultaneously 
represent an entirely different sort of 
scale of qualities. So, for the insight 
into the understood cognitive content, 
the attitude through which the picture 
gives itself to us does not suffice at all. 
The following course of the reflection 
can perhaps run in such a way that the 
subject, disregarding the form of the 
coloured surfaces, their extension and 
suchlike, concentrates on the qualities 
themselves, and at the same time 
places the quality orange in relation to 
the qualities yellow and red in an act of 
synthetic apperception. At last, if he 
does this, the penny drops: orange lies 
in fact between red and yellow; now 
awakes simultaneously within him the 
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Tat zwischen Rot und Gelb, nun erst 
erwächst ihm zugleich die 
Überzeugung von diesem Sachverhalt. 
conviction of this state of affairs. 
Die Überlegung hat damit ihr Ziel 
gefunden. So kurz dieser Prozeß auch 
ist, es ist doch ein Prozeß, der ein ganz 
bestimmtes Verhalten des Subjektes in 
sich schließt. Wir haben die 
Einstellung, die Bilder erscheinen läßt, 
wir haben das Erfassen der 
Farbenqualitäten als solcher, das sicher 
mehr ist als ein bloßes Hinstarren auf 
die Farben, das vielmehr ein 
Herausheben und Heranziehen der 
Qualitäten und ein Sichversenken in sie 
bedeutet. Und wir haben schließlich 
den zusammenfassenden Akt, welcher 
die Qualitäten in bestimmter Hinsicht 
zueinander in Beziehung setzt, 
wodurch erst das zunächst gedanklich 
bloß Gemeinte wirklich einleuchtet 
und einsichtig wird. Die Fragehaltung 
des Subjektes hat dies ganze Verhalten 
durchzogen und ihm zur Grundlage 
gedient. Leuchtet der Sachverhalt ein, 
so ist die ihr immanente Tendenz 
erfüllt, die Antwort ist erfolgt. Damit 
geht die Fragehaltung über in die aus 
der Erkenntnis entspringende 
Überzeugung des Subjektes. 
The reflection has thereby found its 
goal. As short as this process is, it is 
still a process, which contains in it a 
very specific behaviour of the subject. 
We have the attitude that allows the 
pictures to appear; we have the 
grasping of the colour-qualities as 
such, which is certainly more than a 
plain staring at the colours; which 
rather means an underlining and 
drawing out of the qualities, an 
immersion in them. And finally we 
have the together-grasping act which 
places the qualities in relation to each 
other in a specific sense, whereby that 
which was originally merely 
cognitively meant becomes understood 
and the object of insight. The 
questioning attitude of the subject has 
permeated this entire behaviour and 
served as a foundation for it. If the 
state of affairs is understood, then its 
immanent tendency is fulfilled; the 
answer is reached. Thereby the 
questioning attitude transfers into the 
conviction of the subject originating 
from the recognition. 
 {286}In der Änderung der 
Stellung zum Gedanken, speziell in der 
Vergegenwärtigung des gedanklichen 
Inhaltes, erschöpft sich also hier das 
 {286}The reflective doing of 
the I thus exhausts itself in the 
changing of attitude to the thought, 
especially in the presentiation of the 
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Inhaltes, erschöpft sich also hier das 
überlegende Tun des Ich. Keine Rede 
von einem Hinausgreifen nach 
Hinsichten und Gründen, keine 
Herbeischaffung von neuem Material, 
nichts als die Umbiegung vom bloßen 
Verständnis zum Sehen und Einsehen. 
especially in the presentiation of the 
cognitive content. No talk of a 
reaching beyond for intentions and 
reasons, no bringing in of new 
material, nothing but the turning from 
mere understanding to seeing and 
insight. 
 Daß die Vergegenwärtigung des 
Inhaltes verschiedenerlei Stadien in 
sich schließt, haben wir gesehen. 
Immerhin hat es sich in unserem 
Beispiele noch um einen ziemlich 
primitiven Fall gehandelt. Man stelle 
einen anderen Satz daneben: Jede 
Veränderung setzt ein vorausgehendes 
Geschehen voraus, mit dem sie 
notwendig verknüpft ist. Man überlege 
sich diesen Satz, d. h. man versuche, 
sich von seinem bloßen Verständnis zu 
einer Vergegenwärtigung und evtl. 
Einsicht in seinen Inhalt 
durchzuringen, und man wird sehen, 
welche mannigfachen und schwierigen 
Aufgaben hierbei erwachsen.8* Wie 
schwer ist es zunächst schon, das, was 
Veränderung besagt, adäquat zu 
erfassen. Wir gehen darauf nicht weiter 
ein. Schließlich genügt ja die einfache 
Reflexion auf das, was wir soeben tun, 
um unsere These recht eindringlich zu 
machen. Wir überlegen vom Beginne 
dieser Ausführungen an, was wohl 
Überlegung ist. Verstanden wurde 
 We have seen that the 
presentiation of the content runs 
through different stages. So far our 
examples have still always been based 
on a fairly primitive case. Let us add 
another statement to that: every change 
assumes a previous occurence with 
which it is necessarily tied. Let us 
reflect on this statement, that is, let us 
try to go from one’s simple 
understanding to a presentiation and 
perhaps an insight into its content, and 
we will come to see just how many and 
difficult tasks grow out of this.9* How 
difficult it is right away to grasp 
adequately what change means. We 
will not go further into this. In the end, 
the simple reflection10 on that which 
we are doing suffices to make our 
thesis convincing. We reflect, from the 
beginning of this undertaking, on what 
reflection is. The expression was 
immediately understood. Here too the 
task of reflection consists in providing 
the subject with a new attitude towards 
the thought-of content: reflectively we 
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dieser Ausdruck sofort. Auch hier 
besteht die Aufgabe der Überlegung 
darin, dem Subjekte zu dem gedachten 
Inhalte eine neue Stellung zu 
verschaffen: Überlegend 
vergegenwärtigen wir uns das 
überlegende Verhalten selbst. Es wird 
hier deutlich, wie verschieden sich im 
einzelnen die Vergegenwärtigung 
gestalten kann. Etwas ganz anderes ist 
das Erfassen des Wesens an sinnlich 
anschaulichen Bildern als das 
Sichhineinleben in Haltungen und 
Einstellungen und Akte des Subjektes. 
Wir können das nicht im einzelnen 
verfolgen. Wir stellen als ersten Typus 
der Überlegung das Verhalten des in 
Fragehaltung befindlichen Subjektes 
fest, welches vom bloßen Verständnis 
oder Aufblitzen eines Gedankens durch 
Vergegenwärtigung des Inhaltes zur 
Einsicht und Überzeugung führt. 
make present to ourselves the reflective 
behaviour itself. Here it becomes clear 
how differently the presentiation can 
manifest itself in individual instances. 
The grasping of the essence by means 
of sensorily visible pictures is 
something very different from the 
empathising of attitudes and acts of the 
subject. We cannot pursue this in 
detail. We place as the first type of 
reflection the inner behaviour of the 
subject who is in the questioning 
attitude, leading from sheer 
understanding or the sudden appearing 
of a thought, through presentiation of 
the content, to insight and conviction. 
 Daß die Winkelsumme im 
Dreieck = 2 Rechten ist, oder daß ein 
Freund mich besuchen wird, kann ich 
mir mit absoluter Klarheit vorstellig 
machen, ohne daß mir eine Einsicht 
oder Stellungnahme erwächst. Hier 
muß die Überlegung sich anderer 
Mittel bedienen. Hier erst kommen die 
Gesichtspunkte in Betracht, durch die 
man fälschlicherweise das Wesen der 
Überlegung schlechthin zu bestimmen 
sucht: Vermehrung des Materials, 
 That the sum of the angles in a 
triangle equals two right angles, or that 
my friend will come to visit me, I can 
present to myself with absolute clarity 
without an insight or position-taking 
developing for me. Here, reflection 
must work with different means. Here 
at last those viewpoints through which 
one falsely seeks to determine the 
nature of reflection as such become 
relevant: increase of material, 
associations of ideas, seeking for 
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sucht: Vermehrung des Materials, 
Ideenassoziationen, Suchen nach 
Gründen und Gegengründen. Durch 
das Erreichen eines bestimmten 
Endpunktes (der Stellungnahme) von 
einem bestimmten Anfangspunkte aus 
(der Fragehaltung), der zugleich der 
leitende und Einheit schaffende 
Gesichtspunkt ist, wird das Wesen der 
Überlegung als solcher charakterisiert. 
Die Art des Weges und der Mittel dazu 
vermag nur verschiedene Typen zu 
konstruieren. So ist es lediglich ein 
neuer Überlegungstypus, auf den wir 
nun hinweisen möchten. Mit den 
Haltungen und {287} Tätigkeiten des 
Subjekts, die sich hier entwickeln, 
befassen sich zahlreiche Arbeiten zur 
Psychologie des Denkens. Es sei uns 
gestattet, lediglich einige Hauptpunkte 
herauszuheben. 
associations of ideas, seeking for 
reasons for and against. The nature of 
reflection as such is characterised by 
the reaching of a definite endpoint (the 
taking of a position) from a definite 
starting-point (the questioning 
attitude), which is at the same time the 
leading and unifying viewpoint. The 
kind of way and means used permits 
the construal only of different types. So 
it is simply a new type of reflection to 
which we would now like to refer.11 
Numerous works of the psychology of 
thought occupy themselves with the 
attitudes and {287} activities of the 
subject which develop here. For us it is 
only appropriate to raise some key 
points. 
 Wenn ich mich frage, ob mein 
Freund wohl kommen wird, so werden 
keine anschaulichen Bilder mir den 
Sachverhalt repräsentieren; und wenn 
sie es doch tun, so stehen sie nicht im 
Dienst der Überlegung als solcher. Hier 
muß wirklich das gedankliche Material 
vermehrt werden, es bedarf der 
Gesichtspunkte und Gründe. Wie bei 
den anschaulichen Bildern bestehen 
auch hier verschiedene Möglichkeiten. 
Wie bei dem Verständnis von Sätzen 
 If I ask myself whether my 
friend will indeed come to visit, no 
visual pictures represent the state of 
affairs to me; and if in fact they do, 
they do not serve reflection as such. 
Here, the cognitive material really must 
be increased; there is a need for 
viewpoints and reasons. As with the 
visual pictures, there are different 
possibilities here. Just like how, with 
the understanding of statements, visual 
pictures can fall into place without 
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anschauliche Bilder sich ohne jedes 
Zutun des Subjektes einstellen können, 
so auch Gründe und Gegengründe. Ich 
erwäge das Kommen des Freundes, 
und es fällt mir ein, daß er es mir 
versprochen hat. Dieses »Ein-Fallen« 
bezeichnet aufs glücklichste die 
absolute Passivität des Subjektes. So 
braucht es nun natürlich nicht zu sein. 
Wie es eine Einstellung auf 
Anschauung gibt, so gibt es auch eine 
Einstellung auf Gründe. Ich verstehe 
den Satz, nehme wieder eine solche 
Richtung ein, die jeder kennt und die 
man nicht weiter bezeichnen kann, und 
nun strömen mir Gründe und 
Gegengründe zu, ohne ein weiteres 
Zutun von meiner Seite. Bedeutsamer 
erscheint ein dritter Fall. Auch hier läßt 
die Anschauung eine Anknüpfung zu. 
Es gibt Fälle, in denen Anschauung 
weder von selbst zufließt noch durch 
einfache Einstellung gewonnen werden 
kann. Ich versuche, einen Menschen im 
Bilde vorzustellen, den ich einmal 
flüchtig gesehen habe; es gelingt nicht 
sofort. Nun beginnt ein —  phänomenal 
aufweisbares —  Suchen nach dem 
Bilde. Es wird im allgemeinen kein 
Suchen ins Blaue hinein sein, sondern 
ein Suchen auf bestimmtem Wege. 
anything being done by the subject, so 
too can reasons for and against. I 
consider the coming of my friend, and 
it occurs to me that he has promised me 
that he will come. This ‘occuring-to’ 
indicates quite well the absolute 
passivity of the subject.12 But, of 
course, it does not need to be this way. 
As there is an attitude directed towards 
contemplation, so is there an attitude 
towards reasons. I understand the 
statement and once again take such a 
direction, which everyone knows and 
that one cannot define further, and now 
there stream to me substantiating and 
opposing reasons, without anything 
further needing to be done from my 
side. A third case appears still more 
significant. Here too, visualisation 
allows for a continuation. There are 
cases in which visualisation neither 
comes to me by itself, nor can be 
achieved through a simple attitude. I 
attempt to picture someone who I once 
fleetingly saw; I do not succeed right 
away. Now begins a —  phenomenally 
demonstrable —  search for the picture. 
It is, in general, not a blind search, but 
a search along a definite path. 
Vielleicht stelle ich mir den Ort 
anschaulich vor, an dem ich den 
Perhaps I visualise the place where I 
saw the individual, or some kind of 
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Menschen gesehen habe, oder 
irgendeine Einzelheit von ihm, die mir 
zurückgeblieben ist, und suche von da 
aus zu dem Gesamtbild zu gelangen. 
Ein solches Suchen erscheint uns in der 
Sphäre der Anschauung als 
ungewöhnlich; bei Gründen und 
Gegengründen dagegen ist es das 
übliche. Es ist ja bekannt genug: Wenn 
wir das Sein eines Sachverhaltes 
erwägen, so »suchen« wir nach 
Gründen, wir suchen nach Tatsachen, 
die sich für oder gegen das Sein des 
betreffenden Sachverhaltes geltend 
machen. Das Seltsame eines solchen 
Suchens wurde früh bemerkt. Was soll 
es eigentlich? Ist das Gesuchte nicht 
bekannt, so ist ein Suchen nicht 
möglich; ist es bekannt, dann ist ein 
Suchen überflüssig. Es steht mit 
diesem Einwand gegen die 
Möglichkeit eines Suchens wie mit 
denen gegen die Möglichkeit einer 
Bewegung. Sinnlos ist es, die 
Möglichkeit von etwas in Zweifel zu 
stellen, welches uns in seinem Sein 
(wenn auch nicht in einer realen 
Existenz) evident gegeben ist, so wie 
das Erlebnis des Suchens oder wie 
etwa das Überholtwerden eines sich 
bewegenden Gegenstandes durch einen 
zweiten. Problem kann es nur sein, das 
in solcher Weise unbezweifelbar 
unique feature of him which has stuck 
in my memory, and seek from there on 
out to achieve the complete picture. 
Such a search seems to us to be 
unusual in the sphere of contemplation; 
with reasons for and against, on the 
other hand, it is the norm. Indeed, it is 
well enough known: if we consider the 
being of a state of affairs, we ‘seek’ 
after reasons, we seek after facts, 
which count for or against the being of 
a certain state of affairs. The 
strangeness of such a search was noted 
early. What does it actually achieve? If 
that which is sought is not familiar, 
then a search is not possible; if it is 
familiar, then a search is superfluous. 
This objection against the possibility of 
a search is like that against the 
possibility of movement. It is senseless 
to cast into doubt the possibility of 
something which in its being (if not 
also in a real existence) is evidently 
given to us, like the experience of the 
search or like the being overtaken of 
one moving object by another. The 
problem can only be to understand that 
which is undoubtably given in such a 
way. In the cases of searching which 
challenge us here, these difficulties are 
not too great. Nothing concretely 
definite is sought —  as, for example, 
with the attempt to recall a name. 
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Gegebene zu verstehen. In den fällen 
des Suchens, die uns hier angehen, sind 
dabei die Schwierigkeiten nicht allzu 
groß. Nicht konkret Bestimmtes wird 
ja gesucht —  so wie etwa bei dem 
Sichbesinnen auf einen Namen. 
Das Suchen erstreckt sich vielmehr auf 
alles {288} schlechthin, was in 
Betracht kommen kann für das Sein 
des Sachverhaltes. Ob dasjenige, auf 
das wir in dem Suchen und durch das 
Suchen stoßen, zu dem Bereiche 
dessen gehört, wonach wir suchen, ob 
wir in ihm etwas gefunden haben, muß 
sich dadurch ausweisen, daß es beiträgt 
zur Begründung oder Widerlegung des 
Sachverhaltes. Auch dieses Suchen nun 
pflegt kein Hinaustasten ins Ungewisse 
zu sein. Wir verfahren auch hier nach 
bestimmten Hinsichten und 
Richtlinien. Wir können uns auf nähere 
Analysen nicht einlassen, nur das eine 
wollen wir abschließend bemerken: In 
Ideenassoziationen läßt sich auch 
dieser zweite Typus der Überlegung 
keinesfalls auflösen. Das »Spiel der 
Assoziationen« wird ja durch jedes 
aktive Eingreifen des Subjektes 
unterbrochen. Aber über diese 
Selbstverständlichkeit hinaus müssen 
wir betonen: In dem Maße als sich der 
Mensch den Assoziationen überläßt, 
nimmt die Überlegung bei ihm ab. Das 
absolut assoziationsgemäße »Denken« 
The search, rather, extends itself to 
everything {288} that might be relevant 
to the question of the being of the state 
of affairs. Whether that which we come 
upon in and through the search belongs 
to the domain of that which we are 
searching after; whether, with it, we 
have found something, must show 
itself from the fact that it helps to 
support or to contradict the state of 
affairs. This search does not need to be 
any kind of fumbling into the unknown 
either. Here too, we proceed according 
to definite intentions13 and guidelines. 
We cannot allow ourselves a closer 
analysis; we only want to note one 
thing in closing: this second type of 
reflection cannot either be resolved 
into associations of ideas in any way. 
The ‘play of associations’ indeed is 
interrupted by every active intervention 
of the subject. But apart from this self-
evident truth, we must say: inasmuch 
as the human being gives himself over 
to the associations, reflection 
diminishes. The absolutely association-
conformant ‘thinking’ is an absolutely 
reflection-less thinking.
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absolut assoziationsgemäße »Denken« 
ist ein absolut überlegungsloses 
Denken. 
reflection-less thinking. 
 Nehmen wir nun an, 
begründende Gedanken haben sich 
gefunden. Dann scheinen in der 
Hauptsache drei Möglichkeiten zu 
bestehen. Entweder das Subjekt nimmt 
sie ohne weiteres als feststehend an. 
Dann fungieren sie in der Überlegung 
als neugewonnene Stützpunkte. Oder 
das Subjekt ist ihnen gegenüber 
ungewiß. Dann wird sich die fragende 
Einstellung nunmehr auf sie 
mitbeziehen. Auch sie werden dann in 
Frage gezogen; freilich nicht ihrer 
selbst wegen, sondern um des 
Beitrages willen, den sie für das 
eigentlich in Frage stehende Thema zu 
leisten vermögen. Es ist das ein 
eigentümliches Verhältnis, für das wir 
eine Analogie finden innerhalb des 
Wollens bei dem Mittel, das auch nicht 
seiner selbst wegen gewollt ist, 
sondern um seines Beitrages willen zu 
dem eigentlich gewollten Zweck. Es 
kann nun sein, daß der mittelbar in 
Frage gestellte Sachverhalt in sich 
selbst einsichtig ist. Dann sind wir 
wieder bei unserem ersten 
Überlegungstypus angelangt. Oder 
aber wir werden auch hier auf Gründe 
zurückgewiesen, müssen auch hier 
 Let us now take it that 
substantiating thoughts have turned up. 
Then primarily, three possibilities seem 
to obtain. Either the subject takes them 
as secure without further ado. Then 
they function in the reflection as 
newly-won points of support.14 Or the 
subject is uncertain about them. Then 
the questioning attitude will include 
them. They too would then be called 
into question; not really for their own 
sakes, but because of the contribution 
that they might make possible to the 
theme that is really in question. This is 
a distinctive relationship, for which we 
find an analogy within willing in the 
form of the means, which too is not 
wanted for itself, but for the 
contribution it makes to the actually 
willed purpose. Now it may be that the 
state of affairs mediately placed into 
question is self-evident. Then we are 
back to our first type of reflection. Or 
alternatively we are again referred back 
to our reasons, must ‘search’ here as 
well, and so it can continue. Thus 
originate the extraordinarily 
complicated processes of reflection 
which we especially know within the 
sciences, and in which we are driven 
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»suchen«, und so kann es weitergehen. 
Es entstehen so jene außerordentlich 
komplizierten Überlegungsprozesse, 
die wir besonders innerhalb der 
Wissenschaften kennen, und in denen 
wir vom Thema aus immer weiter und 
weiter zu den Gründen und Gründen 
der Gründe zurückgetrieben werden. 
on from the theme further and further 
back to the reasons, and the reasons for 
the reasons. 
Auch dann noch wird das ganze Tun 
des Subjektes durchzogen von der 
einen dem Hauptthema geltenden 
Fragehaltung. Freilich kann diese 
inaktuell werden, so z. B. wenn 
mitüberlegte Nebenthemen die ganze 
Aufmerksamkeit auf sich 
konzentrieren; aber auch dann noch, 
auch als inaktuelle Fragehaltung wird 
sie den Gang der Überlegung 
regulieren, ganz ähnlich wie ein 
inaktuelles Wollen die Abfolge der 
realisierenden Handlungen. Es kann 
freilich auch vorkommen, daß die 
Fragehaltung absolut entschwindet und 
wirkungslos wird. Ein mittelbar 
überlegtes Nebenthema kann dann zum 
Hauptthema werden, das ursprüngliche 
Hauptthema ist entfallen. Sache der 
intellektuellen Disziplin ist es, das zu 
vermeiden. In anderen Fällen ist eine 
Fragehaltung zwar noch vorhanden, 
aber sie ist unbestimmt geworden, sie 
hat {289} ihren Zielpunkt, das Thema 
verloren. Das sind die Fälle, in denen 
Then too the entire activity of the 
subject is driven by the questioning 
attitude defined by the main theme. 
This {questioning attitude defined by 
the main theme} may of course 
become irrelevant, when for example 
subordinate themes reflected upon 
concentrate the entire attention on 
themselves; but then, too, it regulates 
the path of the reflection as an inactual 
questioning attitude, very similarly to 
how a non-actual willing regulates the 
sequence of realised actions. It can 
actually also come about that the 
questioning attitude completely 
vanishes and becomes ineffective. A 
mediately reflected-upon subordinate 
theme can then become the main 
theme; the original main theme has 
slipped away. It is a matter of 
intellectual discipline to {be able to} 
avoid this. In other cases, a questioning 
attitude is indeed still present, but it has 
become nonspecific, it has {289} lost 
its endpoint, its theme. Those are the 
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wir uns mitten im überlegenden 
Verhalten plötzlich fragen, was wir 
denn eigentlich wissen wollten. 
cases in which, in the middle of the 
reflective behaviour, we suddenly ask 
ourselves what it was we actually 
wanted to know. 
 Die auftauchenden und 
aufgefundenen Begründungsgedanken 
müssen sich als begründend bzw. 
widerlegend geltend machen, wenn sie 
sich innerhalb der Überlegung 
irgendwie als nützlich erweisen sollen. 
Auch das kann in verschiedener Weise 
geschehen. Ein Gedanke taucht auf und 
wird sofort geglaubt; nun kann uns auf 
Grund seiner der andere in Frage 
gestellte Sachverhalt einleuchten. Man 
darf dabei nicht von einem Schließen 
im phänomenalen Sinne reden. Nur 
eine logisierende Psychologie kann die 
sogenannten Schlüsse des täglichen 
Lebens als ein ausdrückliches 
Schließen und damit als ein bestimmtes 
Tun des Subjektes interpretieren. 
Zweifellos gibt es ein solches 
Schließen; es wird besonders häufig 
sein, wenn das Subjekt 
wissenschaftlich überlegt, und vor 
allen Dingen, wenn es wissenschaftlich 
formuliert. Indem hier das Subjekt 
einen auftauchenden und von ihm 
geglaubten Gedankeninhalt festhält, 
und indem es gleichzeitig einen 
zweiten, sonst zumeist unterschlagenen 
Inhalt in bestimmter Weise mit dem 
 The substantiating thoughts that 
have emerged or been discovered must 
present themselves as either supporting 
or contradicting if they are to prove 
themselves useful in any way within 
the reflection. That too can occur in 
different ways. A thought emerges and 
is just as quickly believed; now, 
because of it, the other questioned state 
of affairs can become clear to us. One 
ought not speak here of a concluding in 
the phenomenal sense. Only a 
logicising15 psychology can interpret 
the so-called conclusions of everyday 
life as expressed concludings and thus 
as a specific activity of the subject. 
There is of course such a concluding; it 
comes about especially often if the 
subject reflects scientifically, and 
above all if he formulates scientifically. 
In that the subject here holds onto an 
emerged (and for him, believed) 
cognitive insight, and in that he at the 
same time takes in a second, if 
otherwise mostly misappropriated, 
content in a certain way together with 
the first, now the states of affairs 
resulting from both appear to him in 
full clarity. It is noteworthy for us that 
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ersten ineinsnimmt, erschaut es 
nunmehr in voller Klarheit den aus 
beiden resultierenden Sachverhalt. 
Bemerkenswert für uns ist, daß auch 
bei diesem phänomenal wahrhaften 
Schließen eine Vergegenwärtigung der 
in Betracht kommenden Sachverhalte, 
ein Sichversenken in ihre zugehörigen 
Gegenstände durchaus überflüssig ist. 
Das ist ja gerade das Wesentliche an 
Schlüssen, daß es bei ihnen nicht auf 
das eine solche Versenkung zulassende 
und evtl. fordernde Material ankommt, 
sondern auf ganz bestimmte 
kategoriale Formen. 
even with this phenomally true 
concluding, a presentiation of the state 
of affairs in question, an immersing 
oneself in the objects that belong to it, 
is thoroughly superfluous. That is in 
fact precisely the essential point when 
it comes to concludings: that they do 
not have to do with any such material 
that permits and supports exploration, 
but with fully determined categorial 
forms. 
 Von den entscheidenden 
Gründen müssen wir unterscheiden die 
bekräftigenden Instanzen, die sich zwar 
geltend machen für das Sein eines 
Sachverhaltes, ohne ihn jedoch 
eigentlich und restlos zu begründen. 
Am bekanntesten sind sie uns aus 
Überlegungen des täglichen Lebens. 
Manches kann dafür sprechen, daß 
mein Freund mich besuchen wird, 
anderes spricht dagegen. Hier ist ein 
Abwägen erforderlich, ein bestimmter 
Akt synthetischer Apperzeption, der 
das Für und Wider zusammenfaßt und 
seinem Gewichte nach miteinander 
vergleicht. Geht ein solches Abwägen, 
das wahrhaft widersprechende 
Instanzen zu berücksichtigen hat, in 
 We must distinguish decisive 
reasons from reinforcing instances, 
which indeed validate the being of a 
state of affairs, but without establishing 
it specifically and totally. They {the 
reinforcing facts} are the best known to 
us from the reflections of everyday life. 
Much can speak for {the fact} that my 
friend will come to visit, other {facts} 
speak against it. Here, a weighing-up is 
required, a definite act of synthetic 
apperception which brings the ‘for’ and 
‘against’ together and compares their 
respective importance. If such a 
weighing up enters into the reflective 
behaviour that has truly contradictory 
instances to take into account, then the 
concluding position-taking can never 
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das überlegende Verhalten ein, so kann 
die abschließende Stellungnahme 
niemals eine Überzeugung sein, 
sondern sie wird je nach den 
Gewichtsverhältnissen Vermutung, 
kritische Indifferenz oder Zweifel sein. 
Die Fragehaltung kann hier nur eine 
partiale Erfüllung erfahren. 
be a conviction; it becomes, according 
to the balance of weights, suspicion, 
critical indifference or doubt. The 
questioning attitude can here only 
achieve a partial fulfilment. 
 Wir haben mit alledem nur 
einige wenige Linien innerhalb der 
intellektuellen Überlegung 
herausgehoben; wir haben dabei das 
ausgewählt, was geeignet erscheint, 
ihre Eigentümlichkeit gegenüber der 
voluntativen Überlegung heraustreten 
zu lassen. Unter diesem 
Gesichtspunkte mag noch eine 
Bemerkung hinzugefügt sein. Wenn 
wir auch bisher einen rein 
intellektuellen Prozeß besprochen 
haben, so vollzieht sich dieser doch in 
einem Subjekte, welches auch anderer 
Erlebnisse fähig ist. Das Thema der 
Überlegung »interessiert« das {290} 
Subjekt, es erlebt in bezug auf das Sein 
des Sachverhaltes ein Streben und 
Widerstreben, Neigung und 
Abneigung, Hoffnung und Furcht usf. 
So irrelevant nun auch diese 
Anteilnahme des Subjektes für das 
Sein des Sachverhaltes ist, so 
zweifellos ist es doch andererseits, daß 
in der psychologischen Realität 
 We have, in all of this, only 
picked out a few individual strands 
within intellectual reflection; we have 
chosen here that which really appears 
to let us draw out its distinctiveness 
when compared with volitional 
reflection. From this point of view 
another may be added. If we have have 
thus far described a purely intellectual 
process, this process nevertheless runs 
its course in a subject which is also 
capable of other experiences. The 
theme of the reflection ‘interests’ the 
{290} subject; he experiences, in 
relation to the being of the state of 
affairs, a striving for and against, an 
inclination towards and against, hope 
and fear, and so forth. Now as 
irrelevant as this participation of the 
subject is for the being of the state of 
affairs, it is yet equally doubtless on 
the other hand that in psychological 
reality, relations exist between it and 
the intellectual position-taking. It is 
essential to intellectual reflection to 
314 
Beziehungen stattfinden zwischen ihr 
und der intellektuellen Stellungnahme. 
Der intellektuellen Überlegung ist est 
wesentlich, solche illegitimiten 
Beeinflussungen auszuschalten. Indem 
sich die Fragehaltung auf das Sein des 
Sachverhaltes richtet und sich, wie wir 
sagten, der Einsicht gleichsam 
entgegenöffnet, soll eben alles 
Sichtreibenlassen von Emotionen 
jeglicher Art vermieden werden. Wohl 
kann man sagen, daß die Überlegung 
als solche häufig geeignet ist, solche 
Emotionen zu verstärken oder sogar 
wachzurufen. Es kann erst die 
Vergegenwärtigung einer Sache ihre 
Furchtbarkeit dem Subjekt enthüllen 
oder doch besonders deutlich machen. 
Aber nicht das Vorhandsein, sondern 
die unbefugte Einwirkung der 
persönlichen Anteilnahme bedeutet 
eine logische Gefahr. Und gerade 
dieser Einwirkung stellt sich die 
intellektuelle Überlegung als solche 
entgegen. 
exclude such illegitimate influences. In 
that the questioning attitude orients 
itself on the being of the state of affairs 
and, as we said, opens itself at the same 
time to the insight, one should avoid 
allowing oneself to be moved at all by 
any kind of emotion.16 One can well 
say that reflection itself is often 
suitable to strengthen such emotion, or, 
indeed, to awaken them. In the 
presentiation of a thing, {reflection} 
can unveil {the thing’s} fearfulness for 
the subject, or at least make it 
especially clear. But it is not the 
presence, but the inappropriate 
influence of personal participation that 
represents a logical hazard. And 
precisely this influence is counterposed 
by intellectual reflection as such. 
 Es handelt sich hier um rein 
empirische Verhältnisse. So häufig 
auch die Überlegung im menschlichen 
Bewußtsein mit emotionalen 
Erlebnissen verknüpft sein mag, so ist 
hier doch diese Verknüpfung niemals 
wesentlich. Wir können uns ein Subjekt 
konstruieren, das in vollkommener 
 This is a matter of purely 
empirical relations. However often 
reflection can be tied up with emotive 
experiences in human consciousness, 
this binding is never essential. We can 
construe a subject who reflects 
intellectually in a perfect way without 
needing to think that this subject has 
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Weise intellektuell überlegt, ohne daß 
wir in dies Subjekt die Fähigkeit 
emotionaler Anteilnahme 
hineinzudenken brauchen. Und gerade 
hier liegt der wesentlichste Punkt, der 
die Überlegung innerhalb des Wollens 
von der intellektuellen Überlegung 
trennt. Die Konstruktion eines 
Subjektes, das ohne jede Anteilnahme 
seine Willensakte überlegend 
vorbereitet, ist nicht möglich. 
the capability for emotive participation. 
And precisely here lies the essential 
point which divides reflection within 
willing from intellectual reflection. The 
construal of a subject who prepares his 
acts of willing reflectively without any 
{personal} participation is not possible. 
  
II. II. 
Äußerlich betrachtet bietet uns die 
voluntative Überlegung den ganz 
ähnlichen Aspekt eines teleologischen 
Prozesses wie die intellektuelle. 
Freilich steht hier eine andere 
Stellungnahme als Zielpunkt in Frage: 
Nicht ein Sein wird geglaubt, vermutet 
und bezweifelt, sondern es wird ein 
Vorsatz gefaßt, genauer, es setzt sich 
das Subjekt ein eigenes Tun vor. Nach 
zwei Richtungen wird dieser 
Unterschied bedeutsam. Einmal gibt es 
hier nicht die Differenzierungen der 
Stellungnahme, welche in der Sphäre 
des Intellektuellen von der 
Überzeugung zum Zweifel führen, und 
die uns den Begriff einer partiellen 
Erfüllung der Überlegung aufgenötigt 
haben. Es gibt hier nur eine totale 
Erfüllung, welche das Fassen eines 
Volitional reflection, superficially 
regarded, offers us the very similar 
aspect of a teleological process to that 
of the intellectual. Of course, a 
different position-taking stands here as 
the endpoint in question: A state of 
being does not come to be believed, 
suspected and doubted. Rather, a 
resolve is reached; more precisely, the 
subject resolves himself to a specific 
activity. This difference is significant 
in two ways. First, there is not the 
differentiation of position-taking here, 
which in the sphere of the intellectual 
ranges from conviction to doubt, and 
which made necessary for us the 
concept of a partial fulfilment of 
reflection. Here, there is only a total 
fulfilment, which has the making of a 
positive or negative resolution as its 
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positiven oder negativen Vorsaztes zur 
Folge hat, oder ein totales Scheitern, 
bei dem es eben nicht zu einem solchen 
Akte kommt. Sodann bedeutet die 
Verschiedenheit des intentionalen 
Korrelates der Stellungnahme —  ein 
eignes Tun des Subjektes, das 
vorgesetzt wird, statt eines 
Sachverhaltes, der geglaubt oder 
vermutet oder bezweifelt wird —  auch 
eine Verschiedenheit des Themas der 
Überlegung. Wir haben auch hier den 
einfachsten Fall, in dem Korrelat und 
Thema zusammenfallen. Wir haben 
einen charakteristischen {291} zweiten 
Fall, in dem zwei widerstreitende 
Projekte in Frage stehen. Die 
Stellungnahme, welche den Endpunkt 
einer solchen Überlegung bildet, ist 
auch hier, genauso wie in der Sphäre 
des Intellektuellen, eigenartig 
charakterisiert: sie ist gleichsam 
doppelseitig, insofern sie nicht nur das 
eine Tun vorsetzt, sondern gleichzeitig 
damit das zweite widerstreitende Tun 
abweist. Negative und positive 
Vorsatzfassung bilden hier eine 
eigenartige Einheit, innerhalb deren der 
positive Teil dominierend den 
negativen in sich einschließt. Man 
redet hier von einem Wahlakte. Man 
darf aber weder die intellektuelle noch 
die voluntative Wahl konfundieren 
consequence, or a total failure, by 
which it arrives precisely at no such 
act. Furthermore, the difference in the 
intentional correlates of the position-
taking —  an individual activity of the 
subject that comes to be resolved upon, 
instead of a state of affairs that comes 
to be believed or suspected or doubted 
—  also signifies the difference in the 
theme of reflection. Here too we have 
the simplest case, in which the 
correlate and the theme coincide. We 
have a characteristic {291} second case 
in which two contradictory projects are 
in question. The position-taking which 
forms the endpoint of such a reflection 
is here just as distinctively 
characterised as in the sphere of the 
intellectual: it is at the same time 
double-sided, in that not only is one 
activity resolved upon, but 
simultaneously with that, the second, 
contradictory activity is rejected. 
Negative and positive resolve-reaching 
here form a unique unity, within which 
the positive part dominates the 
negative enclosed in it. One speaks 
here of an act of choosing. But one 
ought not to confound the intellectual 
and volitional choice, or place them in 
exclusive association with reflection as 
such. That there is reflection that does 
not end in an act of choosing is self-
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oder in ausnahmslose Verbindung 
setzen mit der Überlegung als solcher. 
Daß es Überlegung gibt, die nicht in 
einem Wahlakte endigt, ist 
selbstverständlich. Aber auch davon, 
daß ein Wählen möglich ist ohne 
Überlegung, kann man sich unschwer 
überzeugen, wenn man sich die Fälle 
vergegenwärtigt, in denen das Subjekt 
sich zwischen zwei auftauchenden 
gedanklichen Inhalten oder Projekten 
ohne Zögern entscheidet. Als dritten 
Fall bezeichnen wir auch bei der 
voluntativen Überlegung die 
Unbestimmtheit des Themas, das erst 
in der Überlegung und durch sie 
diejenige Spezialisierung erfährt, deren 
die endgültige Stellungnahme bedarf. 
evident. But further to that, choosing is 
possible without reflection; of this, one 
can be convinced without difficulty if 
one brings to mind the cases in which 
the subject decides between two 
emerging cognitive contents or projects 
without hesitation. We designate as a 
third case, also within volitional 
reflection the indeterminacy of theme, 
which only in and through reflection 
undergoes the process of specialisation 
which the final position-taking 
requires. 
 Wir heben auch bei der 
voluntativen Überlegung die auf das 
Projekt gerichtete Fragehaltung des 
Subjektes als die Grundlage und den 
Durchgangspunkt des überlegenden 
Verhaltens heraus. Wir scheiden auch 
hier von ihr die Ungewißheit, die ihr 
notwendig zugrunde liegt, aber auch 
dasein kann, ohne sie aus sich heraus 
erwachsen zu lassen, und die innere 
Fassungslosigkeit, die Projekten 
gegenüber besonders häufig ist und 
die, falls sie überhaupt vorlag, in der 
Fragehaltung bereits überwunden ist. 
Auch hier »öffnet sich« das Subjekt in 
der fragenden Einstellung, aber 
 With volitional reflection we 
again highlight the project-oriented 
questioning attitude as the underlay 
and the connecting point of the 
reflective behaviour. We also 
distinguish it here from the uncertainty 
which is necessarily the reason for it, 
but which can also exist without 
{reflection} arising, and the inner 
bewilderment which is especially 
common in regard to projects and 
which, if it was ever present, is 
overcome in the questioning attitude. 
Here too the subject ‘opens himself’ in 
the questioning attitude, but that to 
which he opens himself is not the 
318 
der fragenden Einstellung, aber 
dasjenige, dem es sich entgegenöffnet, 
ist nicht die Einsicht in ein So- oder 
So-Sein, auf Grund deren dann die 
Fragehaltung überginge in eine 
Überzeugung, sondern es ist die 
Einsicht in ein Tunsollen, das 
Vernehmen der »Forderung« eines 
eignen Verhaltens, auf Grund dessen 
dann die Fragehaltung übergeht in die 
Vorsetzung eben dieses Verhaltens. Mit 
diesen Verschiedenheiten des 
Endpunktes und des Themas der 
Überlegung ist natürlich auch der Weg 
verschieden: das überlegende Verhalten 
selbst. 
which he opens himself is not the 
insight into the being of this or that, on 
the basis of which the questioning 
attitude is converted into a conviction; 
rather, it is the insight into an ought-to-
do, the hearing of the ‘demand’ for a 
specific behaviour, on the basis of 
which the questioning attitude is then 
converted into the resolution towards 
this very behaviour. With these 
differences of the endpoint and theme 
of reflection, the way, the reflective 
behaviour itself, is naturally also 
different. 
 Wir orientieren uns wiederum 
zuerst an dem einfachen Falle, in dem 
das Thema der Überlegung und das 
intentionale Korrelat der 
Stellungnahme zusammenfallen, und in 
dem ferner eine unmittelbare Evidenz 
möglich ist. Ein Projekt wird dem 
Subjekt vorgeschlagen, oder es steigt 
auch ohne Einwirkung von außen in 
ihm auf. Dann lebt das Subjekt 
zunächst in dem Projektgedanken, es 
lebt, ohne sich sofort zu entscheiden, in 
dem Gedanken, es könne dieses tun. 
Ungewißheit mag sich nun einstellen 
und eine Fragehaltung aus ihr 
erwachsen. Eine gewisse Absetzung 
des Subjektes von dem 
 We orient ourselves once again 
first on the simple case, in which the 
theme of the reflection and the 
intentional correlate of the position-
taking coincide, and in which, further, 
an immediate evidence is possible. A 
project comes before the subject, or it 
arises for him without outside input. 
Then the subject lives to start with in 
thoughts about the project; he lives, 
without yet having decided, in the 
thought that he could do this. 
Uncertainty may now emerge and a 
questioning attitude may arise from 
that. A certain distancing of the subject 
in regard to the thought of the project 
can be given with this, but there is still 
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Projektgedanken kann damit gegeben 
sein, aber von einer Vergegenwärtigung 
des Projektes ist damit noch keine 
Rede. Nicht das Sein oder Nichtsein 
eines Sachverhaltes soll hier erschaut 
werden, sondern es soll die 
Realisierungsforderung oder das 
Realisierungsverbot vernommen wer- 
{292} den, die ausgehen von einem 
Projekte. Solche Forderungen oder 
Verbote gründen nicht in der 
konstitutiven Beschaffenheit des 
Projektes als solchen, sondern sie 
gründen in seinem Wert oder Unwert. 
Wert- und Unwertcharakter freilich 
haften ihrerseits wieder an dem Projekt 
vermöge seiner Beschaffenheit. Eben 
damit aber ist gesagt, daß eine 
Vergegenwärtigung des Projektes für 
die praktische Überlegung nur insoweit 
in Betracht kommt, als sie erforderlich 
ist, um die Wert- und Unwertcharaktere 
an ihm klar zu erfassen. Werden sie 
erfaßt, so stellen sich eben damit jene 
ganz eigentümlichen, auf die 
Realisation der Projekte bezüglichen 
Erlebnisse ein, die wir als Forderungs- 
und Verbotserlebnisse bezeichnet 
haben. 
no sense of a presentiation of the 
project here. It is not the being or non-
being of a state of affairs that should be 
contemplated here, but rather the 
demand for or prohibition against 
realisation, which arises from a project, 
that should be {292} sensed. Such 
demands or prohibitions are based not 
in the constitutive composition of the 
project as such, but in its value or 
disvalue. Of course the value- and 
disvalue-character pertain to the project 
by virtue of its composition. With this 
it is said that a presentiation of the 
project is relevant for practical 
reflection only insofar as it is necessary 
to grasp the value- and disvalue-
characters pertaining to it clearly. If 
they are grasped, then those special 
experiences related to the realisation of 
the project, which we have designated 
as demanding and forbidding 
experiences, arise. 
 Schon in diesem einfachsten 
Falle kann von einer Stoffvermehrung 
die Rede sein. Ein Projektgedanke 
kann auftauchen, ohne daß die ihm 
 Already in this simplest case 
we can talk of an increase of material. 
The thought of a project can arise 
without the attached value-character 
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anhaftenden Wertcharaktere irgendwie 
miterfaßt würden. Dann ist es Aufgabe 
des überlegenden Verhaltens, solche 
Charaktere an dem Projekte 
aufzusuchen, um von da aus zu dem 
erstrebten Vernehmen der Forderungen 
und Verbote zu gelangen. In anderen 
Fällen taucht das Projekt von 
vornherein mit einem Wertcharakter 
behaftet im Subjekt auf. Eine »gute 
oder schlechte« Tat fällt mir ein; in 
solchen Fällen machen sich die 
Charaktere, so wenig auch die Rede 
davon sein kann, daß sie dabei adäquat 
erfaßt werden, schon im Auftauchen 
des Projektes phänomenal geltend. Das 
überlegende Verhalten kann hier die 
Aufgabe haben, zunächst zu einer 
klaren Einsicht in diese 
Wertverhältnisse zu gelangen; es wird 
auch hier das Projekt sich 
vergegenwärtigen, um an ihm den 
Wertcharakter —  diesmal nicht 
aufzusuchen, sondern bestätigt zu 
finden. Von einem Mehr an Materie 
kann hier nicht mehr die Rede sein. 
being in any way grasped along with it. 
Then the task of the reflective 
behaviour is to seek out such characters 
in the project, in order to achieve the 
hearing of the sought-after demands 
and prohibitions. In other cases, the 
project arises in the subject with a 
value-character attached from the 
outset. A ‘good or bad’ action occurs to 
me; in such cases, the characters, as 
little as it can be said that they are 
herewith adequately grasped, are in the 
emergence of the project already 
phenomenally valid. The reflective 
behaviour can here have the 
assignment of first achieving a clearer 
insight into these value-relationships; 
here too the project is presentiated —  
this time, not in order to seek out the 
value-character, but to find 
confirmation of it. Here, we can no 
longer speak of an increase of material. 
 Das absolute Unerfaßtsein der 
Wertcharaktere und ihr absolut klares 
Gegebensein bilden zwei Grenzpunkte, 
innerhalb deren mancherlei 
Abstufungen möglich sind. Ist mit dem 
Projekte sein Wertcharakter nicht 
sofort aufgetaucht, so kann schon eine 
bestimmte Einstellung des Subjektes 
 Complete unawareness of the 
value-character and its absolutely clear 
givenness form two extremes, between 
which several gradations are possible. 
If the project’s value character has not 
emerged at the same time as the project 
itself, then a specific attitude of the 
subject can suffice to allow it to 
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bestimmte Einstellung des Subjektes 
darauf genügen, um ihn auftauchen zu 
lassen, ähnlich wie in einer 
entsprechend modifizierten Einstellung 
nach unseren früheren Ausführungen 
anschauliche Bilder oder Seinsgründe 
oder -instanzen auftauchen können. Ein 
weiterer Schritt ist das anschauliche 
Erfassen der Wertcharaktere an dem 
vergegenwärtigten Projekt; hier nun 
gibt es eine kontinuierliche Abstufung 
von geringerer Deutlichkeit und 
Klarheit des Wertes bis zu der idealen 
Grenze der absolut deutlichen und 
klaren Selbstgegebenheit. Diese 
Grenze wird sehr selten erreicht; sie 
braucht auch nicht erreicht zu werden, 
wenn es sich nur darum handelt, die 
Realisierungsgebote und -verbote zu 
vernehmen. Ein solches Vernehmen 
kann schon stattfinden, wenn die 
Charaktere bloß aufgetaucht sind. 
Freilich gibt es auch bei ihm größere 
und geringere Bestimmtheit, die sich 
nach den Gegebenheitsstufen der 
Wertcharaktere reguliert. 
subject can suffice to allow it to 
emerge, similarly to how with an 
appropriately modified attitude 
according to our remarks earlier,17 
visual pictures or reasons or instances 
of being can arise. A further step is the 
vivid grasping of the value-character of 
a presentiated project; here now there 
is a continuum ranging from lower 
distinctness and clarity of the value to 
the ideal level of absolutely distinct 
and clear self-givenness. This 
boundary is very seldom reached; and 
it does not need to be reached if it is 
only a matter of sensing the commands 
and prohibitions for realisation. Such a 
hearing can already take place if the 
characters have barely emerged. With 
it, too, there are greater and lesser 
degrees of definiteness, which depend 
on the degree of givenness of the 
value-characters. 
 Dieser erste Typus der 
praktischen Überlegung ist ziemlich 
selten, wie es auch der erste Typus der 
intellektuellen Überlegung war. Es 
kann ja sein, und wird sehr häufig so 
sein, daß das Projekt an sich jenseits 
von Wert und Unwert steht, {293} daß 
es erst im Hinblick auf seine sachliche 
 This first type of practical 
reflection is rather rare, as was too the 
first type of intellectual reflection. It 
can indeed be the case, and very often 
is so, that the project in itself lies 
beyond value and disvalue, {293} that 
it is only in view of its factual 
circumstances that it acquires such 
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es erst im Hinblick auf seine sachliche 
Umgebung solche Charaktere gewinnt; 
oder es kann sein, daß die dem 
Projekte an und für sich anhaftende 
Wertigkeit modifiziert wird durch eben 
diese sachliche Umgebung. Dem, was 
wir jetzt sachliche Umgebung nennen, 
entsprach bei der intellektuellen 
Überlegung der Umkreis von 
Tatsachen, welche für das Sein des in 
Frage gestellten Sachverhaltes sich 
bekräftigend oder widerlegend geltend 
machen. Hier verstehen wir darunter 
den Umkreis aller Tatsachen, welche 
dem Projekte Wertigkeit erst verleihen 
oder eine bereits vorhandene 
Wertigkeit erhöhen und vermindern, 
welche in diesem Sinne also ebenfalls 
»für oder gegen das Projekt sprechen«. 
circumstances that it acquires such 
characters; or it can be that the 
valuability attached to the project in 
and of itself is modified by these same 
factual circumstances. That which we 
now call factual circumstances 
correspond with the circle of facts 
which, within intellectual reflection, 
affirm themselves as supporting or 
contradicting the being of the state of 
affairs in question. Here, we 
understand as within that circle all facts 
which originally lend valuability to the 
project, or increase or decrease an 
already-present valuability, which in 
this sense also just as well ‘speak for or 
against the project’. 
Ein solcher eigenartiger Einfluß wird 
vor allem von solchen Tatsachen 
ausgehen, die dem Tun selbst ihr 
Dasein verdanken, von den 
»Konsequenzen« des Tuns im 
weitesten Sinne. Wenn der Gedanke, 
mit äußerster Schnelligkeit die 
Landstraße zu befahren, an und für sich 
keinen Unwert, viel eher ein 
Wertmoment enthält, so bekommt er 
doch »in Hinblick« oder »mit 
Rücksicht« darauf, daß Menschenleben 
gefährdet sind, einen negativen 
Wertcharakter. 
Such a unique influence originates 
above all else from those facts which 
owe their existence to the action itself, 
from the ‘consequences’ of the action 
in the broadest sense. If the thought of 
driving on the open road at 
extraordinary speed contains in and of 
itself no disvalue, or even a value-
importance, it yet possesses, ‘in view 
of’ or ‘in consideration of’ the fact that 
human lives are endangered, a negative 
value-character. 
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 Es bedarf hier keines weiteren 
Eingehens auf die weitgehenden 
Differenzierungsmöglichkeiten 
innerhalb dieser Verhältnisse. Das für 
uns Wesentliche ist, daß hier der Blick 
auf das Projekt selbst nicht genügt, 
sondern daß auch alle weiteren in 
Betracht kommenden Umstände 
herangezogen werden müssen. Es 
kommen dabei die verschiedenen Fälle, 
Einstellungen und Verhaltungsweisen 
des Subjektes vor, welche wir bei der 
intellektuellen Überlegung bereits 
erörtert haben. Durch ganz bestimmte 
Tätigkeiten kann das Subjekt von der 
Frageeinstellung aus zu der Wertigkeit 
des Projektes in Hinsicht auf die ganze 
sachliche Umwelt und damit zu dem 
Vernehmen der Realisierungsforderung 
gelangen. So sehr nun unser zweiter 
Typus der voluntativen Überlegung 
dem zweiten Typus der intellektuellen 
ähnelt, so dürfen wir doch einen 
fundamentalen Unterschied nicht 
übersehen: Der erste Typ der 
intellektuellen Überlegung leistet da, 
wo er überhaupt eine Stelle hat, alles, 
was Überlegung überhaupt zu leisten 
vermag. Dagegen kann der erste Typ 
der praktischen Überlegung durch den 
zweiten stets eine Korrektur erfahren. 
Ein Sachverhalt, der in seinem Sein 
wirklich evident erschaut ist, kann 
 There is no need here to go 
further into the extensive possibilities 
of differentiation within these 
relationships. What is essential for us is 
that here, looking at the project itself 
does not suffice; rather, all further 
relevant circumstances must be 
considered as well. Thus the different 
cases, attitudes and forms of relation of 
the subject which we have already 
discussed with intellectual reflection 
are relevant. The subject can reach out 
from the questioning attitude, through 
quite specific activities, to the 
valuability of the project in view of the 
entire factual environment, and thereby 
arrive at the hearing of the demands for 
realisation. As much as our second type 
of volitional reflection now resembles 
our second type of intellectual 
{reflection}, we must nevertheless not 
overlook a fundamental difference: 
where it has a place at all, the first type 
of intellectual reflection achieves all 
that reflection is able to achieve. In 
contrast, the first type of practical 
reflection can always experience a 
correction by the second type. A state 
of affairs which in its being is really 
evidently seen cannot be affected in 
this being by any reasons in the world. 
A project, on the other hand, that in and 
of itself is recognised as valuable with 
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durch keine Gründe der Welt in diesem 
Sein tangiert werden. Ein Projekt 
dagegen, das als an und für sich 
wertvoll mit Evidenz erkannt ist, kann 
in Hinsicht auf seine schlimmen 
Konsequenzen als Unwert erscheinen. 
Es gibt eine Wertmodifikation einer 
Sache durch ihren Zusammenhang mit 
anderen; es gibt aber keine 
Seinsmodifikation in irgendeiner 
»Hinsicht«. So werden wir bei der 
praktischen Überlegung stark betonen 
müssen, daß nur der zweite Typus zu 
zuverlässigen Resultaten führen kann. 
evidence, can in view of its terrible 
consequences appear as disvaluable. 
There is a value-modification of a thing 
through its associations with others, 
but there is no being-modification by 
any kind of ‘in view of’. Thus we must 
strongly stress concerning practical 
reflection that only the second type can 
lead to reliable results. 
Eine praktische Überlegung muß stets 
weiter greifen, als die intellektuelle 
unter bestimmten Bedingungen zu 
greifen braucht. Eine ideal gedachte 
praktische Überlegung wird streng 
genommen ins Unendliche gehen 
müssen. Während die intellektuelle 
Überlegung an unmittelbaren 
Wahrnehmungen oder in sich evidenten 
Axiomen sehr bald einen Endpunkt 
und eine feste Stütze gewinnen kann, 
wird die praktische Überlegung, 
insofern die möglichen {294} 
Konsequenzen des Projektes unendlich 
weit in die Zukunft hineinreichen 
können, auf einen Weg ohne 
absehbares Ende geführt. Die geringe 
menschliche Fähigkeit, die 
Zusammenhänge hier vorauszusehen, 
wird freilich de facto die Überlegung 
A practical reflection must always 
reach further than the intellectual 
{reflection} needs to under specific 
conditions. An ideally thought-of 
practical reflection would, strictly 
speaking, go on forever. While 
intellectual reflection can, with 
immediate perceptions or with axioms 
that are evident in themselves, very 
soon attain an endpoint and a secure 
foundation, practical reflection, insofar 
as the possible {294} consequences of 
the project could stretch endlessly far 
into the future, leads down a path 
without a visible end. The limited 
human capability of foreseeing these 
relationships will de facto soon enough 
cut off the reflection, but it is not a 
matter of a true end of the reflection 
here; rather of an imperfectness that is 
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wird freilich de facto die Überlegung 
bald abschneiden; aber nicht um ein 
sachliches Ende der Überlegung 
handelt es sich hier, sondern um eine 
Unvollkommenheit, die oft 
schmerzlich genug empfunden wird. 
here; rather of an imperfectness that is 
often felt as rather painful. 
 In der praktischen Fragehaltung 
sind wir den Forderungen 
entgegengeöffnet, die wir auf Grund 
des vielgestaltigen überlegenden 
Verhaltens von dem Projekte her zu 
vernehmen hoffen. Das Vernehmen der 
Forderungen steht in Analogie zu der 
Einsicht in das Sein von Sachverhalten. 
Und wie sich auf dieser Einsicht eine 
Überzeugung gründet und die 
Fragehaltung ablöst, so geht bei der 
voluntativen Überlegung auf Grund 
des Vernehmens der 
Realisierungsforderung die 
Fragehaltung in ein Vorsatzfassen über. 
Da in der Überlegung das Subjekt sich 
den Sachen selbst entgegenöffnet, in 
der Tendenz, seine Stellungnahme nach 
der Antwort einzurichten, die es von 
dort her erfährt, bedeutet es allemal 
eine Durchbrechung ihres wesenhaften 
Sinnes, wenn die praktische 
Stellungnahme nicht dieser Antwort 
entsprechend erfolgt oder gar ihr 
entgegenerfolgt. De facto ist eine 
solche Abweichung sicherlich möglich. 
Es bestehen hier freilich 
charakteristische Unterschiede 
 In the practical questioning 
attitude, we are opened to the demands 
that we hope to sense on the basis of 
the diverse reflective behaviour 
regarding the project. The hearing of 
the demands stands in analogy with the 
insight into the being of the state of 
affairs. And as we base a conviction on 
this insight and step down from the 
questioning attitude, so with volitional 
reflection, by reason of the hearing of 
the demand for realisation, the 
questioning attitude is converted into 
the reaching of a resolve. When in 
reflection the subject opens himself to 
the things themselves, in the tendency 
of orienting his position-taking 
according to the answer that he 
experiences from there, it always 
signifies a collapse of its essential 
meaning if the practical position-taking 
does not follow from this answer or for 
that matter runs against it. De facto, 
such a deviation is certainly possible. 
There exist here characteristic 
differences between practical position-
taking, resolve-reaching (which is an 
inner performing, an inner doing of the 
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charakteristische Unterschiede 
zwischen der praktischen 
Stellungnahme, dem Vorsatzfassen, 
welches ein inneres Vollziehen, ein 
inneres Tun des Subjektes ist, ein Akt 
im prägnanten Sinne des Wortes, und 
den intellektuellen Stellungnahmen, 
welche, wie die Überzeugung oder die 
Vermutung, sicherlich kein Tun sind, 
sondern eine Zuständlichkeit, welche 
in dem Subjekte erwächst, aber nicht 
von ihm vollzogen wird. Wo ein klares 
und deutliches Seinserkennen als 
Endpunkt der Überlegung auftritt, 
gründet die Überzeugung sicherlich 
notwendig in ihm. 
inner performing, an inner doing of the 
subject, an act in the precise sense of 
the word) and intellectual position-
takings, which, like conviction or 
suspicion, are certainly no doing, but 
rather a condition which develops in 
the subject but is not performed by 
him. Where a clear and distinct 
recognition of being emerges as the 
endpoint of reflection, the conviction is 
surely necessarily grounded in it. 
Nur bei unklaren, verschwommenen 
Erkenntnissen könnte man vielleicht 
Zweifel über einen notwendigen 
Zusammenhang hegen oder wenigstens 
von einer möglichen Zurückdrängung 
der aufsteigenden Überzeugung durch 
das Subjekt reden. Dagegen gibt es bei 
einem unklaren Vernehmen von 
Realisierungsforderungen ganz 
sicherlich Fälle, in denen das Subjekt 
darauf nicht mit einer Vorsatzfassung 
reagiert. Es hat zwar erfaßt, was es zu 
tun hat, aber es tut es trotzdem nicht. In 
diesem »trotzdem« ist auf einen 
phänomenal erfahrenen Widerstand 
hingewiesen, welcher sich dem 
Unterlassen der Vorsatzfassung 
Only with unclear, hazy recognition 
can one perhaps feel doubt regarding a 
necessary association or at least speak 
of a possible repression of the 
established conviction by the subject. 
On the other hand, with an unclear 
hearing of the demands for realisation 
there are certainly cases in which the 
subject thereby does not react with the 
reaching of a resolve. One may indeed 
have grasped what one has to do, but in 
spite of that one does not do it. In this 
‘in spite of,’ a phenomenally 
experienced opposition is indicated 
which sets itself up towards refraining 
from the reaching of resolve. This 
opposition becomes correspondingly 
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entgegenstellt. Dieser Widerstand wird 
umso stärker sein, je deutlicher die 
Realisierungsforderung vernommen 
wird. Es fragt sich, ob auch dann, wenn 
der Wert eines Projektes in absoluter 
Klarheit und Deutlichkeit erfaßt ist, 
und wenn infolgedessen auch die 
Forderung uns mit absoluter 
Bestimmtheit entgegentönt, eine 
Vorsatzunterlassung möglich ist. Es ist 
das alte sokratische Problem: ob man 
das Gute kennen und es doch 
unterlassen kann, ein Problem, das, 
wenn man nur den Begriff des Kennens 
in nicht allzu oberflächlicher Weise 
auffaßt, viel bedeutsamer und viel 
schwieriger ist, als man gewöhnlich zu 
meinen scheint. Wir sind geneigt, die 
Frage auch für den Fall der absoluten 
Evidenz zu bejahen, ohne {295} uns 
hier in eine nähere Untersuchung 
einlassen zu können. Nur ein kleines 
Stück weit haben wir jetzt den Weg zu 
gehen, den auch eine solche 
Untersuchung einschlagen müßte. 
stronger the more distinctly the 
demand for realisation is heard. The 
question is whether, if the value of a 
project is grasped in absolute clarity 
and distinctness, and if following that 
the demand too expresses itself to us 
with absolutely definiteness, it is then 
still possible to refrain from the 
reaching of a resolve. It is the old 
Socratic problem: whether one can 
know the good and yet refrain from it, 
a problem that, if one only takes the 
concept of knowing in not too 
superficial a sense, becomes much 
more meaningful and much more 
difficult than one generally seems to 
believe. We are inclined, to answer the 
question affirmatively also for the case 
of absolute evidence, without {295} 
being able here to engage in a closer 
investigation. We only need to go a 
little bit along this way, where such an 
investigation also would have to go. 
 Wir berühren die Frage, in 
welcher Weise Wert- und 
Unwertcharaktere eigentlich vom 
Subjekte erfaßt werden. Werte werden 
nicht sinnlich wahrgenommen wie 
Dinge, nicht gesehen und gehört wie 
Farben und Töne, nicht gedacht wie 
Zahlen, sondern sie werden gefühlt. 
 We touch on the question of in 
what manner value- and disvalue-
characters actually are grasped by the 
subject. Values are not sensorily 
perceived like things, not seen and 
heard like colours and sounds, not 
thought like numbers; rather, they are 
felt. This feeling should not be 
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Dieses Fühlen darf man nicht 
verwechseln mit den Gefühlen, d. h. 
mit bestimmten Zuständlichkeiten des 
Ich, wie Freude oder Traurigkeit. Ein 
solches Gefühl ist in sich 
abgeschlossen: es mag eine 
intentionale Beziehung haben auf 
etwas Gegenständliches, es mag sich z. 
B. die in Freude beziehen auf den Wert 
einer Sache, aber sie ist 
selbstverständlich nicht das Erfassen 
dieses Wertes selbst, nicht das Fühlen 
des Wertes. Indem wir uns 
vergegenwärtigen, wie in dem 
»Fühlen« eines Wertes die »Gefühle« 
der Freude oder Begeisterung gründen 
oder aber auch nicht gründen können, 
wird uns der Unterschied zwischen 
erfassendem Fühlen und zuständlichem 
Gefühl am besten klar. 
confused with emotions, that is, with 
specific states of the I, like joy or 
sadness. Such an emotion is self-
contained: it may have an intentional 
relation to something objective (it may 
be, for example, that joy relates to the 
value of a thing), but it is self-evidently 
not the grasping of the value itself, the 
feeling of the value. The difference 
between the feeling which is a grasping 
of value of and the feelings that are 
conditions or states becomes clearest if 
we presentiate to ourselves how the 
‘emotion’ of joy or enthusiasm could 
either be grounded in the ‘feeling’ of a 
value or not. 
Im Ästhetischen drängt sich der 
eigenartige Charakter des 
Werterfassens besonders lebhaft auf. 
Jedem muß es deutlich werden, daß 
eine Landschaft selbst anders erfaßt 
wird als ihre Schönheit. Die 
Landschaft wird wahrgenommen, die 
Schönheit gefühlt (ohne daß man 
freilich dieses Fühlen der Schönheit in 
ein »Schönheitsgefühl« umdeuten 
darf). Aber auch moralische 
Wertcharaktere, die Güte und 
Vornehmheit einer Handlung oder ihre 
In aesthetics the unique character of 
value-grasping shows itself especially 
powerfully. It must be clear to 
everyone that a landscape itself is 
grasped apart from its beauty. The 
landscape is perceived, the beauty felt 
(one should not, of course, reinterpret 
this feeling of beauty as an ‘emotion of 
beauty’). But moral value-characters 
too, the goodness and nobility of an 
action or its baseness, its badness and 
maliciousness —  all well-distinguished 
value-characters —  come to be sensed 
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Gemeinheit, ihre Schlechtigkeit und 
Niederträchtigkeit —  alles 
wohlgeschiedene Wertcharaktere — , 
kommen in einem Fühlen zur 
Erscheinung. Auch der in 
phänomenologischer Analyse 
Ungeübteste muß einsehen, daß er das 
Verhalten eines Subjektes in ganz 
anderer Weise erfaßt wie den Wert oder 
Unwert dieses Verhaltens, daß es sich 
hier um ein fühlendes Erfassen handelt. 
Man sollte nicht vorschnell von der 
»Subjektivität« eines solchen Fühlens 
reden (wobei sehr wahrscheinlich der 
Gedanke an echte Gefühlszustände 
verwirrend hineinspielen wird). Das 
fühlende Erfassen läßt vielmehr, wie 
andere erfassende Akte auch, 
mannigfache Abstufungen der Klarheit 
und Deutlichkeit zu bis zur absoluten 
unbezweifelbaren Selbstgegebenheit. 
in a feeling. Even the one least versed 
in the phenomenological analysis must 
recognise that he grasps the behaviour 
of a subject in a very different way to 
how he grasps the value or disvalue of 
said behaviour; that the latter case is a 
matter of grasping by feeling. One 
should not be too quick to speak of the 
‘subjectivity’ of such a feeling 
(whereby quite probably the thought of 
what are actually emotion-states may 
confuse the matter). The grasping by 
feeling permits, moreover, like other 
grasping acts, manifold gradations of 
clarity and distinctness up to absolute, 
indubitable self-givenness. 
Wenn ich mich in ein Erlebnis reinen 
Neides hineinversetze und den Unwert 
dieses Neides fühle, so kann mir dieser 
Unwert mit einer Evidenz gegeben 
sein, die der Evidenz von 
Wahrgenommenem oder Gedachtem in 
keiner Weise nachsteht. Im übrigen 
werden wir die prinzipielle 
Verschiedenheit des Fühlens von jedem 
anderen Erfassen nicht übersehen, 
sondern gerade in unserem 
Zusammenhange hier besonders 
If I place myself in the experience of 
pure envy and feel the disvalue of this 
envy, this disvalue can be given to me 
with an evidence which in no sense is 
inferior to the evidence of things 
perceived or thought. Besides, we will 
not overlook the principal difference 
between feeling and all other grasping, 
which must, in our connection here, be 
especially emphatically underlined. 
Perceiving and thinking are peripheral 
experiences; they belong neither to the 
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nachdrücklich betonen müssen. Das 
Wahrnehmen und auch das Denken 
sind periphere Erlebnisse, sie gehören 
weder zu der Charakterstruktur der sie 
erlebenden Persönlichkeit, noch stehen 
sie zu dieser Struktur in irgendwelcher 
Beziehung. Bei dem Fühlen scheint es 
anders zu sein. Auch die einzelnen 
Fühlenserlebnisse machen gewiß die 
charakterliche Struktur der Person 
nicht aus, aber sie stehen mit ihr in 
einem eigenartigen Zusammenhange: 
in ihnen prägt sich die Person aus, 
kommt die Persönlichkeit zum 
Ausdruck. Es sind sehr {296} einfache 
Verhältnisse, an die ich mich dabei 
halte. Das Wahrnehmen eines Hauses, 
das Sehen von Farben und Hören von 
Tönen, aber auch das Denken von 
Zahlen oder Begriffen, das Erkennen 
logischer oder mathematischer 
Wahrheiten steht außerhalb jeden 
Zusammenhanges mit dem Charakter 
der erlebenden Person. Sie sind 
peripher, sozusagen außerpersönlich. 
character-structure of the experiencing 
personality, nor do they stand in any 
kind of relation to this structure. With 
feeling, it appears to be different. 
Individual feeling-experiences 
certainly do not make out the 
characteristic structure of the person 
either, but they stand in a unique 
connection with it: in them, the person 
manifests itself, the personality comes 
to expression. It is with very {296} 
simple relations that I am concerned 
here. The perceiving of a house, the 
seeing of colours and hearing of tones, 
but also the thinking of numbers or 
concepts, the recognition of logical or 
mathematical truths, all stand outside 
any connection with the character of 
the experiencing person. They are 
peripheral, extra-personal so to speak. 
Man wird freilich auch beim 
mathematischen Erkennen von dem 
persönlichen Scharfsinn sprechen, der 
sich darin dokumentiert. Aber ganz 
abgesehen davon, daß der Scharfsinn 
nicht zu dem Charakter des Menschen 
gehört, von dem allein hier die Rede 
ist, zeigt ein etwas weniger flüchtiges 
With regard to mathematical cognition, 
one would also speak of the personal 
astuteness that documents itself 
therein. But quite apart from the fact 
that the astuteness does not belong to 
the character of the human being 
(which alone is being discussed here), 
a somewhat less fleeting examination 
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Hinsehen auf die Sachlage, daß ein 
solcher Scharfsinn sich in der Art und 
Weise dokumentiert, wie ein Subjekt 
zum Erkennen gelangt, nicht aber in 
dem Resultate der scharfsinnigen 
Betätigung, in dem Erkennen selbst. In 
dem Wertfühlen aber dokumentiert sich 
ein Stück des persönlichen Charakters 
direkt und unmittelbar, ethische 
»Feinfühligkeit« und »Grobfühligkeit«, 
unzählige Stufen von der feinsten und 
zartesten Empfänglichkeit des 
Menschen, der die ethischen Werte 
überall und in ihren feinsten Nuancen 
herausfühlt, bis zum absoluten 
ethischen Stumpfsinn, der die 
gemeinste und niederträchtigste 
Handlung hinnimmt oder selbst 
vollzieht, ohne von diesem 
Unwertcharakter auch nur das leiseste 
zu ahnen. 
of the set of facts shows that such 
astuteness documents itself in the 
manner and way in which a subject 
attains cognition, not in the result of 
the astute-minded activity, in the 
cognition itself. In value-feeling, 
though, a piece of the personal 
character documents itself directly and 
immediately, ethical ‘sensitivity’ and 
‘insensitivity,’ innumerable degrees 
from the finest and most delicate 
human receptivity, which senses ethical 
values everywhere and in their finest 
nuances, to absolute ethical 
obliviousness, which when faced with 
the most base and depraved of actions, 
accepts them or just performs them, 
without even faintly recognising a 
character of disvalue in them. 
 Von hier aus werden wir sofort 
noch einen Schritt weitergehen. Nicht 
nur im Fühlen der Werte dokumentiert 
sich die Eigenart des Charakters, 
sondern auch in den Gefühlen, welche 
in diesem Fühlen gründen. Hier zeigt 
sich deutlich, wie notwendig jene 
Unterscheidung war. Die Gemeinheit 
einer Handlung kann von zwei 
Menschen in derselben Deutlichkeit 
gefühlt werden, die zuständliche 
gefühlsmäßige Reaktion aber kann eine 
 From here on we shall 
immediately take a step further. It is 
not only in the feeling of value that the 
distinctiveness of the character 
documents itself, but also in the 
emotions which are grounded in this 
feeling. Here it is clearly indicated how 
crucial such a differentiation was. The 
baseness of an action can be felt by two 
human beings with the same 
distinctness, yet the accompanying 
emotional reaction can be thoroughly 
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durchaus verschiedene sein. Es gibt 
eine innere Hingabe, eine Liebe zu 
dem gefühlten Wert, es gibt eine innere 
Gleichgültigkeit gegen ihn, es gibt ein 
Sichihmverschließen, es mag sogar 
eine innere Abwendung von ihm, ein 
»Hassen« des Wertes geben. In alledem 
kommt natürlich die Persönlichkeit 
charakteristisch zum Ausdruck: ihre 
reine Hingabe an die Welt der Werte, 
ihre ethische Indifferenz, das Böse oder 
gar Teuflische ihrer Natur. Wenn in 
solcher Weise die Persönlichkeit im 
Fühlen von Werten und in der Reaktion 
auf das Gefühlte zur Geltung kommt, 
so kommt sie es eben damit auch in der 
Überlegung, insofern in ihr abgezielt 
ist auf eine Erfassung der Wertigkeit 
von Projekten.18* 
different. There is an inner surrender, a 
love of the felt value; there is an inner 
indifference towards it; there is a 
closing of the self to it; also possible is 
an inner turning away from it, a 
‘hating’ of the value. In all of these the 
personality naturally finds 
characteristic expression: its pure 
surrender to the world of values, its 
ethical indifference, the evil or even 
diabolicalness of its nature. If in such a 
sense the personality shows itself in the 
feeling of values and in the reaction to 
what is felt, then it is equally so in 
reflection, insofar as the grasping of 
the valuability of projects is aimed for 
in it.19*  
 Wir sahen, wie ein Projekt 
auftauchen kann, ohne seinen 
Wertcharakter mitzubringen, wie in der 
Fragehaltung dann das Subjekt den 
Wert dieses Projektes in Hinsicht auf 
die sachliche Umgebung und deren 
event.{uellen} Wert möglichst klar zu 
erfassen sucht, um dadurch die 
Realisierungsforderung zu vernehmen. 
Wir sehen jetzt, daß dieses Erfassen ein 
Fühlen ist, und daß sich {297} somit im 
überlegenden Verhalten der Charakter 
der Person entfaltet und dokumentiert. 
Nicht im Aufsuchen der Konsequenzen 
 We saw how a project can 
emerge without bringing its value-
character with it, how in the 
questioning attitude the subject then 
seeks to grasp the value of this project 
in view of its factual circumstances and 
their possible value as clearly as 
possible, in order thereby to hear the 
demand for realisation. We see now 
that this grasping is a feeling, and that 
{297} thus, in reflective behaviour, the 
character of the person exposes and 
documents itself. The nature of the 
person breaks through not in the 
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und sachlichen Umstände, welches sich 
prinzipiell von dem Verhalten 
innerhalb der intellektuellen 
Überlegung nicht unterscheidet, 
sondern in dem Fühlen von Werten, 
ihrem Abwägen und Vorziehen und 
schließlich auch in der Reaktion auf 
das Gefühlte selbst kommt das Wesen 
der Person zum Durchbruch. Das, was 
bei der intellektuellen Überlegung 
unwesentlich ist und nur schaden kann, 
die innere Anteilnahme des Subjektes, 
erweist sich hier als wesentlich und 
unentbehrlich. Werterfassung und 
Wertabwägung ist erforderlich, um zu 
einem deutlichen Vernehmen der 
Realisierungsforderungen und -verbote 
zu gelangen. Und je nachdem das 
Subjekt auf die gefühlten Werte und 
Wertverhältnisse innerlich reagiert, 
wird es seine Stellung den Forderungen 
und Verboten gemäß nehmen. Auch 
hier freilich gibt es die Möglichkeit 
eines illegitimen Einflusses 
emotionaler Erlebnisse. Wo z. B. eine 
Neigung oder ein Streben oder ein 
Wunsch vorhanden ist, ein Projekt zu 
realisieren, besteht oft zugleich eine 
Tendenz, an den Wert dieses Projektes 
zu glauben. Umgekehrt sehen wir 
mitunter bei Menschen, deren ethischer 
Argwohn gegen sich selbst krankhaft 
gesteigert ist, eine Tendenz, das für 
seeking out of consequences and 
factual circumstances, which do not 
differentiate principally from the 
behaviour within intellectual reflection, 
but in the feeling of values, their 
weighing-up and preferment, and 
finally also in the reaction to what is 
felt, the nature of the person breaks 
through. The inner participation of the 
subject, which in intellectual reflection 
is inessential and can only cause harm, 
shows itself here as essential and 
indispensable. The grasping and 
weighing up of values is necessary to 
achieve a clear hearing of the demands 
and prohibitions of realisation. And in 
correspondence with how he inwardly 
reacts to the felt values and value-
relationships, the subject comes to take 
his stance towards those demands and 
prohibitions. Here, too, there is actually 
the possibility of an illegitimate 
influence from emotive experience. 
Where, for example, an inclination, a 
striving or a wish to realise a project is 
present, there is often simultaneously 
the tendency to believe in the value of 
this project. Conversely, we sometimes 
see with human beings whose ethical 
suspicions are pathologically 
intensified against themselves a 
tendency to consider bad that to which 
they themselves have an inclination. 
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schlecht zu halten, auf das sich die 
eigene Neigung richtet. Auch hier 
werden wir sagen, daß es der 
Überlegung als solcher, mit ihrer sich 
dem Projekte und seinem Werte 
öffnenden Fragehaltung, wesentlich ist, 
die unbefugte Einwirkung solcher 
Momente auszuschalten. Was 
schließlich die gefühlsmäßigen 
Reaktionen anbetrifft, die sich auf dem 
für die voluntative Überlegung 
wesentlichen Fühlen aufbauen, so sind 
sie sicherlich nicht unentbehrlich; aber 
ihre Einwirkung auf das Vorsatzfassen 
des Subjektes kann nur förderlich sein, 
solange es solche Reaktionen sind, 
welche zu dem gefühlten Werte in 
bestimmtem Sinne wesensgesetzlich 
»passen«, so wie die Liebe zum Wert 
und der Haß zum Unwert. Nur wenn 
andere Reaktionen als die zugehörigen 
sich geltend machen, liegt die Gefahr 
vor, daß das Subjekt eine andere 
Stellung einnimmt als die durch die 
gefühlte Wertigkeit des Projektes ihm 
vorgeschriebene. 
And here we would say that reflection 
as such, which opens its questioning 
attitude to the project and its value, is 
essential to shutting out the 
unauthorised input of such factors. 
Finally, as far as these emotional 
reactions are concerned which form 
themselves from those feelings that are 
essential for volitional reflection, {the 
former} are certainly not 
indispensable; but their input towards 
the reaching of a resolve by the subject 
can only be beneficial so long as they 
are such reactions as ‘suit’ the felt 
value in a specific sense according to a 
law of essence, such as the love of 
value and the hatred of disvalue. Only 
if other reactions than the 
aforementioned make themselves felt 
does the danger arise that the subject 
takes on a different position to that 
prescribed through the felt valuability 
of the project. 
 Würden wir bei den bisherigen 
Ausführungen stehenbleiben, so würde 
uns der Vorwurf einer falschen 
Ethisierung des Psychischen mit 
vollem Rechte treffen. So ist es ja de 
facto gewiß nicht, daß jedermann in 
allen Fällen in seinen praktischen 
Erwägungen eingestellt ist auf das im 
 If we were to stand by the 
undertakings made thus far, we would 
quite rightly meet with the accusation 
of a false ethicising of the psychical. It 
is de facto certainly not the case that 
everyone in all cases is, in his practical 
deliberations, directed towards the 
valuable and the right in the sense 
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Erwägungen eingestellt ist auf das im 
bisherigen Sinne Wertvolle und Rechte. 
Manche Menschen mögen diese 
Einstellung überhaupt nicht kennen. 
Neben dem Wertvollen an sich gibt es 
das, was von Interesse ist für mich. Der 
Satz, daß alle Menschen von Natur aus 
das Gute erstreben, ist nur dann 
aufrechtzuerhalten, wenn er das Gute, 
welches einer Sache selbst anhaftet, 
und das Gute für den jeweilig 
Handelnden gleichermaßen umfaßt. 
Man redet hier von objektivem und 
subjektivem Wert und sucht den 
Gegensatz des ethisch Wahren und 
ethisch Falschen daran zu orientieren. 
Aber diese Orientierung ist durchaus 
mißverständlich, streng genommen 
sogar durchaus falsch. Wahrheit und 
Falschheit gibt es in den beiden 
Sphären, die wir hier zu unterscheiden 
haben. Ich kann {298} mich über den 
Wert einer Sache genausogut täuschen 
wie über das Interesse einer Sache für 
mich. Und es gibt ein wahrhaftes 
Interesse für mich genausogut wie 
einen wahrhaften Wert der Sache an 
sich. Jene Verwechslung gründet 
offenbar darin, daß man der Wertsphäre 
den unbedingten ethischen Vorzug vor 
der Interessensphäre zuspricht —  eine 
These, die uns hier nichts angeht, die 
aber jedenfalls von der vorhergehenden 
valuable and the right in the sense 
intended.21 Many human beings may 
not know this attitude at all. Besides 
the valuable in itself, there is that 
which is of interest for me. The 
statement that all human beings by 
nature strive for the good is only to be 
taken as correct if it embraces in equal 
measure the good which a thing itself 
possesses and the good for the 
particular one who acts. One speaks 
here of objective and subjective value 
and seeks to orient the opposite of the 
ethically true and the ethically false 
upon this. But this orientation is based 
entirely on a misunderstanding; strictly 
speaking in fact, {it} is entirely false. 
Truth and falsity exist in both of the 
spheres which we must distinguish 
here. I can {298} deceive myself 
concerning the value of a thing just as 
much as concerning the interest of a 
thing for me. And there is a true 
interest for me just as much as there is 
a true value of the thing in itself. Such 
confusion is obviously based in the fact 
that one ascribes total ethical priority to 
the sphere of values over the sphere of 
interests —  a thesis that does not 
concern us here, but which in any case 
is to be distinguished from the above 
with all sharpness.22* 
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mit aller Schärfe zu unterscheiden 
ist.20* 
 Die Frage »soll ich das tun«, 
die dem auftauchenden Projekt 
gegenüber sich einstellen kann, darf 
also nicht in einem einseitig ethischen, 
sondern muß in einem Sinne 
genommen werden, der auch diese 
Fälle mitumfaßt, und der dem täglichen 
Sprachgebrauch auch durchaus 
geläufig ist. Das Projekt kann einfach 
auftauchen, und ich kann es nun 
daraufhin ansehen, ob es Interesse für 
mich hat; oder es kann sich schon im 
Auftauchen kundgeben als von 
Interesse für mich, und ich kann es nun 
daraufhin ansehen, ob es ein solches 
Interesse für mich wirklich besitzt. Je 
nachdem das Interesse in der 
Nützlichkeit, Annehmlichkeit, 
Förderlichkeit oder dergleichen basiert, 
wird es von uns in verschiedener Weise 
erfaßt. Wir gehen darauf nicht weiter 
ein. Erkenne ich, daß das Projekt von 
Interesse für mich ist, so vernehme ich 
auch in diesem Falle von ihm 
ausgehend die »Forderung«, oder hier 
besser die »Aufforderung«, es zu 
realisieren. Es kommen nun alle früher 
angedeuteten Gesichtspunkte analog in 
Betracht. Eine eingehende Überlegung 
darf sich nicht darauf beschränken, das 
Projekt selbst auf sein Interesse hin zu 
prüfen, sie muß auch alle zugehörigen 
 The question ‘should I do that’ 
which can come up with regard to the 
emergent project ought not, therefore, 
to be taken entirely in an ethical sense, 
but must be taken in a sense that 
includes these cases as well, something 
which is also entirely conversant with 
everyday linguistic usage. The project 
can simply emerge, and I can now 
explore whether it has interest for me; 
or it can announce itself to me in its 
very emergence as of interest for me, 
and I can now explore whether it really 
possesses such an interest for me. 
Depending on whether the interest is 
based on usefulness, pleasantness, 
beneficialness or the like, we grasp it in 
a different way. We will not go further 
into this. If I recognise that a project is 
of interest for me, then in this case I 
hear from the outset the ‘demand,’ or 
here, to put it better, the ‘invitation,’ to 
realise it. Now all previously outlined 
viewpoints come analogously into 
view. A thorough reflection ought not 
to limit itself to merely testing the 
project itself with regard to interest; it 
must also seek out all connected 
circumstances and take them into 
account. We can refrain here from 
drawing out the different main features 
again. Naturally, the possibility also 
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prüfen, sie muß auch alle zugehörigen 
Umstände aufsuchen und in Betracht 
ziehen. Wir können darauf verzichten, 
die verschiedenen Grundlinien hier 
noch einmal zu ziehen. Natürlich 
besteht auch hier die Möglichkeit, daß 
das Subjekt aus der Bahn der 
Überlegung herausspringt, daß es sich 
der vernommenen Aufforderung zum 
Trotz und wider sein wahres Interesse 
entscheidet. 
again. Naturally, the possibility also 
exists here that the subject leaps out 
from the path of reflection, that he 
chooses despite the sensed invitation, 
and against his true interest. 
 Die beiden Sphären, die wir 
besonders behandelt haben, stehen 
nicht durchaus konkurrenzlos einander 
gegenüber. Die Fragehaltung der 
Überlegung braucht sich von 
vornherein weder einseitig auf den 
Wert des Projektes noch auf sein 
Interesse für mich zu richten, sondern 
kann ganz allgemein auf das 
»Tunsollen« gehen. Ein Unwert des 
Projektes an sich kann dann 
gleichzeitig zur Erfassung kommen mit 
einer großen Nützlichkeit für das 
Subjekt. Auch hier wird »abgewogen« 
werden müssen, allerdings nicht 
zwischen solchem, das ein Mehr und 
Minder innerhalb der gleichen Sphäre 
darstellt, sondern in ganz 
eigentümlicher Weise zwischen 
durchaus verschieden Geartetem. Was 
dabei ein Vorziehen ermöglicht, ist ein 
eigenes, hier nicht zu erörterndes 
 The two spheres of which we 
have treated particularly do not face 
each other entirely without competing. 
For a start, the questioning attitude of 
reflection does not need to be one-
sidedly directed either at the value of 
the project nor at its interest for me; 
rather, it can quite generally concern 
the ‘ought-to-do’. A disvalue of the 
project in itself can then come to be 
grasped simultaneously with a great 
usefulness for the subject. Here too 
there must be a weighing up; not, 
however, between such things as 
constitute a greater and a lesser within 
the same sphere, but in an entirely 
unique way between utterly different 
things. What here makes a preference 
possible is its own problem, not to be 
discussed here. That it is possible {to 
prefer} cannot in fact at all be disputed. 
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Problem. Daß es möglich ist, kann den 
Tatsachen gegenüber auf keinen Fall 
bestritten werden. 
 Die erhebliche und notwendige 
Mitwirkung von Erlebnissen, in denen 
der persönliche Charakter zum 
Ausdruck kommt, besteht in der 
Sphäre des subjekti- {299} ven 
Interesses nicht minder als in der 
Sphäre der ethischen Werte. Während 
der persönliche Charakter bei den 
Werten an sich bloß den erkennenden 
Zugang ermöglicht, hat er für die 
Sphäre des subjektiven Interesses 
vielfach sogar konstitutive Bedeutung. 
Er kann einem Projekte wahrhaftes 
Interesse verleihen, wo für 
andersgeartete Menschen 
Gleichgültigkeit oder sogar negatives 
Interesse vorhanden ist. Es bedarf hier 
keiner weiteren Ausführungen: In dem, 
was dem Subjekte als von 
persönlichem Interesse erscheint, in 
dem was als zugehöriger Umstand oder 
als Konsequenz dies Interesse vermehrt 
oder vermindert oder aufhebt, in der 
Art wie verschiedene und 
widerstreitende Interessen abgewogen 
und einander vorgezogen werden, 
kommt in außerordentlichem Maße der 
Persönlichkeitscharakter zur Geltung. 
So haben wir denn ganz allgemein 
gezeigt, wie in der praktischen 
 The considerable and necessary 
collaboration of experiences in which 
the personal character finds expression 
exists in the sphere of subjective {299} 
interest no less than in the sphere of 
ethical value. While with values in 
themselves the personal character 
simply permits access to their 
recognition as such, for the sphere of 
subjective interest it has a many-sided, 
in fact constitutive, significance. It can 
award a project genuine interest where, 
for different human beings, 
indifference or even negative interest 
exist. There is no need here for any 
further explanation: the character of the 
personality is revealed to an 
extraordinary degree {in three things: 
firstly} in that which appears to the 
subject to be of personal interest; 
{secondly} in that which, as its 
circumstance or as its consequence, 
increases or diminishes or removes this 
interest; and {thirdly} in the form in 
which different and opposing interests 
are weighed up and preferred to one 
another. Thus we have in quite general 
terms indicated how in practical 
reflection, as opposed to the 
intellectual, the personality unfolds 
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Überlegung, im Gegensatz zu der 
intellektuellen, die Persönlichkeit sich 
entfaltet, wie ihre verschiedenen Seiten 
geweckt werden und sich zur Geltung 
bringen, und wie der Ausgang der 
praktischen Überlegung abhängig ist 
von der Struktur des persönlichen 
Charakters. Von hier aus nun muß es 
möglich sein, die eigentümlichen 
Bewertungen des mit Überlegung 
gefaßten Willensvorsatzes zu 
verstehen. 
itself, how its different aspects are 
awakened and displayed, and how the 
result of practical reflection is 
dependent on the structure of the 
personal character. From here, it must 
now be possible to understand the 
characteristic valuations of the 
resolutions of willing grasped as a 
result of reflection. 
 1. Eine verdienstvolle 
Handlung sinkt für uns an Wert, weil 
sie nicht mit Überlegung geschehen 
war. Sicher ist, daß die geringere 
Bewertung hier nicht der Überlegung 
an sich gilt. Die Überlegung als solche 
stellt niemals einen Unwert dar. Sie 
muß also hier als Anzeichen fungieren 
für eine anderweitige 
Verschiedenartigkeit der mit und ohne 
Überlegung begangenen 
verdienstvollen Handlung. Das 
Verdienst einer Handlung kann nun 
darin gesehen werden, daß sie 
begangen, und darin, daß sie nicht 
unterlassen worden ist.  
 1. A praiseworthy action 
declines for us in value if it occurred 
without reflection. It is certain that the 
lower valuation here does not concern 
the reflection itself. Reflection as such 
never displays a disvalue. Here then it 
must function as an indication of 
another difference in kind between the 
action as undertaken with and without 
reflection. The merit of an action can 
now be seen in that it was undertaken 
and in that it was not neglected. 
Wir rechnen es dem Täter positiv an, 
daß er den Wert der Tat gefühlt hat, 
und daß er aus diesem Fühlen heraus 
und aus Liebe zu dem Wert den Vorsatz 
gefaßt hat. Dabei ist freilich ein 
We judge it positively of the agent that 
he has felt the value of the action and 
that he, out of this feeling and out of 
love for the value, reached this resolve. 
Thereby, a law is assumed, which by 
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gesetzmäßiger Zusammenhang 
vorausgesetzt, der seiner 
»Selbstverständlichkeit« wegen 
meistens unbeachtet bleibt, der aber für 
die Ethik nicht minder wichtig ist als 
die oft ebenso selbstverständlichen 
mathematischen Axiome für die 
Mathematik: Das Fühlen eines 
ethischen Wertes und die Liebe zu 
einem solchen Werte sind selbst 
wiederum ethische Werte. Erst dieser 
Zusammenhang verhilft dem Vorsetzen 
eines wertvollen Projektes zu einem 
eigenen Werte. Wir können es dem 
Täter ferner positiv zurechnen, daß ihn 
die persönliche Unerwünschtheit der 
Handlung, die Gefahr z. B., die sie ihm 
zu bringen droht, nicht davon 
abgehalten hat, den Vorsatz zu 
fassen.23* Wir wissen nun, daß in der 
Überlegung das Subjekt den Wert des 
Projektes zu erfassen sucht, daß es 
ferner in ihr nach den Konsequenzen 
des Projektes, ihrem Werte und ihrem 
Interesse fragt. Wir wissen weiter, daß 
im überlegungsfreien Erleben sehr 
häufig ein Projekt auftaucht, ohne daß 
ein Wertcharakter mit auftaucht, oder 
ohne daß er {300} doch lebendig 
gefühlt wird, und daß die 
Konsequenzen des Projektes mit ihrem 
positiven oder negativen Interesse sich 
ebensowenig einzustellen brauchen. So 
reason of its ‘self-evidence’ remains 
mostly unheeded, yet which is no less 
important for ethics than the (often just 
as self-evident) mathematical axioms 
are for mathematics: the feeling of an 
ethical value and the love of such a 
value are themselves in turn ethical 
values. It is this relationship that gives 
the resolve of a valuable project a 
distinct value. We can further 
positively assess that agent who, 
despite the personal unwantedness of 
the action, its danger {for him} for 
example, has not neglected to reach the 
resolve.25* We know now that in 
reflection the subject seeks to grasp the 
value of the project, that he further 
questions the consequences of the 
project, its value and its interest. We 
know, further, that in reflection-less 
experience a project very often 
emerges without a value-character 
emerging along with it, or without 
{300} it being vividly felt, and that the 
consequences of the project with their 
positive or negative interest {for the 
subject} do not have to come forth 
either. So it is to be understood that 
reflection-less willing can be 
considered without value compared to 
the reflective {willing}, insofar as one 
glimpses behind this the genuinely 
praiseworthy feeling of the value and 
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ist es zu verstehen, daß dem 
überlegungslosen Wollen im Gegensatz 
zum überlegten der Wert abgesprochen 
werden kann, insofern man hinter 
diesem das eigentlich verdienstvolle 
Fühlen des Wertes und 
Sichhinwegsetzen über das persönliche 
Interesse erblickt, während jenes, ohne 
ein lebendiges Werterfassen und ohne 
ein Wissen um die gefährlichen 
Konsequenzen, jeglichen Wertes bar 
ist. Der Überlegung kommt somit in 
der Tat bloß ein Symbolcharakter zu. 
Das findet seine Bestätigung darin, daß 
bei einer Gleichsetzung der 
symbolisierten Verhältnisse jene 
verschiedene Beurteilung 
verschwindet, sich sogar eventuell in 
ihr Gegenteil verschiebt.24* 
the overcoming of personal interest, 
while {the willing} that lacks a vivid 
grasping of value and without a 
knowledge of the dangerous 
consequences is devoid of any such 
value. Reflection, then, thus in fact 
possesses a merely symbolic character. 
This finds its confirmation in that with 
an equalisation of the symbolised 
relationships, the different assessment 
disappears, {and} indeed perhaps 
changes into its opposite.26* 
 
 Es gibt notwendige und unter 
allen Umständen bestehende 
Symbolverhältnisse. Zu ihnen gehört 
das eben Erörterte sicherlich nicht. 
Nach zwei Richtungen hin können 
Abweichungen eintreten. Es ist sehr 
wohl möglich, daß auch in der 
Überlegung der Wert nicht gefühlt wird 
und die gefährlichen Konsequenzen 
nicht erfaßt werden. Eine Überlegung 
kann ja mehr oder weniger 
durchgeführt, mehr oder weniger 
eindringlich sein. Umgekehrt ist es 
möglich daß auch ohne Überlegung der 
 There are necessary and 
universally-existent symbolic 
relationships. Those which we have 
just discussed certainly do not belong 
among them. Deviations can occur in 
two directions. It is quite possible that 
the value is not even felt in reflection, 
and that the dangerous consequences 
are not grasped. A reflection can indeed 
be more or less followed through, more 
or less insightful. Conversely, it is 
possible that even without reflection, 
the value is felt and the dangerous 
consequences clearly seen. That 
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Wert gefühlt und die gefährlichen 
Konsequenzen klar gesehen sind. Daß 
die Überlegung auf ein solches Fühlen 
und Sehen hin tendiert, besagt ja nicht, 
daß diese ohne sie nicht eintreten 
können. Vertraut man den 
Symbolverhältnissen ohne weitere 
Prüfung, so wird die Handlung im 
ersten Falle ohne Grund geschätzt, 
während ihr im zweiten Falle das Lob 
grundlos versagt wird. So haben wir 
hier einen Fall, wo eine ethische 
Beurteilung nicht auf die Sache selbst 
geht, sondern sich auf Voraussetzungen 
stützt, welche in der Praxis des 
gewöhnlichen Lebens oft genug 
ungeprüft und meist sogar unbemerkt 
gemacht zu werden pflegen, und die 
erst die nähere Analyse als nicht 
unbedingt zuverlässig herausstellen 
kann. 
reflection tends towards such a feeling 
and seeing does not mean that these 
cannot appear without it. If one trusts 
in the symbolic relationship without 
further examination, then the action 
would in the first case be praised 
without reason, and in the second case 
be groundlessly denied praise. We have 
here a case where an ethical assessment 
does not depend on the things 
themselves, but on assumptions which 
in the practice of ordinary life one 
often enough does not take care to 
examine or take note of, and which a 
closer analysis can expose as not 
absolutely dependable. 
 2. Eine verdienstvolle 
Handlung wird geringer geschätzt, weil 
sie einer langen Überlegung bedurfte. 
Wir können diesen Fall nun ohne 
weiteres verstehen. Das Fühlen eines 
ethischen Wertes und die Fühlfähigkeit 
für ethische Werte überhaupt sind 
selbst ethische Werte. Ihr Wert steigt 
mit der wachsenden Feinheit des 
Fühlens. Wer zu seiner verdienstvollen 
Handlung erst einer langen Überlegung 
bedurfte, dokumentiert eben darin eine 
 2. A praiseworthy action attains 
a lower estimation because it required a 
long reflection. We can now 
understand this case right away. The 
feeling of an ethical value and the 
capacity for the feeling of ethical 
values in general are themselves ethical 
values. Their value increases with the 
growing fineness of the feeling. He 
who requires a long reflection before 
his praiseworthy actions thereby 
documents a lower capacity for the 
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geringere Fähigkeit des Wertfühlens als 
derjenige, dem sich ohne lange 
Überlegung, dem sich vielleicht ohne 
jede Überlegung der Wert sofort 
offenbarte. Und ebenso steht der, 
welcher sich dem negativen Interesse 
des Projektes und seiner Konsequenzen 
entgegen sofort im Sinne seines Wertes 
entscheidet, höher als wer dazu erst 
eines überlegenden Abwägens bedarf. 
Wieder fungiert die Überlegung als 
Symbol. Sehr interessant ist, daß sie 
uns hier Entgegengesetztes 
symbolisiert als vorhin. Während im 
vorigen Fall das Fehlen der 
Überlegung das Fehlen eines 
Wertfühlens anzeigen {301} sollte, 
wird ihr hier umgekehrt ein besonders 
feines Wertfühlen zugrunde gelegt. Die 
Unzuverlässigkeit einer solchen 
Deutung bedarf keiner weiteren 
Darlegung. 
feeling of value than one to whom the 
value is just as obvious without a long 
reflection, perhaps without reflection at 
all. And equally, one who decides in 
light of the project’s value, despite its 
negative interest and its consequences, 
stands higher than one who first 
requires a reflective weighing-up. 
Again, reflection functions as a 
symbol. It is very interesting that here 
it symbolises the opposite to what it 
did before. While in the preceding 
case, the absence of reflection should 
have indicated {301} the absence of a 
value-feeling, here, conversely, an 
especially fine value-feeling is deemed 
to lie at the basis. The unreliability of 
such an assessment requires no further 
demonstration. 
 3. Eine verwerfliche Handlung 
wächst an ethischem Unwert, wenn sie 
mit Überlegung vollzogen wird. Auch 
hier liegen gewisse ethische Axiome 
zugrunde: Die Unfähigkeit, einen 
ethischen Wert zu fühlen, ist selbst ein 
ethischer Unwert, und ebenso oder in 
noch höherem Grade ist es das 
praktische Abweichen vom Fühlen 
eines Unwertes. Wir müssen hier die 
verschiedenen Gesichtspunkte 
besonders sorgfältig trennen. Wir 
 3. A reprehensible action 
increases in ethical disvalue if it was 
performed with reflection. Here too, 
certain ethical axioms are the reason: 
the incapacity to feel an ethical value is 
itself an ethical disvalue, and equally 
or even more so, is practical deviation 
from the feeling of a disvalue. We must 
here distinguish especially carefully the 
different viewpoints. We know that a 
human being can feel the disvalue of a 
project and yet resolve {to do} it. If a 
344 
besonders sorgfältig trennen. Wir 
wissen, daß ein Mensch den Unwert 
eines Projektes fühlen und es sich doch 
vorsetzen kann. Wenn ein Mensch so 
handelt, so ist es um vieles schlimmer, 
als wenn er den Unwert überhaupt 
nicht kennt oder nur von ihm weiß, 
ohne ihn fühlend zu erfassen. Insofern 
nun in der Überlegung der Unwert 
eines Projektes erfaßt zu werden pflegt, 
gilt die mit Überlegung begangene Tat 
als besonders schlimm. Auch hier 
haben wir den Symbolcharakter der 
Überlegung. Wieder aber werden wir 
betonen müssen, daß diese 
Symbolbeziehung keine notwendige 
ist. Auch ohne Überlegung kann der 
Unwert eines Tuns in aller Klarheit und 
Deutlichkeit uns gegenübertreten; und 
umgekehrt braucht es der Überlegung 
nicht zu gelingen, diesen Unwert zu 
erfassen. Dann wird in dem ersten Fall 
die Verwerfung grundlos gemildert, im 
zweiten grundlos verschärft. 
project and yet resolve {to do} it. If a 
human being acts thus, then it is much 
worse than if he does not recognise the 
disvalue at all, or only knows of it, 
without grasping it in feeling. Now 
insofar as the disvalue of a project 
tends to become grasped in reflection, 
the action done with reflection counts 
as especially bad. Here, too, we have 
the symbolic character of reflection. 
Again, though, we must emphasise that 
this symbolic relationship is not a 
necessary one. Even without reflection, 
the disvalue of an action can appear to 
us with all clarity and distinctness; and 
conversely, reflection does not 
necessarily succeed in grasping this 
disvalue. Then, in the first case the 
reproach would be groundlessly 
softened; in the second, groundlessly 
harshened. 
 Aber der zweite Fall ist damit 
noch nicht erledigt. In bezug auf ihn 
müssen wir unsern letzten Satz sogar 
teilweise korrigieren. Nehmen wir an, 
es sei in der Überlegung der Unwert 
eines Tuns nicht gefühlt worden, wird 
es da wirklich so ganz unberechtigt 
sein, diesen Fall schärfer zu beurteilen, 
als wenn das Erfassen im 
 But the second case is thereby 
not yet exhausted. In relation to it we 
must even partially correct our last 
statement. Let us take it that the 
disvalue of a doing should not become 
felt in reflection; would it really then 
be so utterly unjustified to assess this 
case more harshly than if the grasping 
failed to transpire in non-reflective 
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überlegungsfreien Wollen ausgeblieben 
ist? Eine solche schärfere Beurteilung 
darf sich natürlich nicht auf das 
Vorsatzfassen entgegen dem besseren 
Fühlen gründen; das ist ja der 
Annahme nach hier nicht vorhanden. 
Wohl aber kommt ein ganz neuer 
Gesichtspunkt in Betracht. Nicht nur 
das dem Fühlen entgegengerichtete 
Wollen, sondern auch das Fehlen eines 
Wert- oder Unwertfühlens stellt einen, 
wenn auch anders gearteten Unwert 
dar. Im Nichtfühlen des Unwertes eines 
gedachten Projektes zeigt sich ein 
solcher Mangel überhaupt. Aber im 
Nichtfühlen innerhalb eines 
überlegenden Verhaltens offenbart er 
sich in noch höherem Maße. Unsere 
Analyse hat ja gezeigt, wie sich hier 
das Subjekt dem Projekte und seiner 
Wertigkeit fragend öffnet. Hier wo die 
Einstellung für ein Wertfühlen die 
möglichst günstige ist, gibt sich im 
Nichtfühlen ein größerer Mangel kund 
als da, wo etwa ein Subjekt ohne jede 
Überlegung von Vorsatz zu Vorsatz eilt. 
Man darf nicht einwenden, daß 
dasselbe Subjekt auch in der 
Überlegung vielleicht von dem 
Unwerte nichts gefühlt hätte. Nicht 
darum handelt es sich ja, welche 
Persönlichkeitsstruktur das Subjekt im 
ganzen besitzt, sondern welche Teile 
willing? Such a harsher assessment 
ought not, naturally, to be based in the 
reaching of a resolve against better 
feelings; by the terms here, that is not 
the case. Rather, an entirely new 
viewpoint comes into the question. Not 
just willing that is oriented counter to 
feelings, but also the absence of a 
feeling of value or disvalue, displays a 
disvalue, if of a different kind. Such a 
lack reveals itself in the non-feeling of 
the disvalue of a thought-of project. 
But it makes itself obvious to an even 
higher degree in feeling not occurring 
within a reflective behaviour. Our 
analysis has indeed indicated how the 
subject here opens himself 
questioningly to the project and its 
valuability. Here, where the 
preparedness for a value-feeling is 
most favourable, non-feeling expresses 
a greater lack than if the subject, say, 
hurries without reflection from resolve 
to resolve. One ought not to object that 
the same subject, in reflecting, might 
perhaps still not have felt the disvalue. 
The crucial point here is not what 
personality-structure the subject as a 
whole possesses, but of which parts of 
{the structure} unfold themselves in 
his actions and accordingly are 
valuated positively or negatively. And 
here it may be said that in fact, in non-
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von ihr in seinem Tun sich entfalten 
und demgemäß positiv oder negativ 
bewertet werden. Und hier läßt sich in 
der Tat sagen, daß in dem mit 
Überlegung verbundenen Nichtfühlen 
sich ein größerer Mangel offenbart als 
in dem überlegungsfreien. Es handelt 
sich hier offenbar um eine immer 
bestehende {302} Beziehung zwischen 
Überlegung und Persönlichkeitsmanko, 
insoweit das überlegende Tun eine auf 
die Wertigkeit des Projektes gerichtete 
fragende Einstellung impliziert. Im 
übrigen muß man hier eine Reihe 
verschiedener Möglichkeiten 
auseinanderhalten. 
feeling coupled with reflection, a 
greater lack makes itself obvious than 
{in non-feeling} without reflection. 
Here this is obviously a matter of a 
persistent {302} relationship between 
reflection and a deficiency in 
personality, insofar as the reflective 
action implies a questioning attitude 
directed at the valuability of the 
project. Furthermore, one must here 
distinguish a series of different 
possibilities. 
Den einen Grenzpunkt bildet unsere 
auf den Wert selbst gehende 
Überlegung; eine günstigere 
Einstellung ist nicht denkbar. Um eine 
Analogie aus der Sphäre der sinnlichen 
Wahrnehmung zu nehmen: es ist, wie 
wenn ich meine Blicke auf ein Ding 
der Außenwelt richte, um seine 
Ähnlichkeit mit anderen zu erfassen. 
Daneben tritt die auf das persönliche 
Interesse gehende Einstellung, die zwar 
eben damit nach etwas anderem fragt, 
aber die doch dadurch, daß sie 
überhaupt das Projekt ins Auge faßt, 
eine günstigere Bedingung für die 
Werterfassung schaffen kann. So wird 
auch, wenn ich meine Blicke auf ein 
{1} Our reflection on the value itself 
constitutes a high point; a more 
suitable attitude is not thinkable. To 
take an analogy from the sphere of 
sensory perception: it is as if I turn my 
gaze towards a thing in the outside 
world in order to grasp its similarities 
with other things. {2} Next to this lies 
the attitude based on personal interest, 
which in fact asks after something 
different, but which, in that it takes the 
project into view to begin with, may 
still create a more suitable condition 
for the grasping of value. So too, if I 
turn my gaze towards a thing in order 
to estimate its size, its similarity with a 
second will occur to me more easily 
347 
Ding richte, um seine Größe 
abzuschätzen, mir seine Ähnlichkeit 
mit einem zweiten leichter auffallen, 
als wenn ich anderem zugewendet 
bin.27* Ungünstiger liegt in dieser 
Hinsicht der Fall der 
Überlegungslosigkeit, wo keinerlei 
fragende Einstellung auf das Projekt 
geht, wo wir, im Bilde gesprochen, das 
Ding ergreifen, ohne es zu betrachten. 
Und schließlich unterscheiden wir 
davon den ungünstigsten Fall: Das 
Subjekt ist von einem Affekte erfüllt, 
der es auf die Realisierung des 
Projektes hintreibt. Hier fehlt nicht nur, 
wie bei der Überlegungslosigkeit, jede 
Bedingung, die das Erfassen der 
Wertigkeit begünstigen könnte, 
sondern es ist sogar ein Moment 
vorhanden, welches ein solches 
Auftauchen zu hindern geeignet ist. 
than if {my attention} is turned 
towards something else.28* {3} Still 
lower lies the case of 
reflectionlessness, where no kind of 
questioning attitude concerns the 
project, where we, to speak 
illustratively, grab the thing without 
looking at it. {4} And finally we 
distinguish from that the most 
unsuitable case: the subject is filled 
with an affect which drives him to the 
realisation of the project. Here, not 
only is (as in reflectionlessness) any 
condition absent that could be suitable 
for the grasping of the valuability, but 
equally a factor is present which is 
liable to hinder such an emergence. 
Es ist, wie wenn ein Mensch in wilder 
Gier ein Ding ergreift —  was wird ihm 
da die Ähnlichkeit mit anderen Dingen 
bedeuten? So ist also die schärfere 
Beurteilung der überlegten schlimmen 
Handlung und ihre mögliche 
Abstufung in den verschiedenen Fällen 
ganz allgemein verständlich geworden. 
It is as if somebody in wild greed grabs 
a thing —  what then would its 
similarity with another thing mean to 
him? Thus the harsher assessment of 
the reflected-on bad action and its 
possible gradations in different cases 
has been made understandable in quite 
general terms. 
 4. Der Täter einer 
verwerflichen Handlung wird härter 
beurteilt, weil er ohne Überlegung 
vorgegangen ist. Er hat seine 
 4. The doer of a reprehensible 
action is more harshly assessed 
because he carried it out without 
reflection. He has ‘not even 
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Handlungsweise »nicht einmal 
überlegt«. Hier haben wir den ersten 
und einzigen Fall, in dem die 
Überlegung nicht als wertneutrales 
Zeichen für ganz andersartige 
wertbehaftete Realitäten gilt, sondern 
in dem sie selbst und der ihr zugrunde 
liegende Habitus des Subjekts 
Gegenstand der Bewertung ist. Wir 
verlangen vom Menschen, daß »er sich 
überlegt, was er tut«, daß er die 
Konsequenzen seines Projektes und 
ihren Einfluß auf dessen Wert oder 
Unwert ins Auge faßt, und daß er 
insbesondere sein Interesse für das, 
was sein soll, in der Frage nach dem 
Werte des Projektes zum Ausdruck 
bringt. Der ethisch überlegende 
Mensch als solcher repräsentiert einen, 
wenn auch bescheidenen ethischen 
Wert. Ein Widerspruch dieser 
Bewertung mit der scheinbar 
widersprechenden des vorhergehenden 
Falles liegt also in Wahrheit nicht vor. 
Daß er überlegend den Wert oder 
Unwert seines Projektes erwogen hat, 
werden wir auch dem Verbrecher 
zugute halten. Nur kann dieser Wert 
verschwinden hinter dem größeren 
Unwerte eines die Werte nicht 
fühlenden {303} oder sich über die 
gefühlten Werte hinwegsetzenden 
Verhaltens, welches uns das 
considered’ his manner of action. Here 
we have the first and only case in 
which reflection does not show itself as 
a value-neutral indicator of very 
different kinds of valuable realities, but 
in which it itself and the habit of the 
subject which founds it is the object of 
the assessment. We want of the human 
being that ‘he reflects on what he 
does,’ that he takes into consideration 
the consequences of his project and 
their influence on the value or disvalue, 
and that he in particular brings to 
expression his personal interest in in 
the result into the question of the value 
of the project. The ethically reflective 
human being as such represents an 
ethical value, if a modest one. A 
contradiction of this assessment with 
the apparent contradicting elements of 
the foregoing case thus does not really 
occur. We would also regard it as good 
of the criminal that he has considered 
reflectively the value or disvalue of his 
project. This value can however be 
eclipsed by29 the greater disvalue of a 
non-feeling behaviour {303} or one 
that turns against those values which 
the existence of any reflection indicates 
to us. 
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Vorhandensein jener Überlegung 
anzeigt. 
 Die scheinbaren Antinomien 
sind damit zur Auflösung gelangt. Die 
ausschlaggebenden Gesichtspunkte 
sind dabei die: daß in der voluntativen 
Überlegung —  im Gegensatz zu der 
theoretischen —  die Persönlichkeit 
selbst zur Geltung kommt, und daß 
dabei die Überlegung —  als Symbol 
für ihre Vorzüge und Mängel —  ein 
Anhaltspunkt werden kann für ihre 
günstigere oder ungünstigere 
Beurteilung. Das Wesentliche unseres 
Ergebnisses ist, daß eine nur auf dem 
Moment der Überlegung basierende 
ethische Beurteilung ganz äußerlich 
bleiben muß, wenn sie den bloßen 
Symbolcharakter der Überlegung 
vergißt; und daß sie absolut fehlerhaft 
werden kann, insofern jenes 
Symbolverhältnis nicht in allen Fällen 
zu bestehen braucht. 
 The apparent contradictions are 
thus given a solution. The decisive 
viewpoints for this are: that in 
volitional reflection (as against the 
theoretical) the personality itself is 
displayed, and that reflection (as a 
symbol for its good and bad traits) can 
thereby become a clue for its more or 
less favourable assessment. The 
essential point of our finding is that an 
ethical assessment based purely on the 
factor of reflection must remain quite 
superficial if it forgets the merely 
symbolic character of reflection; and 
that it can become absolutely faulty 
insofar as this relationship of 
symbolism need not exist in all cases. 
 Es bleibt uns nun noch übrig, 
dieses Ergebnis auf das strafrechtliche 
Überlegungsproblem anzuwenden. 
 It now only remains for us to 
apply this finding to the problem of 
reflection in the criminal law. 
  
  
III. III. 
Von der strafrechtlichen Bedeutung der 
Überlegung haben wir bereits 
gesprochen. Ihr liegt offensichtlich der 
dritte der von uns dargelegten Sätze 
We have already spoken of the 
meaning of reflection in criminal law. 
The third of the statements we have 
presented is obviously the basis for it.30 
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zugrunde. Daß der strafrechtliche 
Überlegungsbegriff mit dem von uns 
entwickelten genau übereinstimmt, ist 
natürlich nicht von vornherein 
ausgemacht. Weder braucht unter 
Überlegung das verstanden zu sein, 
was wir als voluntative Überlegung 
analysiert haben, noch braucht der 
Begriff so weit gefaßt zu sein, wie es 
unter psychologischen 
Gesichtspunkten notwendig ist: daß 
nämlich jedes Verhalten des Ich, 
welches zur Beantwortung der inneren 
Frage nach einem Sein oder Seinsollen 
zu dienen bestimmt ist, bereits als 
Überlegung gilt. Es entspricht dem 
gewöhnlichen Sprachgebrauch und 
könnte unter juristischem 
Gesichtspunkte als zweckmäßig 
erscheinen, nur bei besonders 
prominenten inneren 
Verhaltungsweisen des Ich —  etwa bei 
einem Suchen nach Gründen und 
Gegengründen oder Motiven und 
Gegenmotiven, oder nur bei einer 
gewissen zeitlichen Dauer des 
überlegenden Tuns —  von einer 
Überlegung zu reden. Was nun nach 
positivem Rechte unter Überlegung zu 
verstehen ist, ist ein Problem der 
positiven Strafrechtswissenschaft, mit 
welchem wir uns hier nicht zu befassen 
haben. Soweit aber in der Diskussion 
That the concept of reflection in 
criminal law agrees exactly with the 
one developed by us is naturally not to 
be taken for granted. There is no need 
either for what is understood as 
reflection to be that which we have 
analysed as volitional reflection, nor 
for the concept to be so wide as is 
necessary from a psychological 
perspective: that in fact every 
behaviour of the I which serves the 
answering of an inner question about a 
being or an ought already qualifies as 
reflection. It corresponds to customary 
linguistic usage and could from a 
juristic perspective appear as useful to 
speak of a reflection only in relation to 
especially prominent ways of inner 
behaviour of the I —  as with a seeking 
after reasons for and against or motives 
for and against, or only in relation to a 
certain temporal duration of the 
reflective doing. What is now to be 
understood by reflection under positive 
law is a problem for the science of 
positive criminal law, with which we 
do not have to concern ourselves here. 
Insofar, however, as viewpoints of a 
generally psychological or ethical 
nature come into the matter, we want to 
explore them. Our earlier analyses will 
thereby become completed and brought 
further. Perhaps we can hope thereby to 
351 
darüber Gesichtspunkte allgemein 
psychologischer oder ethischer Natur 
in Betracht kommen, wollen wir darauf 
eingehen. Unsere früheren Analysen 
werden dadurch ergänzt und 
weitergeführt werden. Vielleicht dürfen 
wir hoffen, dabei auch dem 
Strafrechtler in einem oder dem andern 
Punkte einen klärenden Beitrag zu 
liefern. 
also deliver a clarifying contribution to 
the criminal jurist, on one point or 
another. 
 Es wäre ein positives Recht 
denkbar, in welchem jede Tötung, 
welche mit (voluntativer) Überlegung 
begangen ist, als Mord qualifiziert und 
dem Totschlag als einer ohne solche 
Überlegung begangenen Tötung 
gegenübergestellt wäre. Nach unseren 
bisherigen Analysen wäre eine solche 
Bestimmung leicht verständlich: Wer 
einen verbrecherischen Vorsatz faßt 
trotz Erwägung des Tunsollens, {304} 
dokumentiert eben damit eine 
besonders üble Gesinnung. Unser 
positives Strafrecht nun läßt eine 
solche Interpretation nicht ohne 
weiteres zu, ja es scheint sie sogar zu 
verbieten. Zweierlei kommt dabei vor 
allem in Betracht: Es ist von 
Überlegung schlechthin die Rede, nicht 
etwa speziell von voluntativer 
Überlegung in unserem Sinne. Und 
ferner wird ausdrücklich betont, daß 
die Tötung mit Überlegung ausgeführt 
sein muß, wenn es sich um einen Mord 
 A positive law would be 
thinkable in which every killing 
committed with (volitional) reflection 
qualifies as murder, and {in which} 
manslaughter was contrasted with it as 
a killing committed without such 
reflection.31 By our analyses made thus 
far, such a determination would be 
easily understandable: whoever reaches 
a criminal resolve despite consideration 
of the ought-to-do {304} documents in 
that an especially evil disposition. Our 
positive criminal law now does not, 
however, straightforwardly allow such 
an interpretation; indeed, it seems to 
forbid it. Two things above all are 
important here: It is a question of 
reflection in general, not specifically of 
volitional reflection in our sense. And 
further, it is expressly stated that the 
killing must be carried out with 
reflection if it is to be treated as a 
murder. So it is not the reaching of the 
resolve, but the (perhaps quite 
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sein muß, wenn es sich um einen Mord 
handeln soll. Nicht die Vorsatzfassung 
also, sondern die zeitlich vielleicht 
weit abliegende Ausführung des 
Vorsatzes scheint hier durch 
Überlegung vorbereitet oder von 
Überlegung begleitet sein zu sollen. 
Wo Vorsatz und Ausführung zeitlich 
auseinanderfallen, hätte dann die 
Überlegung ihren Ort im zweiten 
Stadium. Ist es aber so —  und manche 
Strafrechtler vertreten diese Ansicht —  
, dann erscheint es uns nicht als 
möglich, diese Überlegung als 
voluntative anzusetzen. Worauf sollte 
sie sich auch beziehen? 
resolve, but the (perhaps quite 
temporally separate) carrying out of the 
resolve that appears to be what should 
be prepared or accompanied by 
reflection. Where resolve and carrying-
out occur temporally separately, the 
reflection would then have its place in 
the second stage. But if it is so —  and 
many criminal jurists uphold this view 
—  then it does not appear to us as 
possible to interpret this reflection as 
volitional. What, after all, should it aim 
itself towards? 
Der Vorsatz ist ja bereits gefaßt. Eine 
Überlegung, welche sich auf das »Ob« 
der Tat richtet, und die als solche in 
einer neuen Vorsatzfassung ausmünden 
müßte, kann demnach nicht in Betracht 
kommen. Es bleibt als Thema der 
Überlegung nur noch das »Wie«. Die 
Überlegung geht nicht darauf aus, 
welches Projekt oder ob ein Projekt zu 
realisieren ist, sondern auf welche 
Weise ein schon vorgesetztes Projekt 
am geeignetsten realisiert werden kann. 
Es handelt sich dabei offenbar um eine 
intellektuelle Überlegung in unserm 
früheren Sinne. Insofern es sich dabei 
spezieller darum handelt, die Mittel zu 
erwägen, welche einen erstrebten 
The resolve has already been reached. 
A reflection which orients itself after 
the ‘whether’ of the act, and which as 
such must lead to a new resolve-
forming, cannot therefore come into 
the question. There remains for the 
theme of the reflection only the ‘how’. 
The reflection does not concern which 
project to realise or whether to realise 
it, but in which way an already 
resolved-upon project can be most 
suitably realised. It seems here to be a 
case of intellectual reflection in our 
earlier sense. Insofar as it specifically 
concerns consideration of the means 
which is most suited to bringing about 
a strived-for consequence, we could 
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Erfolg am sichersten herbeizuführen 
geeignet sind, können wir von einer 
praktisch intellektuellen Überlegung 
reden. Wie alle intellektuelle 
Überlegung läuft sie in eine 
Seinserkenntnis aus, aber diese 
Erkenntnis wird in ganz eigenartiger 
Weise hier im Vorsatz »aufgehoben«. 
Die als geeignet erkannten Mittel 
werden dann ja selbst vorgesetzt; oder 
genauer —  da es sich nicht um einen 
neuen, selbständigen Vorsatz handelt 
— : Der bereits entstandene Vorsatz 
wird durch die praktisch-intellektuelle 
Überlegung bereichert, er umfaßt nun 
auch die Realisierung der Mittel, 
welche diese entdeckt hat. 
talk of a practical-intellectual 
reflection. Like all intellectual 
reflection, it culminates in a 
recognition of being, but this 
recognition is, in a quite unique way, 
here ‘depending on’ the resolve. The 
means recognised as suitable is already 
then indeed endorsed; or, to be precise 
—  as there is no question of a new, 
independent resolve — : the already 
reached resolve is enriched through 
practical-intellectual reflection; it now 
embraces as well the realisation of the 
means which {that reflection} 
discovered. 
 Von hier aus gesehen ist eine 
Auffassung denkbar —  und in der Tat 
vertreten worden — , nach der es die 
praktische Überlegung ist, welche den 
Mord vom Totschlag unterscheidet. Es 
erhebt sich hier für uns die Frage, von 
welchem Gesichtspunkte aus sich eine 
so viel schärfere Beurteilung der mit 
einer praktisch-intellektuellen 
Überlegung Begangenen Tötung 
rechtfertigen läßt. Das Projekt ist hier 
schon vorgesetzt, seine Realisierung 
wird überhaupt nicht mehr in Frage 
gezogen —  warum hier die härtere 
Verurteilung? Man kann den 
Gesichtspunkt geltend machen, den wir 
 Looking at it from this 
perspective, an interpretation is 
thinkable —  which in fact is 
represented —  according to which it is 
practical reflection which separates 
murder from manslaughter. Here the 
question arises for us: which 
viewpoints allow us to justify such a 
very harsh assessment of the killing 
carried out with practical-intellectual 
reflection? The project is already 
resolved here, its realisation is no 
longer brought into question at all —  
why, here, the stronger condemnation? 
One can put forward the view we 
singled out earlier: here, the project is 
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früher herausgehoben haben: Es wird 
das Projekt immerhin hier in Betracht 
gezogen, wenn auch in einer andern 
Richtung als bei der voluntativen 
Überlegung; somit müßten Unwert und 
negatives Interesse doch mehr auffallen 
als bei gänzlich mangelnder 
Betrachtung, ähnlich wie die 
Ähnlichkeit eines Dinges mit anderen 
uns eher auffallen wird, wenn wir es 
auf seine Größe hin betrachten, als 
wenn wir ihm gar keine Beachtung 
schenken. 
drawn into view throughout, if indeed 
in a different orientation compared to 
volitional reflection; thus, disvalue and 
negative interest would have to stand 
out more than without such attention, 
as when the similarity of a thing with 
others stands out sooner to us when we 
are regarding its size than if we pay it 
no attention. 
Es ist {305} demgegenüber zunächst zu 
betonen, daß die Unempfänglichkeit, 
die sich bei einer direkten Frage nach 
Wert und Interesse des Projektes 
dokumentiert, in jedem Falle sehr viel 
größer ist als bei der Frage nach seiner 
Realisierungsweise, daß es daher ganz 
und gar nicht einzusehen ist, warum 
man der voluntativen Überlegung die 
praktische Überlegung gleichgeordnet 
zur Seite stellen oder gar die erste 
durch die zweite ersetzen sollte. 
Wichtiger noch ist aber ein zweites: So 
sehr die Betrachtung des Projektes die 
Zugänglichkeit seines Wertcharakters 
befördern mag, so ungünstig kann auf 
der andern Seite die gebundene 
Betrachtungsrichtung wirken. Gerade 
weil das Subjekt nur nach dem »Wie« 
der Realisierung fragt, können Unwert 
In relation to this, it is {305} to be 
stressed that the unreceptivity which 
documents itself in a direct question 
about the value and interest of the 
project in any case is much greater than 
in the question about its means of 
realisation; that it therefore is 
incomprehensible why one should 
place volitional reflection on the same 
level as practical reflection, or indeed 
substitute the former for the latter. Still 
more important, though, is a second 
point: As much as the contemplation of 
the project might encourage access to 
its value-character, the narrow angle of 
viewing may also be equally 
unsuitable. Precisely because the 
subject only questions the ‘how’ of the 
project, disvalue and negative interest, 
which might still perhaps have 
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und negatives Interesse, die sonst sich 
vielleicht aufgedrängt hätten, außer 
acht gelassen werden, analog wie eine 
Ähnlichkeit, die mir sonst aufgefallen 
wäre, von mir unbeachtet bleiben kann, 
wenn mich die Frage nach der Größe 
des Dinges allzu ausschließlich 
beschäftigt. Von einer Eindeutigkeit 
des Symbolverhältnisses kann hier 
nicht die Rede sein; es ist daher ganz 
und gar ungerechtfertigt, die so 
ungeheuer weittragende Scheidung von 
Mord und Totschlag auf das 
Vorhandensein oder 
Nichtvorhandensein der praktisch-
intellektuellen Überlegung zu gründen. 
imposed themselves, could be ignored, 
analogously with how a similarity 
which might have stood out for me can 
go unnoticed if I occupy myself too 
exclusively with the thing’s size. We 
cannot say that the symbolic 
relationship is unambiguous here; it is 
therefore well and truly unjustified to 
base the so enormously far-reaching 
difference between murder and 
manslaughter on the presence or 
absence of practical-intellectual 
reflection. 
 Man wird demgegenüber wohl 
einen neuen Gesichtspunkt geltend 
machen. Man wird von der 
Verwerflichkeit reden, die sich in der 
Kaltblütigkeit des Täters dokumentiert, 
wenn er sich nicht von der 
Vorsatzfassung aus sofort auf die Tat 
losstürzt, sondern in aller Ruhe die 
Mittel und Wege dazu erwägt. Aber 
auch das reicht nicht aus, um einen 
prinzipiellen Unterschied zu 
begründen. Denn die Symbolik, welche 
hier zwischen Kaltblütigkeit und 
Überlegung einerseits, Überstürztheit 
und Überlegungsmangel andererseits in 
Anspruch genommen wird, ist nach 
keiner Richtung hin eine eindeutige. Es 
 Against this, one would perhaps 
put forward another point of view. One 
could speak of the reprehensibility 
which documents itself in the cold-
bloodedness of the agent if he does not 
leap directly from the reaching of 
resolve to the doing, but with total 
calm weighs up the means and the way. 
But this too does not suffice to found a 
principal difference. For the symbolism 
which here is invoked between cold-
bloodedness and reflection on the one 
hand, between rashness and a lack of 
reflection on the other, is in no way 
unambiguous. There is not only calm 
reflection, but also a hasty, agitated 
seeking after the means to an already-
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gibt nicht nur die ruhige Überlegung, 
sondern auch ein hastiges, aufgeregtes 
Suchen nach den Mitteln zu einem 
vorgefaßten Ziele. Ein solches Suchen 
kann ebensowohl etwa aus innerer 
Angst entspringen als aus innerer 
Kaltblütigkeit. Andererseits aber 
braucht die absoluteste Ruhe und 
Kaltblütigkeit nicht praktische 
Überlegung zur Folge zu haben. Man 
hat bei jenen Einwänden sich offenbar 
höchst einseitig an den Fällen 
orientiert, in denen zunächst noch die 
Realisierungsmöglichkeit von dem 
Subjekte aufzusuchen ist, oder in denen 
dem Subjekte eine Reihe von 
Realisierungsmöglichkeiten sich 
darbieten, unter denen es zu wählen 
hat. Keineswegs sind damit aber alle 
möglichen Fälle erschöpft. 
grasped end. Such a seeking can just as 
well emerge from, perhaps, an inner 
anguish as from an inner cold-
bloodedness. On the other hand, the 
most absolute calm and cold-
bloodedness do not need to result in 
practical reflection. With these 
objections one has obviously turned 
most one-sidedly to those cases in 
which either the possibility of 
realisation is still to be sought out by 
the subject, or in which an array of 
possibilities of realisation appears 
before the subject from which he has to 
choose. In no way, however, are all 
possible cases exhausted by this. 
Ein Mann lauert auf der Jagd einem 
Wilde auf, sein Todfeind geht vorüber. 
Er überlegt lange, ob er ihn töten soll, 
dann entschließt er sich und erschießt 
ihn. Das ist der typische Mord. Nach 
der Auffassung, welche nur praktische 
Überlegung gelten läßt, müßte es 
Totschlag sein; denn eine Überlegung 
der Mittel hat nicht stattgefunden. 
Hätte der Mann geschwankt, ob er mit 
Schrot oder Kugel laden solle, so wäre 
es Mord gewesen. Kann man aus 
solchen irrelevanten Zufälligkeiten so 
A man lies in wait hunting game, when 
his mortal enemy passes by. He reflects 
at length on whether he should kill {the 
enemy}, decides, and shoots him. That 
is the typical murder. According to the 
understanding which only allows 
practical reflection to be valid, it would 
have to be manslaughter, because a 
reflection on the means has not taken 
place. Had the man vacillated over 
whether he should use shot or a bullet, 
then it would have been murder. Can 
such irrelevant accidental details lead 
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ungeheuere Konsequenzen ziehen? Es 
ist gewiß nicht zulässig, Theorien, 
welche die Aufgabe haben, eine sehr 
große Menge von Einzelfällen zu 
regeln, durch die absurde {306} 
Konsequenz in irgendeinem einzelnen 
Falle zu »widerlegen«. Aber es kommt 
hier gar nicht auf den einzelnen Fall an, 
sondern auf das Prinzipielle, das bei 
ihm nur besonders deutlich zur 
Erscheinung kommt. Es gibt eine 
eigene Art von Fällen, in welchen der 
Weg zum Erfolg ohne weiteres 
eindeutig vor Augen liegt, in denen 
praktische Überlegung also gar keine 
Stelle hat —  warum sollte man diesen 
ganz äußerlichen Umstand dem 
Verbrecher zugute halten? Und es gibt 
andere Fälle, in denen sich von 
vornherein mehrere 
Realisierungsmöglichkeiten des 
Erfolges darbieten, in denen also 
praktische Überlegung am Platze ist —  
warum sollte man um dessentwillen 
den Täter härter verurteilen? Insofern 
sich im Vorhandensein der praktischen 
Überlegung nach keiner Richtung hin 
notwendig eine verwerflichere 
Gesinnung dokumentiert als in ihrem 
Fehlen, entbehrt die Abgrenzung von 
Mord und Totschlag durch jenes 
Moment eines jeden vernünftigen 
Sinnes. 
to such enormous consequences? 
Certainly, it is not permissible to 
‘refute’ theories which have the 
assignment of governing a very large 
number of individual cases through the 
absurd {306} consequences {they may 
have} in any one case. But here it is in 
fact not about the individual case, but 
rather about the principle which 
becomes especially visible in it. There 
is a specific kind of case in which the 
way to success lies clearly before one’s 
eyes, in which practical reflection thus 
has no place at all —  why should one 
count this quite superficial 
circumstance to be to the wrongdoer’s 
credit? And there are other cases in 
which, from the outset, several 
possibilities for realisation of the action 
present themselves, in which case then 
practical reflection has a place —  why 
should one condemn the agent more 
harshly because of that? Insofar as the 
presence of practical reflection in no 
way necessarily documents a more 
reprehensible disposition than its 
absence, the demarcation between 
murder and manslaughter with this 
factor lacks any rational sense. 
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 Die Interpretation unseres 
Strafgesetzes, an der wir uns bisher 
orientiert haben, ist keineswegs die 
einzig mögliche. Man hat für sie 
historische, »dogmatische« und 
Gründe kriminalpolitischer Natur 
geltend gemacht.32* Eine Beurteilung 
der Gründe, welche der 
Entstehungsgeschichte des § 211 
entnommen werden, steht uns natürlich 
hier nicht zu. Für allein 
ausschlaggebend wird sie jedenfalls 
niemand halten. Die Berufung auf den 
Sinn und Zweck der Bestimmung 
kann, wie wir gezeigt haben, nur zur 
Ablehnung jener Interpretation führen. 
Aber auch die dogmatische Erwägung, 
d. h. die Untersuchung »des klaren 
Wortlautes des § 211«, ist nicht so 
entscheidend, wie man geglaubt hat. 
Zwar ist hier ausdrücklich ein 
Ausführen mit Überlegung gefordert; 
aber es ist nicht richtig, daß dabei 
notwendig an die Realisierung des 
Vorsatzes, an die Ausführungshandlung 
in diesem engen Sinne gedacht werden 
muß. Betrachtet man das Verhalten 
oder das Tun eines Menschen im 
ganzen, so kann man das, was er tut, 
und was als Identisches auch beliebig 
viele andere Menschen tun können, 
von dem Tun selbst abtrennen, von 
dem also, was bei hundert »dasselbe« 
 The interpretation of our 
criminal law which we have followed 
so far is in no way the only one 
possible. Reasons have been offered 
for {this interpretation} that are 
historical, ‘dogmatic,’ and of a 
criminal-political nature.34* An 
assessment of the reasons, as they are 
gathered from the history of § 211, is 
naturally not appropriate for us here. 
Nobody would, in any case, take 
{this interepretation} as conclusive 
on its own. The appeal to the sense 
and purpose of the determination 
can, as we have indicated, only lead 
to the rejection of that interpretation. 
But the dogmatic consideration too, 
that is, the investigation of ‘the clear 
wording of § 211,’ is not so decisive 
as some have believed. Admittedly, 
a carrying-out with reflection is 
expressly called for here; but it is 
not correct that it is thereby 
necessarily the realisation of the 
resolve, the action of carrying-out in 
this narrow sense, that must be 
thought of. If one considers the 
behaviour or the conduct of a human 
being as a whole, then one can divide 
that which he does, and which could 
identically be done by any number of 
other human beings, from the doing 
itself; from that, that is, which, with a 
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tuenden Menschen hundertmal 
vorhanden ist. Wie die vielen 
Erlebnisse des Urteilens von dem einen 
in ihnen allen vollzogenen Urteil, so 
trennen wir das beliebig häufige Tun 
von der einen getanen Tat. Dies Tun 
der Tat nun, ihr Vollziehen, wird 
mitunter als ihre Ausführung 
bezeichnet. »Tat« mag z. B. ein 
Diebstahl sein, d. h. das vorsätzliche 
Wegnehmen einer fremden 
beweglichen Sache in der Absicht, sie 
sich rechtswidrig zuzueignen. Damit ist 
der eine identische Gesamttatbestand 
des Diebstahls bezeichnet, der in 
beliebig vielen Akten zum Vollzug oder 
zur »Ausführung« kommt. Zur 
Ausführung des Diebstahltatbestandes 
gehört hier offenbar nicht nur das 
tatsächliche Wegnehmen, die 
Ausführung des Vorsatzes im engeren 
Sinne, sondern auch die Vorsatzfassung 
selbst. Unser jetziger Begriff der 
Ausführung —  dessen häufige 
Verwendung außer Zweifel steht —  
bedeutet also etwas anderes {307} und 
Umfassenderes als der frühere, welcher 
sich lediglich auf die Realisation des 
Vorsatzes bezog. Wir sehen somit, daß 
auch jene dogmatische Erwägung zum 
mindesten nicht zwingend ist. Ist es 
aber möglich, die Ausführung im Sinne 
des § 211 als Realisierung des 
hundred human beings who do ‘the 
same’, is present a hundred times. As 
{we divide} the many experiences of 
judging from the one judgement 
performed in each of them, so too we 
divide the individual, common doings 
from the one action that is done. Now 
the doing of the action, its 
performance, is sometimes indicated as 
its being carried out. ‘Action’ may, for 
example, be a theft, that is, the 
intentional taking away of a thing 
belonging to another with a view to 
illegally depriving them of it. Thereby 
the identical, complete offence of theft 
is designated, which in any number of 
actions comes to be fulfilled or ‘carried 
out’. Not only the factual taking-away 
{of someone’s property} and the 
carrying-out of the resolve in a narrow 
sense belong to the carrying-out of the 
offence of theft, but also the reaching 
of the resolve. Our current concept of 
carrying-out —  of the common usage 
of which there is no doubt —  therefore 
means something different {307} and 
broader than the earlier one, which 
simply relates to the realisation of the 
resolve. We see therefore that such 
dogmatic consideration, too, is at least 
not absolutely compelling. If it is 
possible, though, to understand the 
carrying-out in the sense of § 211 as 
360 
Gesamttatbestandes und nicht als 
Realisierung des Vorsatzes 
aufzufassen, so eröffnet sich damit die 
Möglichkeit, den Überlegungsbegriff 
des Strafgesetzbuches als voluntativen 
in Anspruch zu nehmen. Zugleich aber 
sind die verschiedenartigsten Theorien 
möglich geworden; wir sehen hier 
deutlich, wie die Frage nach der 
Überlegungsart und das 
Lokalisierungsproblem der Überlegung 
zwar in naher Beziehung stehen, aber 
keineswegs zusammenfallen. Auch wer 
nicht der Ansicht ist, daß die 
Überlegung bei der Ausführung im 
engern Sinne statthaben muß, kann 
ausschließlich die praktische 
Überlegung fordern, sei es nur bei der 
Vorsatzfassung, sei es —  was näher 
liegen wird —  bei der Vorsatzfassung 
oder der Ausführung oder bei beiden. 
Dagegen kann, wer die voluntative 
Überlegung zuläßt, sie, wie wir gezeigt 
haben, nur für die Vorsatzfassung 
fordern. Selbstverständlich steht auch 
ihm noch die Möglichkeit offen, 
daneben auch praktische Überlegung 
zu fordern, sei es alternativ oder 
kumulativ, und diese praktische 
Überlegung bei der Vorsatzfassung, 
oder Ausführung oder an beiden 
Stellen zu lokalisieren.33* Welche 
dieser Theorien für das geltende 
the realisation of the entirety of the 
real act and not as the realisation of 
the resolve, it becomes possible to 
take the concept of reflection in the 
civil code as being volitional. 
Immediately, the most different 
kinds of theories become possible; 
we see here clearly how the question 
about the kind of reflection and the 
problem of localisation of the 
reflection certainly stand in a close 
relation, but in no way coincide. 
Also the one who is not of the view 
that reflection must occur at the 
carrying-out in the narrow sense 
may insist on practical reflection 
exclusively, be it only at the reaching 
of the resolve, be it —  which would be 
closer {to being correct} —  at the 
reaching of the resolve or the carrying-
out or at both. Conversely, whoever 
permits volitional reflection may, as we 
have shown, only demand it at the 
reaching of the resolve. Self-evidently, 
the possibility remains open to him 
also of demanding practical reflection 
alongside, should it be alternatively or 
cumulatively, and of localising this 
practical reflection at the reaching of 
resolve, or the carrying-out, or in both 
places.35* Which of these theories has 
interpretive validity for the actual civil 
code is not our concern here; we have 
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Strafgesetzbuch interpretatorisch 
Geltung hat, geht uns, die wir nur den 
Sinn möglicher Bestimmungen zu 
erörtern haben, nichts an. Daß 
praktische Überlegung, von welcher 
Form auch immer, nicht als 
zuverlässiges Symbol verwerflicher 
Gesinnung fungieren kann, haben wir 
gezeigt. So bleibt uns nur noch übrig, 
den Sinn der Theorie zu erörtern, 
welche eine Vorsatzfassung mit 
voluntativer Überlegung verlangt. 
only to discuss the sense of its possible 
determination. We have shown that 
practical reflection, of whatever form, 
cannot function as a reliable symbol of 
a reprehensible disposition. All that 
remains for us is thus to discuss the 
meaning of the theory which demands 
the reaching of a resolve with 
volitional reflection. 
 Das Wesentliche ist hier, daß 
eine Überlegung des Projektes seiner 
Vorsatzfassung vorausgeht. Mag man 
ferner vom Standpunkt des positiven 
Rechtes über das hinaus, was das 
Wesen der Überlegung ausmacht, 
vielleicht einen besonders intensiven 
oder längere Zeit dauernden Prozeß 
verlangen, gleichgültig ist jedenfalls, 
ob der schließliche Vorsatz sich auf 
Grund der überlegenden Tätigkeit 
entwickelt, ob die Überlegung also zu 
ihrem Ziele gelangt, oder ob sie zu 
keinem Resultate führt und der Vorsatz 
ganz unabhängig von ihr, etwa aus 
einem plötzlichen Impuls heraus, 
gefaßt wird, oder ob sie zu einem 
entgegengesetzten Resultate führt, der 
Vorsatz also dem Vernehmen einer 
negativen Forderung zuwider gefaßt 
wird. 
 The essential point here is that a 
reflection on the project precedes its 
being resolved upon. Even if one 
would, from the standpoint of the 
positive law further to that which 
concerns the essence of reflection, 
perhaps call for an especially intensive 
or long-lasting process, it is in any case 
indifferent whether the final resolve 
develops on the basis of the reflective 
activity, whether the reflection thus 
achieves its goal, whether it leads to no 
result and the resolve is reached 
independently of it, perhaps from a 
sudden impulse, or whether it leads to 
an opposing result, and the resolve is 
reached in contradiction of a heard 
negative demand.36  
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 In den hier in Frage 
kommenden Fällen wird das 
verbrecherische Projekt in Betracht 
gezogen; darin, daß das Subjekt den 
Vorsatz dennoch faßt, dokumentiert 
sich zum mindesten eine geringere 
Wertempfänglichkeit, jedenfalls also 
eine üblere Gesinnung, als wenn jede 
Überlegung gefehlt hätte. Unsere 
früheren Erörterungen greifen hier 
Platz; nur in einem Punkte bedürfen sie 
einer Ergän- {308} zung. Es handelt 
sich hier nicht mehr um die rein 
ethische, sondern um die rechtliche 
Bewertung des Tuns. Für sie sind zwar 
sicherlich auch die früher entwickelten 
ethischen Gesichtspunkte maßgebend, 
es treten aber neue, außerethische 
hinzu. Es bedarf zunächst keiner 
weiteren Darlegung, daß bei 
Verbrechen der Regel nach das 
Interesse des Projekts für den Täter, 
und nicht etwa sein Wert oder Unwert 
an sich, in der Überlegung in Frage 
gestellt wird.  
 In the cases in question here, 
the criminal project is drawn into 
consideration; that the subject 
nevertheless reaches the resolve 
documents at least a lower receptivity 
to value, and thus also a more evil 
disposition than if reflection had been 
absent. Our earlier discussions enter in 
here; only in one point do they require 
elaboration. {308} Here, it is no longer 
a matter of the purely ethical, but of the 
legal evaluation of the doing. For this, 
the earlier developed ethical 
viewpoints are indeed certainly 
significant, but new, extra-ethical ones 
enter in. It requires at first no further 
explanation that with a crime, it is the 
interest of the project for the agent, and 
not, for example, its value or disvalue 
as such which is brought into question 
by the reflection.  
Wir haben früher ausgeführt, daß auch 
bei dieser Einstellung eine geringere 
Wertempfänglichkeit sich 
dokumentieren kann, als wenn das 
Projekt überhaupt nicht und in keiner 
Richtung in Frage gestellt wäre. Aber 
für das Strafrecht kommt daneben auch 
die Unempfänglichkeit für gewisse 
We have earlier shown that in this 
attitude, too, a lower value-receptivity 
can document itself than if the project 
was not at all and in no way put into 
question. But for the criminal law, the 
unreceptivity to certain personal 
interest also comes into the question in 
a decisive way. 
363 
persönliche Interessen in 
ausschlaggebender Weise in Betracht. 
Es ist ihm ja wesentlich, durch die 
Strafandrohung ein negatives Interesse 
des Verbrechens für jedermann 
künstlich zu erzeugen. Ihm genügt es 
vollkommen, wenn in Erkenntnis 
dieses negativen Interesses und nur mit 
Rücksicht darauf die von ihm 
bedrohten Handlungen unterlassen 
werden. Ein Mensch, der ein geplantes 
Projekt nur mit Rücksicht auf das 
drohende Strafleiden aufgibt, wird 
ethisch gewiß nicht höher, unter 
Umständen sogar niedriger gewertet 
werden, als wer es allem Leiden zum 
Trotz durchführt. Die rechtliche 
Beurteilung aber verläuft im 
umgekehrten Sinne. Die »antisoziale« 
Gesinnung fällt mit der unethischen 
nicht einmal in der Weise zusammen, 
daß sie einen kleinen Ausschnitt dieser 
bildete; zu ihr gehört auch die —  
ethisch nicht ohne weiteres negativ zu 
wertende —  Unempfänglichkeit gegen 
das Strafübel.37* Von hier aus gesehen 
ist es nicht einmal ein ethisches 
Minimum, welches das Strafrecht 
verlangt, sondern etwas, das jenseits 
aller ethischen Positivitäten liegt. 
Damit ist die rechtliche Beurteilung der 
Überlegung um einen neuen 
Gesichtspunkt bereichert. Insofern in 
ihr dem Gedanken an die rechtlichen 
Indeed, it is essential to it, through the 
threat of punishment, to artificially 
create a negative interest of criminality 
for everyone. For {the criminal law}, it 
suffices perfectly if it is in recognition 
of this negative interest, and only in 
view of that, that the actions which are 
threatened {by punishment} are 
refrained from. A human being who 
gives up on a planned project only in 
view of the threatened suffering of 
punishment certainly does not become 
ethically higher, in the circumstances 
in fact is evaluated even lower, than 
one who carries it out in spite of all 
suffering. The legal assessment, 
however, proceeds in the opposite 
direction. The ‘antisocial’ disposition 
does not coincide with the unethical, 
not even in the sense that it forms a 
small section of it; to {the former}, 
unreceptivity to the evil of punishment 
—  which is not simply to be valuated 
negatively in an ethical context —  also 
belongs.39* From this perspective it is 
not at all an ethical minimum that the 
criminal law calls for, but something 
that lies beyond all ethical positives. 
Thereby, the legal judgement of 
reflection is expanded on account of a 
new viewpoint. Insofar as thoughts of 
the legal consequences, the evil of 
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ihr dem Gedanken an die rechtlichen 
Folgen, an das Strafübel und alle mit 
ihm verbundenen Leiden ein größerer 
Spielraum gegeben ist, dokumentiert 
sich in der mit Überlegung begangenen 
Tat eine rechtlich in besonderem Maße 
verdammenswerte Gesinnung.38* In 
merkwürdiger Weise ergibt sich hier 
bei dem Tötungsdelikte eine 
Komplikation der Sachlage dadurch, 
daß gerade das Moment, welches dazu 
bestimmt ist, das drohende Übel in eine 
besondere geistige Nähe zu rücken, 
durch sein Vorhandensein gleichzeitig 
dieses Übel beträchtlich erhöht. 
the legal consequences, the evil of 
punishment and all of the associated 
suffering are given free reign in it, the 
action undergone with reflection 
documents an especially legally 
damnable disposition.40* Strangely, a 
complication of the situation is present 
when dealing with the offence of 
killing, in that precisely the factor 
which is determined to move the 
threatened evil into an especial 
spiritual proximity, by its existence 
simultaneously increases this evil 
considerably. 
 So scheint also auf den ersten 
Blick die Scheidung von Mord und 
Totschlag durch das Moment der 
Überlegung, wie sie unser 
Strafgesetzbuch vornimmt, und wie sie, 
den Beschlüssen der 
Strafrechtskommission zufolge,41* 
auch für die geplante neue 
Strafrechtskodifikation in Aussicht 
genommen ist, durchaus sinnvoll zu 
sein, insoweit es dabei speziell auf die 
voluntative Überlegung abgesehen ist. 
Indessen dürfen wir auch 
entgegengerichtete Gesichtspunkte 
nicht {309} außer acht lassen. 
 At first glance, then, the 
distinction between murder and 
manslaughter by the factor of reflection 
as it is done by our civil code, and as it, 
as a consequence of the conclusions of 
the criminal law commission,42* is also 
to be taken in the planned new 
modifications of the criminal law, 
appears to be thoroughly sensible, 
insofar as it thereby specifically 
evisages volitional reflection. But we 
ought not {309} to disregard opposite 
viewpoints. 
Der vieldeutige Symbolcharakter der 
Überlegung, den wir in unsrer 
allgemeinen Analyse nachgewiesen 
haben, tritt auch hier zutage. 
The equivocal symbolic character of 
reflection, which we have shown in our 
general analyses, also becomes evident 
here. Katzenstein,45* who stands for 
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haben, tritt auch hier zutage. 
Katzenstein,43* welcher für den 
praktischen Überlegungsbegriff eintritt, 
hat gegen den voluntativen 
eingewendet, es werde dadurch ein 
Privileg geschaffen »für die 
verworfensten Verbrecher, für jene 
Mordbuben, in deren Seelen vor dem 
Entschlusse überhaupt kein Abwägen 
der widerstreitenden Motive stattfindet, 
bei denen die allgemeinen 
Vorstellungen der Religion, der 
Sittlichkeit und des Rechtes sich vor 
der Entschlußfassung gar nicht zur 
Geltung bringen können, eben weil 
ihnen derartige Vorstellungen 
vollständig mangeln«.44* 
here. Katzenstein,45* who stands for 
the concept of practical reflection, has 
objected against the volitional that 
through it a privilege would be created 
‘for the most reproachable criminal, for 
such murdering thugs in whose souls 
no weighing-up of the various motives 
occurs before the decision, with whom 
the various presentations of religion, 
morality and the law do not enter into 
the reaching of decisions, as for them, 
such presentations are utterly 
absent’.46*  
 
 Man sieht, daß sich hier der 
vierte der von uns dargelegten 
Zusammenhänge geltend macht. Neben 
den Unwert, der sich im Vorhandensein 
der Überlegung dokumentiert, tritt der 
Unwert, welchen der Mangel an 
Überlegung anzeigt. Es bleibt natürlich 
dabei, daß, wer eine Handlung 
realisiert, obwohl er ihren Unwert 
fühlt, oder, auf Grund der Frage nach 
dem Tunsollen, hätte fühlen sollen, 
eben dadurch einen größeren Unwert 
repräsentiert, als wer zu einer 
Überlegung überhaupt nicht 
gekommen ist. Aber man darf darüber 
nicht außer acht lassen, daß die 
 One sees that here the fourth of 
our discussed associations is valid.47 
Besides the disvalue which documents 
itself in the presence of reflection 
appears the disvalue which the lack of 
reflection indicates. It naturally 
remains thereby that whoever realises 
an action, although he felt its disvalue 
or, on the basis of the question about 
what he should do, should have felt it, 
represents in this a greater disvalue 
than whoever does not come to a 
reflection at all. But with regard to that, 
one ought not to forget that the fact that 
a volitional reflection was attempted at 
all, and the lack of such a reflection, 
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Tatsache, daß eine voluntative 
Überlegung überhaupt vorgenommen 
wurde, dem Mangel jeglicher 
Überlegung gegenüber einen 
rechtlichen bzw. ethischen Wert 
darstellt. 
represent a legal value and an ethical 
value respectively.48  
Kommt dann noch dazu, daß der 
Mangel an Überlegung aus keinem 
äußerlichen Grunde, sondern aus der 
prinzipiellen Nichtachtung aller Werte 
oder aus einer absoluten 
Unempfänglichkeit für sie entspringt 
—  ein Fall, den Katzenstein offenbar 
im Auge hat — , so ist der Unwert 
zweifellos größer als da, wo von einer 
solchen prinzipiellen Einstellung schon 
auf Grund der Tatsache, daß 
voluntative Überlegung stattgefunden 
hat, keine Rede sein kann, und nur dem 
einzelnen Falle gegenüber jene 
Mißachtung oder Unempfänglichkeit 
vorhanden ist.  
If it then still comes about that the lack 
of reflection originates from no 
external reasons, but from the principal 
disregard of all values or from an 
absolute unreceptivity to them —  a 
case which Katzenstein obviously has 
in mind —  then the disvalue is 
doubtless greater than if there can be 
no talk of such a principled attitude on 
the basis that volitional reflection has 
in fact taken place, and such disregard 
or unreceptivity is only present in the 
individual case.  
Der überlegende »Mörder« steht hier 
sittlich und rechtlich höher als der 
nicht überlegende »Totschläger«; die 
geltende Strafnormierung hat in 
solchen Fällen zweifellos ihren Sinn 
verloren, die Überlegung erweist sich 
als unfähig, als eindeutiges Kriterium 
zu fungieren. 
The reflecting ‘murderer’ here stands 
morally and legally higher than the 
non-reflecting ‘manslaughterer’; the 
actual standard of punishment has in 
such cases doubtlessly lost its sense, 
{and} reflection proves itself as 
unsuitable to function as a univocal 
criterion. 
 Noch weitere Schwierigkeiten 
stellen sich ein. Wie ist es, wenn die 
Vorsatzrealisierung aus der 
Vorsatzfassung nicht unmittelbar 
 Still further difficulties impose 
themselves. How is it if the realisation 
of resolve does not immediately 
originate from the reaching of resolve, 
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Vorsatzfassung nicht unmittelbar 
entspringt, sondern durch einen 
längeren zeitlichen Abstand von ihr 
getrennt ist —  sei es, daß das Subjekt 
den Vorsatz längere Zeit in sich trägt, 
ohne ihn zur Ausübung bringen zu 
können, sei es, daß er seinem Inhalte 
nach von vornherein auf eine spätere 
Ausführung geht? Ist auch zur Zeit 
dieser Ausübung Überlegung 
erforderlich? Aber welche Überlegung 
sollte dies sein; wir wissen ja, daß die 
Forderung praktischer Überlegung 
prinzipiell nicht zu rechtfertigen wäre. 
Man wird hier zunächst zwei Fälle 
unterscheiden können. Eine Handlung 
kann auf Grund des früher gefaßten 
{310} Vorsatzes vollzogen werden oder 
aber auch unabhängig von ihm auf 
Grund eines neuen Vorsatzes. 
Verschiedene Möglichkeiten bieten 
sich hier noch. Der alte Vorsatz kann 
entschwunden, vergessen sein. Er kann 
noch bewußt sein, aber die Welt und 
mit ihm das Subjekt haben sich weiter 
entwickelt, so daß das Subjekt die 
Notwendigkeit verspürt, den 
Willensakt noch einmal in sich zu 
erneuern. Es ist klar, daß bei einem 
solchen Bedürfnis vor der 
Vorsatzfassung zumeist eine neue 
Überlegung einsetzen wird, notwendig 
aber ist das keineswegs: Ein 
originate from the reaching of resolve, 
but is separated from it by a long 
temporal delay —  be it that the subject 
carries the resolve in him for a long 
time without being able to exercise it, 
be it that, according to its content, it 
concerns from the outset a being 
carried out later? Is reflection also 
necessary at the time of this executing? 
But which reflection should this be; we 
know already that the demand for 
practical reflection would in principle 
not be justified. One can here 
distinguish two cases. An action can be 
performed on the basis of an earlier-
reached {310} resolve, or alternatively, 
independently of it, on the basis of a 
new resolve. Different possibilities 
present themselves here. The old 
resolve can disappear, be forgotten. It 
can still be known of, but the world 
and with it the subject have developed 
themselves further, so that the subject 
feels the necessity of once again 
renewing the act of willing. It is clear 
that with such a need, for the most part, 
a new reflection would begin before 
the reaching of the resolve, but that is 
in no way necessary: the thought of a 
project emerges, it displaces the old 
obsolete resolve, in the subject; but, 
unconcerned with this faded piece of 
the past, it at once and without 
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Projektgedanke taucht auf, es regt sich 
der alte, verjährte Vorsatz im Subjekt, 
aber unbekümmert um dies verdorrte 
Stück Vergangenheit faßt es sofort und 
ohne Überlegung den alten Vorsatz 
zum zweiten Male. Dann stellt sich das 
darauffolgende Tun objektiv als eine 
Ausführung sowohl des alten als des 
neuen Vorsatzes dar. Es entspringt aber 
allein aus dem neuen Vorsatze und ist 
ihm und nur ihm als phänomenale 
Ausführungshandlung zugeordnet. Wo 
immer ein neuer Vorsatz gefaßt wird, 
bedarf es gemäß § 211 sicherlich einer 
erneuerten Überlegung. 
reflection reaches the old resolve for a 
second time. Then, the doing that 
follows from this presents itself 
objectively as a carrying-out as much 
of the old resolve as of the new. But it 
originates solely from the new resolve 
and is to be categorised as an action of 
carrying-out of it and it alone. 
Wherever a new resolve is reached, it 
most probably requires in accordance 
with § 211 a renewed reflection. 
Wo aber auf Grund des alten Vorsatzes 
gehandelt wird und mit Rückbeziehung 
auf ihn, ist eine solche Überlegung 
nicht erforderlich; sie wird sogar 
normalerweise ausgeschlossen sein. 
Denn jede voluntative Überlegung 
pflegt ja auf die Fassung eines ihr 
zugehörigen Vorsatzes abzuzielen. 
Höchstens an solche Fälle könnte man 
denken, in denen mit Abbrechung der 
neuen Überlegung und unbeeinflußt 
durch sie das Subjekt den alten Vorsatz 
wieder übernimmt. Aber selbst wo ein 
solcher Fall vorliegt, ist es die 
ursprüngliche, nicht die zweite 
Überlegung, welche die nunmehr 
vollzogene Tötung zum Morde 
stempelt. 
Where, however, there is action on the 
basis of the old resolve and in 
hindsight of it, such a reflection is not 
needed; it is even normally shut out. 
Because every volitional reflection 
normally reaches a resolve that belongs 
to it. At most one could think of such 
cases in which with the breaking-off of 
the new reflection, and uninfluenced by 
it, the subject takes on the old resolve 
again. But even where such a case 
obtains, it is the original reflection, not 
the second, which stamps the now 
performed killing as murder. 
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 So berechtigt diese 
Unterscheidung an sich auch ist, so 
wenig wird sie doch endgültig 
befriedigen können. Sehen wir ganz 
davon ab, daß in der Praxis die 
Trennung eines auf Grund des alten 
Vorsatzes vollzogenen und eines neu 
vorgesetzten Tuns fast niemals möglich 
sein wird, so bleibt uns noch eine 
Klasse bisher unberührter Fälle übrig. 
Zweifellos ist der Eindruck des 
Unwertes und des negativen Interesses 
eines Tuns sehr viel lebendiger, wenn 
der Täter vor der Ausführungshandlung 
steht, als wenn er, noch weit von ihr 
entfernt, den Vorsatz faßt. Wie steht es, 
wenn jemand in heftiger emotionaler 
Erregung einen Vorsatz ausführt, den er 
früher mit Überlegung gefaßt hat, vor 
dessen Ausführung er aber ohne jene 
Erregung sicherlich zurückgeschreckt 
wäre? Insofern auf Grund eines mit 
Überlegung gefaßten Vorsatzes 
gehandelt wird, ist der Fall als Mord zu 
beurteilen. Und doch liegt eine 
offenbare Ungerechtigkeit hier vor. Der 
Täter hat keineswegs die 
Wertunempfänglichkeit des Mörders 
bewiesen, welcher unmittelbar 
angesichts der Tat seinen Vorsatz faßt; 
seine Gesinnung braucht um nichts 
minderwertiger zu sein als die des 
Totschlägers, der erst in der Erregung 
 As justified as this distinction 
as such is, it is equally unsatisfactory in 
the end. If we completely ignore here 
that in practice, the separating of a 
doing performed due to the old resolve 
from one newly resolved would almost 
never be possible, a class of cases not 
touched upon thus far still remains for 
us. Without doubt, the impression 
made by the disvalue and the negative 
interest of a doing is much livelier 
when the agent stands before the action 
of carrying it out than if he, still far 
away from it, grasps the resolve. How 
is it if someone, in a violent emotive 
turmoil, carries out a resolve that he 
had earlier reached with reflection, but 
from which, before the carrying out, 
without such a turmoil, he would 
surely have shrunk away from in 
horror? Insofar as a resolve reached 
with reflection is carried out, the case 
is to be judged as murder. And yet an 
obvious injustice exists here. The agent 
has in no way proven the unreceptivity 
to value of a murderer, who reaches his 
resolve immediately in the face of the 
act; his disposition needs in nothing to 
be valued lower than that of the 
manslaughterer who first in the turmoil 
and without any reflection rushes to the 
decision. 
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und ohne jede Überlegung zum 
Entschlusse hingerissen wird. 
 Solche Erwägungen haben 
wohl mitgewirkt, wenn man 
Überlegung bei der 
Ausführungshandlung forderte. Aber es 
ist nach unseren Darlegungen klar, daß 
voluntative Überlegung hier keine 
Stelle haben, praktische Überlegung 
aber sinnvollerweise nicht zur 
Kennzeichnung des Mordes verwendet 
werden kann. {311} Man hat sogar 
verlangt, daß die Ausführungshandlung 
sich mit Überlegung bis an ihr Ende 
vollziehe. Indessen kann Überlegung 
den Handlungsvollzug zwar 
unterbrechen, um eine neue Erkenntnis 
oder einen neuen Willensentschluß 
vorzubereiten; aber innerhalb eines auf 
Überlegung beruhenden 
kontinuierlichen Handlungsabflusses 
hat sie keine Stelle. Hier macht sich 
freilich häufig eine verwirrende 
Äquivokation bemerkbar: Das mit 
Überlegung vollzogene oder 
»überlegte« Tun gilt als das ruhige und 
affektlose Tun, im Gegensatz zu dem 
in »leidenschaftlicher Aufwallung« 
vollzogenen. Man übersieht dabei, daß 
das Strafgesetzbuch beim Morde vom 
Vorhandensein der Überlegung und 
nicht vom Fehlen des Affektes spricht; 
und daß es beim Totschlag vom Fehlen 
der Überlegung spricht und nicht vom 
 Such considerations probably 
played a role when reflection was 
demanded with the action of carrying-
out. But it is clear from our discussion 
that volitional reflection has no place 
here; practical reflection, though, in a 
more sensible way, cannot be used for 
the identification of murder. {311} It 
has even been asked that the action of 
carrying out itself is performed with 
reflection through to its end. In this, 
reflection can break into the 
performance of the action, to prepare a 
new recognition or a new decision of 
the will; but within a continuous flow 
of actions based on reflection, it has no 
place. Here very often a confusing 
equivocation makes itself notable: the 
doing fulfilled with reflection, the 
‘reflected-on’ doing, is seen as a calm 
and emotionless doing, in opposition to 
that performed in a ‘surge of passion’. 
In this, {two facts are} overlooked: 
{first,} that the civil code speaks, with 
regard to murder, of the presence of 
reflection, not of the absence of 
emotion; and {second,} that with 
regard to manslaughter it speaks of the 
absence of reflection and not of the 
presence of emotion. Nothing, 
however, is clearer than that on the one 
hand there can be reflection during a 
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der Überlegung spricht und nicht vom 
Vorhandensein eines Affektes. Nichts 
aber ist klarer, als daß es einerseits 
Überlegung während einer 
Gemütserregung geben kann, und daß 
andererseits ein Fehlen der Überlegung 
möglich ist ohne jeden Affekt. Gerade 
weil die Typenbildung des 
gewöhnlichen Lebens —  welche von 
der jeweiligen strafrechtlichen 
Typenbildung in weitem Maße 
unabhängig sein kann —  unter 
Totschlag die im Affekt verübte Tötung 
zu verstehen pflegt, und weil auch die 
strafrechtliche Praxis sich von dieser 
außergesetzlichen Anschauung nicht 
selten leiten zu lassen scheint, muß ihre 
prinzipielle Unterscheidung von den 
maßgebenden Begriffen des positiven 
Rechtes in aller Schärfe vollzogen 
werden. Ob eine an der 
»Gemütserregung« orientierte 
Scheidung befriedigen könnte, müßte 
Gegenstand einer eigenen 
Untersuchung sein; das für uns 
Wesentliche ist, daß die Scheidung 
nach dem Merkmal der Überlegung 
nicht befriedigen kann. Die deutsche 
juristische Literatur hat sich 
überwiegend gegen seine Beibehaltung 
ausgesprochen.49* Die philosophische 
Analyse führt zu demselben Ergebnis. 
Angesichts der kommenden 
hand there can be reflection during a 
turmoil of feelings, and on the other 
hand an absence of reflection is 
possible without any emotion. 
Precisely because the classification 
used in ordinary life —  which to a 
great extent can be independent of the 
classification under the particular 
criminal law —  tends to understand by 
manslaughter the killing committed in 
an emotional state, and because the 
practice of criminal law, too, often 
appears to allow itself to be led by this 
non-legal opinion, its distinction in 
principle from the authoritative 
concepts of the positive law must be 
accomplished in all sharpness. Whether 
a distinction oriented according to 
emotional turmoil could be satisfactory 
would have to be the object of a 
separate investigation; what is essential 
for us is that the differentiation based 
on the characteristic of reflection can 
not satisfy. German juristic literature 
has expressed itself in majority against 
{the reflection-based distinction’s} 
retention.50* The philosophical analysis 
leads to the same conclusion. In view 
of the coming reform of the criminal 
law, it must be stressed with particular 
emphasis: insofar as reflection 
possesses a merely symbolic character 
in the criminal law, and insofar as it 
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Strafrechtsreform muß es mit 
besonderem Nachdruck betont werden: 
Insofern die Überlegung im Strafrecht 
bloßen Symbolcharakter besitzt, und 
insofern sie nicht nur Verschiedenes, 
sondern direkt Entgegengesetztes 
symbolisieren kann, ist sie absolut 
untauglich, eine so schroffe und 
folgenschwere Unterscheidung, wie die 
von Mord und Totschlag nach 
heutigem Rechte, zu fixieren. 
can symbolise not only different but 
directly opposite things, it is absolutely 
unsuitable to determine so radical and 
consequential a differentiation as that 
in our present law between murder and 
manslaughter. 
                                               
1 Literally, ‘by reason of’ or ‘on the basis of’. 
2 ‘Menschen’; not to be confused with ‘persons’. 
3  Reinach suggests two terms, Einstellung and Haltung, which he treats as synonyms. 
Both are translated here as attitude’. 
4 Reinach discusses questioning and asserting in this sense —  as social acts —  in Die 
Apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes, §3. 
5 * Es gibt auch eine Überlegung, welche sich einzig und allein das Verstehen zur 
Aufgabe macht. Von ihr sei hier abgesehen. 
6 * There is also a reflection whose single assignment is to understand. This will be left 
aside here. 
7 i.e. it creates this necessity of really engaging with the subject. 
8 * Ob die adäquate Veranschaulichung des hier in Rede stehenden Satzinhaltes zu 
einer unmittelbaren Evidenz überhaupt zu führen vermag, bleibe hier dahingestellt. 
9 * Whether the adequate illustration of the statement-content discussed here suffices 
to lead to immediate evidence, we shall leave unexplored. 
10 ‘Reflexion’ refers to analysis of the experience, as opposed to Überlegung’s 
deliberation or consideration. 
11 (p. 37) Reinach’s point here warrants some clarification. All reflection is 
characterised by (1) the questioning attitude, from which it begins and in which the 
subject remains, and (2) a specific endpoint that is aimed at from the beginning. The 
means of getting from the characteristic starting-point of reflection to its 
characteristic endpoint can vary, but not matter how much it does vary, the process 
remains one of reflection and not some other process. Thus, reflection of the kind 
Reinach now means to discuss (where no amount of clear understanding is enough to 
resolve the question, and one seeks out new evidence, reasons for and against 
believing in the state of affairs) is simply another type of reflection with the same 
key characteristics as before. 
12 ‘Einfallen’ literally translates as ‘to fall into’. The idiomatic English translation here 
also indicates the passive nature of this process; ‘it occurs to me’ suggests ‘it happens 
to me’. 
13 Here, an intention in the sense of that which one sets out to do, not in the sense of 
intentionality. 
14 Stützpunkt also translates as a military base or stronghold, suggesting that the reasons 
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can be likened to conquered territory. 
15 That is, an approach to psychology that attempts to make its subject matter reducible 
to logic. 
16 On this page, ‘emotion’ translates ‘Emotion’ rather than the more usual ‘Gefühl’. 
17 This attitude is of the same type as the attitude towards contemplation and the 
attitude towards reasons, mentioned above. 
18 * Der Mensch, welcher nach fest angenommenen Prinzipien seine Vorsätze faßt, 
scheidet hier freilich aus. Solange er nicht diese Prinzipien und ihren ethischen Wert 
selbst in Frage zieht, bereitet er seine Willensentschlüsse durch rein intellektuelle 
Überlegung vor. 
19 * The human being who grasps his resolves based on already-established principles 
is of course separate here. So long as he does not question these principles and their 
ethical value, he prepares his decisions of willing through pure intellectual reflection. 
20 * Die für ethische Probleme wichtige Scheidung, von der hier die Rede ist, ist 
von Dietrich Hildebrand in einer - noch nicht gedruckten - Arbeit über den »Träger 
der sittlichen Werte in der Handlung« prinzipiell durchgeführt worden. 
21 That is, in the ‘attitude towards values’ or the ‘attitude towards rightness’. 
22 * The distinction, important for ethical problems, of which we speak here has been 
carried out in principle by Dietrich Hildebrand in a —  not yet published —  work on 
the ‘bearers of the moral values in actions’. 
23 * Auch hier sind natürlich axiomatische Zusammenhänge vorausgesetzt, deren 
genauere Formulierung zu weit führen würde. 
24 * Vergleiche unten sub 2. 
25 * Here too, naturally, axiomatic relationships are assumed, the more precise 
formulation of which would lead too far. 
26 * Cf. under section 2. 
27 * Vgl. aber unter III. 
28 * Cf., however, under III. 
29 Literally, ‘can only disappear behind’. 
30 The third assessment of reflection, i.e., that ‘a reprehensible action increases in 
ethical disvalue if it was performed with reflection’. 
31 Based on Reinach’s subsequent comments, ‘commit’ here seems to mean the 
reaching of the resolve, not the actual carrying out of the crime. 
32 * Vgl. Katzenstein, »Die vorsätzliche Tötung nach geltendem Recht«, Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Straf[rechts]wissenschaft, Band 24, S. 517ff. 
33 * Über die Vertretung einzelner dieser Möglichkeiten in der Strafrechtstheorie vgl. 
Katzenstein, a.a.O., S. 516f. 
34 * Cf. Katzenstein, ‘Intentional killing in the present law’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Straf[rechts]wissenschaft, volume 24, p. 517ff. 
35 * Concerning the advocacy of these possibilities in the theory of criminal law, cf. 
Katzenstein, ibid., p. 516f. 
36 That is to say, indifferent under the positive law Reinach is discussing, which takes 
into account only whether or not the action was carried out ‘with reflection’. 
37 * Scharf davon zu trennen ist die Unempfänglichkeit gegenüber der Bestrafung als 
solcher, welche sehr wohl einen ethischen Unwert darstellen kann. 
38 * Unsre früheren Analysen und Unterscheidungen gestatten hier eine analoge 
Anwendung. 
39 * To be sharply divided from this is the unreceptivity towards being punished as 
such, which can very well be explained as an ethical disvalue. 
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40 * Our earlier analyses and differentiations allow here an analogous application. 
41 * Vgl. Reichsanzeiger vom 12. Juli 1912. 
42 * Cf. {Deutscher} Reichsanzeiger from July 12 1912. 
43 * a.a.O., S. 524f. 
44 * Analoge Bedenken vom rechtspolitischen Standpunkte aus bei von Liszt, 
Vergleichende Darstellung des deutschen und ausländischen Strafrechts, Besonderer 
Teil, Band V, S. 63. 
45 * Ibid., p. 524f. 
46 * Analogous thoughts from a legal-political standpoint from von Liszt, Comparative 
account of the German and foreign criminal laws, special section, volume V, p. 63. 
47 i.e., that a human being who is thoughtless and unreflective is less morally valuable 
than one who reflects on his or her actions. 
48 Reinach’s meaning is not clear here. So far he has indicated that the ethical and legal 
assessments of volitional reflection have the same conclusion, though for different 
reasons (and ‘legal value’ has not figured at all). 
49 * von Liszt, a.a.O., S. 43f. 
50 * von Liszt, ibid., p. 43f. 
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APPENDIX (IV) 
‘GRUNDZÜGE DER ETHIK’ 
 
Part of Reinach’s Einleitung in die Philosophie course (1913). 
First published in Sämtliche Werke, pp. 485-513. 
 
GRUNDZÜGE DER ETHIK BASIC FEATURES OF ETHICS 
{485} §1 {485} §1 
[Das Wertproblem] [The problem of value] 
[Die] Welt der Werte und Unwerte 
[ist] grundsätzlich geschieden von 
[der] Welt, wie [die] Psychologie sie 
betrachtet. [Im] Gebiet der 
Psychologie [geht es um die] 
deskriptive Verwandtschaft der Akte. 
Liebe und Haß [sind in] ihm näher 
verwandt (Gesinnungen) als Liebe und 
Vergeben (Akte). Psychologie schaltet 
notwendig Wertbetrachtungen aus. 
[Der] Ethiker [scheidet] anders: Liebe 
und Vergeben [sind] sehr nahe 
verwandt, [auch] Haß und Neid. Aber 
Liebe und Haß [gehören ihm] 
auseinander. Es gibt nicht nur [den] 
von Spinoza so gut beschriebenen 
Gesichtspunkt des Psychologen in der 
Welt. Werte z. B. sind [ebenfalls eine] 
Sphäre, wo wir wahre und falsche 
Urteile [und] Auffassungen haben1 
können, [und es gibt] verschiedene 
Begabungen der Menschen in [der] 
[The] world of values and disvalues 
[is] fundamentally different from [the] 
world as psychology sees it. [In] the 
domain of psychology, [it is all a 
matter of] the descriptive relationships 
of acts. [In] it, love and hate [are] more 
closely related (dispositions) than are 
love and forgiving (acts). Psychology 
necessarily excludes the consideration 
of value. [The] ethicist [distinguishes 
things] differently: love and forgiving 
[are] very closely related, [as are] hate 
and envy. But love and hate, [for him] 
are opposites. [The] viewpoint of 
psychology so well described by 
Spinoza is not the only one that exists 
in the world. Values, for example, are 
[likewise a] sphere where we can have 
true and false judgements [and] 
perspectives, [and there are] different 
talents among human beings in the 
grasping of these distinctions of value. 
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Erfassung dieser Wertunterschiede. 
 [Es gibt] viele Orte der Werte 
im Bewußtsein: einzelne Erlebnisse 
(Wertfühlen), Charakterzüge, [die] 
ganze Person (Wert der Person: Ethik 
als personale Werttheorie). Was macht 
etwas zum Wert, und was zum sittlichen 
Wert? Wertcharaktere sonst [sind z. B. 
die] Schönheit einer Landschaft, 
Klugheit u. dgl. Was unterscheidet 
ethische Werte? [Es gibt] verschiedene 
Stufenreihen hier. Man scheide 
Wertmodalitäten, Werthöhe, Wertgröße, 
Wertcharakter. Grund [genug] für 
[eine] Phänomenologie der ethischen 
Werte! Dann aber [auch für eine] 
Phänomenologie der sittlichen 
Wertcharaktere als Gegenständliches 
(Träger der Werte: Personenwerte, 
Eigenschaftswerte, Aktwerte u. Dgl.). 
 [There are] many places for 
values in consciousness: individual 
experiences (the feeling of value), traits 
of character, [the] entire person (value 
of the person: ethics as a personal 
value-theory). What makes something 
into a value, and what into a moral 
value? {Non-moral} value-characters 
[are, for example, the] beauty of a 
landscape, wisdom, and suchlike. What 
distinguishes ethical values {from 
these}? [There are] different tiers here. 
One distinguishes modalities, heights, 
magnitudes and characters of value. 
Basis [enough] for [a] phenomenology 
of ethical values! But then [also for a] 
phenomenology of moral value-
characters as objective (bearers of 
values: values of persons, of 
characteristics, of acts, and so on). 
 Soweit die personalen 
Funktionen der Personen; [nun zur] 
Rangordnung der Werte. In [diese] 
andere Richtung blickend [sehen wir, 
daß z. B. bei der] 
Geschichtswissenschaft statt [einer] 
bloß tatsächlichen Darstellung, welche 
[hier] ebenso möglich ist wie in [der] 
Psychologie, [eine] sittliche 
Beurteilung gewöhnlich dabei [ist]. 
[Zwar werden] wertfreie Tatsachen 
geschildert, aber [sie werden] doch 
 So far {we have addressed} the 
personal functions of persons; [now to 
the] hierarchy of values. Looking in 
[this] other direction [we see that, for 
example, in the] science of history, [a] 
purely factual presentation (which is 
just as possible [here] as in 
psychology) [is] customarily 
accompanied by [a] moral assessment. 
Value-free facts [are indeed] 
portrayed, but [they are] nevertheless 
viewed in a valuating manner. [From 
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wertend aufgefaßt. [Daher der] Streit: 
[Ist] Geschichte schlicht erzählend 
oder unter [den] Gesichtspunkt des 
Seinsollens [zu stellen]? Hier [in der] 
Welt des Seinsollens [ist ein] neues 
Gebiet des ethisch Rechten und {486} 
Unrechten [gegeben]. [Dieser] Begriff 
der sittlichen Rechtheit führt [den] 
Wert [aus der] Welt der Werte in [die] 
Welt des Seins. [Rechtheit] steht in 
nahem Zusammenhang mit [der] 
personalen Wertewelt. Aber [sie ist] 
nicht so reich wie diese. [Die] 
weitgehende Nüancierung der ethisch-
personalen Wertewelt ([der] personalen 
sittlichen Werte) findet hier kein 
Analogon. 
this comes the] dispute: [is] history 
plainly narrative, or [to be viewed] 
under the viewpoint of the ‘ought to 
be’?2 Here [in the] world of what 
ought to be, [a] new domain of the 
ethically right and {486} wrong [is 
given]. [This] concept of moral 
rightness takes value [from the] world 
of values into [the] world of being. 
[Rightness] stands in a close 
connection with [the] world of personal 
values. But {the former} is not so rich 
as {the latter}. The extensive nuancing 
of the ethical-personal world of values 
([the] personal moral values) finds no 
analogue here. 
 Glück und Sittlichkeit in ihrem 
Verhältnis: Glück des sittlichen 
Menschen ist recht, d. h. es ist recht, 
daß der sittliche Mensch glücklich ist. 
Aber [es besteht] kein 
Seinszusammenhang hier, wie so viele 
behauptet haben. »[Der] sittlich 
wertvolle Mensch [ist] notwendig 
glücklich« ist [et]was prinzipiell 
anderes wie »Es sollte so sein, daß der 
sittlich wertvolle Mensch glücklicher 
ist als der sittlich Nichtwertvolle.« [Es 
ist z. B. ein] einleuchtender Satz, daß 
es nur gerecht ist, wenn die Guten 
glücklich sind. Man denke [auch] an 
Strafe! 
 Happiness and morality in their 
relationship: The happiness of the 
moral human being is right; that is, it is 
right that the moral human being is 
happy. But [there obtains] here no 
relationship of being, as so many have 
proposed. ‘[The] morally valuable 
human being is necessarily happy’ is 
something in principle different from ‘it 
should be so that the morally valuable 
human being is happier than the one 
who is not morally valuable.’3 [It is, for 
example, a] self-explanatory statement 
that it is only just if the good are happy. 
Think [also] of punishment! 
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 Hier [ist der Ort für eine] 
Philosophie des Rechtes und des 
Unrechtes, [eine] Rechtsphilosophie im 
weitesten Sinne. Darin [wäre die] 
Philosophie des positiven Rechts [nur] 
ein Kapitel. Träger der Rechtheiten 
können anders sein als Träger der 
persönlichen Werte (Sittlichkeitswerte). 
Recht und unrecht sind nur 
Sachverhalte ([Bereich der] sittlichen 
Rechtheitslehre). Sittlich wertvoll sind 
Personen, Eigenschaften u. dgl.: keine 
Sachverhalte, sondern Gegenstände 
([Bereich der] sittlichen Wertlehre). 
[Ein] Drittes [ist die] Lehre von [den] 
Gütern (Güterlehre). Was ist ein Gut? 
[Hier gibt es eine] Rangordnung. Im 
Strafrecht werden Güter geschützt. 
Leben oder Besitz sind nicht [die] 
Person selbst. Nur [die] Existenz der 
Güter oder ihre Vernichtung können 
recht oder unrecht sein. 
 Here [is the place for a] 
philosophy of the right and the wrong, 
[a] philosophy of right4 in the widest 
sense. Therein, [the] philosophy of the 
positive law [would be just] a chapter. 
Bearers of rightness5 can be different 
from the bearers of personal values 
(moral values). Only states of affairs 
are right and wrong6 ([sphere of the] 
doctrine of moral rightness). Persons, 
characteristics and suchlike are morally 
valuable: not states of affairs, but 
objects ([sphere of the] doctrine of 
moral value). [A] third [is the] doctrine 
of goods (doctrine of goods). What is a 
good? [Here there is a] hierarchy. In 
the criminal law, goods are protected. 
Life or property is not [the] person 
herself.7 Only [the] existence of goods 
or their destruction can be right or 
wrong. 
 [Die] Probleme der Ethik [sind] 
sehr verschieden formulierbar in bezug 
auf die drei Gebiete; besonders [aber] 
sind die drei auseinanderzuhalten. 
 The problems of ethics [can be] 
very differently formulated in relation 
to these three domains; [but] 
importantly, the three are to be 
distinguished from one another. 
  
§28 §2 
Eudämonismus und Utilitarismus Eudaimonism and Utilitarianism 
Diese gehen aus vom menschlichen 
Handeln und [sehen es als ihre] 
Aufgabe, [ein] Ziel für [das] Tun 
vorzuzeichnen: Glück, Lust, Genuß 
These take human action as their point 
of departure and [see it as their] task to 
prescribe [a] goal for acting: 
happiness, pleasure, enjoyment for 
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vorzuzeichnen: Glück, Lust, Genuß 
beim Eudämonismus, Nutzen beim 
Utilitarismus. 
happiness, pleasure, enjoyment for 
eudaimonism; usefulness for 
utilitarianism. 
 Zuerst [ist der] spezifisch 
hedonistische Gedanke hervorzuheben: 
Es liegt im Wesen, im Sinne des 
Wollens selbst, Lust des Wollenden zu 
suchen. Irgendeine andere 
Willenslehrmeinung und Ethik [wird 
nicht zugestanden]. Jeder Mensch will 
nur das, kann nur das wollen, wovon er 
sieht, daß es ihm Lust machen wird. 
Dem Sprachgebrauch nach läßt sich 
[darum statt] »Ich will etwas tun« 
sagen »ich habe Lust dazu«. [Zu] 
untersuchen [ist]: Um welche Lust 
handelt es sich [dabei]? [Eine] 
Orientierung [der] hedonistischen 
Prinzipien an [der] Wahl [ist dabei 
gegeben]: [Von der] Vorstellung der 
verschiedenen Alternativen als 
realisiert [geht man über zur] Auswahl 
dessen, wovon man wesensmäßig die 
meiste {487} Lust erwartet. Bei 
Wahlakten [würde also] das 
ausgewählt, dessen vorgestellte 
Erfüllung uns am meisten befriedigt. 
Dies ist ein allgemeines Gesetz, sagt 
[der] Hedonismus. Maximum der Lust 
bzw. Minimum der Unlust ist [das] 
entscheidende Moment. Auswahl des 
Unlustigen [geschieht nur] um noch 
größere Unlust zu vermeiden. 
 First, [the] specifically 
hedonistic idea [is] to be emphasised: it 
lies in the essence, in the meaning of 
willing itself, to seek the pleasure of the 
one who wills. Any other kind of 
teaching on the will and ethics [is not 
admitted]. Every human being wants 
only that, can want only that of which 
he sees that it will bring him pleasure. 
According to customary speech it is 
[thus] possible to say ‘I want to do 
something’ as ‘It would please me to do 
that’.9 [To be] investigated [is]: which 
pleasure do we talk about here? [An] 
orientation [of the] hedonistic 
principles toward choice [is given with 
this]: [from the] presentation of the 
different alternatives as realised, [one 
proceeds to] pick out that from which, 
based on its essence, one expects the 
most {487} pleasure. With acts of 
choosing, [then], that {option} [will 
be] chosen whose predicted fulfilment 
will satisfy us the most. This is a 
general law, says hedonism. The 
maximum of pleasure and the 
minimum of displeasure is [the] 
decisive factor. The choosing of a 
displeasure [occurs only] in order to 
avoid even greater displeasure. 
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 Lust [meint] stets Eigenlust 
hier: Wollen bezieht sich auf eigene 
Lust. Damit [ergibt sich] hier [die] 
Lehre des notwendigen Egoismus. Für 
[den] Hedonismus hat [die] 
Unterscheidung von Egoismus und 
Altruismus keinen Sinn, prinzipiell 
stehe [der] Altruismus auf gleicher 
Stufe wie [der] Egoismus. [Der] 
Gedanke des Retters, [einen] 
Menschen zu retten, [ist]10 lustvoller 
[und schenkt] größere Befriedigung als 
der des das Kind Ertrinkenlassens (in 
[einem] andern Fall kommt vielleicht 
[der] Gedanke an eigene Gefahr mehr 
zur Geltung). Hier [ist] gezeigt, daß es 
[eine] Ethik im gewöhnlichen Sinn gar 
nicht geben kann. [Das] Gebot 
»Bezwecke [das] Wohl des Andern in 
deinem Tun« ist sinnlos, denn es ist 
[eine] wesensgesetzliche 
Unmöglichkeit. Grundsatz der Ethik 
hier ist [daher der] Satz, wie etwas sein 
muß, statt sein soll. Ethik stellt nur fest, 
was klug ist; nur [eine] Klugheitslehre 
[ist hier] noch möglich. Gebote 
ethischer Art sind nicht mehr 
aufzustellen. [Ein] Gebot etwas zu tun 
ist sinnlos, entweder weil unmöglich 
oder selbstverständlich soseiend. 
 Pleasure always [means] one’s 
own pleasure here: willing relates to 
one’s own pleasure. Thus [is here 
stated] the doctrine of necessary 
egoism. For hedonism, the difference 
between egoism and altruism has no 
sense; altruism is in principle on the 
same level as egoism. [The] idea of 
rescuing [a] human being [is], for the 
rescuer, more pleasurable [and 
provides] greater satisfaction than 
leaving the child to drown (in [a] 
different case [the] thought of one’s 
own being in danger may take 
priority). In this it [is] indicated that 
there cannot be [an] ethics in the 
customary sense at all. [The] 
exhortation ‘aim toward the well-being 
of others in your actions’ is senseless, 
because it is [an] impossibility by a 
law of essence. The basic statement of 
ethics here is [therefore the] statement 
of how something must be, instead of 
how it ought to be. Ethics only puts 
forward what is prudent; only [a] 
doctrine of prudence11 [is] still possible 
[here]. Commandments of an ethical 
sort are no longer to be set out. [A] 
commandment to do something is 
senseless, either because it is 
impossible, or because it is self-
evidently so.12 
 [Der] Eudämonismus geht aus  Eudaimonism sets out from [a] 
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von [einer] hedonistischen Theorie des 
Wollens. Kritik [und] Stellung[nahme] 
zu diesen Grundsätzen: [Die] 
erkenntnistheoretische Struktur der 
Grundsätze der Theorie ist ganz 
komisch. Alle Altruisten seien 
Egoisten, sagt der Hedonismus. Aber 
wenn auch faktisch alle Menschen 
Egoisten wären, würde dieses [eine] 
eudämonistische Lehre nicht nötig 
machen. Wir könnten doch sagen: Es 
sind alle Leute bis jetzt Egoisten 
gewesen, aber ihr sollt es nicht sein! 
[Der] Eudämonismus meint aber 
[einen] Wesenszweck: Im Wesen des 
Wollens liegt [es] , Egoist zu sein. 
hedonistic theory of willing. Critique 
[and] position-taking in relation to 
these basic statements: [the] 
epistemological structure of the basic 
statements of the theory is quite 
comical. All altruists are egoists, says 
hedonism. But if in fact too all human 
beings13 were egoists, it would not 
make [a] eudaimonistic doctrine 
necessary. We could still say: all people 
until now have been egoists, but they 
ought not to be so! Eudaimonism, 
though, believes in an essential 
purpose: It is in the nature of willing to 
be an egoist. 
 Dazu ist [die] Wollensstruktur 
näher zu untersuchen. Nicht alles, 
dessen Realisierung gewollt ist, ist von 
gleichem Range. Endpunkt des 
Realisierens [ist der] Zweck des 
Wollens. Zweck [ist also], um dessen 
willen bei jedem Wollen das letztlich 
zu realisierende Ziel [gewollt wird], für 
das alles andere dabei Mittel ist. Motiv 
ist etwas anderes: das, was mich zum 
Entschluß bestimmt. [Das ist] ganz 
anders als [der] Zweck. [Der] Zweck 
muß etwas zukünftig zu Realisierendes 
sein, [das] Motiv kann in [der] 
Vergangenheit liegen. [Ein] Motiv [ist] 
in zwei Bedeutungen14 möglich: [als] 
vergangener Tatbestand oder dadurch 
 Therefore, [the] structure of 
willing is to be investigated more 
closely. Not everything whose 
realisation is willed is of the same 
status. The endpoint of the realisation 
[is the] purpose15 of the willing. The 
purpose, [then, is] that for the sake of 
which the final goal to be realised [is 
willed], for which everything else is a 
means. Motive is something different: 
that which determines me to a decision. 
[That is] very different from [the] 
purpose. [The] purpose must be 
something to be realised in the future; 
[the] motive can lie in [the] past. [A] 
motive [is] possible in two senses: 
{first} [as] a past fact, or {second, as} 
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hervorgerufene Gesinnung. [Die] 
Tatsache einer vergangenen Wohltat z. 
B. oder Dankbarkeit [dafür]. Letzteres 
fassen wir nicht ins Auge, obgleich es 
da ist und motivierende Kraft ausübt. 
[Die] frühere Wohltat vergegenwärtige 
ich: [sie] ist Motiv. [Die] Dankbarkeit 
[ist dagegen] nicht selbst Motiv. 
Dankbarkeit nennen wir Quelle des 
Wollens. Z. B. Quelle [eines Wohltuns] 
ist Frömmigkeit, Zweck ist Hilfe der 
Armen, Motiv ist [das] Gebot Gottes. 
»Wozu« (»um zu«) weist hin auf 
Zweck, »weil« auf Motiv, »aus« auf 
Quelle. 
a disposition called for by the former. 
The fact of a past good deed, as an 
example {of the former}, or gratitude 
[for the same] {as an example of the 
latter}. We do not fix our attention on 
the latter, although it is there and 
exercises motivating power. [The] 
earlier good deed, {which} I 
presentiate to myself, is {my} motive. 
The gratitude, [on the other hand, is] 
not itself a motive. We call gratitude 
the source of the willing. For example, 
the source [of a good deed] is piety; the 
purpose is to help the poor; the motive 
is God’s commandment. ‘For what’ 
(‘In order to’) indicates purpose, 
‘because’ indicates motive, ‘out of’ 
indicates source. 
 {488}Soll [die] »Lust« des 
Hedonismus nun Zweck, Motiv oder 
Quelle beim Wollen sein? Wenigstens 
[ist sie] nicht Zweck in unserem Sinn. 
[Dies] kann der Hedonist nicht sagen. 
[Es gibt nur] sehr wenige Fälle, wo 
dieses wirklich das Ziel ist.16 Nur bei 
abnormalen Fällen [kommt 
dergleichen vor]: beim Psychologen 
kann Zweck die Gewinnung der Lust 
sein, der sich [z. B. einen] Fall von 
Lust zur Analyse herbeiholen will. 
Aber Lust als Motiv? Motiv [ist sie] 
auch nicht, [denn ein] Motiv [ist] das 
was uns vorschwebt und uns zum Tun 
bestimmt. Bei [der] Rettung des 
 {488}Should [the] ‘pleasure’ of 
hedonism now be the purpose, motive 
or source for willing? At least, [it is] 
not purpose in our sense. [This], the 
hedonist cannot say. [There are only] 
very few cases where this is really the 
goal. Only in abnormal cases [does this 
occur]: [for example], for the 
psychologist who wants to bring about 
[a] case of pleasure for analysis, the 
achievement of pleasure can be a 
purpose.18 But pleasure as motive? [It 
is] also not motive, [because a] motive 
[is] that which we have in mind and 
which determines us to action. With 
[the] rescuing of a child, [though, it is] 
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bestimmt. Bei [der] Rettung des 
Kindes [ist es aber] sicher nicht so, 
[daß der] Gedanke an künftige Lust 
[unser Handeln motiviert]. Nun [erst 
kommt das] richtige Geschütz des 
Hedonismus: Lust ist die Quelle der 
Handlung. Lust gibt dem Motiv erst die 
motivierende Kraft. Aber hier [hilft] 
kein Gedanke an künftige Lust, 
sondern [nur ein] gegenwärtiges 
Gefühl der Lust. Wenigstens sind 
solche Fälle sehr häufig. [Die] 
Meinung17 [des Hedonismus] wäre hier 
wenigstens verständlich. Aber was 
hätte er eigentlich gewonnen? Es gibt 
Fälle, wo [der] Gedanke an [das] Wohl 
eines Anderen uns mit Freude erfüllt 
([das] sind [die] gewöhnlich 
»altruistisch« genannten Fälle). Freude 
als Quelle ist [also] möglich. Aber 
daraus muß [der] Hedonismus nicht 
[den] Gedanken einer zukünftigen Lust 
als Zweck machen. 
[the] rescuing of a child, [though, it is] 
certainly not so [that the] idea of future 
pleasure [motivates our action]. Now 
[at last come the] real big guns of 
hedonism: pleasure is the source of 
action. Pleasure19 gives the motive its 
motivational power. But here, no idea 
of a future pleasure [helps], but [only 
a] present feeling of pleasure. At least 
such cases are very common. [The] 
opinion [of hedonism] would here at 
least be understandable. But what 
would it actually have achieved? There 
are cases in which [the] idea of [the] 
well-being of another fills us with joy 
(what would customarily be called the 
‘altruistic’ cases). Joy as a source is 
[therefore] possible. But hedonism 
must not make of this that the idea of a 
future pleasure can be a purpose. 
 Ist [das] Wohl des anderen der 
Zweck, [so spricht man von] 
Altruismus. [Er wird] nicht aufgehoben 
dadurch, daß fremdes Wohl mich mit 
Freude erfüllt. Ist eigenes Wohl der 
Zweck, [so haben wir] Egoismus. [Die] 
Scheidung [von] Egoismus und20 
Altruismus betrifft [also den] Zweck. 
Selbst wenn [die] hedonistische 
Behauptung wahr wäre, so würde 
 If [the] well-being of the other 
is the purpose, [then one speaks of] 
altruism. [This would] not [be] 
annulled {by the fact} that the well-
being of others fills me with joy. If 
one’s own well-being is the purpose, 
[then we have] egoism. [The] 
distinction [between] egoism and 
altruism [thus] relates to the purpose. 
Even if [the] hedonistic assertion were 
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[daraus] nichts für [die] Ethik folgen. 
Prinzipien u. dgl. [wären] hier noch 
möglich. 
true, [it] would have no consequences 
for ethics. Principles and the like 
[would] still [be] possible. 
 Wir wollen aber [den 
hedonistischen] Grundsatz selbst 
befragen. Welche Lust [ist darin 
gemeint]? [Die] eine Alternative 
[haben wir] abgelehnt. [Ein] 
Wesensgesetz, daß Lust Quelle sei, [ist] 
nicht als solches anzuerkennen. [Die] 
andere [Alternative ist]: [Der] Gedanke 
an [die] Realisierung des Willenszieles 
[ist] lustbereitend. [Aber] muß es so 
sein, daß ich bei [einer] Wahl das Ziel 
wähle, dessen Vorstellung mich mit 
größter Lust erfüllt? 
 But we want to question [the 
hedonistic] founding statement itself. 
Which pleasure [is meant there]? [We 
have] rejected one alternative. [A] law 
of essence that pleasure is the source 
[is] not, as such, to be acknowledged. 
[The] other [alternative is]: [The] 
thought of [the] realisation of the goal 
of willing brings pleasure. [But] must it 
be that with the choosing of [a] goal, I 
choose the one whose presentation fills 
me with greater pleasure? 
 [Man muß sich dabei] am 
Wollen [selber] orientieren. Es gibt 
eben verschiedene Wollens- und 
Wahlarten: freudiges, mühsames, 
ungernes u. dgl. Notwendigkeit des 
Lustmoments? [Aber] man muß sich 
nicht nur an ethischen Beispielen 
orientieren. Es gibt gänzlich 
gleichgültige Wahlen. [Und es ist] 
möglich, Entschlüsse mit reiner Unlust 
zu fassen. Jemand tut etwas, bloß weil 
es ihm geboten wurde. Das Befohlene 
selbst kann ihn sogar bloß mit Unlust 
erfüllen. Aber der Hedonismus sagt: 
Die Befehlsausführung ist größere 
Lust, wenn auch das Ziel selbst Unlust 
erweckt, als [den] Befehl nicht zu 
 [In this we must] take our cue 
from willing [itself]. There are indeed 
different kinds of willing and choosing: 
joyful, laboured, reluctant, and so on. 
Necessity of the factor of pleasure? 
[But] one must not only look toward 
ethical examples. There are entirely 
indifferent choices. [And it is] possible 
to make decisions with outright 
displeasure. Someone does something 
simply because it was bidden of him. 
That which is ordered of one21 can, in 
and of itself, fill one with displeasure. 
But hedonism says: To carry out the 
order is a greater pleasure than not to 
obey it, even if the goal itself brings 
displeasure; [thus, the] carrying out of 
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erfüllen; [also die] Erfüllung des 
Befehls ist das, dessen Ausführung 
mich mit Freude erfüllt. Solche Fälle 
der Befehlsausführung kommen vor, 
aber [es ist] Unsinn [zu meinen], daß 
dieses stets [der] Grund ist. Bei 
[einem] Befehl liegt meistens nicht 
[der] Gedanke an Lust vor. [Ein] 
Soldat entschließt sich nicht auf Grund 
einer Vergegenwärtigung mehrerer 
Ziele, [sondern der] Befehl wird 
einfach erfüllt. {489} [Die] Tatsache, 
daß ich etwas gern oder ungern tue, hat 
begünstigenden oder entgegengesetzten 
Einfluß auf [das] Entschließen [und 
die] Entschlußfassung. Wo [ich etwas] 
ungern [tue], da ist [ein] besonderer 
Grund nötig, um es zum Entschluß zu 
bringen. Nach hedonistischer Theorie 
wäre ungernes Tun unmöglich. Es hilft 
nicht, nach Lust dabei zu suchen, denn 
[der] Hedonismus hat [hier schließlich 
ein] Wesensgesetz behauptet. [Der] 
Hedonismus scheitert [also] an zwei 
Sätzen: 
the order is what fills me with joy. 
Such cases of carrying out orders do 
occur, but it is unsound [to believe] that 
this is always the reason. With [an] 
order, the thought of pleasure mostly 
does not come into it. [A] soldier 
decides not on the basis of the 
presentiation of several goals, [but the] 
order is simply carried out. {489} 
[The] fact that I do something gladly or 
reluctantly has an encouraging or 
opposing influence on [the] deciding 
[and the] decision. Where [I do 
something] reluctantly, then [a] 
particular reason is necessary to bring 
about the decision. By hedonistic 
theories, reluctant doing would be 
impossible. It does not help to seek 
pleasure within that, because [here] 
hedonism has [ultimately] stated [an] 
essential law. Hedonism [thus] fails on 
two accounts: 
1. Wäre alles Wollen lustvolles, 
dann wäre Lust noch nicht zum 
Zweck gemacht. 
1.  If all willing was pleasant, then 
pleasure would still not be made 
into a purpose. 
2.  Selbst das [ist aber] nicht 
richtig. 
2.  Even the former [is in any case] 
not correct. 
 [Die] Scheidung hier [von] 
Egoismus und Altruismus ist primitiv 
[und] reicht nicht aus bei sittlicher 
Wertung. Man kann etwas um der 
 [The] difference here [between] 
egoism and altruism is primitive [and] 
is not sufficient for a moral evaluation. 
One can do something for the sake of 
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Wertung. Man kann etwas um der 
Gerechtigkeit selbst willen tun, [aber 
im] Gebot der Gerechtigkeit spielt 
mein und anderer Wohl keine Rolle. 
Dieses [ist dann] weder Egoismus noch 
Altruismus. Nur einen Ausschnitt aus 
[dem] ethisch relevanten Tun kann man 
also unter dieser Rubrik behandeln. 
[Wäre] Egoismus alles zu nennen, was 
auf Bereicherung der eigenen Person 
(statt [auf das allgemeine] »Wohl«) 
abzielt? Nein. [Das] Wesen des 
Egoismus [ist] durch [diese] Beziehung 
auf [die] eigene Person nicht 
ausgemacht [und] nicht eindeutig 
bestimmt. [Denn die] Rettung der 
eigenen Person kann wegen großer 
Aufgaben geschehen. Nur [die] 
Intention kommt für [die] 
Unterscheidung hier in Frage. [Das] 
Phänomen, das [dem] Egoismus 
zugrunde liegt, ist [eine] Haltung, die 
nichts in der Welt betrachten kann ohne 
Beziehung auf das Ich. Egoismus [ist 
dieses] Verschieben des eigenen Ich 
und [die] Beziehung aller Dinge auf 
das eigene Ich. Alles wird zum Größer-
als, Angenehm-für u. dgl. [Die] Größe 
eines Menschen [ist dann] stets [ein] 
»größer als ich«. Keine reinen 
Sachbetrachtungen [sind] hier möglich. 
Objektive Versenkung in [die] Welt 
und ihre Schönheit [z. B. ist] 
One can do something for the sake of 
the justice of it, [but in the] 
commandment of justice my well-being 
and that of others play no part. This [is 
then] neither egoism nor altruism. So 
one can only treat of a part of ethically 
relevant acting under this rubric. 
[Would] everything that aims toward 
the enrichment of the individual person 
(instead of [toward the general] ‘well-
being’) be described as egoism? No. 
[The] nature of egoism [is] not 
constituted from [this] relationship 
with one’s own person [and] not 
univocally determined. [Because the] 
rescuing of one’s own person can be 
done for the sake of great tasks. Only 
[the] intention comes into question for 
the differentiation here. [The] 
phenomenon that forms the basis of 
egoism is [an] attitude which cannot 
see anything in the world except 
through its relationship to the I. Egoism 
[is this] dislocation22 of one’s own I 
and [the] orientation of all things 
toward one’s own I. Everything 
becomes greater-than, pleasant for, and 
suchlike. [The] height23 of a human 
being [is then] always ‘bigger than 
me.’ No pure viewings of facts24 [are] 
possible here. Objective contemplation 
of [the] world and its beauty, [for 
example, is] impossible. [The] thought 
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unmöglich. [Der] Gedanke an das Ich 
schiebt sich zwischen [das] Objekt und 
den Andern. 
of the I moves between [the] object and 
the other. 
 Egoistisch ist [eine] Haltung, 
die immer fragt: Was bedeutet [eine] 
Handlung für mich; nie: für die 
anderen. [Die] Auswahl der Projekte 
[geschieht] durch das »für mich«. 
[Die] Behauptung von Scheler: 
»Egoismus setzt [den] Blick auf andere 
voraus« stimmt nicht beim krassesten 
Egoismus. [Dieser] Egoismus setzt 
nicht [den] Blick auf [den] anderen 
voraus. Das, was ihn selbst bereichert, 
gewinnt für ihn, [den Egoisten,] zwar 
Vorzug.25 [Aber] das Ich, die Person, 
steht nicht als ganze Persönlichkeit in 
gefühltem höherem Eigenwert da, ich 
[stelle mich] nicht als wertvolle Person 
vor. Egoismus ist Außersachlichkeit in 
besonders prägnantem Sinn, den wir 
sonst nicht in der Welt finden. [Ein] 
Mensch, der sich überschätzt, ist kein 
Egoist, [denn er] handelt noch aus 
Gründen ([der] Egoist schützt sie nur 
vor), [wenn] zwar [aus] einer 
subjektiven Täuschung. Aber [der] 
Egoist [ist] dadurch bezeichnet, daß 
ihm [sein] eigenes Wohl, bloß als 
eigenes, lieber ist als das eines anderen. 
Der echte Egoist handelt [insofern] 
nicht nach Gründen. Kants 
kategorischer Imperativ richtet sich 
 [An] attitude is egoistic which 
always asks what [an] action means for 
me, never for others. [The] selection of 
projects [occurs] through the ‘for me.’ 
Scheler’s assertion: ‘egoism 
presupposes that one has others in 
mind’ does not apply in the case of the 
most crass egoism. [This] egoism does 
not presuppose that one has others in 
mind. That which enriches [the egoist] 
himself or herself certainly earns his or 
her preference. [But] the I, the person, 
is not, as a complete personality, 
represented in the fullness of its higher 
intrinsic value; I do not [represent 
myself] as a valuable person. Egoism is 
non-objectivity26 in an especially 
blatant sense, which we do not find 
elsewhere in the world. [A] human 
being who overrates himself is not an 
egoist, [because he] still acts based on 
reasons ([the] egoist only pleads them 
as excuses), [if] admittedly [from] a 
subjective delusion. But [the] egoist 
[is] characterised by the fact that, for 
him, [his] own well-being, simply for 
being his own, is dearer than that of 
any other. [To this extent] the genuine 
egoist does not act for reasons. Kant’s 
categorical imperative opposes this 
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besonders gegen diese spezielle 
Einstellung. Auch nach Kant müssen 
{490} alle personalen Qualitäten mit in 
[die] Handlung aufgenommen werden. 
Kant meint nicht, [zu handeln sei] 
allgemein ohne Ansehung aller 
Umstände. [Aber das] Ich kann keine 
Ausnahmestelle behaupten bloß wegen 
[seiner] Eigenheit. Aus dieser 
Einstellung können wir beinahe alle 
sittlichen Unwerte ableiten: Neid, Haß, 
Bosheit, Ressentiment. Der echte 
Egoismus ist [so] recht das radikale 
Böse in [der] menschlichen Natur. 
particular attitude especially. For Kant, 
too, all personal qualities must {490} 
be integrated into [the] action. Kant 
does not believe that [acting is] in 
general without regard for all 
circumstances. [But the] I can claim no 
exceptional position merely on account 
of [its] being my own. We can deduce 
nearly all moral disvalues (envy, hate, 
malice, ressentiment) from this 
attitude. True egoism, [therefore], is 
rightly {called} the radical evil in 
human nature. 
 Es gibt aber neben [dem] 
Egoismus des Ich einen Egoismus des 
Wir, worin [das] Ich des Egoisten nur 
ein Glied ist. Dieser steht auf einer 
Stufe mit [dem] anderen Egoismus. 
[Hier sind] zwei verschiedene Fälle 
[zu unterscheiden]. Es kann [den] Fall 
geben, wo [ein] Mensch erst bei seinen 
Freunden [so] recht objektive Werte 
sieht. [Das] eigene Wohl ist das 
Wichtigste; nur beim Wohle der 
Freunde tritt das Ich zurück. Da [liegt] 
kein Wir-Egoismus [vor]. [Ein] anderer 
Fall aber ist richtiger Egoismus: Unser 
Wohl [wird gewollt], bloß weil [es] auf 
[das] Wir bezogen [ist]. Mit den 
Freunden zusammen das Wir bildend, 
hat »unser« Wohl Vorrang vor fremdem 
Wohle. [Das] Wesen des Egoismus [ist] 
hier genau dasselbe [wie oben]. 
 Alongside [the] egoism of the I, 
however, there is also an egoism of the 
We, wherein [the] I of the egoist is only 
one part. This stands on the same level 
as [the] other egoism. [Here,] two 
different cases [must be distinguished]. 
[The] case can exist where [a] human 
being only really sees true, objective 
values in relation to his friends. One’s 
own well-being is the most important; 
only to the friends’ well-being does the 
I take second place. There, no we-
egoism [obtains]. [A] different case, 
though, is true egoism: our well-being 
[is willed], merely because [it is] 
related to [the] We. Forming the We 
together with the friends, ‘our’ well-
being has precedence over the well-
being of strangers. [The] nature of 
egoism [is] here precisely the same [as 
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hier genau dasselbe [wie oben]. egoism [is] here precisely the same [as 
previously]. 
 Wie ist [der] Altruismus jetzt zu 
bezeichnen? [Man darf ihn] nicht 
einfach am »fremden Wohl« 
orientieren. Altruismus [ist] ein 
Gegensatz zu egoistischem Tun [und 
insofern] ein Drittes neben [dem] 
sachlich Gerichtetsein und [dem] 
Egoismus. [Es] fehlt jeder Grund, [das] 
sachlich Gerichtetsein als 
»Altruismus« zu bezeichnen. Sachliche 
Einstellung [ist] nicht [ein] 
entsprechendes Gegenstück zum 
Egoismus. [Das wäre sie] nur da, wo 
Alter [einen] echten Gegensatz zu Ego 
bildet. Es gibt [tatsächlich] (seltene) 
Fälle, wo Alter an [die] Stelle des Ich 
tritt: Menschen, denen [das] Wohl der 
Fremden, bloß weil [es das] der 
Fremden ist, höher steht. Fremdes Wohl 
ist [dabei] wichtig einzig in [seiner] 
Eigenschaft als fremd. Neigung zur 
Selbstunterschätzung ist Folge, nicht 
Grund hier. Folgeerscheinung [ist 
außerdem die] Außersachlichkeit. Wo 
[der Altruismus] Gründe voraussetzt, 
[ist allerdings] dann immer noch [eine] 
sachliche Einstellung [gegeben]. 
[Aber] auch hier schützt man leicht 
Gründe vor, die man dann schließlich 
glaubt.27  
 How is altruism now to be 
defined? [One ought] not to align it 
simply on ‘the well-being of others.’ 
Altruism [is] in opposition to egoistic 
doing, [and as such] is a third 
{position} alongside objective 
directedness28 and egoism. There is no 
reason whatsoever to designate 
objective directedness as ‘altruism.’ 
The objective attitude [is] not expressly 
[an] opposition to egoism. [It would 
only be so] where the other29 forms [a] 
real opposition to the ego. There are [in 
fact] (rare) cases where the other takes 
the place of the I: human beings for 
whom the well-being of others, simply 
because it is that of others, takes a 
higher place. The well- being of others 
is [thereby] important simply in [its] 
distinctiveness as being that of others. 
A tendency toward underestimation of 
the self is a consequence, not a cause 
here. Consequence [is likewise the] 
non-objectivity. Where [altruism] 
presupposes reasons, then a factual 
attitude [is] also still [given]. [But] 
here, too, one easily pleads excuses, 
which one then finally comes to 
believe. 
 [Die] gewöhnlichen  [The] customary determinations 
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Bestimmungen [von] Egoismus und 
Altruismus [sind, wie gesagt,] viel zu 
primitiv. [Es] liegt im Wesen des 
Egoismus, daß er nicht motiviert ist, 
nicht aus Gründen geschieht, 
[vielmehr] alles aufs Ich bezogen 
[wird]. Selbstversenkung in Objekte ist 
[beim Altruismus] wenigstens möglich 
—  [ein] äußerster Gegensatz zum 
Egoismus, wo jede Erscheinung ihre 
Bedeutung als »höher« oder »tiefer als 
ich« gewinnt. Charakteristisch ist [die] 
Art der Befriedigung aus solcher 
Einstellung: [sie ist] 
Selbstbefriedigung, Erhöhung des Ich 
und Genießen desselben. Nicht zu 
verwechseln mit Gefühlen der 
Befriedigung über [den] eigenen Wert 
(Selbstwertgefühlen) oder [mit] 
Unbefriedigtheit [bzw.] Schmerz über 
[den] eigenen Unwert. 
[of] egoism and altruism [are, as has 
been said,] much too primitive. [It] lies 
in the essence of egoism that it is not 
motivated, does not occur out of 
reasons, [but rather] relates everything 
to the I. Immersion of oneself in 
objects is at least possible [under 
altruism] —  [an] extreme contrast with 
egoism, where every phenomenon 
earns its meaning as ‘higher’ or ‘lower 
than I.’ [The] kind of enjoyment that 
comes from such an attitude is 
characteristic: it is self-enjoyment, 
elevation of the I and satisfaction from 
the same. Not to be confused with 
emotions of satisfaction with one’s 
own value (self-esteem), or [with] 
dissatisfaction or pain concerning one’s 
own disvalue. 
 Hier entspringen Neid, 
Mißgunst [und die] Erscheinungen des 
Ressentiments (Nietzsche), wo 
gefühlte Werte um- oder weggedeutet 
werden. Nietzsche hat {491} geglaubt, 
[das] Christentum als 
Ressentimenterscheinung beweisen zu 
[können]. [Dagegen] Schelers 
Widerlegung. 
Verdrängungsverhältnisse können 
mitwirken beim Ressentiment, sind 
[aber] nicht das Wesentliche. 
 Here originate envy, 
resentment30 [and the] phenomena of 
ressentiment (Nietzsche), where felt 
values are reinterpreted or interpreted 
away. Nietzsche {491} thought he 
[could] prove Christianity to be a 
phenomenon of ressentiment.31 
[Against that] {stands} Scheler’s 
refutation. Relationships of repression 
can play a role in ressentiment, but 
[are] not the essential. [Rather, the] 
dislocation of the I is essential. The 
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[Vielmehr die] Ichverschiebung ist 
wesentlich. Tiefste Wurzel des 
Ressentiments ist [dieses] Vorschieben 
des Ich: [Es] würde bei Anerkennung 
des fremden Wertes sich selbst 
verkleinert fühlen. Von hier aus zu 
verstehen ist [die] Rede von [der] 
»Erlösung« des Ich durch Kunst o. 
dgl., [überhaupt durch] alles was zur 
objektiven Einstellung überführen 
würde. [Dies ist etwas anderes als die] 
Bereicherung des Ich als seines Ich 
beim Egoisten. [Der] Egoist hat 
eigentlich keine Gründe [und] sucht 
prinzipiell nicht nach Gründen. [Das] 
eigene Ich gewinnt ihm unmittelbaren 
Vorschub. [Er] täuscht sich nur 
gewöhnlich Gründe vor; täuscht sich 
und anderen Objektivismus vor. 
deepest root of ressentiment is [this] 
promotion of the I: in the recognition 
of foreign value, it would feel itself 
diminished. From here is to be 
understood all talk of the ‘redemption’ 
of the I through art or suchlike, 
[generally through] anything that 
would lead it on to the objective 
attitude. [This is something different 
from the] enrichment of the I as its own 
I to the egoists. [The] egoist has really 
no reasons [and] in principle does not 
look for reasons. His own I achieves 
for him immediate advantage. He only 
ordinarily pretends to have reasons; 
{he} falsely ascribes objectivism to 
himself and others. 
 [Der] Altruismus [ist] von 
gleicher Struktur wie [der] Egoismus. 
Auch da fehlt Abwägen und 
Sachlichkeit. Fremdes Wohl [ist] an 
[die] Stelle des eigenen gesetzt, [sein] 
Wert liegt rein im Fremdwertsein. 
 Altruism [is] of the same 
structure as egoism. There too, there is 
no weighing-up or objectivity. The 
well-being of others [is] substituted for 
one’s own, its value lies purely in its 
being the value of another. 
 [Der] Satz des Hedonismus, 
daß alles Wollen auf 
Selbstbefriedigung geht, [und die] 
hedonistische Behauptung, 
wesensgesetzlich möglich [sei] nur 
[der] Egoismus, ist ganz falsch [und] 
sinnlos. Objektive Einstellung kann 
auch beim Egoismus und Altruismus 
 [The] precept of hedonism —  
that all willing has self-gratification as 
its goal —  [and the] hedonistic 
assertion that, by a law of essence, 
only egoism [is] possible, is32 entirely 
false [and] senseless. The objective 
attitude can also appear with egoism 
and altruism; [there is] always only 
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vorkommen; [es ist] immer nur [ein] 
gewisser Bereich, wo beide herrschen. 
Auch [der] sog. Egoist ist es nur 
innerhalb bestimmter Grenzen. 
[Dennoch stehen beide im Gegensatz 
zum] sachlichen Typus [und seiner] 
Bestimmung durch objektive Gründe. 
[a] certain domain, where both hold 
sway. [The] so-called egoist, too, is 
only {an egoist} within specific 
boundaries. [Nevertheless, both stand 
in opposition to the] objective type 
[and his] determination through 
objective reasons. 
 Hedonismus im von uns 
definierten Sinne ist nicht mit 
Eudämonismus überhaupt zu 
verwechseln. [Der] Hedonismus 
verwechselt Quelle, Zweck und Motiv; 
und nicht jede Quelle ist Lust. 
 Hedonism, in its sense as we 
have defined it, is not to be confused 
with eudaimonism as such. Hedonism 
confuses source, goal and motive; and 
not every source is pleasure. 
 Nicht jeder Eudämonismus ist 
hedonistisch in diesem Sinne. Neben 
[dem] Eudämonismus des 
unvermeidlichen (notwendigen) Seins 
gibt es [den] Eudämonismus des 
Sollens: Jede Handlung soll ausgehen 
auf höchste Lust. Lust ist [nämlich] 
höchstes Glück. Evtl. soziales: [Es] 
braucht nicht eigene Lust zu sein —  
nur daß [das] Lustmaximum sich 
realisiert (sozialer Eudämonismus). [Er 
findet sich] besonders in [der] 
englischen Ethik des 18. und 19. 
Jahrhunderts (Bentham und Mill). 
 Not every eudaimonism is 
hedonistic in this sense. Alongside 
[the] eudaimonism of inevitable 
(necessary) being, there is the 
eudaimonism of ‘ought’: every action 
should aim towards the highest 
pleasure. Pleasure is [accordingly] the 
highest happiness. Perhaps social: [it] 
does not need to be one’s own pleasure 
—  only that [the] greatest possible 
pleasure is brought about (social 
eudaimonism). [This comes up] 
especially in [the] English ethics of the 
18th and 19th centuries (Bentham and 
Mill). 
 Bentham [war] praktisch 
eingestellt. [Er] geht aus vom inneren 
Widersinn einiger 
Gesetzeszusammenhänge. [In seiner 
Philosophie] geht Bentham aus vom 
 Bentham [was] practically-
minded. [He] sets out from the 
contradiction internal to certain 
complexes of laws. [In his philosophy] 
Bentham sets out from the premise of 
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Satz der größten Lust (größtmöglichen 
Glückseligkeit) der größtmöglichen 
Anzahl. [Er] beweist [diesen] Satz 
nicht, [sondern] stellt ihn als 
selbstverständlich auf, als direkt 
einsichtig.[Dann wird ein] Maßstab 
zur Beurteilung der eigenen Handlung 
gesucht. Intensität, Dauer und 
Gewißheit der Lust sind Maßstäbe; 
und in bezug auf [die] Folgen 
Fruchtbarkeit und Reinheit und 
Ausbreitung der Gefühle der Lust (aus 
Lust wieder Lust; [die] Menge von 
Lust). [Sie fungieren] als Maßstäbe für 
[die] Bewertung der verschiedenen 
Lust[arten]. [Bentham] sucht daraus33 
alle Gesetzgebung und Ethik zu 
entwickeln, [indem] menschliche 
Eigenschaften {492} nach [ihrer] 
Hervorbringung von Lust beurteilt 
[werden]. [So kommt er zu einer] 
Rangordnung der Güter. [Seine] 
psychologischen Erklärungen [sind] 
manchmal ganz primitiv. [Es kommt 
darauf an,] Lust und Unlust des 
Einzelnen den höchsten Zwecken 
dienstbar zu machen. [Die] Sanktionen 
der sittlichen Ordnung [werden darum 
bestimmt] durch Lust und Unlust der 
eigenen Person. [Bentham 
unterscheidet] 1. die physische 
Sanktion, 2. [die] moralische Sanktion 
(öffentliche Meinung u. dgl.), 3. [die] 
politische Sanktion (Strafe und 
the greatest pleasure (the greatest 
possible happiness) for the greatest 
possible number of people. [He] does 
not prove [this] premise, [but] presents 
it as self-evident, as directly intuitive.34 
[Then a] standard for the assessment 
of one’s own actions [is] sought. The 
intensity, duration and certainty of the 
pleasure are {such} standards; and 
concerning [the] consequences {the} 
prolificness and purity and extent35 of 
the emotion of pleasure (from pleasure, 
further pleasure; [the] volume of 
pleasure). [They function] as standards 
for [the] evaluation of different [kinds 
of] pleasure. [Bentham] seeks to base 
on those {standards} all lawmaking 
and ethics, [so that] human 
characteristics {492} [are] assessed 
based on [their] production of 
pleasure. [So he arrives at a] hierarchy 
of goods. [His] psychological 
explanations [are] sometimes very 
primitive. [The point is to] make the 
pleasure and displeasure of individuals 
serve the highest purposes. [The] 
sanctions of moral order [are thus 
determined] by one’s own person’s 
pleasure and displeasure. [Bentham 
distinguishes] (1) the physical 
sanction, (2) [the] moral sanction 
(public opinion etc.), (3) [the] political 
sanction (punishments and rewards 
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politische Sanktion (Strafe und 
Belohnung vom Staat), 4. [die] 
religiöse Sanktion. Ziel der 
Gesetzgebung ist, diese alle in einer 
Richtung zu gestalten: [der] Staat muß 
sorgen für [ein] Maximum von Lust. 
[Die] politischen Folgen liegen auf der 
Hand. Bentham [war darum] vor allem 
juristischer und politischer Reformator. 
from the state), and (4) [the] religious 
sanction. The goal of lawmaking is to 
form all of these in one direction: [the] 
state must facilitate [a] maximum of 
pleasure. [The] political consequences 
are obvious. Bentham [was thereby] 
above all a legal and political reformer. 
 John Stuart Mills 
Ausgangspunkt [ist] ähnlich [dem] 
Benthams. [Eine] Handlung [ist] recht, 
insofern wie auf Glückseligkeit 
abzielend, [und] Glückseligkeit ist Lust 
plus Abwesenheit von Leid. [Er] 
behauptet aber qualitative 
Wertunterschiede innerhalb [der] Lüste 
selbst ([in der] Abhandlung über 
»Utilitarismus«; contra Bentham). [Er 
stellt die] Frage, wonach [der] Wert 
einer Lust sich bestimmt. Mills 
[Antwort]: nach Erfahrung. »Reichtum 
an Freuden« [ist] mehr als [nur eine] 
Menge von Lust, menschliche Freude 
[ist] größer als tierische Freude, [und 
ein] Dasein möglichst frei von 
Schmerz und reich an Freude ist 
einsichtiges größtes Glück. Diese 
Glückseligkeit ist eigentlich [das] Ideal 
jedes Menschen. [Eine] Abmessung an 
Idealen vollkommenen Glückes liegt 
selbst beim Pessimisten vor,36 weil er 
dieses Ideal hat. 
 John Stuart Mill’s starting-point 
[is] similar [to] Bentham’s. [An] action 
[is] right insofar as it is directed 
toward happiness, [and] happiness is 
pleasure plus the absence of suffering. 
However, [he] asserts qualitative 
differences in value within [the] 
pleasures themselves ([in the] treatise 
concerning ‘Utilitarianism’; against 
Bentham). [He puts forward the] 
question: according to what is [the] 
value of a pleasure determined? Mill’s 
[answer]: according to experience. ‘To 
be rich in joy’ [is] something more than 
[just] {to have} [an] amount of 
pleasure; human joy [is] greater than 
animal joy, [and an] existence as free 
as possible from pain and as rich as 
possible in joy is evidently the greatest 
happiness. This blissful state is actually 
[the] ideal of every human being. [A] 
measuring by the ideal of perfect 
happiness presents itself even in the 
case of the pessimist, because he has 
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this ideal. 
 Hier [dann Mills] Versuch, 
Einwände gegen [den] Utilitarismus 
zurückzuweisen. Was heißt 
»Selbstzweck« des Sittlichen? Mill 
[sagt]: »Sittliche Werte um ihrer selbst 
erstreben« heißt: [Der] sittliche Wert 
ist [ein] Zweck, [der so beschaffen ist,] 
daß wir da[bei] stehenbleiben können, 
da schon Lust darin [enthalten ist], 
[wir also] Glückseligkeit schon daraus 
haben. [Ein anderer] Einwand 
[besagt], daß jede Selbstverleugnung 
dem Eudämonisten unmöglich [sei]. 
Mill [antwortet]: Akte der 
Selbstverleugnung haben [einen] 
eudämonistischen Hintergrund. Kants 
Einwand [lautete]: Wie kann man das 
allgemeine Wohl zum Prinzip des 
sittlichen Handelns machen, da wir 
nicht alle Konsequenzen unseres Tuns 
übersehen können? Aber Mill usw. 
[antworten]: Wir können sehr weit 
empirische Zusammenhänge zwischen 
Handeln [im Sinne der] Sittlichkeit und 
Glückseligkeit ([als] Gesamtglück) 
aufstellen. [Ein] großer fertiger Vorrat 
solcher Sätze [ist] schon [vorhanden, 
da die] Berechnung durch traditionelle 
Überlieferung [schon vorgegeben ist]. 
 Here[, then,] {we have} 
[Mill’s] attempt to repudiate objections 
[to] utilitarianism. What does the ‘end 
in itself’ of the moral mean? Mill 
[says]: ‘To pursue moral values for 
themselves’ means: [the] moral value 
is [a] purpose [which is such] that we 
can stay with it, because pleasure [is] 
already [contained] in it and [we thus] 
already have bliss from it. [A different] 
objection [states] that it [would be] 
impossible for a eudaimonist to deny 
himself anything. Mill [replies]: acts of 
self-denial have [a] eudaimonistic 
background. Kant’s objection [went]: 
how can one make the general good 
into the principle of moral action, if we 
cannot foresee all of the consequences 
of our actions? But Mill et al 
[respond]: we can establish very broad 
empirical connections between actions 
[in the sense of] morality and 
happiness ([as] collective happiness). 
[A] large supply of such principles37 
already [exists, since the] calculation 
[has already been established] by 
means of traditional customs. 
 [Nun] unsere Stellungnahme 
zum Utilitarismus [und] Kritik des 
Utilitarismus. Unsere drei Sphären 
[waren]: 1. Sphäre der sittlichen Werte 
 [Now] {to} our position 
towards utilitarianism [and] {our} 
critique of utilitarianism. Our three 
spheres [were]: (1) the sphere of moral 
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[waren]: 1. Sphäre der sittlichen Werte 
(persönliche Werte), 2. Sphäre des 
sittlichen Rechtseins (Rechte, die wir 
erstreben), 3. Sphäre der Güter 
(Güterwelt). [Der] Utilitarismus 
möchte für alle drei Sphären gelten, 
alle drei beherrschen, [indem er] alles 
in Beziehung zur Lust setzt. 
spheres [were]: (1) the sphere of moral 
values (personal values); (2) the sphere 
of moral being-right (rights, for which 
we strive); (3) the sphere of goods 
(world of goods). Utilitarianism 
purports to apply to all three spheres, 
govern all three, [by] placing 
everything in relation to pleasure. 
 Korrelat [des] Wertfühlens ist 
[der] sittliche Wert; [er] wird [z. B.] an 
[einer] {493} Gesinnung erfaßt. 
[Dieses] Erlebnis [wird] innerlich 
wahrgenommen. [Ein] Wert [dagegen 
wird] nie innerlich erlebt, [er] wird 
höchstens an dem innerlich Erlebten, 
am Erlebnis erfaßt (gefühlt). [Der] 
Schönheitswert [ist] auch in [solchen] 
fühlenden Akten gegeben. Das Fühlen 
der Werte, [sofern es] auf [die] Werte 
zu beziehen [ist], ist nicht mit Gefühlen 
(als Zuständen des Ich) im 
psychologischen Sinne zu 
verwechseln. [Diese] sind aber nie 
Akte des Wertfühlens. Allerlei 
verschiedene Gefühle können sich auf 
[das] Fühlen des Wertes aufbauen. Bei 
gleichem Wert können [sogar] 
entgegengesetzte Gefühle entstehen 
(Betrachtung des Werkes eines 
Feindes!). Sittliche Werte [also 
werden] von uns an wertvollen 
Gegenständen erfaßt, gefühlt: [z.B.] in 
Güte als solcher gründet sittlicher 
 The correlate of the feeling of 
value is moral value; [it] is grasped 
[for example], in [a] {493} {mental} 
disposition. [This] experience [is] 
perceived internally. [A] value, [on the 
other hand, is] never experienced 
internally; at most, [it] is grasped (felt) 
within the internally experienced, 
within experience. [The] value of 
beauty [is] also given in [such] feeling 
acts. The feeling of value, [insofar as 
it] concerns [the] values, is not to be 
confused with emotions (as states of 
the I) in the psychological sense. 
[These], on the other hand, are never 
acts of value-feeling. All kinds of 
different emotions can build 
themselves on [the] feeling of value. 
[Even] opposite emotions can arise 
from the same value (viewing the work 
of one’s enemy!). Moral values [are 
thus] grasped by us in valuable objects; 
[for example], moral value is founded 
in goodness as such. 
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Wert. 
 [Nach dem] Eudämonismus 
[dagegen] beziehen Güter ihren Wert 
aus Gefühlen der Lust oder Unlust, die 
sie bereiten können. Edle Gesinnungen 
wie Güte haben allgemein sittliche 
Bedeutung [nur wegen ihrer] 
Glücksfolgen:38 Sittlichen Wert hat 
Güte nur in bezug auf [daraus] 
entspringende Lust. [Indessen,] wenn 
[der] Wert der Güte erfaßt [wird, ist 
dabei] nie an [die durch sie] bewirkte 
Lust gedacht, auch nicht an die an 
einem Andern bewirkte Lust. [Und] 
wenn Lust fehlt, bleibt doch Güte, [was 
sie ist]. [Die] Theorie des Utilitarismus 
[besagt] : Güte bringt im allgemeinen 
Lust hervor [und] wird darum sittlich 
bewertet. [Aber das stimmt nicht bei] 
Übertragung auf Fälle, wo [eine] 
Glückhervorbringung fehlt. [Ein] edler 
Mensch, der gelähmt ist, kann [seine] 
edle Gesinnung nicht betätigen, aber 
[diese] edle Gesinnung büßt [dadurch] 
kein Stück ihres Wertes ein. Das kann 
der Utilitarismus nicht anerkennen. [Er 
erklärt dies wie im Fall des] Geizigen: 
[Dessen] Geld pflegt Nutzen zu 
bringen; [der] Wert wird darum [dem] 
Geld selbst zugeschrieben. Aber der 
Wert des Geldes sinkt, wenn 
Nutzenschaffung unmöglich [wird; 
dagegen der] Wert von Güte sinkt nie. 
 [According to] eudaimonism, 
[on the other hand,] goods acquire 
their value based on the emotions of 
pleasure and displeasure which they 
can bring about. Noble dispositions, 
like goodness, [only] have moral 
significance at all [because of the] 
happiness that is consequent from 
them: moral value has goodness only 
in relation to the pleasure that arises 
[from it]. [Whereas,] if [the] value of 
the good [is] grasped, [it is] never the 
pleasure that is brought about by {the 
value} that is thought of, nor the 
pleasure that is caused to someone 
else. [And] if there is no pleasure, the 
good nevertheless remains [what it is]. 
[The] theory of utilitarianism [says]: 
the good brings about pleasure in 
general [and] is morally valued on that 
basis. [But that does not] obtain in 
cases where the bringing about of 
pleasure does not occur. [A] noble 
human being who is paralyzed cannot 
act out [his] noble disposition, but 
[this] noble disposition does not forfeit 
any part of its value [as a result]. 
Utilitarianism cannot recognize this. 
[Utilitarianism explains this as in the 
case of the] miserly: [their] money is 
usually useful; the value is therefore 
ascribed [to the] money itself. But the 
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[Dies ist das] »Gesetz der Heterogonie 
der Zwecke«. Ihm [gehört hier] große 
Bedeutung zugemessen. [Es ist zwar] 
möglich, daß Güte ursprünglich nur 
wegen [ihres] Nutzens geschätzt und 
erst spät [der] Wert von Güte selbst 
erkannt [wurde]. Es kann sein, daß aus 
Lustgefühlen erst allmählich sittliche 
Werte [den] Menschen aufgegangen 
sind. Falsch [ist aber], daß ihm bloße 
zufällige Bedeutung angerechnet 
werde. [Es ist] nicht so, daß Wert sich 
zufällig historisch an Güte geheftet 
[hätte]. 
value of the money declines if its being 
put to use [becomes] impossible; [on 
the other hand], the value of goodness 
never declines. [This is the] ‘law of 
heterogeny of purposes.’39 Great 
significance is to be allocated [here] to 
{this law}. [It is indeed] possible that 
goodness was first estimated only on 
the basis of its usefulness, and that the 
value of goodness itself only [came to 
be] recognised later. It is possible that 
it was gradually, through feelings of 
pleasure, that moral values were 
discovered by human beings. [But it is] 
false to assign only accidental 
significance to them. [It is] not the case 
that value [would have been] 
accidentally linked historically to 
goodness. 
 Nach [dem] Utilitarismus 
müßte Schadenfreude ein Wert sein. 
Wir erklären sie [aber] nicht deshalb 
für [einen] Unwert, weil andere 
Menschen sich darüber ärgern. 
[Vielmehr ist] einzusehen, [daß] 
Schadenfreude in sich selbst betrachtet 
[ein] Unwert ist. [Es ist] nicht möglich, 
[mittels ihrer] Beziehung auf Künftiges 
[über ihren Wert entscheiden zu 
wollen]. 
 According to utilitarianism, joy 
at the misfortune of others 
(Schadenfreude) would have to be a 
value. We, [however,] do not consider 
it [a] disvalue just because it annoys 
other people. [Rather, it should be] 
recognised [that] Schadenfreude 
regarded in itself is [a] disvalue. [It is] 
not possible [to want to decide on its 
value by means of] its orientation 
toward things in the future. 
 Resultat: [Es ist] nicht möglich, 
personale und personal funktionale 
Werte und Unwerte auf Nutzen40 
zurückzuführen. [Die] erste These des 
 Result: [It is] not possible to 
reduce the values and disvalues of 
persons and of personal functions to 
utility. [We have thereby] disproven 
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zurückzuführen. [Die] erste These des 
Utilitarismus [haben wir damit] 
zurückgewiesen. Es hat keinen Sinn, 
personale Werte auf Lust oder Unlust 
zurückführen zu wollen. [Aber der] 
Utilitarist sagt dann: Personale Werte 
{494} kümmern ihn nicht, es kommt 
ihm nur auf sittliche Richtigkeit 
(Rechtheit) an. [Und der] Utilitarismus 
sagt zweitens: Sittlich richtig [ist] das, 
was [ein] Maximum an Lust 
hervorbringt. Hier [haben wir das] 
Prinzip des Utilitarismus: Jede sittliche 
Rechtheit hat sich dadurch 
auszuweisen, daß sie Glück bereitet. 
[Die] Utilitaristen waren tatsächlich 
praktisch gerichtet, [auf] Politik u. dgl. 
[Als Illustration dieses Prinzips gibt es 
ein] schönes Beispiel aus [der] 
Beraubung einer Karawane (von Lipps 
kritisiert) [über] Glücks- und 
Unglücksfolgen erster, zweiter und 
dritter Ordnung. 
utility. [We have thereby] disproven 
[the] first thesis of utilitarianism. It is 
senseless to want to reduce personal 
values to pleasure or displeasure. [But] 
the utilitarian then says: personal 
values {494} do not concern him; for 
him it is only about moral correctness 
(rightness). [And] secondly, [the] 
utilitarian says: That which brings 
about [a] maximum of pleasure [is] 
morally correct. Here [we have the] 
principle of utilitarianism: All moral 
rightness has proven to be such in that 
it causes happiness. [The] utilitarians 
were in fact practical in their outlook, 
oriented [toward] politics etc. [As an 
illustration of this principle, there is 
the] beautiful example of [the] robbing 
of a caravan (criticised by Lipps), 
[concerning] consequences of 
happiness and unhappiness of the first, 
second and third orders. 
 [Der] Utilitarist beurteilt die 
Tat, nicht den Täter. Der zufällige 
Erfolg eines Tuns ist irrelevant für 
[seinen] sittlichen Wert —  [dies ist 
nach den Utilitaristen ein] 
Wesensgesetz. [Der] Utilitarist [sagt]: 
[Die] Tat als Tun bleibt gleich, aber 
[die] Folgen [können] verschieden 
sein, [und] danach [wird ihre] 
Sittlichkeit beurteilt. [Der] 
 [The] utilitarian assesses the 
act, not the agent. The accidental 
success of something that is done is 
irrelevant for [its] moral value —  [this, 
for the utilitarians, is an]43 essential 
law. [The] utilitarian [says]: [The] act 
as something that is done remains the 
same, but [the] consequences [can] be 
different, [and] it is on that basis that 
[its] morality [is] assessed. 
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Utilitarismus hält sich hier an 
Äußerlichkeiten, [an die] zufälligen 
Folgen der Akte.41 [Typisch ist seine] 
Berufung hier auf42 [die] allgemeinen 
Aussagen des sittlichen Bewußtseins. 
Aber eigentlich spricht dieses gerade 
gegen [das] Prinzip des Lustmaximum. 
[Die] Menschen aus [ihrer] passiven 
Glückseligkeit zu wecken, ist [ja die] 
ethische Aufgabe! Personale 
Funktionen und ihre sittlichen Werte 
und Unwerte [sind] unabhängig von 
Glück oder Unglück. 
Utilitarianism concerns itself here with 
superficial details, [with the] accidental 
consequences of acts. [Typically, its] 
appeal here [is] to [the] general opinion 
of moral consciousness. But this really 
goes directly against [the] principle of 
the greatest pleasure. To wake human 
beings from [their] passive blissfulness 
[is in fact the] task of ethics! Personal 
functions and their moral values and 
disvalues [are] independent from 
happiness or unhappiness. 
 [Was] aber nun sittliche 
Rechtheit in [ihrer] Beziehung zu 
personalen Werten [betrifft, so zeigt 
sich ein] Wesenszusammenhang 
zwischen diesen Werten und [dem] 
Rechten: [Die] Existenz personaler 
Werte ist sittlich recht [und] soll sein. 
Schadenfreude ist unrecht [und] soll 
nicht sein, obgleich sie Lust vorbereitet 
[und] Freude ist. 
 But [as regards] moral 
rightness in [its] relation with personal 
values [an] essential connection 
[appears] between these values and that 
which is right: [The] existence of 
personal values is morally right [and] 
should be. Delight in the misfortune of 
others is wrong [and] should not be, 
although it begets pleasure [and] is joy. 
 [Die] erkenntnistheoretische 
Struktur der sittlichen Rechtheit [wird 
vom Utilitarismus] verkannt. Sittliche 
Rechtheit [ist] ein Charakter, der im 
Wesen des Sachverhalts gründet. [Der] 
Utilitarist [sagt]: Der Charakter kann 
gehen und kommen, [er] ist zufällig. 
Allgemeine Sätze [sind darum] nicht 
auszusprechen, nur Einzelfälle zu 
beurteilen. [Aber] wie Ähnlichkeit 
 [Utilitarianism] fails to 
recognise [the] epistemological 
structure of moral rightness. Moral 
rightness [is] a character which is 
founded in the essence of the state of 
affairs. [The] utilitarian [says]: The 
character can come and go, [it] is 
coincidental. General statements [are 
thus] not to be expressed; only 
individual cases can be assessed. [But] 
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oder Verschiedenheit im Wesen der 
Sache [und] des Sachverhalts fundiert 
und nicht wie Röte oder Wärme [davon 
ablösbar sind, so] ist Mord sittlich 
unrecht [und] erscheint [als das], was 
die Folgen auch seien. [Der] 
Utilitarismus müßte sagen: An und für 
sich ist Mord weder recht oder unrecht; 
man müßte jeden Fall abwägen. 
Annahme eines Mordes im Schlaf: 
[Das] Opfer fühlt44 keine Unlust, auch 
keine weiteren Folgen; nur große Lust 
des Mörders [ist gegeben]. [Dieser] 
Fall müßte recht sein! [Aber das ist 
eine] erkenntnistheoretische 
Widersinnigkeit: Ethische 
Bestimmtheiten von Sachen (sittliche 
Rechtheit) können nicht von zufälligen 
empirischen Umständen abhängig sein. 
[Der] Utilitarist hat nicht [den] Mut 
anzuerkennen, daß [ein] Sachverhalt 
[sein] Recht in sich trägt. Es gäbe nach 
[dem] Utilitarismus nichts Unrechtes, 
was nicht durch eventuelle Erfolge 
recht gemacht werden kann. 
as similarity or difference are founded 
in the essence of a thing or a state of 
affairs, and not [separable from it] in 
the way that redness or coldness [are, 
so] murder is morally wrong [and] 
appears [as such] whatever the 
consequences are. [The] utilitarian 
must say: In and of itself, murder is 
neither right nor wrong; one would 
have to weigh up each case 
individually. Take the murder of 
someone in {their} sleep; [the] victim 
feels no displeasure, and {there are} no 
further consequences; all [there is] is a 
great pleasure for the murderer. [This] 
case would have to be right! [But that 
is] epistemological nonsense; the 
moral determinations of things (their 
moral rightness) cannot be dependent 
on accidental empirical circumstances. 
[The] utilitarian lacks the courage to 
acknowledge that [a] state of affairs 
carries [its] rightness in itself. In 
utilitarianism, there would be nothing 
so wrong that it could not be made 
right by its possible consequences. 
 Einfluß [des Utilitarismus] auf 
[die] Strafgesetze und ihre Auffassung: 
Heute sieht man ebenso [das] Wesen 
der Strafe in Verbesserung des 
Verbrechers o. dgl. {495} Strafe [wird] 
nur als Erziehung aufgefaßt in 
Beziehung auf zu erreichende Zwecke, 
statt darin einen Nebenzweck [zu 
 The influence [of 
utilitarianism] on [the] criminal law 
and its creation: Today one sees, like 
{the utilitarians did} [the] essence of 
punishment as being in the betterment 
of the criminal, etc. {495} Punishment 
[is seen] only as education in relation 
to a purpose to be achieved, rather than 
402 
statt darin einen Nebenzweck [zu 
sehen]. [Damit wird die] 
Eigenrechtheit der Strafe verkannt. 
Genau genommen [wird dann] Strafe 
nur um [ihrer] Konsequenzen willen 
gewollt, die auch auf andere Weise zu 
erzielen [sind]. An [ihre] Stelle könnte 
ebensogut ärztliche Behandlung treten. 
Kants schöner Satz [steht] dagegen: 
Wenn [die] menschliche Gesellschaft 
sich auflösen sollte, müßte zuerst [der] 
letzte Mörder hingerichtet werden. 
Hier ist Unlust [also sogar] sittlich 
gefordert! [So stellt sich die] Frage 
nach [der] positiven Stellung und 
ethischen Bewertung von Lust und 
Unlust. Man [ist] oft in Reaktion gegen 
[den] Utilitarismus (besonders von 
seiten des Kantianismus) zu weit 
gegangen. [Es ist gewiß] ethisch nicht 
bedeutungslos, ob [etwas dem] 
Menschen Glück bereitet. Aber welche 
Rolle spielt [die] Lust? [Der] 
Eudämonismus redet [immer nur] mit 
zwei Wörtern —  Lust, Unlust usw. — , 
als ob das alles dasselbe wäre: Lust, 
Glückseligkeit, Freude o. dgl. [Der] 
Eudämonismus sah [so] nicht, was 
Lust eigentlich ist. 
to a purpose to be achieved, rather than 
as a separate purpose {in itself}. [In 
this, the] intrinsic rightness of 
punishment in itself goes unrecognised. 
Strictly speaking, punishment [is then] 
only wanted for [its] consequences, 
which can also be achieved in other 
ways. Medical treatment could just as 
well take [its] place. Kant’s beautiful 
objection against that goes: If human 
civilisation were to be dissolved, [the] 
last murderer would first have to be 
executed. [So] here, displeasure is 
[even] morally demanded! [Thus we 
have to ask the] question about [the] 
positive position and ethical valuation 
of pleasure and displeasure. One has 
often gone too far in reacting against 
utilitarianism, especially from the side 
of Kantianism. [It is of course] not 
ethically meaningless whether 
[something] makes someone happy. 
But what role does pleasure play? 
Eudaimonism [only ever] uses two 
words —  pleasure, displeasure, etc. —  
as if it were all the same thing: 
pleasure, bliss, joy, and so on. [In this 
way] eudaimonism did not see what 
pleasure really is. 
 Was ist Lust? Mill schon hat 
höhere und niedrigere Lust 
unterschieden. Wir haben [sogar noch] 
mehr: 1. Spezifisch sinnliche Lüste und 
 What is pleasure? Mill has 
already distinguished higher and lower 
pleasures. We have more, [in fact]: 1. 
Specifically sensory pleasure and 
403 
Unlüste (sinnlich Angenehmes, 
Unangenehmes) —  wo[bei] man es 
bestritten hat, ob [man] nicht hier bloß 
mit sinnlichen Empfindungen statt 
Gefühlen zu tun [habe]. Sinnliche 
Empfindung, Fühlen des 
Unangenehmen an [der] Empfindung 
(Erfassen des 
Annehmlichkeitscharakters) und unsere 
Lust/Unlust daran (am Angenehmen) 
sind dreierlei. [Es besteht ein] naher 
Zusammenhang, [eine] überaus enge 
Verknüpfung zwischen 
Empfindungsinhalten und Lust/Unlust 
daran. Sinnliche Lust wurzelt in 
Empfindungsinhalten, geht 
phänomenal aus ihnen hervor. 
displeasure (the sensorily pleasant and 
unpleasant) —  it has been contested 
whether one does not only have to do 
with sensations here, instead of 
emotions. Sensations, the feeling of 
that which is unpleasant in the 
sensation (the grasping of the 
character of acceptability), and our 
pleasure/displeasure (as regards the 
pleasant) are three different things. 
[There obtains a] closer systematic 
connection, [an] extraordinarily close 
link between the content of sensations 
and the pleasure/displeasure derived 
therefrom. Sensory pleasure is rooted 
in the content of sensations, arises 
phenomenally from them. 
 2. Freude-über: Wahrnehmung 
eines Ereignisses und Freude daran —  
darüber —  ist [eine] ganz andere 
Beziehung. [Die] Wahrnehmung des 
Ereignisses hebt sich scharf ab von 
[der] Freude, geht nicht aus [der] 
Wahrnehmung hervor (wie oben). Hier 
betreten wir [die] Welt des Geistes, 
[das] Gebiet des Geistigen in 
prägnantem Sinne, wo wir von 
Motiven, Gründen o. dgl. reden 
können, wo [also] 
Motivierungsverhältnisse vorhanden 
[sind] ([dies ist] dagegen [nicht der 
Fall bei] sinnlicher Lust/Unlust). 
Freude und Trauer sind 
 2. About joy: The perceiving of 
an event and joy at it —  over it —  is 
[an] entirely different relationship. 
[The] perceiving of the event stands 
out sharply from [the] joy; {the joy} 
does not arise from [the] perception 
(as above). Here we enter [the] world 
of the spirit, [the] domain of the 
spiritual in the precise sense, where we 
can speak of motives, reasons and 
suchlike, where relations of motivation 
[thus] are present ([this is] on the other 
hand [not the case] [with] sensory 
pleasure/displeasure). Joy and sadness 
are attitudes taken by the person. 
Sensory pleasure/displeasure, however, 
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Stellungnahmen der Person. Sinnliche 
Lust/Unlust ist aber unvernünftig, 
[genauer:] vernunftlos. [Die] 
Scheidung zwischen Geist und 
Sinnlichkeit hat hier volle 
Berechtigung. [Das hat der] 
Eudämonismus übersehen. 
Intensitätsunterschiede reichen in 
diesem Gebiet nicht im mindesten zur 
Charakterisierung der hiesigen 
Unterschiede [und] zur Deckung der 
Differenzen aus. Betrübnis über [das] 
Wetter [ist] qualitativ [nach] 
Gewichtigkeit [und] Tiefe 
unterschieden von Betrübnis über [das] 
Schicksal. Begeisterung [ist] 
gewichtiger45 als Entzücken. Ansetzen 
der vielen Gefühlseinheiten hier an 
allerlei verschiedenen Schichten der 
Persönlichkeit, Anpacken an tieferer 
Schicht des Ich. Ganz sanfte Freude 
kann uns vollständig erfüllen und kann 
einfach dasein. Intensität, Ausbreitung 
und Tiefe der Gefühle sind drei 
gegenseitig unabhängige 
Bestimmungen. [Die] seelische 
Ausbreitung der Erlebnisse [ist] nicht 
identisch mit [ihrer] Intensität. [Eine] 
{496} intensivere Freude hat 
Ausbreitungstendenz, [aber diese] 
Tendenz braucht nicht erfüllt zu sein. 
Begeisterung, Bewunderung sind ihrer 
Natur nach lustgefärbt; Verachtung, 
is irrational; [more precisely], 
mindless. [The] division between spirit 
and sensation has full legitimacy here. 
Eudaimonism [has] overlooked [this]. 
In this area, differences of intensity do 
not at all suffice to characterise these 
distinctions [and] to cover the 
differences. Being saddened because of 
[the] weather is qualitatively different 
[in] importance [and] depth from 
being saddened because of {one’s} 
fate. Enthusiasm [is] weightier than 
delight. The many unities of emotion 
here correlate to all kinds of different 
layers of the personality, impact on 
deeper layers of the I. Entirely peaceful 
joy can fill us completely and can 
simply exist. The intensity, extent and 
depth of the emotion are three 
coexistent and independent dimensions 
{of it}. [The] extension of experiences 
within the soul46 [is] not identical with 
[their] intensity. [A] {496} more 
intense joy has a tendency to extend 
itself, [but this] tendency does not need 
to be fulfilled. Enthusiasm and 
admiration are, by their nature, 
coloured by pleasure; contempt and 
hatred are by their nature coloured by 
displeasure. 
405 
Haß sind ihrer Natur nach 
unlustgefärbt. 
 Mill macht [einen] Unterschied 
zwischen sinnlicher und geistiger Lust. 
Aber daran [ist] nicht [die sittliche] 
Rechtheit zu orientieren. [Der] 
Utilitarismus müßte zugeben: Wenn 
Menschen sich über etwas freuen, 
worüber sie sich nicht freuen sollten, 
könnte dies [letztere] evtl. Pflicht 
werden. [Der] Eudämonismus gibt das 
vielleicht zu —  aber damit [hat er] 
Lust abhängig gemacht von [der] 
ethischen Bedeutung des Korrelats, 
[und] damit schon [sein] Prinzip 
aufgegeben. [Der] Utilitarismus von 
edler und unedler Lust und Unlust ist 
nach [seinen] eigenen Gesichtspunkten 
nicht zu begründen. Geistige Lust kann 
unedel sein. [Zwar:] Sittliche 
Empörung über [eine] schlechte Tat 
[ist] »edle Unlust«, könnte [der] 
Utilitarist sagen. Aber woran [wäre] 
»edel« [zu] messen? Damit [ist ein] 
objektives Verhältnis schon 
vorausgesetzt. [Also der] 
Eudämonismus hört da auf, wo [die] 
Ethik anfängt. 
 Mill makes [a] distinction 
between sensory and spiritual pleasure. 
But [moral] rightness [is] not to be 
oriented on that. Utilitarianism would 
have to admit: If human beings enjoy 
something which they should not, [the 
latter] could perhaps be a duty. 
Eudaimonism does perhaps admit that 
—  but thereby, it has made pleasure 
dependent on [the] ethical significance 
of its correlate, [and] thus has already 
abandoned [its] principle. The 
utilitarianism of nobler and baser 
pleasures and displeasures cannot be 
justified according to [its] own point of 
view. Spiritual pleasure can be base. 
[In fact: the] utilitarian could say that 
moral outrage over [a] bad act [is] 
‘noble displeasure.’ But according to 
what [would] ‘noble’ [be] measured? 
Here, [an] objective relationship [is] 
already presupposed. [So] 
eudaimonism stops where ethics 
begins. 
 Glück und Unglück sind etwas 
ganz anderes als Lust/Unlust. Glück 
[hat] Bezug auf [die] ganze 
Daseinssphäre [und ist] auch nicht mit 
Stimmung, Stimmungswechsel o. dgl. 
 Happiness and unhappiness are 
something very different from 
pleasure/displeasure. Happiness relates 
to the entire sphere of existence [and 
is] also not [to] be confused with 
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[zu] verwechseln. Stimmung steht in 
Beziehung zu Glück, ist es [aber] nicht 
selbst. In Heiterkeit [liegt] vielleicht 
[ein] Hinweis auf Glück, aber [er ist] 
nie unfehlbar. Täuschung [bleibt] 
möglich. Kein eindeutiger 
Zusammenhang, keine eindeutige 
Beziehung hier. Glück und Unglück 
[liegen] in ganz anderer Schicht wie 
Freude. Glück und Unglück sind keine 
Erlebnisse wie Stimmungen; Glück [ist 
evtl.] vorhanden vor [seinem] 
Erfassen. 
mood, change of mood and so on. 
Mood stands in relation to happiness, 
[but] is not itself {happiness}. In 
cheerfulness we may find a hint toward 
happiness, but [it is] never infallible. 
Deception [remains] possible. {There 
is} no univocal connection, no 
univocal relationship here. Happiness 
and unhappiness [reside] in a 
completely different layer {of the I} to 
joy. Happiness and unhappiness are not 
experiences like moods; happiness 
[can be] present before [it is] grasped. 
 [Es ist ein] Grundfehler des 
Eudämonismus, daß er Glück mit jeder 
beliebigen Lust verwechselt. Glück ist 
[ein] hohes Gut, wenn auch nicht 
höchstes. Aber [die] Gutseigenschaft 
des Glücks ist nicht mit sittlichem Wert 
(personalen Funktionen usw.) zu 
verwechseln. Frohsinn kann gewertet 
Werden; Schicksal kommt hinzu: Glück 
und Unglück ist [also] etwas, das den 
Menschen zuteil wird. [Es ist ein] sehr 
schlechter Vorwurf gegen eine Ethik, 
daß sie Gut und Wert verwechselt. 
 [It is a] fundamental error of 
eudaimonism that it confuses happiness 
with any and all pleasure. Happiness is 
[a] great good, even if not the greatest. 
But [the] quality of goodness that 
happiness possesses is not to be 
confused with moral value (personal 
functions etc.). Cheerfulness can be 
valued; fate befalls one: thus, 
happiness or unhappiness is something 
that is bestowed upon the human being. 
[It is a] very serious reproach against a 
system of ethics that it confuses good 
and value. 
 [Es ist ein] frommer Traum 
schon bei [den] alten Griechen, daß die 
Guten die Glücklichen sind. So sind 
[die] Griechen gezwungen, [den] 
Menschen ans innere Leben zu 
beschränken (als [Ort der] Pflicht), 
 It was already a pious dream 
with [the] ancient Greeks that the good 
people are also the happy ones. In this 
way [the] Greeks are forced to restrict 
people to their inner lives (as the place 
of duty), [and] Greek ethics (Stoicism) 
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[und die] griechische Ethik (Stoiker) 
sprach dem Schicksal jede Bedeutung 
ab.47 Aber [das ist] Wegdeutung von 
Tatsachen [und heißt] vor Übeln [die] 
Augen verschließen. [Es wäre] 
Widersinn, daß [der] sittlich Wertvolle 
sich um Übel nicht kümmern solle. 
Ganz anders ist [es], wenn [man] 
behauptet, [der] unsittliche, ethisch 
wertlose Mensch müßte unglücklich 
sein. Ebenso wie [der] persönliche 
Charakter nicht zur Schaffung von 
Glück ausreicht, ebenso läßt hier [sein] 
Unwert Glück nicht aufkommen. 
[Derlei] Unwertsfunktionen können 
[das] Glück hindern, [denn sie] sind 
dem Wert nach unlustgefärbt. [Ein] 
vollkommen unsittlicher Mensch kann 
nicht vollkommen glücklich sein, 
[denn es ist] wesensgesetzlich [eine] 
Ummöglichkeit, daß Glück mit 
ethischem Unwert vereint [sei]. 
denied any significance to fate. But 
[that is] ignoring facts [and is called] 
closing one’s eyes to evil things. [It 
would be] nonsense {to say} that [the] 
morally valuable {person} should not 
concern herself with evil. [It] is 
something very different if one asserts 
that [the] immoral, ethically value-less 
human being must be unhappy. Just as 
[the] personal character is not enough 
to create happiness, so too, [its] 
disvalue does not prevent happiness 
from arising. [Such] disvaluable 
functions can hinder [the] happiness 
[because they] are, on account of their 
value, coloured with displeasure. [A] 
perfectly immoral human being cannot 
be perfectly happy [because it is an] 
essential impossibility that happiness 
[should be] united with ethical 
disvalue. 
 {497}Daß Lust ein Gut ist, 
werden wir nicht bestreiten. Nur gibt es 
hier Abstufungen [und] verschiedene 
Güterstufen. Luststufen sind nicht die 
einzigen Güter. Geistige Freude ist 
[ein] höheres Glück als sinnliche 
Freude. Aber Gesundheit [oder] Leben 
ist auch ein Wert [und ein] Gut, selbst 
[das] unglücklichste. Nur als eines 
unter vielen [Gütern] kann [das] Glück 
als Gut angesehen werden. Glück 
nimmt [eine] Sonderstellung unter 
 {497}We would not dispute that 
pleasure is a good. There is simply a 
hierarchy here [and] different degrees 
of good. Degrees of pleasure are not 
the only goods. Spiritual joy is [a] 
higher happiness than sensory joy. But 
health [or] life is also a value [and a] 
good, even [the] unhappiest. Only as 
one among many [goods] can 
happiness be regarded as a good. 
Happiness takes a special place among 
[the] goods, [but] it is not the highest 
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nimmt [eine] Sonderstellung unter 
[den] Gütern ein, ist [aber] nicht 
höchster Gesichtspunkt des sittlich 
Guten. [Der] Utilitarismus [muß] mit 
blinden Augen an [den] eigentlichen 
ethischen Phänomenen vorübergehen. 
[the] goods, [but] it is not the highest 
viewpoint of the moral good. 
Utilitarianism [must] pass over the real 
ethical phenomena blindly. 
  
§ 348 § 3 
Kants Ethik Kant’s Ethics 
[Den] deutschen Charakter [von] Kants 
Ethik [kann man darin erblicken, daß 
sie] Pflicht u. dgl., nicht Liebe [ins 
Zentrum rückt]. [Aber man muß die] 
Weltanschauung des Denkers trennen 
von [seiner] wissenschaftlichen 
Begründung der Ethik.49 
[The] German character [of] Kant’s 
ethical theory [can be seen in that it 
moves] duty etc., not love, [into the 
centre]. [But one must] separate [the] 
world-view of the thinker from [his] 
scientific justification for ethics. 
 Kant hat auch hier verschiedene 
Stadien der ethischen Entwicklung 
durchgemacht. In der ethischen 
Preisschrift (Preisausschreiben der 
Berliner Akademie, 1764) [ist sein] 
Prinzip: »Tue das Vollkommenste, was 
durch dich möglich ist.« Aber davon 
[sind] keine positiven Grundsätze 
abzuleiten; aus diesem rein Formalen 
[ist] nichts Materiales abzuleiten 
([Kant will] weg von [der] 
Aufklärungsphilosophie hier). Es muß 
[et]was hinzukommen; [ein] spezielles 
Vermögen des Gefühls, [das] 
Vermögen Gutes zu empfinden, [ist] 
hier heranzuziehen. Einfluß der 
schottischen Schule: Kant beruft sich 
 Kant too went through several 
stages of ethical development. In his 
ethical competition piece (Competition 
of the Academy of Berlin, 1764), [his] 
principle [is]: ‘Do the most perfect 
thing that is possible for you.’ But no 
positive principles [are] to be derived 
from that; from this pure formality, 
nothing non-formal [is] to be derived 
([Kant wants] to be rid of [the] 
Enlightenment philosophy here). 
Something must be added; a special 
capability of emotion, the capability to 
feel that which is good, needs to be 
brought into play here. The influence of 
the Scottish school: Kant calls on 
Hutcheson here. [There is an] 
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hier auf Hutcheson. [Es gibt eine] 
unmittelbare Erfassung in Gefühlen der 
Billigung und Mißbilligung dessen, 
was recht ist: [der] moralische Sinn 
(von allen besessen). [Die] 
Werterfassung in dem »Gefühl« [ist] 
ebenso unmittelbar wie in äußerer 
Anschauung: Hier ist so und so [ein] 
Ding; so hier: Hier ist ein Wert. [Die 
behaupteten] Akte des Fühlens hier 
sind [von] solcher [Art]: Wir sehen 
[eine] Landschaft und fühlen ihre 
Schönheit. Allen Gegenstandsarten 
sind Aktarten korreliert. Werte werden 
gefühlt. Auch hier [gibt es] 
Unterschiede der Deutlichkeit, Klarheit 
u. dgl. Den Unwert eines Neides fühlen 
wir evtl. viel klarer, als wir [den] Neid 
selbst erleben. Hutcheson spricht aber 
von den Gefühlen statt von Akten des 
Fühlens. [Die Folge ist] Unklarheit 
durch die schwere Verwechslung von 
Ichzuständlichkeiten (Gefühl) mit 
fühlenden Akten. Daran scheitert die 
Grundlegung der Ethik von Hutcheson. 
Beim Fühlen gibt es Täuschungen. 
Aber [es] sind Akte, in deren Wesen es 
liegt, Objektives zu treffen. Fühlen ist 
ein seinserfassender Akt. Gefühle 
machen keine solchen Ansprüche. 
Gefühle sind Zuständlichkeit, abhängig 
von Zufälligkeiten, [und] können nicht 
[eine] objektive Ethik begründen. 
immediate grasping of what is right in 
emotions of approval or disapproval: 
the moral50 sense (possessed by all). 
[The] grasping of values in ‘emotion’ 
[is] just as immediate as in outward 
viewing: ‘Here is such and such [a] 
thing,’ so here: ‘here is a value.’ [The] 
acts of feeling [put forward] here are 
[of] such a [kind]: We see [a] landscape 
and feel its beauty. All kinds of objects 
are correlated to kinds of acts. Values 
are felt. Here too [there are] differences 
in the distinctness, clarity, etc. We feel 
the disvalue of envy perhaps much 
more clearly than we experience [the] 
envy itself. But Hutcheson51 speaks of 
emotions rather than acts of feeling. 
[The consequence of this is] unclarity 
due to the serious confusion of states of 
the I (emotion) with acts of feeling. On 
this, Hutcheson’s foundation for ethics 
fails. In feeling, there are deceptions. 
But [there] are acts in whose nature it 
is to make contact with something 
objective. Feeling is a being-grasping 
act. Emotions make no such claim. 
Emotions are states, dependent on 
accidental circumstances, [and] cannot 
found [an] objective ethics. 
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 Kant wendet sich später völlig 
ab von Hutcheson. Kant verließ 
[dessen] {498} Standpunkt und 
bekämpfte ihn später. In [der] »Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft« [haben wir den] 
Gegensatz von Sinnlichkeit und 
Verstand. [Die] Grundsätze dieser 
[beiden Vermögen] machen Erkenntnis 
erst52 möglich. [Dieser] Gesichtspunkt 
[des] Gegensatzes von Vernunft und 
Sinnlichkeit in Kants Erkenntnistheorie 
[ist] auch maßgebend für [die] »Kritik 
der praktischen Vernunft«: [er] findet 
sich in der Ethik wieder. [Diese] fragt, 
wie Urteile des »Sollens«, »Müssens« 
uns möglich sind. Nichts liegt Kant 
ferner, als [eine] neue Moral 
aufzustellen. [Seine Absicht ist] nur, 
allgemeine Vernunftprinzipien 
aufzudecken, die ihr zugrunde liegen 
[sowie die] Allgemeingültigkeit und 
Notwendigkeit bei Werturteilen und 
Geboten [zu begründen.] 
 Kant later turned away 
completely from Hutcheson. Kant 
abandoned [Hutcheson’s] {498} 
standpoint and later attacked it. In [the] 
‘Critique of Pure Reason,’ [we have 
the] opposition between sense and 
reason. [The] fundamental principles of 
[both of these faculties] are what make 
cognition possible. [This] viewpoint 
[of the] opposition between the 
rational and the sensory in Kant’s 
epistemology [is] also determining for 
[the] ‘Critique of Practical Reason’: 
[it] is found again in the Ethics. [This 
latter] asks how judgements about 
‘ought’ and ‘must’ are possible for us. 
Nothing could be further from Kant’s 
intent than to establish [a] new 
morality.53 [His intent is] only to 
discover its general fundamental 
principles of reason [and to justify the] 
universality and necessity of value-
judgements and precepts. 
 Wie ist [das] Apriori in der 
praktischen Vernunft möglich? [Im] 
Ausgang vom Faktum des sittlichen 
Bewußtseins [gefragt]: Wie ist das 
sittliche Bewußtsein möglich? [Die] 
reine Moralphilosophie Kants [hat] 
alles bloß Empirische auszuschalten 
[und] muß alles ausschließen, was zur 
Anthropologie gehört. Er scheidet 
Maximen [und] Imperative. Maximen 
 How is [the] apriori in 
practical reason possible? [Asked in] 
relation to the fact of moral 
consciousness: How is moral 
consciousness possible? Kant’s pure 
moral philosophy had to dismiss 
everything merely empirical [and] to 
exclude everything belonging to 
anthropology. He distinguishes maxims 
[and] imperatives. Maxims are 
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sind subjektiv. Anders sind Imperative: 
[sie sind] objektiv, ein Seinsollen in 
sich enthaltend. Sie können, an den 
Willen sich wendend, sich am Willen in 
verschiedenster Weise geltend machen. 
1. Hypothetische Imperative: [Solche] 
Sätze gelten allgemein, aber unter 
Voraussetzung gewisser Zwecke, in 
Ansehung einer begehrten Wirkung 
usw. 2. Nun gibt es auch kategorische 
Imperative: unbedingt geltend, ohne 
Voraussetzung; »du sollst« rein an und 
für sich, nicht für [einen] Zweck. Alle 
anderen sind Vorschriften der Klugheit, 
Gebote des Scharfsinns. Für 
Sittlichkeit kommt allein der 
kategorische Imperativ in Betracht. 
Allgemeiner Lehrsatz: Alle Sätze, die 
einen Zweck voraussetzen, sind 
empirisch bedingt. Jeder hypothetische 
Imperativ beruht auf Erfahrung. Jede 
Zweckethik, die [die] Abhängigkeit des 
Wollens von einer fremden Macht 
voraussetzt, [ist] zu verwerfen. So [ist 
der] Utilitarismus abhängig vom 
Streben nach Glück, und es ist nur 
empirisch erkennbar, was zum Glück 
führt. Jede Glücksethik ist [daher] 
falsch. Sittlichkeit [ist] um ihrer selbst 
willen [da]. Weshalb sollte [etwa der] 
Anblick der Pflicht den Menschen 
nicht mit Gefühlen des Hasses 
erfüllen? Auf Gefühle also kann 
subjective. Imperatives are different: 
[they are] objective, containing an 
ought-to-be in themselves. They can, 
turning towards the will, impose 
themselves on the will in the most 
diverse ways. 1. Hypothetical 
imperatives: [Such] statements are 
valid in general, but under the 
assumption of certain purposes, in view 
of a desired effect, etc. 2. Now there 
are also categorical imperatives: 
absolutely valid, without assumption; 
‘you should,’ purely in and for itself, 
not for [a] purpose. All others are 
prudential instructions, precepts of 
intelligence. For morality, only the 
categorical imperative is relevant. 
General theorem: All statements that 
presuppose a purpose are empirically 
qualified. Every hypothetical 
imperative is based on experience. 
Every teleological ethics that 
presupposes [the] dependency of the 
will on an external power [is] to be 
discarded. In this way, utilitarianism 
[is] dependent on the striving for 
happiness, and what will lead to 
happiness is only recognisable 
empirically. Every ethics of happiness 
is [therefore] false. Morality [exists] 
for its own sake. For what reason 
should, [for example, the] appearance 
of duty not fill a human being with 
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Sittlichkeit des Tuns nicht zu 
begründen sein, auf zufällige 
Affektionen des Menschen. Eigentlicher 
Gegenstand sittlicher Wertschätzungen 
ist [der] gute Wille —  nicht wegen 
[seiner] Resultate, sondern wegen [des] 
Willens selbst. Moralischer Wert kann 
nur im Prinzip des Willens selbst 
liegen, nicht in einer Handlung oder 
Absicht. [Der] Wille [ist] »gut durch 
das Wollen selbst«, allein bestimmt 
durch absolutes Sollen. 
emotions of hatred? So the morality of 
actions cannot be founded on emotions, 
on accidental affections of the human 
being. The genuine object of moral 
value-estimation is [the] good will —  
not because of [its] result, but because 
of [the] willing itself. Moral value can 
only lie in the principle of the will 
itself, not in an action or intention. 
[The] will [is] ‘good because of the 
willing itself,’ determined alone 
through {the} absolute ought. 
 [Man muß] suchen, den guten 
Willen in Reinheit aufzustellen [und] 
jedes Gefühlsmäßige 
herauszuabstrahieren. [Der] ethische 
Wert einer Handlung [hängt also ab 
vom Wollen, und] gut [ist] ein Wollen, 
das nicht aus Neigung entspringt, nur 
aus Achtung vor [dem] Sittengesetz. 
»Pflicht ist [die] Notwendigkeit einer 
Handlung aus Achtung vor dem 
Gesetze«, [und eine] Handlung aus 
Pflicht [ist] lediglich aus [der] Maxime 
des absoluten Pflichtgesetzes 
entspringend. Kant {499} unterscheidet 
Legalität und Moralität der 
Handlungen. Ehrfurcht vor dem Gesetz 
ist [das] einzige Motiv [der] Ethik; 
[das] Fundament der Sittlichkeit 
[liegt] in [der] Ehrfurcht vor dem 
Seinsollen. Wo etwas aus Gefühl 
geschieht, auch [wenn] es mit [dem] 
 [One must] seek to establish the 
good will in its purity [and] abstract it 
from all things emotional. [The] ethical 
value of an action [is thus dependent 
on the willing, and] a willing [is] good 
that does not issue from inclination, 
only from respect for [the] moral law.54 
‘Duty is [the] necessity of an action out 
of respect for the moral law,’ [and an] 
action performed out of duty [is] 
simply originating from the maxim of 
the absolute law of duty. Kant {499} 
distinguishes the legality and the 
morality of the action. Reverence for 
the moral law is [the] only motive [of] 
ethics; the foundation of morality [lies] 
in reverence for what ought to be. 
Where something occurs out of 
emotion, even [if] it agrees with [the] 
precept of the moral law, [it] has no 
moral value. [The] dignity of the 
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Gebot des Sittengesetzes 
übereinstimmt, hat [es] keinen 
sittlichen Wert. [Die] Würde der Person 
[besteht gerade] in [der] Möglichkeit 
der Achtung vor dem Moralgesetz. 
[Der] Grundton [von] Fichtes »Reden 
an die deutsche Nation« [findet sich 
schon] hier. 
person [subsists precisely] in the 
possibility for her to respect the moral 
law. [The] tone [of] Fichte’s 
‘Addresses to the German Nation’ [is 
already to be found] here. 
 Wie ist [das] Sittengesetz zu 
formulieren? Bestimmte konkrete 
Einzelhandlungen [werden] nicht 
dadurch bestimmt, nur [die] 
Gesetzmäßigkeit der Handlung selbst. 
Nur [eine] formale Bestimmung [liegt 
darin], und doch [ist es das] ethische 
Grundgesetz. »Tue das unbedingt 
Gesollte«, »Handle stets… « u. dgl.: 
Der kategorische Imperativ ist [die] 
allgemeingültige Gesetzmäßigkeit 
selbst. In [der] Tauglichkeit einer 
Handlung zum allgemeinen Gesetz 
liegt der sittliche Wert. [Wir haben] nur 
eine Formalbestimmung hier. Wie 
durch allgemeine Gesetze 
(Kausalgesetz!) [der] Stoff der 
theoretischen Erkenntnis geformt und 
gestaltet [wird], so hier [durch den] 
kategorischen Imperativ. [Ein] 
konkreterer Imperativ [wird] aus [dem] 
ganz formalen gewonnen: Sei 
moralisch! [Dieser ist das] Gebot, 
etwas zu tun —  nie weil es diese oder 
jene Sache ist, sondern weil es recht 
 How is [the] moral law to be 
formulated? Specific, concrete, 
individual actions do not [become] 
determined by the above, only [the] 
lawfulness of the action itself. Only [a] 
formal determination [is found 
therein], and yet [that is the] basic law 
of ethics. ‘Do what you absolutely 
ought to,’ ‘Always act… ’ etc.: the 
categorical imperative is in itself [the] 
universally valid law.55 Moral value 
lies in [the] suitability of an action to 
the general law. [We] [have] only a 
formal characterisation here. Like how 
[the] material of theoretical cognition 
is given form and shape through 
general laws (law of causation!), so 
here {that material is given shape} 
[through the] categorical imperative. 
[A] concrete imperative [is] derived 
from [the] entirely formal: Be moral! 
[This is the] precept for doing 
something —  not because it is this or 
that thing is, but because it is right. 
[We are talking of] pure practical 
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ist. [Es geht um die] reine praktische 
Vernunft hier. 
reason here. 
 Kant bezeichnet [diesen] 
Grundbegriff seiner Ethik als 
Autonomie des Wollens. Würde 
gebührt eigentlich nur [dem] 
Sittengesetz selbst, der menschlichen 
Person nur als Teilnehmer an ihm. Alle 
Erscheinungen sind dem Gesetz 
gegenüber bloße Sachen. [Es wäre ein] 
Verstoß gegen [die] Würde der Person, 
wenn etwas um der Sache willen getan 
wird und nicht aus Achtung vor dem 
Gesetz entspringt. [Das] Gesetz der 
Gesetzlichkeit, [als] Autonomie des 
Willens, wird jetzt zum Gesetz der 
Wahrung der Würde des Menschen. 
[Die] Person [ist] stets als Zweck, nie 
bloß als Mittel [zu behandeln]. Wären 
wir durchaus vernünftig, dann gäbe es 
keine solchen Gebote. [Was] für [ein] 
reines Vernunftwesen (Gott z. B.) 
Naturgesetz [wäre], wird für uns ein 
»du sollst«. [Der] Mensch [ist eben] 
Bürger zweier Welten —  [der] 
sinnlichen und [der] intelligiblen. [Das] 
Sittengesetz als Gesetz der intelligiblen 
Welt [liegt] in uns selbst. [Das] 
Sittengesetz verleiht dem Menschen 
[einen] unendlichen Wert, indem er 
sich als Bürger dieser Welt fühlen 
kann. Der Mensch [ist] unwürdig 
genug, [aber die] Menschheit selbst ist 
stets würdig, [denn sie ist befähigt zur] 
 Kant designates [this] basic 
concept of his ethics as the autonomy 
of the will. Dignity belongs only 
properly to the moral law itself; the 
human person {possesses it} only as a 
participant in the latter. All appearances 
are merely things in comparison to the 
law. [It would be an] offense against 
[the] dignity of the person if anything 
was done for its own sake56 and not out 
of respect for the moral law. [The] law 
of conformity with the moral law, [as] 
the autonomy of the will, now becomes 
the law of the preservation of human 
dignity. [The] person [is] always [to be 
treated] as an end, never merely as a 
means. If we were thoroughly rational, 
there would be no such precepts. [That 
which would be a] law of nature for a 
being of pure reason (God, for 
example) becomes, for us, a ‘you 
should.’ [The] human being [is indeed] 
a citizen of two worlds —  [the] sensory 
and [the] intelligible. As a law of the 
intelligible world, [the] moral law 
[resides] within us. [The] moral law 
lends the human being [an] unending 
value, insofar as he can feel himself to 
be a citizen of this world. The human 
being {may} lack dignity, [but] 
humanity itself always possesses 
dignity, [because it is empowered to] 
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stets würdig, [denn sie ist befähigt zur] 
Kausalität durch Freiheit. Freien 
Willen [gibt es] nur, insoweit [der 
Mensch dem] kausalen Nexus des 
Geschehens nicht unterworfen [ist]. 
Freiheit ist Voraussetzung für 
Bestimmung durch [das] Sittengesetz. 
[Sie ist daher] für [die] intelligible Welt 
der Dinge an sich zu postulieren. [Das] 
Sittengesetz in uns verbürgt uns [die] 
Willensfreiheit: [Dies ist] Kants 
Umkehrung der gewöhnlichen 
Deduktion hier. [Die] Erfahrung zeigt 
uns überall kausale Bestimmtheit. 
dignity, [because it is empowered to] 
causality through freedom. [There is] 
only free will insofar as [the human 
being is] not subjected to the causal 
nexus of events. Freedom is a 
precondition for determination by [the] 
moral law. [Therefore it is] to be 
postulated for [the] intelligible world 
of things in themselves. [The] moral 
law in us vouches for our free will: 
[this is] Kant’s turning around of the 
customary deduction here. Experience 
shows us causal determinedness 
everywhere. 
 Freiheit bei Kant [ist] damit 
[noch] nicht eindeutig bestimmt. Frei 
ist auch [die] Fähigkeit, frei zu sein, 
[die] Möglichkeit, sich zu befreien von 
[der] Sinnlichkeit. {500} [Der] Mensch 
als Noumenon ist wirklich frei in 
[diesem] zweiten Sinne. Daraus 
allein57 versteht Kant Verantwortung, 
Zurechnung u. dgl. [Das] Böse [ist] 
auch [ein] Werk der Freiheit. Beide 
Freiheitsbegriffe beziehen sich nicht 
auf [den] empirischen Verlauf der 
Dinge, [sondern] auf [die] Welt der 
Dinge an sich. 
 Freedom for Kant [is still] not 
clearly defined with this. [The] 
capacity to be free, [the] possibility of 
freeing oneself from the senses, is itself 
free. {500} [The] human being as 
noumenon is really free in this second 
sense. Kant understands responsibility, 
accountability etc., on this basis alone. 
Evil [is] also [a] work of freedom. Both 
concepts of freedom relate not to [the] 
empirical procession of things, [but] to 
[the] world of the things in themselves. 
 [Das] Ding an sich [ist] 
unzugänglich für Kants theoretische 
Erfahrung. [Das] sittliche Bewußtsein 
sollte zur Annahme dieser Welt 
zwingen. Als intelligible Wesen [stehen 
 [The] thing in itself [is] 
inaccessible for Kant’s theoretical 
experience. Moral consciousness 
should force the acceptance of this 
world. As intelligible beings, [we] no 
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wir] nicht mehr unter kategorialen 
Gesetzen, sondern [sind] frei und 
geben uns [selber das] Gesetz des 
kategorischen Imperativs. [Im 
Gegensatz zu] Platons außerzeitlichem 
vorweltlichem Akt der freien Wahl ist 
bei Kant [der] freie Wille stets da. 
[Der] Ausgangspunkt beider ist [aber] 
derselbe: sonst [gäbe es] keine Schuld, 
Verantwortung u. dgl. Daran will man 
[aber] festhalten. 
longer [stand] under categorical laws; 
we [are] free and give [the] law of the 
categorical imperative to ourselves. [In 
opposition to] Plato’s act of free choice 
outside of time and the world, [the] 
free will is always there for Kant. 
[However, the] starting-point of both is 
the same; otherwise there would be no 
guilt, responsibility, etc. [But] those, 
one will want to hold on to. 
 Kant will nicht [der] 
Glückseligkeit jede Bedeutung 
absprechen. [Er] betrachtet sie als [ein] 
Gut [und fragt nach dem] 
Zusammenhang zwischen Sittlichkeit 
und Glück. Nur [ein] sittlicher Mensch 
ist würdig der Glückseligkeit, aber58 
Erreichung der Glückseligkeit ist nicht 
Motiv des Wollens. [Die] 
Widersprechung des [tatsächlichen] 
Seins [ist] auch hier nicht ausreichend, 
um [etwas] Seinsollendes aufzuheben. 
[Daher das] Erwachsen der Idee der 
Unsterblichkeit der Person. Damit 
[sind wir] nicht schon sofort [bei der] 
Verwirklichung des höchsten Glückes, 
sondern nur bei [der] Annahme der 
sittlichen Weltordnung, und die [ist] 
nur durch [die] Existenz Gottes 
[garantiert]. [Dies sind] die drei 
Postulate der praktischen Vernunft. 
[Das] irdische Leben [erscheint] 
 Kant does not want to strip 
blissfulness of all significance. [He] 
regards it as [a] good [and investigates 
the] connection between morality and 
happiness. Only [a] moral human being 
deserves bliss, but the achievement of 
bliss is not a motive for the will. [The] 
contradiction of [factual] being [is] 
also not sufficient here to suspend 
[something] that should be. [Hence the] 
growth of the idea of the immortality 
of the person. With that, [we are] not 
already [at the] realisation of the 
highest happiness, but merely at [the] 
acceptance of the moral order of the 
world, and the latter [is] only 
[guaranteed] through [the] existence of 
God. [These are] the three postulates of 
practical reason. Thereby, earthly life 
[appears] in [a] higher light. 
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dadurch in [einem] höheren Licht. 
 [Nicht zu unterschätzen ist die] 
gewaltige Wirkung dieser Ethik: [Der] 
eigentliche Wert des Menschen [liegt] 
in diesem »Sollen«. [Dies ist eine] tiefe 
Bereicherung der Gedankenwelt der 
Menschen, wie man sich auch dazu 
stellt. 
 [The] mighty influence of this 
ethical theory [is not to be 
underestimated]; [the] genuine value of 
the human being [rests] in this ‘ought.’ 
[This is a] deep enrichment of the 
world of human thought, however one 
might assess it. 
 Kritik [an den] 
wissenschaftlichen Gründen von Kants 
Ethik: Kants Theorie des sittlichen 
Handelns und des sittlich Guten [ist] 
orientiert am guten Willen: »Gut [ist] 
allein der gute Wille.« Sittliche Werte 
[sind also] an Akten haftend. Was in 
[der] Welt recht und unrecht ist, [ist 
dies] nie an sich selbst, sondern wegen 
[seiner] Entsprechung des Gesetzes. 
Aber so [kommt es zu einer] 
ungeheueren Beschränkung der 
Provinz der Ethik. [Der] Mensch ist 
nicht bloß [ein] wollendes Wesen. 
Einem Feinde sein Unrecht verzeihen, 
Verzicht auf [ein] Gut u. dgl. sind echt 
ethische Akte. [Sie haben] sittlichen 
Wert, aber [dabei findet sich] kein 
Wollen, [einen] Sachverhalt zu 
realisieren. [Auch] Vergeben [ist ein] 
Akt der Person —  könnte man ihn 
[aber] zu [den] willentlichen Akten 
rechnen? Also59 auch auf Erlebnisse 
nichtwillentlicher Akte beziehen sich 
Werte, auch an Erlebnissen 
 Critique [of the] scientific bases 
of Kant’s ethics: Kant’s theory of moral 
action and the moral good [is] oriented 
upon the good will: ‘The good will 
alone [is] good.’ Moral values [thus] 
attach to acts. Whatever is right and 
wrong in [the] world [is so] not in 
itself, but because of [its] 
correspondence with the moral law. But 
then an enormous reduction of the 
province of ethics [comes about]. [The] 
human individual is not simply [a] 
willing being. To excuse an enemy of 
his wrong, relinquishment of [a] good, 
etc., are genuine ethical acts. [They 
have] moral value, but [in these cases 
there is] no will to realise [a] state of 
affairs. Forgiving, [too, is an] act of 
the person —  [but] could one consider 
it an act of willing? Thus, values relate 
also to the experiences of non-willing 
acts; we also detect an ethical character 
in experiences of a non-willing nature. 
For example, [the] emotion of 
resentment [or] inner participation in 
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nichtwillentlicher Natur spüren wir 
[den] ethischen Charakter. Z. B. [das] 
Gefühl der Mißgunst [oder] innere 
Teilnahme an unglücklichem Geschick. 
Wie [gäbe es] denn nur guten Willen in 
der Welt? Solche personale Akte und 
Erlebnisse [dienen vielmehr] als 
Zeichen für [die] personale Struktur. 
[Die] Person60 selbst wird auch als 
ethisch wertvoll bewertet. [Eine] 
egoistische Handlung im einzelnen, 
aber auch [die] egoistische Person im 
ganzen [ist] verurteilbar. {501} Seit 
Kant also [ist] leider [die] Ethik als 
Lehre der guten Handlungen 
beschränkt. Luther sagte: [Die] Person 
muß gut sein [noch] vor [der] guten 
Handlung. 
an unhappy twist of fate. Why, 
therefore, would there exist only good 
will in the world? Such personal acts 
and experiences [serve in fact] as 
indications of [the] personal structure. 
[The] person herself is also assessed as 
ethically valuable. A specific egoistic 
action can be denounced, but so too 
can [the] egoistic person herself. {501} 
So, since Kant, ethics has sadly been 
limited to the doctrine of good actions. 
Luther said: [The] person must 
[already] be good, before [the] good 
action.61  
 [Eine] wissenschaftliche Ethik 
muß versuchen, beidem gerecht zu 
werden. [Es ist] merkwürdig, wie weit 
[dies] von Kant verkannt [wurde in] 
zweierlei [Hinsicht]: 
 [A] scientific ethics must 
attempt to account for both. [It is] 
noteworthy by how far Kant neglected 
to do that, on two points: 
1.  Relativierung der Werte bei 
Kant: Überlegung [ist] nach 
Kant nur gut, wenn auf Gutes 
abzielend. [Aber] ruhige 
Überlegung beim Menschen 
wird nicht zum Unwert, weil 
[sie] im Dienst des schlechten 
Willens [steht]. Wir nehmen sie 
als Zeichen für [die] 
Unempfänglichkeit des 
1.  Relativisation of values by Kant: 
For Kant, reflection [is] only 
good if it is direct towards the 
good. [But] calm reflection in a 
human being does not become a 
disvalue just because [it] serves 
the bad will. We take it as an 
indication of [the] villain’s lack 
of receptivity to the good, and 
condemn him all the more. 
419 
Bösewichts fürs Gute und 
verurteilen ihn desto mehr. 
Überlegung [ist] stets [ein] 
positiver Wert. 
Reflection [is] always [a] 
positive value. 
2. Talente des Geistes [sind] keine 
spezifisch sittlichen Werte. 
Warum beschränkt Kant sich 
auf diese und spricht nicht von 
den ethischen Phänomenen der 
Güte, Treue, Barmherzigkeit u. 
dgl.? [Dies sind] Sachen, die 
alle sich nicht auf Wollen 
reduzieren lassen. 
2. Spiritual talents [are] not 
specifically moral values. Why 
does Kant limit himself to these 
and not speak of the ethical 
phenomena of goodness, 
faithfulness, compassion and so 
on? [These are] things which do 
not admit of being reduced to 
willing. 
 [Für] Kants Ethik als bloße 
Ethik des guten Willens aber, müßte 
man sagen, ist 1. ethisch recht der 
Sachverhalt, dem allgemeines 
Seinsollen zukommt. 2. Sittlich gut ist 
das Wollen, das [einen] solchen 
Sachverhalt realisiert, nicht um 
irgendeines Zweckes willen, sondern 
um des obersten Sittengesetzes willen; 
[kurz eine] Handlung, die formal sich 
unter [das] Sittengesetz fügt.62 Etwas 
anderes ist [es aber] zu sagen, man soll 
dieses realisieren. Wie ist sittliche 
Rechtheit im konkreten Fall zu 
erkennen? [Die] Schwierigkeit [liegt 
darin], einzelne Handlungen aus [dem] 
bloß formalen Gesetz abzuleiten. [Die] 
Tauglichkeit zur allgemeinen 
Gesetzgebung hilft uns hier nirgends. 
[Man denke an den Fall der] Lüge 
 But [for] Kant’s ethics as a 
mere ethics of the good will, one would 
have to say: 1. A state of affairs that in 
general ought to be is ethically right. 2. 
The willing that realises such [a] state 
of affairs, not out of desire for some 
{other} purpose but for the sake of the 
higher moral law, is morally good; [it 
is, in short, an] action that formally fits 
under [the] moral law. [But it] is 
something different to say that one 
should realise it. How is moral 
rightness to be recognised in concrete 
cases? [The] difficulty [lies in] 
deriving individual actions from [the] 
mere formal law. Capacity for 
legislating the universal law does not 
help us here. [One might think of the 
example of the] lie under specific 
circumstances! 
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unter bestimmten Umständen! 
 Kants eigene konkrete 
Ableitung einzelner Fälle aus [dem] 
allgemeinen Sittengesetz [beim] 
Beispiel des Depositums. Aber warum 
sollte es [überhaupt] Deposita geben? 
[Ein] anderer Versuch: [Die] 
Formulierung der Maximen sollte63 
zum allgemeinen Naturgesetz taugen. 
Niemals aber ist Kant so weit von 
[den] Grundlagen seiner ganzen Ethik 
[entfernt] wie hier. [Das] sittliche 
Gesetz [macht er] hier davon abhängig, 
ob es Naturgesetz sein kann oder nicht. 
Das widerspricht seinem eigenen 
ethischen Hauptsatz. [Seine] dritte 
Formulierung [lautet]: Daß wir wollen 
können, [daß] unsere Maxime zum 
allgemeinen Gesetz wird. Kriterium 
des sittlich Richtigen [ist also, man 
könne] unmöglich wollen, daß 
Unrichtiges allgemeines Naturgesetz 
werde. [Aber ist das] so z. B. [im Fall 
des] Genußmenschen? Alle diese 
Bemühungen Kants, inhaltliche 
Gesetze aus formalen Gründen 
abzuleiten, müssen scheitern. Es 
gelingt ihm nicht und kann nicht 
gelingen. 
 Kant’s own concrete derivation 
of particular cases from [the] general 
moral law [with the] example of the 
deposit.64 But why should there be 
deposits at all?65 Another attempt: [the] 
formulation of maxims should lead to a 
general law of nature. Never is Kant so 
far from [the] foundations of his entire 
ethics as here. Here [he makes the] 
moral law dependent on whether it can 
be a law of nature or not. That 
contradicts his own ethical first 
principle. [His] third formulation: That 
we can want [that] our maxim should 
become a universal law. The criterion 
of moral correctness66 [is thus that one 
could] not possibly want for something 
incorrect to become a general law of 
nature. [But is that] so, for example, [in 
the case of] one who is pleasure-
driven? All of these efforts by Kant to 
derive substantial67 rules from formal 
bases must fail. It does not succeed for 
him, and cannot succeed. 
 Zweiter großer Einwand: Kants 
Ethik will formal sein und doch 
materiale Hinweise geben. In keinem 
Falle kann [sie aber] sagen, was recht 
 Second major objection: Kant’s 
ethics wants to be formal and yet give 
non-formal references. In no case, 
[though,] can [it] say what is right in a 
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ist im besonderen Fall. Wenn er es 
versucht, stützt er sich auf [die] vagen 
sittlichen Einsichten des täglichen 
Lebens und gibt diese als aus 
allgemeinen Gesetzen abgeleitet aus; 
setzt also voraus, was er nicht darf. 
Inhaltliche Gesetze ([z. B.] 
Rechtssätze) werden von Kant 
hineingeschmuggelt [und] benützt. Wie 
[wir das] Wesen der Veränderung 
aufklären müßten, um [den] Satz »Jede 
Veränderung hat {502} ihre Ursache« 
aufstellen zu können, so hier [das] 
Wesen z. B. der Lüge. [So] erwächst 
hier [die] Idee einer materialen Ethik, 
die [das] ethisch Rechte in der Welt 
[und die] evidenten 
Rechtheitszusammenhänge erforscht. 
particular case. When he attempts to 
do so, he supports himself with the 
vague moral insights of daily life and 
doles them out as derived from general 
laws; thus {he} presupposes that which 
he ought not to. Substantial rules (legal 
statements [for example]) are 
smuggled in by Kant [and] used. Just 
as [we] must clear up the essence of 
‘change’ in order to be able to assert 
that ‘every change has {502} its cause,’ 
so here, {we must do the same} for 
[the] essence of lying, for example. [So 
the] idea emerges here of a non-formal 
ethics which investigates that which is 
ethically right in the world [and the] 
evident complexes of rightness. 
 Im letzten Grunde ist Kants 
Behauptung unanfechtbar, [auch wenn 
die] Allgemeingültigkeit des 
Sittengesetzes bei Kant 
Allgemeingesetzlichkeit [wird]. 
Sittliche Rechtheit ist 
Wesensattribution: Was recht ist, ist 
recht als solches, seinem Wesen nach, 
Umstände machen [dabei] nichts aus. 
Was recht ist, läßt sich [darum] als 
allgemeine Gesetzmäßigkeit 
ausdrücken. Diese Einsicht [ist] nicht 
zu unterschätzen. Darin hat Kant 
absolut recht. Die Relativierung der 
sittlichen Rechtheit auf Glückseligkeit 
beim Eudämonismus [ist] damit 
 Kant’s assertion is indisputable 
in the final analysis, [even if the] 
universal applicability of the moral law 
[becomes] universal law for him. 
Moral rightness is an attribute of 
essence: that which is right, is right as 
such, on the basis of its essence; 
circumstances make no difference 
[there]. What is right can [thus] be 
expressed as conformance to a general 
law. This insight is not to be 
underestimated. Therein, Kant is 
completely right. Eudaimonism’s 
relativisation of moral rightness to 
happiness [is] thereby dismissed. All 
eudaimonistic ethics, all 
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beim Eudämonismus [ist] damit 
abgetan. Alle eudämonistische Ethik 
[ist] dadurch vernichtet, alle 
Erfolgsethik überhaupt. 
eudaimonistic ethics, all 
consequentialist ethics in general, [is] 
defeated by this. 
 Kant bestimmt auch [den] 
sittlichen Wert des Wollens nach [dem] 
Inhalt des Gewollten, nämlich nach 
[dem] sittlichen Wert des rechten 
Sachverhaltes [und] um seiner 
Rechtheit willen. Sittliches Wollen soll 
geschehen im Hinblick auf [den] 
kategorischen Imperativ, [d. h.] weil 
[der] kategorische Imperativ es 
befiehlt. Kant meint gerade dieses. 
Aber kann man von Achtung vor einem 
formalen Gesetz sprechen, von [der] 
Würde eines Satzes? Pharisäer und 
Pharisäismus sind gerade durch [ihre] 
Achtung vor Gesetzen bestimmt.68 
 Kant also determines [the] 
moral value of willing on the basis of 
[the] content of what is willed, that is 
to say on the basis of [the] moral value 
of the right state of affairs and for the 
sake of its rightness. Moral willing 
should occur in view of [the] 
categorical imperative; [that is,] 
because [the] categorical imperative 
demands it. Kant meant exactly this. 
But can one speak of respect for a 
formal law, of [the] dignity of a 
statement? Pharisees69 and Pharisaism 
are defined precisely by [their] respect 
for laws. 
 Man hat Kants Ethik als 1. 
voluntaristisch, 2. formalistisch, 3. 
rigoristisch bezeichnet.70 
 Kant’s ethics has been 
designated as: 1. voluntaristic; 2. 
formalistic; 3. rigoristic. 
 1. Voluntarismus Kants: Nicht 
[der] Wille allein [ist] ethisch relevant. 
[Ein] unwollendes, bloß zusehendes 
Bewußtsein könnte mit boshaften 
Gefühlen o. dgl. erfüllt sein. Auch [ist 
ein] einzelnes Neiderlebnis o. dgl. von 
[der] neidischen Natur der Person zu 
unterscheiden. [Eine] rein 
voluntaristische Ethik bedeutet 
Verkümmerung und Beschränkung der 
Ethik. Schwierigkeiten [zeigen sich] an 
vielen Punkten. [Sie sind auch von] 
 1. Kant’s voluntarism: Not just 
[the] will [is] ethically relevant. [A] 
non-willing, merely observing 
consciousness could still be filled with 
malicious emotions and the like. And 
an individual experience of envy, or 
suchlike, is to be distinguished from 
[the] envious nature of a person. [A] 
purely voluntaristic ethics implies a 
crippling and diminishing of ethics. 
Difficulties [present themselves] on 
many points. [They also have] 
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vielen Punkten. [Sie sind auch von] 
Einfluß auf [das] Problem der 
Auffassung der Sünde und des Bösen 
in der Welt. Wie ist Böses in die Welt 
gekommen? [Eine Erklärung ist] 
möglich bei Annahme von 
Willensfreiheit (Versuch, alles Böse aus 
[dem] freien Willen zu erklären). Oder 
[man kommt zur] Ableugnung des 
Bösen, [wie sie] erwachsen [ist] auf 
[dem] Boden [der] voluntaristischen 
Ethik (Versuch, die Realität des Bösen 
in Positivität zu verneinen). [Das] Böse 
in der Welt [wird] relativistisch 
wegerklärt. [So auch in] Th. Lipps’ 
»Ethischen Grundfragen«: Jedes Motiv 
an sich [und] als solches ist gut, Böses 
erwächst aus [dem] Verhältnis der 
Motive. Nur in [ihrer] 
Entgegenwirkung sind sie schlecht, im 
falschen Gleichgewicht. »Nicht das 
Wollen der Menschen ist böse, sondern 
nur das Nichtwollen.« 
many points. [They also have] 
influence on [the] problem of 
conceiving of sin and evil in the world. 
How has evil come into the world? [An 
explanation is] possible by appeal to 
the freedom of the will (an attempt to 
explain all evil based on [the] free 
will). Or [one ends up] denying evil 
[as it has] come to within the domain 
of voluntaristic ethics (an attempt to 
deny the reality of evil in a positive 
form). Evil in the world is 
relativistically explained away. [So too 
in] Theodor Lipps’ Ethischen 
Grundfragen: Every motive in itself 
[and] as such is good, evil arises from 
[the] relationship of the motives. Only 
in [their] opposite effect, in their false 
equilibrium, are they bad. ‘Not the 
willing of human beings is evil, only 
the non-willing.’71 
 Aber [eine] solche Auffassung 
ist haltlos [und] nur möglich, wo man 
[eine] unberechtigte voluntaristische 
Beschränkung begeht. Schon Regungen 
unterstehen der ethischen Jurisdiktion. 
Böses aus Mangel gibt es (wie bei 
Lipps), Unempfindlichkeit für Werte ist 
selbst unwert —  und es handelt sich 
nicht immer [bloß] um 
Unempfindlichkeit! Aber Mißgunst: 
 But such [a] perspective is 
unfounded [and] only possible where 
one commits [an] unjustified 
voluntaristic reduction. Strivings are 
already answerable to the jurisdiction 
of ethics. There exists an evil from lack 
(as for Lipps); unreceptivity to values 
is itself disvaluable —  and it is not 
always [just] a matter of unreceptivity! 
But resentment: the other should not 
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der Andere soll nicht haben, was er 
hat. Es ist [dies] nicht bloß [ein] »ich 
will haben, was er hat«; [das] kann 
{503} sogar fehlen. Wie können 
[solche] positive Regungen der 
Mißgunst, des Hasses u. dgl. so 
wegerklärt werden? Lipps’ [Beispiel 
der] Grausamkeit: Nur Fehlen von 
Mitgefühl ist Unwert nach72 Lipps. 
Dem rohen Menschen [mit seiner] 
Unempfindlichkeit ist [sein] Opfer 
gleichgültig. Der Grausame aber 
genießt [das] Leiden des Opfers, kostet 
es aus. [Das ist ein] evident zu 
erfassender Unwert der Grausamkeit. 
Lipps [sagt dazu: Ein] höheres 
Machtbewußtsein werde erstrebt bei 
Grausamkeit, [und] das sei ein Wert 
(Lipps hebt [auch] sonst nur gute 
Elemente bei verschiedenen Unwerten 
hervor). [Ein] Grausamer [habe] kein 
Machtbewußtsein, wo [er] Leiden 
genießt, das er nicht selbst 
hervorgebracht hat. Aber es stimmt 
nicht mal ([man denke an die] 
Sklavenkämpfe [in] Rom)! [Eine] 
Konsequenz von Lipps’ Auffassung 
[wäre]: [Sich] weiden an Grausamkeit 
[ist] wertvoller als bloßes Fehlen von 
Mitgefühl. 
have what he has. Here it is not merely 
[a] ‘I want to have what he has’; in 
fact [that] can {503} even be absent. 
How could [such] positive strivings of 
resentment, hate etc. be so 
{thoroughly} explained away? Lipps’ 
[example of] cruelty: only the absence 
of sympathy is a disvalue according to 
Lipps. The callous human being [with 
his] unreceptivity is indifferent to [his] 
victim. But the cruel {human being} 
takes pleasure in the victim’s suffering, 
enjoys it to the full. [That is an] 
evident disvalue to grasp in cruelty. 
Lipps [replies:] cruelty strives for [a] 
greater feeling of power,73 and that 
should be a value (Lipps [elsewhere 
also] emphasises only good elements 
pertaining to different disvalues). [A] 
cruel human being has no feeling of 
power when he enjoys suffering that he 
did not produce himself. But even that 
is not correct ([one thinks of the] 
gladiatorial combats [in] Rome)! [A] 
consequence of Lipps’ conception 
[would be]: to feed on cruelty [is] 
more valuable than to simply fail to 
sympathise. 
 Böses [wird] also in sehr 
positiven Formen und Erlebnissen 
angetroffen. [Die] Ethik darf dieses 
nicht wegleugnen. [Die] Metaphysik 
 Evil [is] thus found in quite 
positive forms and experiences. Ethics 
should not deny these. Metaphysics 
still has work to do there. 
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nicht wegleugnen. [Die] Metaphysik 
hat da noch zu tun. 
still has work to do there. 
 2. Formalismus: Es gibt 
[tatsächlich eine] formale Ethik. Als 
formale Sätze [sind z. B.] 
selbstverständlich: »Wenn etwas 
positiv wertvoll [ist], so ist seine 
Existenz [ebenfalls] positiv wertvoll, 
seine Nichtexistenz negativ unwertvoll« 
und andere [solche] Sätze. Solche 
Zusammenhänge sind nicht zu 
unterschätzen, [und es bleibt] 
verdienstvoll, die hier [geltenden] 
trivialen Selbstverständlichkeiten zu 
entwickeln. Brentanos Versuch hier ist 
kein Grund des Niedrigschätzens. 
Hier[her gehören] auch 
Wesensbeziehungen zwischen 
Rechtheiten und Wert ([z. B.] 
»Ethische Rechtheit und sittlicher Wert 
sind Wesensprädikate«). Dieser 
Zusammenhang ist eigentlich das, was 
Kants kategorischer Imperativ 
ausdrückt; im letzten Grunde sagt [er] 
nicht mehr. 
 2. Formalism: There is [in fact 
a] formal ethics. As a formal statement, 
the following, [for example, is] self-
evident: ‘If something [is] positively 
valuable, then its existence is [also] 
positively valuable, its non-existence 
negatively disvaluable’, and other 
[such] statements. Such connections 
are not to be underestimated, [and it 
remains] worthwhile to develop these 
kinds of self-evident truths. Brentano’s 
attempt here is no reason to devalue 
this. Relationships of essence between 
rightness and value74 also belong here 
([for example], ‘Ethical rightness and 
moral value are predicates of 
essence’). This connection is really that 
which Kant’s categorical imperative 
expresses; in the final analysis [it] says 
no more than this. 
 [Der] Bruch in Kants Ethik: Er 
versucht, [die] materiale Ethik 
abzuleiten aus [einem] formalen Satz 
([Beispiel der] Lüge). Es kann ihm 
nicht gelingen. Wenn Lüge sittlich 
unwert ist, dann gründet es in ihrem 
Wesen, [und] damit ist ihr Unwert 
allgemeingültig. Und nicht umgekehrt: 
 [The] flaw in Kant’s ethics: he 
attempts to derive a non-formal ethics 
from a formal statement ([example of 
the] lie). He cannot succeed. If lying is 
morally disvaluable, that is because of 
its essence, [and] thus its disvalue is 
universally valid. And not the other 
way around; its disvalue [is] not to be 
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aus Allgemeingültigkeit [ist] nicht der 
Unwert abzuleiten. [Das] wirkliche 
Verhältnis [wird] oft bei Kant direkt 
umgedeutet. Kant hat sich 
[dementsprechend auch] sehr gegen 
[eine] materiale Ethik gewendet. 
Diesem liegt Kants eigenartige Ansicht 
des Apriori zugrunde. Eine materiale 
Ethik muß nach Kant eine empirische 
Ethik sein, und die bekämpft er. [Er] 
hatte [eben] material mit empirisch 
[und] a priori mit formal verwechselt. 
[Seine] Wendung gegen [eine] 
empirische Ethik ist berechtigt; 
empirische Ethik [ist ein] Widersinn. 
[Der] Gegensatz empirisch —  formal 
[ist] aber nicht gerecht[fertigt]. Kant 
kennt nur Formalismus und 
Empirismus, nicht das materiale 
Apriori. Aber Ethik hat es nicht mit 
[dem] Wertbewußtsein zu tun, sondern 
mit [dem] Wert, [und im Wertgebiet 
gibt es] apriorische Zusammenhänge 
materialer Natur. [Ihre] 
Allgemeingültigkeit und 
Notwendigkeit [ist] hier zu sehen. Also 
[sind sie auch] nach Kant a priori. 
[Und] mit [der] Möglichkeit 
materialer apriorischer Ethik fällt die 
Notwendigkeit, alle Ethik als formale 
ansehen zu müssen auf Grund der 
Forderung der Allgemeingültigkeit. 
derived from generality. [The] actual 
relationship [is] often interpreted by 
Kant in the reverse sense. Kant 
[therefore also] turned strongly against 
[a] non-formal ethics. The reason for 
this is Kant’s peculiar view of the a 
priori. A non-formal ethics must, for 
Kant, be an empirical ethics, and that, 
he fights against. [He] had confused 
‘non-formal’ with ‘empirical’ [and] ‘a 
priori’ with ‘formal.’ [His] turning 
against [an] empirical ethics is 
justified; empirical ethics [is a] 
nonsense. The placement of empirical 
and formal as opposites, however, is 
not justified.75 Kant knows only 
formalism and empiricism, not the non-
formal a priori. But ethics does not 
have to do with [the] consciousness of 
values, but with [the] values 
{themselves,} [and in the domain of 
values there are] a priori connections 
of a non-formal nature. [Their] 
universality and necessity [is] to be 
seen here. So [even] according to Kant 
[they are] a priori. [And] with [the] 
possibility of non-formal a priori ethics, 
the necessity falls away of having to 
view all ethics as formal on the basis of 
the demand for universality. 
 {504} Subjektivismus und  {504} Subjectivism and 
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Relativismus in der Ethik: Da [erhebt 
sich die] Frage, ob wir je mit 
Sicherheit ethische Werte aufstellen 
können. »Ist nicht da alles subjektiv?« 
Man verweist auf [die] 
Kulturgeschichte, auf [den] Wandel der 
Ansichten u. Dgl., oder man verfällt 
dem Skeptizismus. Wert, Unwert sei 
nur Ausdruck unserer verschiedenen 
Gefühls- und Reaktionsweisen in 
verschiedenen Situationen —  wie 
könne man [da] zur Objektivität 
kommen? Hobbes und Spinoza [sagen]: 
Nicht weil etwas gut ist, begehren wir 
es, sondern die [Dinge] sind gut, [d. h.] 
nennen wir gut, weil wir sie begehren. 
Ähnlich andere Theorien. Was alle 
diese Theorien bekämpfen, ist 
dasselbe: daß Dinge in sich wertvoll 
sind. Sie sagen: Streichen wir [das] 
Bewußtsein, so bleiben Dinge, aber 
nicht ihre Werte. Werte kommen [den] 
Dingen nicht so zu wie Ausdehnung o. 
Dgl. 
relativism in ethics: Here [arises the] 
question of whether we can indeed set 
out ethical values with certainty. ‘Is 
that not all subjective?’ One refers to 
cultural history, to [the] changing of 
perspectives and so forth, or one falls 
into scepticism. Value {and} disvalue 
would be mere expressions of our 
different modes of emotion and 
reaction in different situations —  how 
could one get from there to objectivity? 
Hobbes and Spinoza [say]: we do not 
want something because it is good; 
[things] are good ([that is,] we call 
them good), because we desire them. 
Likewise other theories. All of these 
theories attack the same thing: that 
things are valuable in themselves. They 
say: if we take consciousness out of the 
equation, things remain, but not their 
values. Values do not belong to things 
as extension and suchlike do. 
 Aber [unsere] ganze natürliche 
Verhaltensweise, unsere 
Stellungnahmen zu der Welt (die 
wertende [usw.]), setzen objektiv an 
sich bestehende Werte und Unwerte in 
[der] Welt voraus. Lob und Tadel tun 
es. Orientierung hier wieder an [einem] 
Beispiel: Es gibt Dinge ohne rationale 
Motiviertheit ([z. B. ein] Erlebnis, das 
 But [our] entire natural way of 
reacting, our attitude toward the world 
(the valuing [etc.]), presupposes the 
objective subsistence of values and 
disvalues in [the] world. Praise and 
censure do this. To orient ourselves 
here again with [an] example: There 
are things without rational 
motivatedness ([for example, an] 
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sinnliche Lust am Wohlgeschmack 
einer Speise [gewährt]). Da hat Wert 
keine Stelle. Aber Freude über ein 
Geschehen [ist] motiviert, [ob] zu 
Recht oder Unrecht, [jedenfalls ein] 
Erlebnis mit innerem Sinngehalt, und 
da hat Wert eine Stelle. Durch [einen] 
Akt des Verzeihens z. B. wird 
tatsächlich [ein] neues Verhältnis 
zwischen zwei Personen geschaffen. 
Der Verzeihende kann wieder zornig 
werden, aber wir bemerken sofort, es 
liegt hier [dann] eine 
Sinnesinkonsequenz vor. Das ganze 
emotionale Leben ist Leben mit 
[einem] bestimmten Sinngehalt, mit 
Sinnes- und Unsinnskonsequenzen u. 
dgl. Wie in [der] Logik, so [gibt es] 
auch hier Sinngehalt und Unsinn des 
emotionalen Lebens. Unter [den] 
Cartesianern [wurde das] z. B. 
besonders bei Malebranche [gesehen]. 
Später in [der] mechanistischen 
Psychologie [hat man dies] vergessen, 
aber dann gründlich. In der Neuzeit 
[hat] Franz Brentano zuerst auf [den] 
intentionalen Sinnescharakter des 
inneren psychischen Lebens 
aufmerksam gemacht. 
experience that [gives] sensory 
pleasure from the good taste of a 
meal). There, value has no place. But 
joy over an occurence [is] motivated, 
[whether] rightly or wrongly; [in either 
case an] experience with an inner 
content of sense, and there value has a 
place. Through [an] act of forgiving, 
for example, [a] new relationship is in 
fact formed between two persons. The 
forgiver can become angry again, but 
we notice immediately that we have an 
inconsistency of meaning here. All 
emotive life is life with [a] particular 
meaning-content, with consequences 
that can be sensible and nonsensical, 
and so on. As in logic, here too [there 
is] meaningfulness and nonsense of the 
emotive life. Among [the] Cartesians, 
for example, [that was seen] especially 
by Malebranche. Later, in mechanistic 
psychology, [people] forgot [this], and 
then seriously. In more recent times 
Franz Brentano was the first to take 
note of [the] intentional character of 
inner psychic life. 
 Unser Verhalten zur Welt setzt 
seinem Sinn nach Objektivität der 
Werte voraus. Wo den Werten 
Objektivität abgesprochen [wird], ist76 
 Our relation to the world 
presupposes according to its meaning 
the objectivity of values. Where the 
values are denied objectivity, every 
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jede Begeisterung, jede Empörung, 
Entrüstung u. dgl. in sich selbst 
unsinnig. Wir sind begeistert über die 
Tat um ihres Wertes willen. Über 
[einen] psychologischen Mechanismus 
kann man sich nicht begeistern oder 
empört man sich nicht; wenn man es 
doch täte, wäre es Täuschung. [Die] 
Konsequenzen des Wertsubjektivismus 
[sind] sehr weitreichend. Alles [wird] 
auf [die] Lust des Einzelnen reduziert. 
[Bei einem] sittlichen und religiösen 
Genie muß [der] Subjektivismus sagen: 
[sein] Anblick erweckt Lust, der von 
gewöhnlichen Menschen nicht. Das ist 
[ein] bloßes Faktum. [Der] blinde 
irrationale Mechanismus des 
Lustgefühls ist [dann die] einzige 
bleibende Basis des Wertbewußtseins 
—  und aller Kultur! [Dies führt zur] 
Proklamation von Sinnlosigkeit von 
Kultur beim Subjektivismus. 
enthusiasm, every outrage, indignation 
and so on is meaningless in itself. We 
are enthused over the act because of its 
value. One cannot be enthused or 
outraged over [a] psychological 
mechanism; if one did so, it would be a 
deception. [The] consequences of 
value-subjectivism [are] very wide-
ranging. Everything [is] reduced to 
[the] pleasure of the individual. [Of a] 
moral and religious genius, 
subjectivism must say: [his] outlook 
awakens pleasure {where} that of 
ordinary people {would} not. That is 
[a] plain fact. [The] blind, irrational 
mechanism of pleasure-feeling is 
[therefore the] only remaining basis for 
value-consciousness —  and all culture! 
[This leads to the] proclamation of the 
meaninglessness of culture by 
subjectivism. 
 Aber [der] Subjektivismus hat 
ebensowenig [eine] Basis hier wie 
sonst. Worauf stützt er sich [dann]? 
Auf Meinungsverschiedenheit kann er 
sich nicht {505} berufen, ebensowenig 
wie bei [der] Mathematik [und] in 
anderen Gebieten auch. Wie kommt es 
dann, daß man behauptet, Werturteile 
seien bloß Ausdruck der 
gefühlsmaßigen Reaktionen der 
Einzelmenschen auf [ihre] Umwelt? 
Sprechen wir [einem] Bild Schönheit 
 But subjectivism has just as 
little basis here as ever. How does it 
[then] support itself? It cannot {505} 
appeal to differences of opinion, any 
more than in mathematics [and] other 
areas. So why is it that one asserts that 
value-judgements are merely 
expressions of the emotional reactions 
of individual human beings to [their] 
environment? When we attribute 
beauty to [a] picture, we are looking at 
[the] picture, not at ourselves. ‘Beauty’ 
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Sprechen wir [einem] Bild Schönheit 
zu, so blicken wir nach [dem] Bild, 
nicht auf uns selbst. »Schönheit« 
spricht [dem] Gegenstand selbst 
[et]was zu. »Merkst du nicht diese und 
jene Schönheit?« Ob du dich an [der] 
Schönheit freust oder ob du dich 
darüber ärgerst, tut nichts dazu.77 
Anders bei Ärger über eine Sache, wo 
[wir] auf uns blicken. Ärger steht nie 
als etwas an der Sache Haftendes vor 
mir,78 aber Werte werden an Sachen 
vorgefunden. In Akten des Fühlens 
kommen sie zur Gegebenheit. Es gibt 
hier alle Charaktere der erkennenden 
Akte; auch Täuschungen über Werte 
gibt es wie Täuschung bei Farben. 
Aber diese [sind] nur in neuen Akten 
derselben Art,79 aber klareren o. dgl., 
erkennbar. Aber [die] Zuverlässigkeit 
des Wertfühlens überhaupt [ist] damit 
nicht zu bezweifeln. [Sie] wird 
vorausgesetzt bei Täuschungen. 
[the] picture, not at ourselves. ‘Beauty’ 
attributes some[thing] to [the] object 
itself. ‘Do you not notice this or that 
beauty?’ Whether you take pleasure 
from the beauty or it irritates you 
makes no difference. It is different with 
annoyance over a thing, where [we] 
look at ourselves. Annoyance never 
stands as something in the thing before 
me, but values are found in things. In 
acts of feeling, they come to givenness. 
Here, all the characteristics of an act of 
cognition are to be found; there are 
deceptions with regard to value just as 
there are deceptions about colours. But 
these [are] only recognisable in new, 
but clearer, acts of the same kind. 
However, [the] dependability of value-
feeling in general is not to be doubted 
on this basis. {That dependability} is 
presupposed with deceptions.80  
 Allerdings ist [das] Gefühl des 
Wertes zentraler als Sehen oder Hören 
[und] steht unter bestimmten 
Bedingungen. Feinheit und Schärfe des 
Wertfühlens sind abhängig von [der] 
Struktur der Person. Nur wo bestimmte 
personale Qualitäten da sind, ist ein 
bestimmtes Wertfühlen überhaupt 
möglich. Dadurch wird [es] erst 
möglich, daß Unempfindlichkeit als 
 To be sure, [the] feeling81 of 
value is more central than seeing or 
hearing [and] is subject to specific 
conditions. Fineness and sharpness of 
value-feeling are dependent on [the] 
structure of the person. Only where 
specific personal qualities are present 
is a specific value-feeling possible at 
all. It is because of this that it becomes 
possible to grasp unreceptivity as a 
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Unwert der Person erfaßt wird. Aber 
Voraussetzungen des Erfassens sind 
nicht Voraussetzungen des Erfaßten, 
des Wertes selbst. Das vergißt [der] 
Subjektivismus. Fiktion: [Es] könnte 
Werte geben, die so fein und 
tiefliegend sind [und] die ein so 
feindifferenziertes Wertfühlen 
voraussetzen, daß faktisch kein 
Mensch in der Welt sie erfassen kann. 
Aber es sagt nichts gegen die 
Objektivität dieser Werte. Aber dann 
verfällt [der] ganze Grund des 
Subjektivismus, indem wir nach seinen 
Voraussetzungen solche Werte gar 
nicht als möglich ansehen können. 
Krankhafte Subjektivitätssucht in 
solchen wichtigen Dingen ist 
besonders verwerflich. Hier ist gar 
nicht ein Boden für schnellfertige 
Urteile. Ob es objektive Werterkenntnis 
gibt, ist vielleicht das Wichtigste auf 
der Welt. 
disvalue in the person. But 
assumptions about the grasping are not 
assumptions about what is grasped, 
about the value itself. Subjectivism 
forgets this. Fiction: there could be 
values which are so fine and profound 
[and] that require so finely-
differentiating a value-feeling that in 
fact no human being in the world can 
grasp them. But it says nothing against 
the objectivity of these values. But 
then, [the] entire basis of subjectivism 
collapses, in that according to its 
presuppositions we could not regard 
such values as being possible at all. 
Pathological craving for subjectivity in 
such important matters is especially 
reprehensible. Here is no place for 
hasty judgements. Whether there is 
objective cognition of values is perhaps 
the most important {question} in the 
world. 
 Sokrates’ und Platons 
Behauptung [lautete]: Alle Sünde ist 
eigentlich Irrtum. Wenn jemand genau 
weiß, was das Gute ist, muß er das 
Gute tun. [Dies wurde] vielfach 
bestritten. [Im] Strafrecht [gibt es] 
gewisse Fälle, wo [ein] Bewußtsein der 
Strafwürdigkeit vorausgesetzt [ist]. 
Nach Sokrates und Platon sollten diese 
[Fälle] unmöglich sein. Aber [das ist] 
 Socrates’ and Plato’s assertion 
[went]: All sin is actually in error. If 
someone genuinely knows what is 
good, he must do what is good. [This 
has been] disputed in many ways. [In 
the] criminal law [there are] certain 
cases where [a] consciousness of 
deserving punishment is presupposed. 
According to Socrates and Plato, these 
[cases] should be impossible. But [that 
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zu oberflächlich. [Zum] sokratischen 
Begriff des Wissens [ist zu sagen, daß 
es] verschiedene Begriffe von 
Erkenntnis gibt. 1. Stellungen der 
größeren oder geringeren Nähe des 
Wertes, bloßes Wissen ohne Anschauen 
des Wertes —  [die] äußerste 
Fernstellung zu Werterfassungen. Auch 
bei Urteilen, daß etwas wertvoll ist, bei 
jeder bloß intellektuellen 
Stellungnahme ist Fernstellung 
möglich. 2. Soll diese Überzeugung 
geprüft werden, dann müssen wir auf 
[den] fühlenden Akt der 
Wertanschauung zurückgehen. 
Anschauen des Wertes, Fühlen des 
Wertes ist nächste Kenntnisnahme des 
Wertes, [wobei es] verschiedene Grade 
der Adäquation [gibt]. Und wenn [ein] 
{506} Unwert völlig gefühlt wird, dann 
[ist die] Realisierungshemmung umso 
intensiver, je lebhafter [der] Unwert 
[gefühlt wird]. Daß ich etwas Böses 
tun kann, mit bloßem Wissen, bloßer 
Überzeugung davon82 tun kann, ist 
klar. Aber [ein] lebendiges Fühlen des 
Unwertes ist ohne weiteres [ein] 
Hindernis, das nach [dem Maß der] 
Lebendigkeit des Fühlens Abneigung 
gegen83 [das] Tun hervorbringt. In 
jedem Wollen ist [eine] innere 
Bejahung der Sache [enthalten], im 
Fühlen von Wert ist Stellungnahme zum 
is] too superficial. [Of the] Socratic 
concept of knowing [we must say that] 
there are different concepts of 
cognition. 1. Positions of the greater or 
lesser proximity of the value, mere 
knowing without intuition of the value 
—  [the] furthest distancing {of oneself} 
from value-grasping. With judgements 
that something is valuable, too, with 
every purely intellectual attitude-
taking, distancing is possible. 2. 
Should this conviction be tested, then 
we must go back to the feeling act of 
value-perception. Perception of value, 
feeling of value is the next {level of} 
acquaintance with the value, [of which 
there are] different grades of 
adequateness. And if [a] {506} 
disvalue is fully felt, then [the] 
inhibition against realisation [is] 
correspondingly more intensive the 
more vividly [the] disvalue [is felt]. 
That I can do something evil, in full 
knowledge, full conviction of the fact, 
is clear. But [a] vivid feeling of the 
disvalue is immediately [a] hindrance 
that brings about an aversion against 
the act [in the same degree as the] 
vividness of the feeling. In every 
willing is [contained an] inner 
affirmation of the thing; in the feeling 
of value, the taking of a position 
towards the value is present 
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Wert da (Brentano: Liebe und Haß). 
Hier[her gehört das] sokratische 
»Wissen«. [Der] sokratische Satz [ist] 
nur soweit unverständlich, wie man 
bloßes kaltes Urteilen mit Erkennen 
verwechselt. 
(Brentano’s love and hate). It is here 
that [the] Socratic ‘knowing’ 
[belongs]. [The] Socratic statement 
[is] only impossible to understand 
insofar as one confuses mere, cold 
judgement with cognition. 
 [Eine] intellektuelle 
Stellungnahme (Überzeugung) stellt 
sich beim Einsehen der Sache ein, kann 
aber auch hier unterdrückt werden 
(Beispiele [finden sich] in mancher 
wissenschaftlicher Polemik). Ähnliches 
bei fühlender Stellungnahme. Etwas 
zum Willensziel setzen, was innerlich 
verneint wird durch lebhaftes Fühlen 
des Unwerts, das ist nur möglich bei 
künstlichem Unterdrücken der 
emotionalen Stellungnahme, nicht bei 
rückhaltloser Hingabe an [ein] Fühlen 
von Wert. So ohne weitere 
Beschränkung gilt also [der] 
sokratische Satz nicht. Aber [er] geht 
tiefer als die meisten [seiner] Kritiken. 
[Der] sokratische Satz führt tief in 
[die] erkenntnistheoretische Struktur 
ethischer Werte. 
 [An] intellectual attitude-taking 
(conviction) {which} installs itself via 
an insight into the matter can, however, 
also be suppressed here (examples [are 
to be found] in many scientific 
polemics). {It is} similarly so with 
feeling attitude-taking. To make 
something a goal of willing which is 
inwardly denied through vivid feeling 
of its disvalue is only possible with an 
artificial suppression of the emotive 
attitude-taking, not through unreserved 
devotion to [a] feeling of value. Thus, 
[the] Socratic statement does not hold 
unconditionally. But [it] goes deeper 
than most [of its] critiques. [The] 
Socratic statement leads deeply into 
[the] epistemological structure of 
ethical values. 
 3. Rigorismus Kants: Weiter zu 
Kants Idee, [eine] sittliche Handlung 
müsse lediglich aus Pflicht (durchs 
Pflichtgebot bestimmt) und nicht auch 
[aus] Neigung geschehen. Alle innere 
Anteilnahme am Schicksal der 
Menschen gehört nach Kant nicht zu 
echter Sittlichkeit. Nur [das] Gefühl der 
 3. Kant’s rigorism: Further to 
Kant’s idea, [a] moral action would 
have to occur only out of duty 
(determined through the precept of 
duty) and not also [out of] inclination. 
For Kant, all inner participation in the 
fates of human beings does not belong 
to true morality. Only [the] emotion of 
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echter Sittlichkeit. Nur [das] Gefühl der 
Achtung [wird] noch zugelassen. Alle 
Neigung muß ausgeschaltet werden 
(»Rigorismus«). Schillers spöttische 
Verse! 
to true morality. Only [the] emotion of 
respect [is] allowed. All inclination 
must be shut out (‘Rigorism’). 
Schiller’s mocking lines! 
 Kritik: Wenn etwas in [der] 
Welt wertvoll ist, dann ist [das] Fühlen 
des Wertes ein Wert; [auch] Empörung 
über [eine] unsittliche Tat ist selbst 
[ein] Wert. Im Stellungnehmen zu 
sittlichen Werttatsachen konstituieren 
sich wieder Werte. [Das] Wesen des 
Teufels [besteht ja gerade] darin, daß er 
das Gute haßt und nicht liebt. Im 
Mitleid liegt Wert. [Ein] weiterer Wert 
[ist es], wenn ich [einem] armen 
Menschen helfe. [Auch ein] Willensakt 
als solcher [ist] wertvoll. [Der] Wert 
der Rettung [wird] erfaßt und Hilfe 
verabreicht mit oder ohne Teilnahme 
am Geschick des Gefährdeten. [Sie ist 
aber ein] größerer Wert im zweiten 
Fall. Was als Wert gefühlt [wird], wird 
als zu realisierend vorgesetzt, [und 
diese] Vorsetzung ist wertvoll. 
 Critique: if something in [the] 
world is valuable, then [the] feeling of 
value is a value; outrage over [an] 
immoral act is also itself [a] value. In 
the taking of an attitude towards 
matters of value-fact, values constitute 
themselves again. [The] essence of the 
Devil [consists precisely] in that he 
hates the good, and does not love it. 
There is value in sympathy. [It is] 
another value if I help [a] poor person. 
[An] act of willing as such, too, [is] 
valuable. [The] value of a rescue is felt 
and help administered with or without 
participation in the fate of the one in 
danger. [But it is a] greater value in the 
second case. That which [is] felt as of 
value is put forward as to be realised, 
[and this] putting-forward is valuable. 
 [Diese] gefühlsmäßige 
Stellungnahme des Subjekts [wird] als 
»Neigung« bekämpft von Kant. Worauf 
beruht das? Eigentlich [auf] zweierlei: 
1. Wo etwas angestrebt [wird], nicht 
weil [es] wertvoll [ist], sondern weil es 
mich angeht (unser Egoismus, 
»außersachliches Verhalten«), [werden 
 [This] emotion-oriented taking 
of an attitude by the subject [is] 
attacked as ‘inclination’ by Kant. On 
what is that based? Really on two 
things: 1. Where something [is] striven 
for not because [it is] valuable but 
because it appeals to me (our egoism, 
‘non-objective behaviour’), things 
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die] Dinge nur betrachtet als »wichtig 
für mich«. Das [wird] mit Recht 
bekämpft von Kant. 2. Es gibt ein Tun, 
das darauf abzielt, mich von 
unangenehmen Gefühlen zu befreien 
(Helfen, weil [ein] Leid mich mit 
Unlust erfüllt) oder mir angenehme 
heranzuziehen. Hier [spricht] Kant 
wieder [von] »aus Neigung«, und auch 
[das ist] zu {507} bekämpfen. Aber 
Mitleid, echte Anteilnahme als 
»Quelle« des Tuns ist etwas ganz 
anderes. Aber [die] Not des Menschen 
ist [dabei das] Motiv, sie bestimmt 
mich. Hier [ist das Handeln] »aus 
Neigung« ein Wert. Sinnvolles 
Antworten auf objektiv erfaßte Werte 
ist selbst ein Wert. Bei Kant liegt [hier 
ein] Psychologismus zugrunde, der 
[den] Sinngehalt des Emotionalen 
übersieht. [Er] behandelt emotionale 
Stellungnahmen wie Zahnschmerzen. 
[become] only regarded as ‘important 
for me.’ That, Kant rightly attacks. 2. 
There is a doing that aims to free me 
from unpleasant feelings (helping 
because [a] suffering fills me with 
displeasure) or to bring pleasant ones 
to me. Here Kant [speaks] again [of] 
‘out of inclination,’ and again [that is] 
to be {507} attacked. But sympathy, 
genuine participation, as the ‘source’ 
of the doing is something completely 
different. But [the] need of the {other} 
human being is [the] motive [here]; it 
determines me. Here, [an action] ‘out 
of inclination’ [is] a value. A 
meaningful response to objectively-
grasped values is itself a value. With 
Kant, there is [a] psychologism at work 
[here] that overlooks the meaning 
content of the emotive. [He] treats the 
emotive taking of attitudes like 
toothache. 
 Wie [steht es] denn mit [dem] 
Pflichtbegriff [und] Pflichtgefühl bei 
Kant [und seiner] Zurückführung auf 
[eine] phänomenale Quelle? Wo [ein] 
Sachverhalt als sittlich wertvoll 
erscheint, [wird die] Realisierung eines 
[solchen] werten Sachverhalts von uns 
verlangt; seine Realisierung durch uns 
»soll sein«. In [dieser] 
Realisierungsgerechtheit fundiert ist 
[das] Pflichtbewußtsein. Ist solches 
Pflichtbewußtsein hier konstitutiv 
 How [is it] then with [the] 
concept of duty [and] {the} feeling of 
duty for Kant, [and its] reduction to [a] 
phenomenal source? Where [a] state of 
affairs appears {to us} as morally 
valuable, [the] realisation of [such] a 
worthy state of affairs becomes 
required of us; its realisation by us 
‘should be.’ Consciousness of {one’s} 
duty is founded in [this] rightness of 
realisation. Is this {kind of} 
consciousness of value here 
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Pflichtbewußtsein hier konstitutiv 
[und] bestimmend für [den] sittlichen 
Wert? [Die] sittliche Rechtheit des 
Tuns erleidet nicht Einbuße, wenn nur 
[ein] Fühlen des Rechtes da ist und 
nicht erst [die] Frage »soll ich es 
tun?« vorhergeht. Wo ich hingerissen 
vom Wert handle, kann es nicht 
weniger wertvoll [sein] als [ein 
Handeln] aus Pflichtüberlegung. [Das] 
Pflichtbewußtsein ist gleichsam [die] 
Quittung für84 [den] gefühlten Wert des 
Ziels. 
consciousness of value here 
constitutive [and] determining of moral 
value? [The] moral rightness of action 
is not damaged if it is only preceded by 
a feeling of that rightness and not by 
[the] question ‘should I do it?’ Where I 
act enthralled by value, it cannot [be] 
less valuable than [an action] out of 
reflection on duty. Consciousness of 
duty is at the same time [the] receipt 
for [the] felt value of the goal. 
 Kants andere Ansichten, diese 
Verzerrung des Ideals (»Handeln aus 
Grundsätzen«), sind von seinen 
Voraussetzungen [her] verständlich. 
Kant redet von »Achtung« vor Sätzen. 
Wahrhaftigkeit ist [allerdings ein] 
sittlicher Wert; den kann ich schätzen. 
Aber [doch] nicht Sätze darüber! Jedes 
Tun verliert [an] Wert in dem Maße, 
als es sich nach Grundsätzen richtet —  
[es] ist [dann] nur Rubrizierung. 
[Statt] Kants Satz [der] Achtung vor 
den Imperativen [hat er] auch 
manchmal von Achtung vor dem 
Pflichtgebot im einzelnen Fall, vor 
konkreter Forderung, gesprochen. Aber 
man muß sich hüten: [Das] Erleben 
der Forderung darf nicht 
gegenständlich gemacht werden, 
sondern im Hinblick auf [den] 
 Kant’s other opinions, this 
distortion of the ideal (‘actions from 
principles’), are understandable from 
his assumptions. Kant speaks of 
‘respect’ for statements. Truthfulness is 
[indeed a] moral value; that I can value 
highly. But not statements about it! 
Every action loses value to the extent 
that it is oriented according to 
principles —  [then it] is just 
classification.85 [Instead of] regard for 
the imperatives, Kant sometimes spoke 
of regard for the precept of duty in 
specific cases, of concrete commands. 
But one must be on one’s guard: [the] 
experience of the command should not 
be made objective; it is rather that 
action must take place with reference 
to [the] felt value. The former 
[approach] is a perversion. There are 
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gefühlten Wert muß gehandelt werden. 
Das erstere ist eine Perversion. Es gibt 
Menschen, die gut dastehen wollen, die 
an [den] Werten stets vorbeischielen 
auf [ihre] eigenen Erlebnisse [hin]. »So 
handeln, daß man sich selbst achten 
könne«: Achtung als Ziel des Tuns ist 
Pharisäertum. 
human beings who want to be good, 
who always squint past the values at 
[their] own experiences. ‘To act in such 
a way that one could respect oneself’: 
respect as the goal of action is 
Pharisaism. 
 Alle Gefahren, die Kants Ethik 
bedrohen, alle Fehler Kants 
[entspringen] aus einem Grund: [der] 
Leugnung der Apriorität von 
materialen Wertverhältnissen. 
Materiale Ethik soll [nach seiner] 
Auffassung heteronom sein. 
Heteronomie ist uneinsichtige Bindung 
an [das] Urteil Anderer, wo sachlich 
nicht einzusehende Verhältnisse [uns] 
bestimmen. Aber heteronom [ist man 
auch] da, wo alles an [einer] sittlichen 
Formel gemessen [wird]. Kants eigene 
Prüfung [von] allem an [einer] 
formalen Regel ist eigentlich 
heteronom. Und echte Autonomie [ist 
vorhanden], wo ich aus [der] Evidenz 
der eigenen fühlenden Akte die 
Wertverhältnisse objektiv bestimme. 
Für Kants Ethik kann es nur [den] 
schroffen Gegensatz zwischen gut und 
schlecht, [einen] Dualismus gut —  
böse, geben unter [den] Akten. 
Innerhalb des Guten [kennt er] keine 
Grade. Eigentlich [wird eine] 
 All of the dangers that threaten 
Kant’s ethics, all Kant’s failings, 
[originate] from one thing: {the} denial 
of a priori status to material 
relationships of value. Material ethics 
should [according to his] view be 
heteronymous. Heteronomy is an un-
insightful binding {of oneself} to [the] 
judgement of others, where in fact [we] 
are determined by relationships that are 
not accessible to insight. But 
heteronomy also applies where 
everything [is] measured according to 
[a] moral formula. Kant’s testing [of] 
everything according to [a] formal rule 
is really heteronymous. And genuine 
autonomy [is present] when I 
objectively determine the value-
relationships based on [the] evidence 
of my own acts of feeling. In Kant’s 
ethics there can only be among acts a 
strict dichotomy between good and 
bad, [a] dualism of good and evil. 
Within the good, [he knows] no 
gradation. In fact, an endlessly rich 
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unendlich reiche Nüancierung hier 
geleugnet, und das geht nicht. Sittliche 
Werte {508} [sind] verschieden an 
Größe und Tiefe, und [die] Akte [sind] 
danach von verschiedenem Werte. 
nuancing is denied here, and that will 
not do. Moral values {508} [are] 
different in magnitude and depth, and 
[the] acts [are] accordingly of different 
values. 
 Kants Begriff der Freiheit: Jede 
Pflichthandlung ist [ein] Akt der 
Freiheit selbst. Seit Aristoteles 
[herrscht] Streit zwischen 
Determinismus und Indeterminismus. 
[Ihr] Ausgangspunkt ist einfach genug. 
[Der] Determinismus betont: Auch 
[der] Willensprozeß, als 
Naturgeschehen, ist notwendig 
determiniert. [Der] Indeterminismus 
[dagegen unterstreicht mein] klares, 
helles Bewußtsein, daß ich meine Taten 
begehe. Es wäre [das andernfalls eine] 
seltsame Täuschung, die ich nicht 
durch Aufklärung aufheben kann. 
 Kant’s concept of freedom: 
every action out of duty is [an] act of 
freedom itself. Since the time of 
Aristotle, a feud has reigned between 
determinism and indeterminism. [Its] 
starting-point is simple enough. 
Determinism emphasises: the process 
of willing too, as an occurrence in 
nature, is necessarily determined. 
Indeterminism, [on the other hand, 
underscores my] clear, bright 
consciousness that I commit my acts. 
[Otherwise] it would be a peculiar 
deception that I cannot remove by 
discovery of it. 
 Einleitende Diskussionen: 
[Dies ist ein] Streit meistens aus [den] 
Konsequenzen. [Der] Indeterminismus 
ist historisch [der] angreifende Teil: 
[Dem] Phänomen des Vorwurfs kann 
[der] Determinismus nie gerecht 
werden. [Denn das] setzt voraus, daß 
man anders sein könnte. [Aber] 
niemand macht mir meine Dummheit 
zum Vorwurf. Also sonst ist es anders 
wie in [der] Willenssphäre. Nach [dem] 
Indeterminismus sind auch 
Verantwortlichkeit, Schuld und Strafe 
 Introductory discussions: [this 
is a] dispute mostly from [the] 
consequences. Indeterminism is 
historically [the] attacking side: 
determinism cannot justify [the] 
phenomenon of reproach. [Because 
that] presupposes that one could have 
been different. [But] nobody 
reproaches me for my stupidity. And 
thus it must be different in [the] sphere 
of willing. As far as indeterminism is 
concerned, responsibility, guilt and 
punishment are all impossible to 
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für [den] Determinismus unerklärlich. account for under determinism. 
 Antwort des Determinismus: 
Schuld [gibt es] nur, wo [ein] Akt aus 
[dem] Charakter des Subjekts 
hervorgegangen ist. Verantwortlich 
sind solche, die so [und so] handeln 
können. Eigentlich soll Strafe 
abschreckend und warnend, nicht 
vergeltend wirken.86 [Der] 
Indeterminismus —  so sagt [der] 
Determinismus —  schadet sich selbst 
mehr als [dem] Determinismus. Wie 
sollen Strafen determinierend auf 
Menschen wirken, wenn Menschen 
nicht determinierbar sind? 
 Determinism’s response: guilt 
only [exists] where [an] act is 
performed out of [the] character of the 
subject. Such people are responsible 
who can act in such and such a way. 
Really, punishment should be a 
deterrent, not serve retribution. 
Indeterminism, says determinism, 
damages itself more than determinism 
{does}. How can punishment manage 
to determine human beings when 
human beings are not determinable? 
 [Zur] weiteren Bedeutung des 
Problems: [Dem] Determinismus wirft 
[der] Indeterminismus vor, er ersticke 
alle Aktivität u. dgl. [mit dem] 
Fatalismus als Resultat. Aber [der] 
Determinismus wirft [dem] 
Indeterminismus genau dasselbe vor: 
Nur beim Determinismus können wir 
auf uns vernünftigerweise wirken. 
 [To] the wider meaning of the 
problem: indeterminism reproaches 
determinism that it stifles all activity 
etc., [with] fatalism as the result. But 
determinism makes just the same 
reproach of indeterminism: only under 
determinism can we have an effect on 
ourselves according to reason. 
 [Bezüglich des] Problems der 
Willensfreiheit [ist das] Motiv des 
Indeterminismus: Was für [einen] Sinn 
[hätte es], zu loben oder tadeln, wenn 
alles eindeutig bestimmt [wäre]? [Der] 
Indeterminismus fordert Willensfreiheit 
wegen der Verantwortlichkeit der 
Überlegung. [Wir haben das] 
Bewußtsein des dieses oder jenes Tuns, 
 [In relation to the] problem of 
freedom of the will, [the] motive of 
indeterminism is: what kind of sense 
[is there] in praising or censuring if 
everything [were] univocally 
determined? Indeterminism demands 
the freedom of the will because of the 
responsibility of reflection. [We have 
the] consciousness of acting this or 
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selbst nachdem wir gehandelt haben. 
[Das] Dogma des eindeutigen 
Bestimmtseins, sagt [der] 
Indeterminismus, fehlt eben beim 
Willen —  [es] ist nur [ein] Dogma. 
that way, even after we have acted. 
[The] dogma of being univocally 
determined, says indeterminism, is 
defeated by the will87 —  [it] is only [a] 
dogma. 
 Phänomenologie darf sich nicht 
mit dieser Fernstellung zu den Sachen 
begnügen. In einem Punkt hat [der] 
Indeterminismus recht: [Ein] 
Willensakt ist [eine] eigenartige Sache 
[und] nicht mit [einem] Naturvorgang 
zusammenzuwerfen. [Zur] 
wesensmäßigen Eigenart des 
Willensvorgangs [gehört die] 
phänomenale Ichurheberschaft bei 
jedem echten Willensakt. [Die] 
Vorsatzfassung geht phänomenal vom 
Ich spontan aus. [Es ist die] Frage, ob 
dieser spontane Akt im Vollzug durch 
vorangehende Umstände eindeutig 
bestimmt ist oder nicht. Das Ich faßt 
[einen] Vorsatz —  aber das Ich 
erschrickt auch beim Donnerschlag. 
Aber im {509} Schrecken liegt 
Passivität des Ich vor; [der] Schrecken 
affiziert uns. Hier aber [ist es] anders. 
[Den] Schrecken hat jeder als 
notwendig [und] eindeutig determiniert 
angesehen (auch [den] 
Vorstellungsverlauf). Erst wo [das] Ich 
als spontaner Urheber auftritt, tritt 
[das] Problem der Willensfreiheit auf, 
und diese zwei Gebiete decken sich. 
 Phenomenology should not be 
satisfied with this distant attitude to the 
matter. In one point, indeterminism is 
correct: [an] act of willing is [a] unique 
thing [and] is not to be thrown in with 
the processes of nature. [To the] 
essential uniqueness of the process of 
will [belongs the] phenomenal I-
authorship of all genuine acts of 
willing. Phenomenally speaking [the] 
grasping of a resolution {to act} goes 
out from the I spontaneously. [The] 
question [is], whether this spontaneous 
act in its entirety is absolutely 
determined by pre-existing 
circumstances, or not. The I grasps [a] 
resolution —  but the I also feels fear at 
a peal of thunder. But in {509} fear, the 
passivity of the I becomes apparent; 
fear affects88 us. But here [it is] 
different. Fear is acknowledged by 
everyone as necessary [and] univocally 
determined (likewise with [the] process 
of presentation). Only where [the] I 
emerges as the spontaneous author {of 
the act} does [the] problem of freedom 
of the will arise, and these two domains 
coincide. Phenomenal I-authorship 
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Phänomenale Ichurheberschaft 
umgrenzt den Kreis der Freiheit. 
delimits the realm of freedom. 
 Wir müssen hier eine89 erst 
neuerdings durchgeführte Scheidung 
von Wollen und Streben anwenden. 
Jedes Streben geht von einem Ich aus. 
[Es gibt] Positivität und Negativität 
hier; Streben nach etwas hin oder von 
etwas weg oder gegen etwas (wider 
etwas). Einige Strebungen können 
peripher oder zentral, andere nur 
zentral sein. Aber Strebungen sind kein 
Wollen. Viele Strebungen zusammen 
können sich ans Ichzentrum 
heranmachen. [Das] Ichzentrum kann 
willenlose90 Beute der Strebungen sein: 
der Kampf spielt sich im Ich ab. Ganz 
anders das Vorsatzfassen. Streben kann 
blind sein, auch wo [es] heftig [ist]. 
Beim Wollen (Vorsatzfassen) hätte 
dieses keinen Sinn. Wollen ist 
Selbstbestimmungsakt des Ich. Wir 
können Wollen mit oder gegen 
Neigung haben. [Wollen] scheint auch 
möglich ganz ohne Streben, aus kalter 
Überlegung. Dieses schwebte Kant oft 
als Ideal vor. 
 Here we must employ a 
differentiation, only recently made, 
between willing and striving. Every 
striving originates from an I. [There is] 
{both} positivity and negativity here; 
striving toward something or away 
from something or against something 
(in opposition to something). Some 
strivings can be peripheral or central, 
others only central. But strivings are no 
willings. Many strivings together can 
accost the I. [The] I-centre can be the 
will-less prey91 of strivings: the 
conflict {among them} takes place 
within the I. Very differently from the 
grasping of resolutions. Striving can be 
blind, even where [it is] violent. With 
willing (resolution-grasping) this 
would make no sense. Willing is the act 
of self-determination of the I. We can 
have willing with or without 
inclination. [Willing] also appears 
entirely possible without striving, 
issuing from cold reflection. This often 
occurred to Kant as the ideal. 
 [Die] Grenze des 
Freiheitsproblems [verläuft] zwischen 
Streben und Wollen. Strebungen nun 
[werden] von allen als eindeutig 
determiniert angesehen. [Das wird] 
auch von [den] Indeterministen 
 [The] boundary of the problem 
of freedom [runs] between striving and 
willing. Strivings [are] viewed by all as 
univocally determined. [The] 
indeterminists too concede [that]. [It 
is] different, says indeterminism, where 
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zugegeben. Anders, sagt [der] 
Indeterminismus, [ist es] wo das Ich in 
diesen sich abspielenden Kampf 
eingreift. [Also] erst beim Wollen sei 
[das] Freiheitsproblem [gegeben]. 
Aber [die] Freiheitsfrage [ist] nicht auf 
[das] Wollen zu beschränken, 
[sondern] auszudehnen auf alle 
willentlichen Akte, d. h. [Akte] von92 
phänomenaler Ichurheberschaft. 
Warum hat man aus allen (unendlich 
[vielen]) Akten, in denen [das] Ich als 
Urheber phänomenal fungiert, nur den 
Willensakt als frei hervorgehoben? 
[Dafür gibt es] keinen Grund. So [sind 
auch] Sich-etwas-Zuwenden, Bejahen, 
Urteilen, Verzeihen u. dgl. alles 
willentliche Akte, wo [das] Ich als 
phänomenaler Urheber hervortritt. Hier 
stellt sich [der] Begriff des spontanen 
oder willentlichen Aktes ein. (Ganz 
anders [gilt er] vom Willen, der auf 
Realisierung eines Sachverhalts in der 
Welt abzielt.) 
the I intervenes in the conflict that is 
being played out. [So] only with 
willing would [the] problem of freedom 
[exist]. But [the] question of freedom 
[is] not to be limited to willing, [but] 
must be extended to all volitional acts, 
that is, [acts] of phenomenal I-
authorship. Why would one, out of all 
the (countless) acts in which [the] I 
functions phenomenally as the author, 
emphasise as free only the acts of 
willing? [There is] no reason [for that]. 
Thus, turning towards something, 
affirming, judging, forgiving and so on 
[are also] all voluntary93 acts in which 
[the] I emerges as phenomenal author. 
Here, the concept of the spontaneous or 
volitional acts comes forth. ([This] is 
very different from willing, which aims 
at the realisation of a state of affairs in 
the world.) 
 Einige Eigentümlichkeiten 
dieser Akte [betreffen zunächst ihre] 
Möglichkeit der Motivierung. [Eine] 
Tatsache hat Kraft zur phänomenalen 
Bestimmung des Ich zum Vollzug des 
Aktes, [und diese] motivierende Kraft 
[wird] den Tatsachen zuerteilt von 
[der] Erlebnisquelle. Bei passiven 
Erlebnissen hätte dieses keinen Sinn. 
 Particular distinguishing 
characteristics of these acts [relate to 
their] possibility for motivation. [A] 
fact has the power to phenomenally 
determine the I to the carrying-out of 
the act, [and this] motivational power 
is given to the fact by the source of 
experience. With passive experiences 
this would not make sense. [The] 
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[Das] Hören eines Donnerschlags ist 
verursacht, aber nicht motiviert. Jeder 
spontane Akt ist motivierbar, nicht 
notwendigerweise aber motiviert. [Die] 
Tatsache, daß Lärm mir nahekommt, 
bestimmt mich, mich ihm zuzuwenden, 
ist aber kein Motiv meines mich 
Hinwendens. Neue Frage: Wo beziehen 
vorschwebende Tatsachen ihre 
motivierende Kraft her? [Das ist je] 
anders bei verschiedenen Personen. 
Diese motivierenden Quellen selbst 
[sind] nicht vorschwebend. {510} [Sie] 
setzen [die] Erlebnisquelle also voraus, 
aus welcher [die] Motive ihre Kraft 
schöpfen können. 
hearing of a thunderclap is caused, but 
not motivated. Every spontaneous act 
can be motivated, not necessarily but in 
a motivated manner. [The] fact that a 
sound is coming close to me 
determines me to turn towards it, but is 
no motive for my turning. New 
question: where do facts that one has in 
mind obtain their motivational power? 
[That is in fact] different for different 
persons. These motivational sources 
[are] not themselves held in mind. 
{510} So [they] presuppose [the] 
source of experience from which [the] 
motives can take their power. 
 [Es herrschen] ganz eigenartige 
Verhältnisse hier: Was soll hier 
[eigentlich] indeterminiert oder 
determiniert sein? [Die] phänomenale 
Freiheit, [der] mögliche Aktvollzug 
durch das Ich ist [eine] letzte 
phänomenale Tatsache, die nicht 
umgestoßen werden kann. Daran daß 
Akte vom Ich vollzogen werden, 
könnte alle mögliche Determiniertheit 
durch Umstände nichts ändern. Hier 
[ist es] möglich zu sagen, [der] Mensch 
sei undeterminiert in einem Sinne, in 
dem man dieses bei Tieren bezweifeln 
muß. Ob Tiere Akte vollziehen, ist 
problematisch. Hier [herrscht] 
spontane Aktivität des Ich im Vollzug 
 Entirely unique relationships 
[reign] here: what should [in fact] be 
undetermined or determined here? 
Phenomenal freedom, [the] possible 
carrying out of acts by the I is [an] 
ultimate phenomenal fact that cannot 
be got around. The fact that acts are 
carried out by the I could not be 
changed by any possible 
determinedness through circumstances. 
Here [it is] possible to say that [the] 
human being is undetermined in one 
sense, in which one must doubt that 
animals are. Whether animals carry out 
acts is problematic. Here, spontaneous 
activity of the I reigns in the carrying 
out of acts, [but that is] still not the 
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der Akte, [aber das ist] noch nicht die 
gemeinte Freiheit. 
freedom meant. 
 Phänomenale Nötigung 
innerhalb [des] Aktvollzugs ist etwas 
weiteres [und] hat nichts mit 
Motivierung zu tun. Im Aktvollzug 
[gibt es] Modalitäten, die auf Freiheit 
resp. Unfreiheit hinweisen. Von 
erlebter Nötigung kann in einem Fall 
nicht [die] Rede sein, wo man [eine] 
Aufforderung hört und einfach negiert. 
[Auch nicht] im zweiten Fall, wo [die] 
Aufforderung (gern oder ungern) zum 
Motiv eines Aktes wird. [Ein] dritter 
Fall [ist der], wo Zwang oder Nötigung 
phänomenal vorliegt. [Bei] 
phänomenaler Nötigung geht von 
[einer] Aufforderung unmittelbar 
erlebter Zwang aus, [der] nicht mit 
Motivierung zu verwechseln [ist]. Z. B. 
[die] Aufforderung von [einem] 
Kunstkenner, [ein] Gemälde zu 
betrachten, vs. [den] Fall, wo 
Verwandte eines Hingerichteten 
herbeigefordert sind zuzusehen. Hier 
[herrscht] Unfreiheit, obgleich 
Ichspontaneität auf Grund innerlich 
erlebter Nötigung von außen. Wo gar 
nicht Ichspontaneität [vorliegt], hat 
Freiheit [und] Unfreiheit keine Stelle, 
d. h. [dort herrscht] physischer Zwang, 
Gewalt. [Der] phänomenale 
Unterschied zwischen Aufforderung 
und Drohung [ist] nicht wegzuleugnen. 
 Phenomenal necessitation 
within [the] carrying out of acts is 
something further [and] has nothing to 
do with motivation. In the carrying out 
of acts [there are] modalities that 
indicate both freedom and unfreedom. 
We cannot speak of experienced 
necessitation in a case where one hears 
[a] requirement94 and simply rejects it. 
[Nor] in a second case where [the] 
requirement (gladly or reluctantly) 
becomes the motive for an act. [A 
third] case [is the one] where force or 
necessitation is phenomenally present. 
[With] phenomenal necessitation [a] 
command produces an immediate 
experience of being coerced [which is] 
not to be confused with motivation. For 
example, [the] command of [an] expert 
on art to look at [a] painting, versus 
[the] case where the relatives of a man 
being executed are compelled to come 
and watch. Here, unfreedom [reigns], 
despite I-spontaneity on the basis of an 
inwardly experienced necessity from 
without. Where I-spontaneity is not 
[present] at all, freedom [and] 
unfreedom have no place; that is, 
[there] physical coercion and violence 
[reign]. [The] phenomenal difference 
between requirement and threat [is] not 
to be denied. 
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und Drohung [ist] nicht wegzuleugnen. to be denied. 
 Wo [das] Ich zum Aktvollzug 
durch Drang, Zug von außen u. dgl. 
(nicht physisch), [durch] unmittelbar 
erlebte Nötigung von außen [bestimmt 
wird, herrscht] phänomenale 
Unfreiheit. [Es gibt] verschiedene 
Grade davon, [und diese sind] von 
ethischem oder strafgesetzlichem 
Standpunkt von Wichtigkeit. 
 Where [the] I [is determined] 
toward the fulfilment of an act through 
force, an external pull, etc. (not 
physical), [through] immediately 
experienced necessitation from the 
outside, phenomenal unfreedom 
[reigns]. [There are] different grades of 
this, [and they are] important from an 
ethical or legal standpoint. 
 [Der] Unterschied hier [ist] 
ganz unabhängig von [der] Frage der 
Determiniertheit und 
Undeterminiertheit. Im Vollzug der 
Akte durch [das] Ich finden wir also 
phänomenale Freiheit und 
phänomenale Unfreiheit. Nun [ist] es 
seltsam: Historisch hat man (besonders 
[der] Determinismus) [diese] Zweiheit 
[von] Ichvollzug und Unfreiheit usw. 
nicht gesehen [und die] Frage der 
eindeutigen Bestimmtheit durch 
Ursachen vermengt mit phänomenaler 
Unfreiheit im Aktvollzug. Aber was hat 
eindeutige Determiniertheit der Akte 
mit phänomenaler Unfreiheit 
(Nötigung) zu tun? 
 [The] difference here [is] 
entirely independent of [the] question 
of determinedness and 
undeterminedness. In the fulfilment of 
acts through the I we thus find both 
phenomenal freedom and phenomenal 
unfreedom. It [is] strange; historically, 
people (especially [the] determinists) 
have not seen [this] duality [of] I-
fulfilment and unfreedom, etc., [and] 
have mixed up [the] question of 
absolute determinedness through 
causes with phenomenal unfreedom in 
the fulfilment of acts. But what does the 
absolute determinedness of acts have to 
do with phenomenal unfreedom 
(necessitation)? 
 [Der] Mensch [ist] geneigt, 
innere Verhältnisse auf äußere zu 
übertragen, aber auch umgekehrt 
(Bergson). Der Determinismus 
behandelt Willensakte wie Fäuste und 
Steine, die aufeinanderstoßen. [In der] 
 [The] human being [is] inclined 
to transfer inner relationships to the 
outside, but also vice-versa (Bergson). 
Determinism treats acts of willing like 
fists and stones that crash into one 
another. [In] external nature [there 
446 
äußeren Natur [gibt es] Ursache [und] 
Geschehen; [im] Psychischen 
[dagegen] Umstände [und] Akt-
{511}vollzug —  [und] hier [stellt sich 
das] Freiheitsproblem. Bergson 
bekämpft [die] Vermaterialisierung der 
Erlebnisse. [Das] Subjekt kennt 
phänomenale Nötigung. Dieses 
Müssen [wird] bildhaft in [die] 
Außenwelt projiziert: Kugelstoßen als 
Nötigung des einen durch den anderen, 
sich zu bewegen! Nun geht es weiter 
auf umgekehrte Weise. Das Müssen, 
das [seinen] ursprünglichen 
phänomenalen Sinn in [der] Außenwelt 
verloren hat, gewinnt ihn wieder hier, 
und hier werden [die] zwei 
durcheinandergeworfen. [So wird der] 
Determinismus durch [eine] äußerst 
plumpe Verwechslung zur Leugnung 
der Verantwortlichkeit gebracht. [Aber] 
Aktvollzüge durch [das] Ich sind 
kompliziertere Vorgänge. Wir werden 
finden, daß es so etwas [wie 
Verantwortlichkeit] beim Aktvollzug 
gibt, ganz unabhängig von [der] Frage 
nach [einer] Ursache [und von] 
eindeutiger Bestimmtheit. 
are] causes [and] occurrences; [in the] 
psychical {realm,} [on the other hand,] 
there are circumstances [and] act-
{511}fulfilments —  [and] here [the] 
problem of freedom [has its place]. 
Bergson attacks [the] materialisation of 
experiences. [The] subject knows 
phenomenal necessitation. This ‘must’ 
[is] projected visually into [the] 
external world: shot-puts compelled to 
move by one another!95 Now it goes on 
in the opposite direction. The ‘must’ 
that has lost [its] original phenomenal 
sense in [the] external world attains it 
again here, and here the two are thrown 
together indiscriminately. [Thus] 
determinism [is] brought by an 
extremely unfortunate confusion to 
deny {the possibility of} responsibility. 
[But] act-fulfilments by [the] I are 
more complicated processes. We will 
come to find that there is such a thing 
[as responsibility] in act-fulfilment 
quite independently of [the] question of 
a cause [and of] univocal 
determination. 
 An [der] eindeutigen 
Bestimmtheit alles Geschehens in der 
Welt wollen wir nicht zweifeln. Daß96 
ich in denselben Umständen anders 
hätte handeln können, ist zu verneinen. 
 We do not want to doubt the 
univocal determinedness of all 
occurrences in the world. That I, in the 
same circumstances, could have done 
otherwise, is to be denied. [One thinks 
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[Man denke an das] Beispiel von 
Nietzsches wiederkehrender Welt! 
Wenn [der] Determinismus nur dieses 
meint, hat er sicher recht; wenn [der] 
Indeterminismus dieses verneint, hat er 
unrecht. Dieses alles [und das] 
Freiheitsproblem97 hat [aber] mit [der] 
Frage der eindeutigen Determiniertheit 
alles Geschehens nichts zu tun. Wir 
müssen uns an [der] phänomenalen 
Bestimmung der Akte orientieren, 
besonders an der Aktquelle. Die Iche 
sind qualitativ gleich, [aber] 
verschiedene Ich vollziehen 
verschiedene Akte. [Die] personale 
Struktur [darf man also] nicht 
verwechseln mit [dem] Ich, dem 
einheitlichen Beziehungspunkt aller 
Erlebnisse. [Die] personale Struktur 
des Ich ist [das] jeweilig 
Determinierende, und zwar je 
nachdem, was von der personalen 
Struktur zur Geltung kommt. 
of the] example of Nietzsche’s 
recurring world! If determinism means 
only this, it is certainly right; if 
indeterminism denies this, it is wrong. 
All of this [and the] problem of 
freedom, however, has nothing to do 
with [the] question of the absolute 
determinedness of all occurrences. We 
must orient ourselves toward [the] 
phenomenal determinant of the act, 
especially to the source of the act. The 
Is are qualitatively alike, but different 
Is fulfil different acts. [Thus one 
should] not confuse [the] personal 
structure with [the] I, the unified 
connecting-point of all experience. 
[The] personal structure of the I is the 
respective determinant of the I, and 
that depending on what of the personal 
structure accentuates itself. 
 [Der] Prozeß der Überlegung 
[steht] vor [dem] Willensakt. [Hier ist] 
Verschiedenes zu betrachten. [Dieser 
Prozeß ist] in [seiner] eigenartig 
fragenden Stellung etwas Besonderes. 
Vom überlegenden Subjekt selbst aus 
betrachtet sieht es so und so aus. Aber 
[die] Motivationsquelle strömt da mehr 
und mehr hinein, ohne daß sie bewußt 
ins Bild, [welches] das Ich sich vom 
 [The] process of reflection 
[precedes] the act of willing. [Here] 
different things [are] to be observed. 
[This process is] something special in 
[its] unique questioning stance. From 
the perspective of the reflecting subject 
it seems to be in such and such a way. 
But [the] source of motivation streams 
more and more in, without it 
consciously entering into the picture 
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Prozeß macht, hereinkommt. In [der] 
Überlegung legt sich [die] Person98 
aus. Frei ist [das] Subjekt, das Ich in 
diesen Fällen insoweit, wie es wirklich 
alle Motivations- [und] 
Erlebnisquellen realisiert, die sich aus 
[seiner] personalen Struktur ergeben. 
[Die] personale Zugehörigkeit der 
Erlebnisse [verbürgt dabei die] 
Echtheit der Aktquellen. Hier [haben 
wir] wieder nichts mit Determinismus 
zu tun. [Das] Subjekt [kann] im Vorsatz 
mehr oder weniger in allen 
Abstufungen zur Geltung kommen. 
Nur einige Seiten können [unter 
Umständen] beteiligt sein. Es kann 
aber Abstufungen der Eigenheit hier 
geben, z. B. wo [ein] Schauspieler 
Othello spielt —  [die] Handlung 
entspringt [dabei] spontan aus [dem] 
eingefühlten Ich. 
which the subject makes of the process. 
In reflection, [the] person interprets 
herself. [The] subject, the I, is free in 
these cases insofar as it actually 
realises all sources of motivation [and] 
experience that arise from [its] 
personal structure. [The] personal 
ownership of the experience [vouches 
in this way for the] genuineness of the 
source of the act. Here [we have] again 
nothing to do with determinism. In 
resolving {to do something}, [the] 
subject [can] be more or less brought 
out at all levels. Only specific aspects 
can be involved [in any given 
circumstances]. But there can be 
degrees of originality here; for example 
where [an] actor plays Othello —  
[there the] action originates 
spontaneously from [the] empathised I. 
 Aus unechter Güte oder 
Tatkraft können gute Handlungen 
entspringen; [das ist sogar] sehr häufig. 
Bestimmt99 [werden können sie evtl.] 
durch fertige Ideale der verschiedenen 
sozialen Schichten. Unfreiheit [herrscht 
jedenfalls immer da], wo {512} [die] 
personale Struktur nicht zum 
Durchbruch kommt. Unendlich 
vielgestaltige und mannigfaltige Lagen 
[gibt es] hier. [All das wurde] wenig 
von [der] Wissenschaft beachtet, 
 From inauthentic goodness or 
capacity for action, good actions can 
originate; [in fact this is] very 
common. [They can perhaps be] 
determined by pre-existing ideals of 
different social strata. Unfreedom 
[always reigns, in any case,] where 
{512} [the] personal structure does not 
achieve a breakthrough. [There] are 
situations here infinitely varied in their 
form and diversity. [All of that is] little 
noticed by science, [but] much by 
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[indessen] sehr von Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche [sagte zu Recht]: [Die] 
meisten Menschen sind 
Transmissionsmaschinen und keine 
Personen. [Die] Einflüsse einer Person 
auf eine andere sind hier von 
Bedeutung. Vor Gericht [gibt es z. B. 
eine] Verschiedenheit zwischen Fällen, 
wo man durch [den] Einfluß einer 
anderen [die] eigene Person geändert 
hat, und wo dieses nicht der Fall ist. 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche [says rightly]: 
most human beings are transmitting 
machines and not persons. [The] 
influence of one person on another is 
important here. In the courts, [for 
example, there is a] difference between 
cases where one has acted out of 
character under [the] influence of 
another, and where this is not the case. 
 [Der] Fall der Wahlfreiheit [ist 
ein] Phänomen, das in [den] 
Diskussionen [eine] große Rolle 
gespielt hat. [Der] Indeterminismus 
beruft sich darauf. [Der] 
Determinismus [dagegen] sagt: [Das 
scheint] nur so [in Fällen], wo ich [die] 
übrigen Umstände nicht kenne. Wo 
sage ich aber dieses: »Ich hätte 
ebensogut das andere tun können«? 
[Doch nur in Fällen,] wo Neigungen, 
Gründe u. dgl. beinahe gleich [sind]. 
[Dies ist der] Tatbestand der 
Gleichbegründetheit zweier Vorsätze. 
[Hierher gehören die] historischen 
Probleme, wo man [einen] Esel 
zwischen zwei Heubündel setzt. [Der] 
Determinismus läßt hier keine Wahl, 
keine Entscheidung zu. [Es ist] 
bezeichnend, daß man gerade dieses 
Beispiel gewählt hat. Strebungen: [Ein] 
rein strebender Esel würde [tatsächlich] 
 [The] case of free choice [is a] 
phenomenon that has played [a] major 
role in [the] discussions. Indeterminism 
appeals to this. Determinism, [on the 
other hand,] says: [It] only [appears] so 
[in cases] where I do not know [the] 
other circumstances. But where do I 
say: ‘I could just have well have done 
other things’? [Really only in cases] 
where my inclinations, reasons etc., 
{on both sides} [are] nearly the same. 
[This is the] situation of the equally-
foundedness of two resolutions. [Here 
belongs the] historical problem where 
one places [a] donkey between two hay 
bales. Determinism allows no choice, 
no decision here. [It is] indicative that 
one has chosen precisely this example. 
Strivings: a purely striving donkey 
would [it seems] starve. [This is] 
different from [the] case where we do 
something on impulse, out of a sudden 
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verhungern. [Dies ist] etwas anders 
hier als [der] Fall, wo wir etwas aus 
Laune, plötzlicher Regung u. dgl. tun. 
[Es ist aber eine] Fiktion, daß [das] 
Bewußtsein nur strebendes sein kann. 
[Ein] metaphysischer Esel könnte 
verhungern, [ein] wirklicher Esel nicht. 
Hier [ist] überhaupt keine Frage vom 
Willen [wegen der] Verwechslung von 
Streben und Wollen. [Der] Fall vom 
Menschen mit zwei gleichen Motiven 
[ist] aber nichts anderes [als ein] 
fiktiver Fall; unmöglich vorkommend. 
stirring, etc. [But it is a] fiction that 
consciousness can only be striving. [A] 
metaphysical donkey could possibly 
starve; [a] real donkey would not. Here 
there [is] no question of willing at all 
[because of the] confusion between 
striving and willing. [The] case of a 
human being with two equal motives, 
though, [is] nothing but a fictional 
case; one that cannot come about. 
Auch [wäre] hier kein Vorsatz möglich. 
Wirklich spielt sich alles anders ab. Wo 
[das] Hin- und Herschwanken 
langweilig wird und wir uns für eins 
der zwei Projekte entscheiden, ist 
[diese] Entscheidung »frei« von [der] 
Motivation durch eins der zwei, aber 
nicht frei in diesem Sinne [des 
Strebens]. [Der] Determinismus [macht 
sich] oft [dort geltend], wo keine 
vernünftigen Motive [zu finden sind]. 
Was hat [der] Determinismus [aber 
damit] gewonnen? Nichts, [denn nur] 
innerhalb [der] eindeutigen 
Bestimmtheit haben wir [den] 
Unterschied zwischen Freiheit und 
Unfreiheit. 
And here no resolution [would be] 
possible. In reality, it all plays out 
differently. Where vacillating back and 
forth grows tiresome and we decide on 
one of the two projects, [this] decision 
is ‘free’ from motivation by one of the 
two, but not free in this sense [of 
striving]. Determinism often [presents 
itself] where no rational motives are [to 
be found]. [But] what has determinism 
achieved [from this]? Nothing, 
[because only] within univocal 
determinedness do we have the 
difference between freedom and 
unfreedom. 
 Begeisterung über [einen] Wert 
[ist] viel sinnvoller und zentraler als 
[ein] launenhafter Impuls. [Die] 
Stellung der Person zu 
 Enthusiasm concerning [a] 
value [is] much more meaningful and 
central than [a] capricious impulse. 
[The] attitude of the person towards the 
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Stellung der Person zu 
widerstreitenden Projekten kommt nur 
im ersteren Fall zum Vorschein. Wo 
[die] Stellung der Person zum Projekt 
keinen Ausdruck findet, können wir 
davon reden, wir hätten uns anders 
entscheiden können. Freiheit [ist aber] 
mit Unentschiedenheit nicht zu 
verwechseln, [wie] Descartes und 
Malebranche schon [betonten]. Gerade 
diese [hier gegebenen] Beispiele zeigen 
[die] Determiniertheit, obgleich [es] 
beliebte Beispiele des Indeterminismus 
sind. Solche Fälle, wo kein innerer 
Zwiespalt des Ich da ist, [sind] das 
Wichtige im gerichtlichen Sinn. 
Verantwortlichkeit [liegt vor], wo 
[eine] Tat aus [der] persönlichen 
Struktur des Täters [sich] bestimmt. 
[The] attitude of the person towards the 
opposing projects only comes to light 
in the former case. Where [the] stance 
of the person towards the project finds 
no expression, then we can say we 
could have decided differently. [But] 
freedom [is] not to be confused with 
undecidedness, [as] Descartes and 
Malebranche have already [stressed]. 
Precisely the examples [given here] 
indicate determinedness, even though 
they are beloved examples for 
indeterminism. Such cases, where no 
inner conflict occurs within the I, [are] 
the important ones in in the eyes of the 
courts. Responsibility [is present] 
where [a] doing is determined by [the] 
personal structure of the doer. 
 {513}Unter [den] eindeutig 
determinierten Akten finden wir [also] 
Unterschiede der Freiheit und 
Unfreiheit. Erst von hier aus gewinnt 
Freiheit ihren hohen moralischen Wert. 
[Die] meisten Handlungen [sind] in 
diesem Sinne unfrei. An die100 Stelle 
[des] Gegensatzes von 
Indeterminismus und Determinismus 
hat [die] Analyse der persönlichen 
Quellen und Strukturen zu treten. [Das] 
Freiheitsproblem [ist] also schließlich 
auch [ein] Problem der 
Phänomenologie. 
 {513}[So] within [the] univocal 
determinedness of acts we find both 
freedom and unfreedom. Here at last 
freedom achieves its high moral value. 
Most actions [are] in this sense unfree. 
[The] analysis of personal sources and 
structures must take the place of the 
opposition between determinism and 
indeterminism. [The] problem of 
freedom [is] thus ultimately also [a] 
problem for phenomenology. 
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1 Ortmann’s version. In Bell’s text, ‘machen’. 
2 Reinach is referring to the debate in historiography on whether it is desirable (or, in 
fact, possible) for a historian to present only plain, objective facts. 
3  ‘Unvalueful’ here translates ‘Nichtwertvoll’, and refers to a comparative lack of 
value rather than the presence of disvalue (Unwert). 
4 In German there is no linguistic distinction between ‘law’ and ‘right.’ 
‘Rechtsphilosophie’ can also refer to the philosophy of law, and in a sense, it does 
have that meaning here. As the next sentence states, the ‘law’ that is referred to is a 
far wider concept than anything to do with positive law. 
5 The German here is plural, suggesting that there can be multiple ‘rightnesses.’ 
6 The structure of this sentence in fact suggests that ‘right and wrong are only states of 
affairs,’ but Reinach’s usual use of rightness as a predicate of states of affairs (see 
Grundbegriffe) and the fact that he here uses ‘recht und unrecht’ instead of ‘Rechtheit 
und Unrechtheit’, suggest the meaning that has been used here. 
7 Gramatically, ‘Person’ is a feminine noun in German, but in phenomenological terms 
it does not refer to a literal human being and is neither male nor female. For the 
purposes of this translation the abstract person is referred to as ‘she.’ 
8 Ortmann’s version. In Bell’s text, ‘§1’. 
9 The German word Lust as used here can mean either desire or pleasure. 
Idiomatically, this sentence would usually be translated as ‘I want to do that.’ While 
‘Lust’ has been translated as ‘pleasure’ here, its dual meaning is significant. 
10 The verb here could instead be reconstructed as ‘sei’, signifying ‘would be’. This 
would highlight the fact that Reinach is presenting a hedonistic interpretation of this 
hypothetical situation. 
11 Or ‘wisdom,’ or ‘good sense.’ 
12 Reinach explored this line of thought in his earlier Apriori Foundations of the Civil 
Law. One cannot say ‘2+2 ought to equal 5’, because 2+2 can never equal 5; but it is 
also senseless to say ‘2+2 ought to equal 4’ because 2+2 can never not equal 4. In the 
same way here, if no human action is possible that does not seek the greatest 
pleasure, one cannot talk about what one ‘ought’ to do because only one possibility 
exists in each situation. 
13 Ortmann’s version. In Bell’s text, ‘people’ (‘Leute’). 
14 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘Sinnen’. 
15  ‘Zweck’, ‘purpose,’ is to be distinguished from ‘Ziel’, ‘goal’. The purpose of the 
action is ‘that for the sake of which the final goal is willed’ (see below). 
16 Bell notes, ‘Reinach weiß nur einen Fall.’ (‘Reinach knows only one case.’) 
17 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘seine Meinung’. 
18 Reinach’s point here is a psychologist wanting to study pleasure might first need to 
induce an experience of pleasure in an experimental subject. This is one of very few 
cases where a person might perform an action for the purpose of creating pleasure (as 
opposed to performing it for a different purpose and taking pleasure in the outcome). 
19 Or the desire for pleasure. The German ‘Lust’ has a dual meaning as ‘pleasure’ and 
‘desire.’ 
20 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, “vs.”. 
21 This is to be distinguised from Reinach’s ‘Forderung’, the inwardly-experienced 
demand to carry out an action based on its value. Here, the situation is one where we 
would say colloquially that the subject ‘has no choice’. As the next sentence suggests 
however, inaction is always a possible choice. 
22  ‘Verschiebung’ denotes a movement with negative connotations, a change in position 
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that is somehow wrong. This may also be an error in the text; the very similar word 
‘Vorschieben’ would mean an advancement or promotion, which may be what is 
meant in context. However, ‘verschieben’ also appears later in the text. 
23 Or ‘greatness’ in a more abstract sense. 
24  ‘Sachen’ and ‘sachlich’ carry connotations of objective reality here. The egoist’s 
distorted perspective does not allow him to experience values as they truly are. 
25 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘Vorschub’. 
26  ‘Außersachlichkeit’. ‘Sachlich’, ‘factual’, refers to regard for actual felt value. 
27 Bell and Ortmann here note the date as July 22, 1913. 
28  ‘Sachlich Gerichtetsein’, that is, an attitude in which one is directed towards the 
objective, including values. This refers back to Reinach’s first case in the previous 
paragraph; action based on values, even if one’s grasping of them is limited, is never 
egoism or altruism by his definitions. 
29 Reinach’s meaning here is not clear. ‘Alter’ translates from German as age, seniority 
or an age group. In Latin it refers to otherness, which, given the unusual reference to 
‘ego’ here, appears to be what is meant. In other words, the value (which for Reinach 
is outside the subject) would here take precedence over the subject’s ego, thus 
directly opposing egoism. 
30 Not to be confused with ‘ressentiment’ (see below). 
31 The French term ressentiment does not translate easily into English or German, and 
was used in this form by Nietzsche and Scheler. Here, it refers to a process where 
someone at first recognises the value in something that he knows he can never have. 
To lessen the emotional pain of this separation, his perception of the thing’s value 
becomes twisted until he no longer wants it. 
32 The singular ‘ist’ is used, even though two things seem to be being referred to, 
suggesting ‘are.’ 
33 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘davon daraus’. 
34  ‘Einsicht’ refers to an insight rather than an intuition, but there is no direct English 
translation for ‘einsichtig’ in this sense. 
35 ‘Ausbreitung’ translates as ‘extent’, ‘spread’ or ‘distribution’. Reinach seems to be 
using it to refer to the extent to which an emotion ‘fills’ the I, possibly to the number 
of different layers of the I that are ‘seized’. 
36 Ortmann’s version. In Bell’s text, ‘selbst Pessimist ist so’. 
37 Literally, ‘statements’; this refers back to the ‘empirical connections’ described in the 
previous sentence. 
38 Bell has an incomplete note here: ‘Diese tragen uns bis auf… ’ 
39 Bell traces this reference to Wilhelm Wundt’s Ethik: ‘Mit diesem Namen wollen wir 
die allgemeine Erfahrung bezeichnen, daß in dem gesamten Umfang menschlicher 
Willensvorgänge die Wirkungen der Handlungen mehr oder weniger über die 
ursprünglichen Willensmotive hinausreichen, so daß hierdurch für künftige 
Handlungen neue Motive entstehen [… ] Der Zusammenhang einer Zweckreihe [… ] 
wird wesentlich dadurch vermittelt, daß infolge nie fehlender Nebeneinflüße der 
Effekt einer Handlung sich mit der im Motiv gelegenen Zweckvorstellung im 
allgemeinen nicht deckt.’ (Wundt, Ethik I (1912), p. 284f.) 
‘By this name we wish to indicate the general experience that, in the whole extent of 
human processes of volition, the effects of action more or less go beyond the original 
motive of volition, so that in this way, motives for future actions originate. [… ] The 
systematic connection amongst a series of purposes [… ] is essentially mediated by 
the fact that, as a result of never- absent secondary influences, the effect of an action 
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is not, in general, covered by the presentation of purpose laid down in the motive.’ 
40 Ortmann’s version. In Bell’s text, ‘Gefühle’. 
41 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘Akte hält’. 
42 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘an’. 
43 The editorial note seems to go too far here, confusing the meaning of the sentence. 
The utilitarian is a consequentialist; as the rest of the paragraph indicates, the 
consequences of the action are what is morally relevant from a utilitarian point of 
view. If the words ‘for the utilitarians’ are removed, the sentence makes more sense. 
44 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘ist’. 
45 Ortmann’s version. In Bell’s text, ‘(intrinsically) wichtiger’. 
46 Literally ‘the soul-ish distribution… ’ 
47 Editors’ version. In Ortmann’s text, ‘hat’. 
48 Bell and Ortmann here note the date as July 24, 1913. 
49 Ortmann’s version. In Bell’s text, ‘derselben’. 
50  ‘Moralisch’ rather than ‘sittlich’. Reinach may wish to emphasise that he is 
borrowing a word from Hutcheson’s vocabulary here. 
51 Editors’ version. Bell abbreviated this to ‘H.’, and later (apparently erroneously) 
completed it as ‘Hedonismus’. 
52 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘zuerst’. 
53 Here, ‘Moral’ rather than ‘Sittlichkeit’. 
54 This ‘moral law’ (‘Gesetz’) is not to be confused with ‘the law’ (Recht). 
55 Literally ‘legality’. 
56 Literally ‘for the want of itself’. 
57 Ortmann’s version. In Bell’s text, ‘nur darunter’. 
58 Bell notes here, ‘Alle sittlichen Menschen sind so.’ (‘All moral human beings are 
thus.’) 
59 Editors’ version. In Ortmann’s text, ‘Aber’. 
60 Ortmann’s version. In Bell’s text, ‘Diese’, suggesting the personal structure. 
61 This text predates Reinach’s religious conversion in 1916. This appears to be an early 
sign of Reinach’s interest in Protestantism. 
62 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘sich fügt’. 
63 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘sollte sich’. 
64 ‘In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant says that if a man contemplates keeping a 
deposit left for him for which no receipt was asked or given, he can consider whether 
“everyone may deny a deposit of which no one can produce a proof” could become a 
universal law. It could not, “because the result would be that there would be no 
deposits”.’ H.B. Acton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 
22-3. 
65 Reinach may be referencing a criticism of Kant made by Hegel here. ‘In an essay 
entitled On the Scientific Treatment of Natural Law, Hegel says that all that Kant’s 
argument shows is that a system without deposits is contradicted by a system with 
deposits, but not that there is any contradiction in a system without deposits.’ Acton, 
Kant’s Moral Philosophy, p. 24. 
66 ‘Richtig’, as opposed to ‘recht’, ‘right’. 
67 ‘Inhaltlich’, literally ‘content-like’ or ‘having content’. 
68 Bell and Ortmann here note the date as July 29, 1913. 
69 In this context, a person who abuses the law by following its letter rather than its 
spirit. 
70 Bell notes here, ‘Ersten zwei schon behandelt.’ (‘First two already treated of.’) 
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71 Here Reinach quotes from Lipps, Die ethischen Grundfragen, p. 55. 
72 Editors’ version. In Ortmann’s text, ‘von’. 
73 Literally, ‘consciousness of power’ or of ‘might’. 
74 As introduced by Reinach in Grundbegriffe der Ethik. 
75 Literally, ‘the oppositing of empirical —  formal is not justified.’ 
76 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘so ist’. 
77  ‘… tut nichts dazu’ is the editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘daß du dich intest ?’ (the 
last word was found to be illegible by the editors). 
78 Bell notes here, ‘Weshalb ist anderes auch relevant? Wie nicht da gelassen, wo wir 
sie finden?’ (‘Why is anything else relevant, anyway? Why not leave it where we 
find it?’). 
79 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘Sorte’. 
80 That is, the fact that we can be deceived indicates the degree to which we take these 
experiences for granted. 
81 Here, ‘Gefühl’ rather than ‘Fühlen’. This is inconsistent with Reinach’s usual usage 
of the terms; ‘the emotion of value’ does not make sense here. 
82 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘darüber’. 
83 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘zum’. 
84 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘auf’. 
85 Literally ‘rubrication’, placement under a rubric. 
86 Bell and Ortmann here note the date as July 31, 1913. 
87 Literally, ‘is absent even with the will’. 
88 Or ‘influences’. 
89 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘hier erst eine’. 
90 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘als willenslose’. 
91 That is, at the mercy of strivings. 
92 Editors’ version. In Ortmann’s text, ‘vor’. 
93 In contrast with willing, which in the present context signifies that something is 
willed. In an act of judgement, the subject does not will (want) anything to occur or 
to be. 
94 ‘Aufforderung’ means a call to do something; an informal ‘request’ or a formal 
‘requirement’. Though it is described as being heard (‘hört’), this is not necessarily a 
literal hearing. 
95 Reinach’s reference here is to the classic metaphor of balls (usually billiard balls) 
striking and setting one another in motion. 
96 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘ob’. 
97 Editors’ version. In Ortmann’s text, ‘erstes Freiheitsproblem’. 
98 Bell’s version. In Ortmann’s text, ‘lebt sich das Ich’. 
99 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘Bestimmungen’. 
100 Editors’ version. In Bell’s text, ‘seine’. 
